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   Table of Contents
Title Page
Introduction
About This Book
Where Are We Going? Wallace Sampson
The Dawning of Friends of Science in Medicine (FSM) | J Dwyer
ETHICS, CAM and SBM
Conflicts of interest in science-based medicine. David Gorski
Conflict of Interest in Medical Research. Steven Novella
Conflicts of Interest. Harriet Hall.
Corporate pharma ethics and you. David J Kroll.
The Ethics of Deception in Medicine Steven Novella 
Is it ethical to sell complementary and alternative medicine? | S Gavura
Placebos as Medicine: The Ethics of Homeopathy. Scott Gavura 
Should placebos be used in randomized controlled trials of surgical interventions? | D Gorski
The Ethics of CAM: More Harm than Good? | H Hall
The Ethics of Prescribing Worthless Treatments | S Novella
Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 1: Tu Quoque and History Kimball Atwood
Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 2: Tu Quoque and History Kimball Atwood
Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 3: Tu Quoque and History Kimball Atwood
Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 4: Tu Quoque and History Kimball Atwood
Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 5: Tu Quoque and History Kimball Atwood
The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part I). Kimball Atwood
The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part II). Kimball Atwood
The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part III). Kimball Atwood 
The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part IV). Kimball Atwood
The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part V). Kimball Atwood
The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part V). Kimball Atwood
The “Gonzalez Trial” for Pancreatic Cancer: Outcome Revealed. Kimball Atwood
Evidence-Based Medicine, Human Studies Ethics, and the ‘Gonzalez Regimen’: a Disappointing Editorial in the Journal of Clinical Oncology Part 1. Kimball Atwood.
Evidence-Based Medicine, Human Studies Ethics, and the ‘Gonzalez Regimen’: a Disappointing Editorial in the Journal of Clinical Oncology Part 2. Kimball Atwood.
Of the Trial to Assess Chelation Therapy, Bayes, the NIH, and Human Studies Ethics | K Atwood
The Nuances of Informed Consent | S Novella
Informed Consent and CAM: Truth Not Optional | J Bellamy
True Informed Consent Is Elusive | H Hall
Ethics in human experimentation in science-based medicine. David Gorski.
Human subjects protections and research ethics: Where the rubber hits the road for science-based medicine. David Gorski
Did Facebook and PNAS violate human research protections in an unethical experiment? | D Gorski
Is Homeopathy Unethical? | H Hall
Is the use of “Open-Label” Placebo Ethical in the Treatment of Children? | C Jones
Does alternative medicine have alternative ethics? Peter Lipson
Followup: Benedetti on Placebo Ethics | H Hall
Selling complementary and alternative medicine: An business ethics perspective | S Gavura
When doctors betray their patients and science-based medicine for money | D Gorski
Ethical Failures | M Crislip
When urgency to cure beats research ethics, bad things happen | D Gorski
Dr. Marty Makary Was Paid $130,357 By Pharma. Is His “Undue Influence” Affecting the FDA? | J Howard
The Truth? | M Crislip
The Guatemala syphilis experiment and medical ethics in science-based medicine. David Gorski.
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Case Study Exploring the Battle Lines of Science Based Medicine. Joseph Albietz
How SHOULD We Discuss Quackery with Innocents and the Not-so-Innocent? Kimball Atwood 
When science- and evidence-based guidelines conflict with patient wishes: What’s a doc to do? | D Gorski
Should the Incidental Discovery of Nonparentage be Disclosed? | D Gorski
Beyond Informed Consent: Shared Decision-Making | H Hall
Patient Participation in Decision-Making | S Novella
Paternalism Revisited. Harriet Hall 
Animal rights terrorists endanger science-based medicine David Gorski 
Bad scientific arguments in the service of animal rights activism. David Gorski
A Foolish Consistency. Mark Crislip
Antiscience-Based Medicine in South Africa. Steven Novella 
Doctors Shouldn’t Legitimize Pro-Tobacco, Child-Labor Advocates | J. Howard
The Ethics of Artificial Brains | S Novella
When healing turns into killing: religious and philosophical exemptions from parental accountability | J Bellamy
Anti-vaccine warriors vs. research ethics. David Gorski.
Every accusation is a confession (or a statement of intent): MAHA’s new Tuskegee experiment | D Gorski
Does society try to shame and shun vaccine refusers and the vaccine-averse? | D Gorski
Treating the Unvaccinated | S Novella
Is Firing Vaccine-Hesitant Families Unfair? Definitely…I think. | C Jones
Would you pay $1 million to enroll in a phase 1 clinical trial of an “anti-aging” gene therapy? | D Gorski
Update on neglect cases | S Gavura
The Ethics of Involuntary Pediatric Drug Testing | C Jones
Stem Cell Therapy and the Need for Transparency. Steven Novella
Tightening Gene Editing Rules for Humans | S Novella
CRISPR and the Ethics of Gene Editing | S Novella
Faith Healing: Religious Freedom vs. Child Protection | H Hall
A Request for Founders of Sensible Medicine: Teach Us Why it Was Ethical to Profit from Pro-Kennedy Propaganda. We All Have So Much to Learn From Your Glorious Nuance. | J Howard
   
Science-Based Medicine Reviews: Ethics, Law, Politics, Media and CAM
A Critical Guide for the Health Practitioner and Consumer 
2025 Edition

Executive Editor Steven Novella MD
Managing Editor David Gorski MD PhD
Series Editor Mark Crislip MD

   Introduction 
Steven Novella
The world of health care is becoming an increasingly complex and challenging place. The internet is changing the way we generate and access information, and health information is one of the most popular uses of the internet. It represents an unprecedented democratization of information and opinion. 
While there are many advantages and benefits to such information access, there are also many challenges to health professionals, regulators, academics, and consumers. There is a proliferation of health related products and services, with many provocative health claims. Regulations are generally not keeping up, and often have been watered down, in the face of this onslaught of claims and products. 
The consumer is left with an overwhelming array of health claims, many of which challenge and even directly oppose the traditional experts and institutions. 
The mission of Science-Based Medicine (SBM) is to be a source of reliable information and analysis to help navigate the wild west of health information on the internet and elsewhere. The authors who contribute to this series of e-books are all physicians and other health care professionals who have a great deal of experience educating the public about complex medical issues. We especially take on controversial issues and try to expose pseudoscience and fraud wherever possible.
The Philosophy of Science-Based Medicine
The philosophy of SBM, at its core, is simple: Safe and effective health care is critical to everyone’s quality of life; so much so that it is generally considered a basic human right. Therefore, health care products and services that work and are safe are better than those that do not work or are unsafe. 
The best method for determining which interventions and health products are safe and effective is, without question, good science. Therefore it is in everyone’s best interest for health care to be systematically evaluated by the best science available.
Too often the nature of science itself is misunderstood or misrepresented to the public. Science is not an arcane and privileged discipline. By its very nature it is meant to be transparent and public. Science is nothing more than a systematic and careful use of evidence and logic to evaluate factual claims. And good science possesses certain virtues that are not unique to science but generic to all intellectual endeavors: fairly accounting for all available evidence, using valid and internally consistent logic, using unambiguous concepts and language, proper use of statistics, being quantitatively precise and accurate, and above all being honest.
And yet there are numerous and powerful influences in society that strongly appose the scientific basis of medicine. Driven by some combination of ideology or the desire for profit they wish to eliminate standards of science in health care, or (often under the guise of “health care freedom”) create a double standard in which unscientific methods and products can thrive unchecked. Others simply lack the training or knowledge to achieve minimal standards of quality for scientific medicine. And even the best traditions of scientific medicine can benefit from more critical analysis.
Recognition of the need for careful scientific analysis in medicine partly stems from a recognition that it is very difficult (almost impossible) to reliably assess treatments anecdotally. Human perception, memory, and cognition are prone to a host of flaws, weaknesses, and biases that will tend to mislead us, especially towards conclusions that we wish to be true. Placebo effects, confirmation bias, and simple statistics can make any intervention seem effective, even when they are worthless or harmful. 
Science-Based Medicine vs Evidence-Based Medicine
Within the practice of medicine there is already a recognition of the need to raise the standards of evidence and the availability of the best evidence to the practitioner and the consumer – formalized in the movement known as evidence-based medicine (EBM). 
EBM is a vital and positive influence on the practice of medicine, but it has its limitations. EBM tends to focus on clinical trial results to the exclusion of scientific plausibility. The focus on trial results (which, in the EBM lexicon, is what is meant by “evidence”) has its utility, but fails to properly deal with medical modalities that are highly implausible, or seem to defy well-established findings in science.
All of science describes the same reality, and therefore it must (if it is functioning properly) all be mutually compatible. Collectively, science builds one cumulative model of the natural world. This means we can make rational judgments about what is likely to be true based upon what is already well established. This does not necessarily equate to rejecting new ideas out-of-hand, but rather to adjusting the threshold of evidence required to establish a new claim based upon the prior scientific plausibility of the new claim. Failure to do so leads to conclusions and recommendations that are not reliable, and therefore medical practices that are probably not safe and effective.
The SBM Series
This is why the authors of this series strongly advocate for science based medicine – the use of the best scientific evidence available, in the light of our cumulative scientific knowledge from all relevant disciplines, in evaluating health claims, practices, and products. 
Some of the articles here will analyze individual studies, and explore the strengths and weaknesses of their methods, separating what the study really tells us from how it may be represented in the media. Other articles will summarize what many studies tell us about a specific medical question. 
We will also explore health information on the internet, separating out which information is reliable from that which is misleading, erroneous, or possibly even fraudulent. Likewise we will critique mainstream media coverage of health topics, giving the reader specific tools for to critically analyze health information for themselves.
Other articles will explore topics related to health regulation and academia. Regulations have struggled to keep up with the rapidly changing health care market place, with critical gaps that leave the health care consumer responsible for their own protection. Academic institutions themselves, long the defenders of high standards of scholarship in all fields, including medicine, have been infiltrated by promoters of pseudoscientific belief systems. The result is that there is no longer any single reliable guarantee of scientific integrity. 
The SBM series of e-books is organized by topic, such as acupuncture, chiropractic, homeopathy, and many others. The books are collections of essays, not intended to be a systematic reference, but rather to explore the various scientific issues related to each topic. The goal is to give the reader critical thinking skills and a deeper understanding of, not just the current findings of science, but the process of science, specifically how it relates to health care and the topic of each book. 
Science-based medicine can serve as your pocket guide through the wilderness of health information.

As of 2025, there are over 5000 essays on the Science Based Medicine website. I do no know about you, but I find it difficult to find any post I wrote, much less one written by another contributor. 

So I have updated the books and include almost all the articles through 2025. The volumes are

CAM Concepts
Chiropractic
COVID 
Critical Thinking
Diet and Nutrition
Ethics and CAM
Herbs, Supplements, and Diet
Homeopathy
Infections and Immunity
Law and CAM
Media and Internet
Medicine, Public Health, Dentistry and Pediatrics
Miscellaneous CAM
Naturopathy
Neurology and Psychiatry
Placebo
Quackademic Medicine
Regulation. FDA and FTC
SBM or EBM
Stem Cells, Genetics, AI and Gender
Supplements, Vitamins and Herbs
Vaccine & Anivax
Vaccines and Autism
Vaccines and Preventable Infections

The articles are roughly organized by publication date and topic. Many articles will be in multiple volumes as an essay of, for example, chiropractic and law will be found in both the chiropractic volume and the law volume.

You may find the organization a bit odd. I do. But 4700 plus articles are difficult to organize and I have more to do in my retirement than work of these volumes.

Still, if you find I have missed a nentry or some glaring error, drop me a note and I will fix it for the next edition.

About the authors
Steven P. Novella, MD – Founder and Executive Editor Science Based Medicine.
Founder and currently Executive Editor of Science-Based Medicine Steven Novella, MD.
David H. Gorski, MD, PhD – Managing Editor. Science Based Medicine.
Mark A. Crislip, MD. Editor, Science Based Medicine Guides. 
He did he editing of all the volumes so is to blame for any mistakes.
As to all the other contributors, if you are interested click on the ‘Link’ at top of each essay to go the SBM site, where further information about each author can be found.
A Note On References

The chapters in this book were originally blog entries at ScienceBasedMedicine.org.
Blog and web pages lend themselves to hyperlinks to sources and references that are tedious to translate into footnotes for this ebook.
Under the title of each essay is a hyperlink, cleverly titled ‘Link’, to the original blog entry with all the hyperlinks and references, as well as the comments to the blogs, which often have interesting and thoughtful insights by our readers, as well as some curious comments by the not so thoughtful.
Graphs, tables and links to videos are not in included these essays due to issues of copyright and permission. However, thanks to the ‘Link’, the graphics are a click away.
Thanks for reading the site.
Mark Crislip 




   Where Are We Going?
Wallace Sampson
Link
Where is it all headed? Medicine on another threshold. Allow me to present several previously unconnected news articles that illuminate the serious problem we face in today’s increasingly scientifically rootless world.
Who are scientific medicine’s friends; on whom can we rely for support of reason and common sense, unbiased approaches to funding, unbiased efficacy evaluation, fair law enforcement, and a return to the logical world of decades ago? The private insurance industry is taking it in the gut, while Pharma receives the repeated jabs. Corrupt administrations run off with hundreds of millions, inadequately punished for the degree of misbehavior. Academicians, no longer squeaky clean, unwilling to keep house on big-money grant recipients while tolerating massive private consulting fees. Schools infiltrated by mindless relativism satisfy the lowest academic levels despite the revolutionary changes in biology and massive knowledge base new MDs have to apply.
Just in 2 weeks a number of seemingly unrelated developments in the news got one to thinkin’, …there aren’t any to trust anymore. The government agencies are just as bad. Start with the FDA. Steve Barrett’s Consumer Health Digest Quackwatch.com has been trying to reassess the status of one or more quackery proponents and practitioners. One of his routes is the examination of FDA records of enforcement and warning letters to violators. From CHD of 3/11/08:
FDA “hides” old warning letters. The FDA Web site has made several changes that greatly decrease the visibility of warning letters about products and safety violations. Letters issued before January 2007 have been moved into a new directory so that all incoming links to them from other sites have been broken. This directory is also coded so that search engines cannot index its contents. Searching for warning letters on the FDA site is difficult because (a) the newer and older letters have to be searched separately, (b) the search page for pre-2007 pages in not easy to find. (c) letters are moved to the archive folder at irregular intervals, and (d) many of the older letters are in PDF format, which means that they will be found only if the searcher uses specific keywords. The agency as become extremely slow in responding to Freedom of Information Act requests. In August 2005, Dr. Barrett asked for a document related to a warning letter. If one exists, finding it would take only a few minutes. Barrett’s Congressman has asked twice for the document, and FDA staff members have phoned Barrett four times during the past year to find out whether he still wants it. But it still has not come. Bloomberg News has reported that in May 2007, the agency had 20,365 unfilled requests, including 1,924 that were more than three years old and that the the number of workers filling requests has been cut even though the backlog had been steadily rising. [Blum J. Drug, food risks stay secret as inquiries to U.S. FDA pile up. Bloomberg News, June 19, 2007]
It took Steve Barrett a year to get his requested information. Is this under-funding, incompetence, or intentional indifference to public exposure of misdeeds? FDA people have complained of under-funding and staffing since the DSHEA Act of 1994. Sen. Hatch maintains FDA has enough. The system seems poorly organized – to say the least. Last week I received this article from the AHIP Solutions SmartBrief , a health insurance industry newsletter, titled Senate seeks $375 million more for FDA:
The Senate passed a budget resolution Friday that includes an additional $375 million for the FDA ‘to close the glaring gaps in food and drug safety,’ said Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., who pressed for the new funding. The proposed 20% increase might face opposition from critics, including Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., who says the FDA “doesn’t have the infrastructure to carry out its mission.
The summary was of this New York Times article. It was more complete and brought in party politics, with a threat of a veto of any bill increasing FDA appropriation. How come? GW may not have any direct interest in the matter, but Senators Hatch and Harkin, who control NIH and FDA funding, certainly do. One can only speculate on the pressures – they do and do not cross party lines. The article also reviewed the proposed stationing of FDA reps in various Chinese cities to monitor the impure and adulterated pharmaceutical precursors originating there (30-50 percent of US products.) How do they plan to monitor or analyze the massive trade in products with 10-20 offices in China?
Then I received this note from Carl Bartecchi, MD of the U. of Colorado about this deal, the request for Federal funding of acupuncture and homeopathy studies on war injuries. It’s getting really bad, said Dr. Bartecchi, who had also seen an article in the Hawaiian paper in August 25, 2002: The article headed: “Pentagon should consider alternative battlefield medicine” by Pat Linton and Dr. Wayne B. Jonas. Dr. Bartecchi reported the article to the former Air Force Surgeon General, who said that he didn’t know anything about it but would look into it. But the matter was apparently dropped.
Jonas, former Director of the National Center for Complementary/ Alternative Medicine and his sponsor, Samueli Institute have already received two separate grants from the Army and Air Force, each for $1 – 2 million. Samueli is the ultra-wealthy “CAM” support foundation funding the UC Irvine “CAM” group and its research. Samuelis are the people who developed the broadband.
The NCCAM and other NIH people have exceeded the $1 billion mark for research, now fund school training programs also, as their former employees are feeding and sucking from every government supported agency they can, sometimes via “earmarks.”
Then Consumer Health Digest reported on the policy of the American College of Physicians supporting the “Single Payer” proposal for funding all US medical care (other than Medicare and Medicaid.) That would be a Federal administered fund, supposedly privately administered locally. Every month or so I receive requests from ACP national office to write congress people not to REDUCE Medicare allowances for physicians. I have not seen an ACP attempt to reconcile these two opposing policies. Government plans have been compared to lobster traps – easy in, but hard to get out of. Ever see a tax supported plan that was not controlled by some governmental force?
As bad as the present private insurance system is, with lax laws and worse enforcement, does anyone around have experience dealing with the two Federal Medical systems now in place? Is any physician truly satisfied? Private docs out here do not see Medicaid patients and have left the Medicare system by hundreds to thousands. Reimbursement is below expense for Medicaid and barely equal to expense for Medi-Care. Raise hands those who can see a Federally funded single payer plan working better than the British, Canadian, or US Fed systems. Could it work if the system were as under-funded as much as FDA with equivalent lax enforcement of rip-off artists?
And finally, pseudoscience medicine will at last meet rational medicine on the field of economics as all players will be treated as professional equals, and “alternative” methods will be reimbursed while “cost-ineffective” scientific methods will not be because there is a voting bloc for the former.
Rational scientific physicians, as hard as it will be to find them, will no longer be in charge. It’s happened already in EBM, as physiology and rationality have given way to RCTs, and their reviews as Kim Atwood has pointed out. And it is happening in med school faculties and teaching, as we all have noted. Anyone got a solution (greater than 60X?)

The Dawning of Friends of Science in Medicine (FSM)
For over 10 years, Friends of Science in Medicine has been fighting quackery, fraud, and pseudoscience in Australia.
John Dwyer on December 4, 2021

The Australian anti-quackery group “Friends of Science in Medicine” was founded in 2011. Since that time, it has been advocating, with some success and the occasional setback, for improved consumer protection and more awareness of the nonsense that makes up complementary and alternative medicine. With this post we provide a short history of our organization and some of our key activities.
Before FSM…

In the early 80’s, I cared for many patients with ‘Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome’ (AIDS), for which we had no cure. As an immunologist, I was angry that so many were promised expensive cures by ‘alternative practitioners’.
That stimulated my interest in health care fraud. In 2003, the New South Wales Health Minister asked me to chair a relevant committee. This ‘politically correct’ committee of practitioners of non-evidence based care ran for more than a year. Consensus, in this most scientific of ages, was impossible.

With inadequate legislative protection of consumers, occasional outbursts by individuals might generate publicity for 24 hours but changed nothing. One exception was former computer professional, Loretta Marron, in Queensland. After a health scare when she saw first-hand the exploitation by ‘alternative’ practitioners, she set about exposing fraud. A skilled user of the media, her ‘stunts’ proved effective. She became the ‘Jelly Bean Lady’ after using jelly beans to test ‘therapeutic’ magnetised mattress underlays. She substituted jelly beans in one of the underlays and had participants use a magnetism-detecting meter. They were not able to tell which had the magnets.

In 2011, Loretta and some senior academics became concerned that some Australian universities were giving credibility to non-evidence-based practices. She introduced me to Professor Alastair MacLennan, a respected obstetrician countering false information about cerebral palsy and Professor Rob Morrison, a highly effective science communicator. Also concerned was Professor Marcello Costa, renowned neuroscientist and member of the Australian Academy of Science. Costa had been educating the public, especially concerning neuroscience and acupuncture.
Australian Skeptics, also concerned about universities teaching pseudoscience, produced a list of such courses. RMIT in Melbourne was promoting ‘Energy Healing’. At ‘Open days’, staff teaching Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) gave participants an earring which they claimed, if placed strategically, could prevent and treat depression.
Southern Cross University, whose foundation Chair of Science was a ‘Healing Touch’ practitioner, was training homeopaths, running an on-site clinic. Other universities offering courses in Chiropractic were exposing students to ‘subluxation theory’, claiming that running up and down our spines is an invisible energy that was essential for health, and that all illnesses result from distortions of the bony anatomy (subluxation) interfering with this energy. Even though invisible with our latest imaging, this energy can be corrected by manipulating the spine. Many were manipulating the cervical spines of infants and offering pregnancy care, including the ‘Webster technique‘ which could safely turn breech babies. None of this is evidence based.
In 2011, we learnt that the Central Queensland University was proposing a Bachelor degree in Chiropractic. Voicing our concerns about giving credibility to ‘pseudo-sciences’, we wrote to the university’s leadership urging them to abandon that lucrative initiative. We were ignored.
The birth of FSM
Brought together by Loretta Marron, we recognised that a formal organisation, with medical and scientific leaders collectively promoting the importance of “credible scientific evidence underpinning the provision of health care in Australia”, might be more effective. In 2011, we launched Friends of Science in Medicine (FSM) with Loretta Marron as foundation CEO, attracting 1,000 members within a few months.
Ten years later, FSM is well established and respected by those we would wish to respect us and loathed by many who feel threatened.
Soon realising that consumer protection from health care fraud was inadequate, we approached the two major government agencies ‘protecting’ consumers, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) and the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA).
AHPRA
AHPRA regulates health care provision via 15 standard-setting Boards. The inadequate ‘National Law‘ governing it allows Boards to determine what their registrants may advertise, but not what they do!
At a meeting with AHPRA executives (none of them are health professionals or scientists) and members of the Chiropractic Board, we found that Chiropractic Board members included some advertising and practising pseudoscience. This flaw, where Board members flout the standards required by the National Law, also pertains on the Osteopathy and Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) Boards.
Our diligent CEO developed a modus operandi. We ‘bombarded’ AHPRA and the Chiropractic Board with hundreds of practitioners’ websites’ false claims. All needed investigation, overburdening the few AHPRA staff. Over the next few years, we provided hundreds of examples of fraudulent advertising by osteopaths and TCM practitioners.
We achieved a major reform when the deluge led AHPRA to appoint a senior executive to oversee them. Complaints about advertising led to registrants being required to respond within six weeks, stating remedial action taken. Although positive, it could not change what a practitioner might actually do.
Chiropractic
Pestered by FSM, the Chiropractic Board eventually informed chiropractors that they were not to offer pregnancy care and could not claim to be ‘specialists’ in any given area of health care. More recently, some States have forbidden them from manipulating young childrens’ necks. Yet a majority of chiropractors still offers interventions based on correcting the invisible ‘subluxations’.
Acupuncture

FSM soon turned its attention to the acupuncture scam. Marcello Costa’s neuroscience expertise was invaluable. Most acupuncture is offered by TCM practitioners, but a number of registered doctors and physiotherapists offer it. Credibility had been provided by the WHO’s listing some 160 diseases/problems proven to respond. The underpinning theory is nonsense (i.e. not science). No well-performed studies prove that acupuncture can alter any pathology. It has been called “the perfect theatrical placebo”.
The WHO’s list of benefits, supplied by Chinese doctors, had been accepted without questions. After FSM approached the WHO, and with no little wrangling, the WHO removed the recommendations, replacing them with plans for further study of the evidence before a new list would be provided. FSM met the Chair and members of the TCM Board and AHPRA executives. The latter seemed content with the Board’s refusal to challenge their members; their explanation was that research was proceeding.
Osteopathy
A note for our American readers: Osteopaths in America are just physicians, receiving essentially the same training as an MD, while outside of America the profession is as unscientific as chiropractic or homeopathy.
We tackled the Osteopathy Board. Two particularly objectionable techniques are ‘Osteopathy of the cranial field‘ (OCF) and ‘Visceral manipulation‘. Osteopaths claim to feel, through the skull bones, pulsations of the brain’s cerebrospinal fluid. This alerts them to disease treatable by manipulating the skull bones. The truth is that the fluid does not pulsate and that the skull bones of an adult cannot be moved.
With ‘visceral manipulation’, osteopaths palpate the abdominal organs and send healing vibrations in different directions to treat diseases outside the abdominal cavity – frankly ridiculous.
When we met some members of the Board, including the Chairman, we noted that her own website advertised OCF. She promised that the Board would look at advising practitioners not to use this technique. No action resulted. As of today’s writing, her website still offers OCF.
Nursing and midwifery
In 2013, FSM welcomed experienced nurse, Joanne Benhamu, to the Board. She was particularly concerned about the growing ‘anti-vax’ movement and nurses’ role in championing evidence-based care. We complained to the Midwifery Board when it declared that midwives, as part of their Continuing Professional Development requirements, could get points for studying reflexology!
We got no traction from that Board when objecting to some midwives’ claim that they could turn a breech baby by placing crystals around a patient’s bed!
The TGA
Pursuing our advocacy, we soon discovered that the Therapeutic Goods Agency, ostensibly a natural partner in our mission, was anything but! Ensuring the safety of medicines, supplements claiming a health benefit and equipment used for therapeutic purposes is their responsibility. The TGA, however, is funded by the very companies whose products it regulates. This critical conflict of interest weakens the agency’s efforts to protect consumers.
The TGA tells manufacturers that claims for their products must be supported by credible science. In registering a product, they do not have to provide proof, but have such available for a random audit. We discovered that few claims are checked and that, on average, the required evidence is absent in 70%-80% of cases.
When FSM first engaged with the TGA about fraudulent advertising of medicines and ‘instruments’ for which therapeutic benefit was claimed, the TGA had an independent committee to review advertising. Though we found problems with the process, we could see benefits. The TGA has, in recent years after industry pressure, dispensed with that committee.
We were particularly disturbed by products offering ‘Bioresonance’. Ten minutes’ study of the claims should have seen the TGA ban the use of these products. It took some years until our CEO’s persistent badgering eventually saw such products de-listed.
Where is FSM now?
Studying problems of consumer protection and the TGA, we learnt much from Professor Ken Harvey, an outstanding public health advocate in Melbourne. With unmatched knowledge of all things TGA, he is an effective, vocal critic of its deficiencies. In 2014, he resigned from LaTrobe University when it accepted millions of ‘research’ dollars from Suisse Wellness to prove that their products worked as claimed! The mutual respect which developed paid enormous dividends when he agreed to succeed me as President of FSM.
As we reach our ten-year anniversary, FSM is well respected by sister organisations in the US, UK, and Canada. Australian media frequently consult us. No other Australian organisation is organised to champion evidence-based medicine and to expose health care fraud.
The legislative landscape, protecting consumers poorly, needs urgent overhaul. Hindering this, to be blunt, is the powerful, very profitable ‘alternative’ industry which influences political parties and governments’ decisions. There is no effective protection from the myriad of registered health professionals offering unscientific, often dangerous, advice. Even the nation’s pharmacists, schooled to appreciate and practise evidence-based care, have let profits from the sale of non-evidence-based products diminish their professionalism.
As foundation President of FSM, I am proud of what our organisation has achieved. I have no doubt that the current committed and talented executives will continue to work with our membership to tackle many of the continuing issues which deny so many Australians the benefit of the best that scientific medicine has to offer.
If you have taken the time to read this FSM story, I encourage you to join, at no cost, and support our important, continuing struggle.
FSM 2021
    • President: Assoc. Prof. Ken Harvey AM, MBBS, FRCPA, School of Public Health and Preventative Medicine, Monash University.
    • Vice-President: Prof Paul Rolan MBBS, MD, FRACP, FFPM(UK), FFPMANZCA, Director Innovation, Health and Medical Sciences Faculty Office, Adelaide University.
    • Chief Executive Officer and Secretary: Loretta Marron OAM, BSc, AssocDip(Bus), AAII, MACS.
    • Treasurer and Public Officer: Prof Hubertus Jersmann MD, PhD, Discipline of Medicine, University of Adelaide.
    • Dr Paulina Stehlik, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Research in Evidence-Based Practice, Bond University.
    • Dr Ian Musgrave, Senior Lecturer, Medical Sciences, University of Adelaide.
    • Kurt van Ryswyk, BEng Mechanical (Hons), MEng Biomedical.
Consultants
    • Emeritus Prof. John Dwyer AO
    • Emeritus Prof. Alastair MacLennan AO
    • Prof. Marcello Costa AO
    • Prof. Rob Morrison OAM
    • Dr. Pallave Dasari
    • Dr. Sue Ieraci
Work groups coordinators
    • Chief Editor: Peter Arnold OAM
    • Web Site: Emeritus Prof. Ian Gibbins
    • Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube): Kurt Van Ryswyk
    • Pharmacy: Ian Carr
    • Regulatory Compliance and Consumer Protection: Bruce Arnold, Mal Vickers
        ◦ Laboratory Investigation: Bruce Campbell, Mark Belkin

   Ethics

   Conflicts of interest in science-based medicine
David Gorski
Link
The topic of conflicts of interest among medical researchers has recently bubbled up to the public consciousness more than usual. The catalyst for this most recent round of criticism by the press and navel-gazing by researchers is the investigation of Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) of nine psychiatric researchers, one of which held $6 million in stock in a company formed to bring a drug for depression to market, but had allegedly concealed this, even though he was an investigator on an NIH grant to study the drug he was developing. From my perspective, there is more than a little politics going on in this story, given that for the last decade federal law, specifically the Bayh-Dole Act, and policy have actually encouraged investigators and universities to co-develop drugs and treatments with industry, but it does bring into focus the issue of conflicts of interest, in particular undisclosed conflicts of interest. There are two articles of note that recently appeared in the scientific literature discussing this issue, one in Science in July (about the Grassley investigation) and an editorial in the Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience by Simon N. Young, PhD, the Co-Editor-in-Chief of the journal and faculty at McGill University. I was more interested in the latter article because it takes a much braoder view of the issue. Science-based medicine (SBM) depends upon the integrity of the science being done to justify treatments; so it’s useful to discuss how conflicts of interest intersect medical research.
In most public discussions of conflicts of interest (COIs), Young notes, the primary focus is on payments by pharmaceutical companies to investigators. Make no mistake, this is a big issue, but COIs are not just payments from drug companies. Indeed, I’ve written about just such COIs that have arguably impacted patient care negatively right her on this very blog, for example seeding trials (in which clinical trials are designed by the marketing division of pharmaceutical companies), a case of fraud that appeared to have been motivated by COIs. What needs to be understood is that every single scientific and medical investigators have COIs of one sort or another, and many are not financial. That’s why I like Young’s introduction to what COIs are:
A COI occurs when individuals’ personal interests are in conflict with their professional obligations. Often this means that someone will profit personally from decisions made in his or her professional role. The personal profit is not necessarily monetary; it could be progress toward the personal goals of the individual or organization, for example the success of a journal for a publisher or editor or the acceptance of ideas for a researcher. The concern is that a COI may bias behaviour, and it is the potential for bias that makes COIs so important. Before getting into the specifics of COIs, I will describe some of the research on the biases we all have, the evidence that we are not always aware of our own biases, how biases can be created by vested interests and how people behave in response to revela- tions of COIs. The idea that scientists are objective seekers of truth is a pleasing fiction, but counterproductive in so far as it can lessen vigilance against bias.
Oddly enough, financial COIs are probably the easiest to deal with as far as a practical matter. Here, transparency is key, because it’s not necessarily COIs per se that can destroy the credibility of a study. Rather it’s the COIs that are not disclosed (henceforth referred to as undisclosed COIs, or UCOIs) that cause the most problems. If I read a paper and in the paper it is disclosed that the first author received funding from the pharmaceutical company that makes the drug being studied, that in and of itself does not invalidate the study, the simplistically nonsensical arguments of, for example, Dr. Jay Gordon notwithstanding, who of late has been claiming that the promotion of H1N1 flu vaccination is far more due to pharmaceutical companies’ drive for profits than it is based on scientific and public health considerations and who likens vaccine manufacturers to tobacco manufacturers promoting junk science. Good science trumps COIs, and, in spite of how badly they are often castigated and some of their misdeeds in the past, pharmaceutical companies do fund a lot of good science. That being said, pharma funding of a study does make me look at it more skeptically than I would if it were funded by another source, mainly because there is a direct financial incentive, often with hundreds of millions of dollars invested in the development of a drug on the line, to have a good result. For these COIs, daylight is the best remedy. If readers don’t know about a financial COI, they can’t judge how important that COI is or is not or how it might impact a study.
On the other hand, Young points out that, while disclosure is the primary means by which scientific organizations and journals deal with COIs, this is not a bullet-proof solution. True, there is evidence that disclosure does work to have the intended effect, and Young cites a study in which two manuscripts were given to two groups of reviewers to read, one to each group. The manuscripts’ content was identical, but one listed COIs and the other did not. The results showed that those reading the manuscripts with the disclosed COIs found the study reported in the manuscript to be “less interesting and less important.” However, it turns out that disclosure may not always be effective due to paradoxical effects. First, authors who declare a COI may feel that their declaration “frees” them to be less objective and argue their point more strongly. Also, authors may feel that the weight of the declared COI makes it necessary for them to exaggerate the significance of their results in order to overcome any additional skepticism in the reader provoked by the COI. Finally, readers may actually be influenced by statements and information they know they should ignore, the COI disclosure notwithstanding.
Far more difficult to quantify are non-financial COIs. Let’s start with one COI that each and every researcher can be reasonably assumed to have, and that’s a strong desire to have one’s ideas and hypotheses validated by science and accepted by the scientific community. I originally became a scientist, as well as a physician, in order to study cancer and to develop more effective therapies for cancer than what we currently have. To achieve that goal, I have to develop hypotheses that accurately describe a phenomenon and make useful predictions. I can see how easy it is to become emotionally attached to my preferred hypothesis, especially since I can see that if I’m right I will have a rare chance to improve significantly the care of breast cancer patients. If my hypothesis is wrong it could well be back to the drawing board for one of the two projects that my lab works on, my career half over and not a lot of time to make a mark. (Bringing an idea to fruition in terms of treatment can easily take 10 or 20 years, and I probably have about 20 years left in my career if I stay healthy and productive.) Add to that my desire to be perceived as a good researcher and for my strategy for treating breast cancer that I’m working on (but have not yet published on) to take hold, and it’s easy to see that I have to be very, very careful not to let such considerations sway me. For a scientist, few things are more painful than to see a cherished hypothesis fall under the weight of opposing evidence.
I recently wrote about how a very common procedure for osteoporotic vertebral fractures, vertebroplasty, had recently been subjected to two significant clinical trials, one from the U.S. and one from Australia, both of which found vertebroplasty to be no more efficacious at relieving pain than placebo. Indeed, I even likened it to acupuncture and briefly recapped its history, in which small, lower quality studies (unblinded, no controls, or other methodological shortcomings), along with physicians’ anecdotal experience, led to the perception that vertebroplasty is efficacious. Consider this quote I included in my post from one of the early boosters of vertebroplasty, Dr. Joshua A. Hirsch, director of interventional neuroradiology at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston:
“I adore my patients,” Dr. Hirsch added, “and it hurts me that they suffer, to the point that I come in on my days off to do these procedures.”
Never underestimate the desire of physician-scientists and physician-investigators to help their patients. Trust me, we get a rush when we can dramatically help a patient. Scientists get the same rush when their hypotheses are confirmed. It’s one of the rewards that motivate us. In Dr. Hirsch’s case, he even declared that he “believed in clinical trials” but that he really believed that vertebroplasty worked.
Here’s where basic human psychological considerations then start to mix with more tangible COIs. Let me use myself as an example If my hypothesis is not falsified, then there’s the potential for more publications, more grants, and much more prominence in the breast cancer research community than I currently have, which, admittedly, is relatively modest. More importantly, if my hypothesis is correct, the results of my research might improve the survival and ease the suffering of millions of women with breast cancer. Here, emotional attachment to a hypothesis can merge with other intangible COIs (fame, prominence, the respect of one’s peers) and tangible COIs (more grants, more publications, promotions, and awards). Any researcher who claims that these things don’t sway their decisions and thinking or don’t contribute to bias is either self-deluded or lying. Indeed, this pride of ownership of their own research can lead to overselling it or to downplaying its shortcomings:
This presumably is responsible for the fact that when authors were interviewed about their published papers “important weaknesses were often admitted on direct questioning but were not included in the published article.”46 Certainly editors are used to ask- ing authors to mention the limitations of their studies and to be more cautious about the implications of the research. Another related factor is the desire for researchers to advance their careers and get recognition from their peers. Research suggests that social and monetary reward may work through both psychological47 and neuroanatomical processes48 that overlap to some extent. The big difference in relation to COIs is that social rewards, unlike monetary rewards, cannot be disclosed in any meaningful way.
Indeed they can’t, even though scientists are human after all, and therefore subject to the same human needs as any other.
Another point that comes up in behavioral research about COIs is that human beings do not know their own minds very well. They think they do, but they really do not, which may account for just how vehemently so many researchers deny that financial support from drug companies or elsewhere affects their decisions. Ask yourself how many times you’ve heard a researcher claim that, yes, he has a COI but he would never, ever be influenced by that. He can remain objective in spite fo that. As Young summarizes:
A recent short review in Science asks how well people know their own minds and concludes the answer is not very well.3 This is because “In real life, people do not realize that their self-knowledge is a construction, and fail to recognize that they possess a vast adaptive unconscious that operates out of their conscious awareness.” Wilson and Brekke4 reviewed some of the unwanted influences on judgments and evaluations. They concluded that people find it difficult to avoid unwanted responses because of mental processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable. Moore and Loewenstein5 argue that “the automatic nature of self-interest gives it a primal power to influence judgment and makes it difficult for people to understand its influence on their judgment, let alone eradicate its influence.” They also point out that in contrast to self-interest, understanding one’s ethical and professional obligations involves a more thoughtful process. The in- volvement of different cognitive processes may make it difficult to reconcile self-interest and obligations. MacCoun,6 in an extensive review, examined the experimental evidence about bias in the interpretation and use of research results. He also discussed the evidence and theories concerning the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that produce bias. He concluded that people assume that their own views are objective and “that subjectivity (e.g., due to personal ideology) is the most likely explanation for their opponents’ conflicting perceptions.”
In other words, when it comes to COIs, we as human beings are in general very, very poor at judging how much we are being influenced by such considerations, because self-interest is primal and functions at very basic and largely unconcious areas of our minds. Again, this is why so many scientists will deny that they are being influenced pharma funding and why physicians will vehemently deny that their prescribing choices are influenced by gifts received from drug companies. They really, really believe it, too. They’re not lying. They’re self-image is that they are rational and that they can separate these COIs from their scientific and medical decision-making process, but behavioral research would argue otherwise.
So does all of this mean that the “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) crowd or the quacks of the world are right? Is science-based medicine so hopelessly compromised by COIs and bias that it can be discounted in favor of fairy dust like homeopathy, reiki, and other magic? Of course not. Reality is reality, science is science, and evidence trumps all, even COIs. Here, I think it’s instructive to contrast how science-based medicine is dealing with COIs now with how CAM advocates deal with them. However halting, messy, and at times inadequate science-based medicine deals with COIs, it is as nothing compared to how poorly CAM advocates deal with them. Let’s contrast how CAM advocates and pseudoscientists deal with COIs. Basically, they don’t. To them, COIs only matter if the person with the COI is someone they don’t like. The aforementioned Dr. Gordon likes to state over and over again that if a study is funded by a drug company he doesn’t believe it. I’ve tried over five years to convince him that this is poppycock. Yet, when it comes to COIs, few can match CAM researchers.
Indeed, as long as the investigator or physician with a COI is on the “right” side, COIs can be completely overlooked. For example, the patron saint of the anti-vaccine and autism quackery movement, Dr. Andrew Wakefield, not only received large amounts of money from trial lawyers before doing his “research” in 1998 that sparked the MMR scare but he had filed for a patent on a vaccine to compete with the existing MMR, as investigative journalist Brian Deer has reported. The result was incompetent and possibly even fraudulent research. Yet the anti-vaccine crank blog Age of Autism circles the wagons around Wakefield whenever he is criticized and even awarded him its “Galileo Award” for 2008, where Mark Blaxill likened the “inquisition” against him for his COIs and incompetent research to the Inquisition that ultimately forced Galileo to recant, likening the scientific complaints against Wakefield for his gross incompetence and undisclosed COIs to a “religious war,” writing this gag-inducing bit of desecration of Galileo’s memory:
I wouldn’t in any way diminish the importance of Galileo, but in an interesting way, Wakefield’s steadfastness in the face of adversity outshines the man in whose name we honor him. For, although Galileo finally agreed to recant his support for heliocentrism, Wakefield has never buckled under the pressure. Instead he has stuck to his guns and continued to fight for families with autism.
I apologize for that one and ask for your forgiveness if you now find yourself praying to the porcelain god, disgorging the contents of your upper GI tract as an offering. Meanwhile, at the risk of causing a repeat trip to worship, I will point out that just last month the granddaddy of all anti-vaccine groups, with the wonderfully Orwellian name National Vaccine Information Center, gave Wakefield its Humanitarian Award. What can we conclude from this? Basically, in SBM UCOIs, once discovered, usually get you castigated, particularly if there is even a whiff of fraud. In quackery land, they get you awards, regardless of whether there is fraud. There are numerous other examples of “alternative medicine” practitioners with nearly as massive COIs.
Clearly, there are at least two huge differences between pseudoscience and quackery versus SBM. In SBM, scientists try very hard to falsify their hypotheses in order to test their validity; in contrast, among pseudoscientists and quacks, rarely do “investigators” actually “test” anything. Rather they look for confirmatory evidence to support their beliefs and view themselves as virtuous underdogs fighting for their patients for having done so, even as they subject them to useless or even harmful quackery. More telling is the reaction to COIs. This is where the hypocrisy of CAM supporters comes into full relief. AoA bloggers will blast, for instance, Paul Offit as Dr. PrOffit, and cranks like Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. will call him a “biostitute” for having received royalties from a drug company for the vaccine his lab invented. They’ll blast scientific journals for accepting too much advertising from drug companies. Yet, on AoA itself are numerous ads for compounding pharmacies, supplement sellers, gluten-free diets, and all manner of other unproven “treatments” for autism. Another example, Dr. Joseph Mercola, routinely castigates SBM for COIs while at the same time selling all manner of supplements and woo on his website. To such as J.B. Handley and his merry band of anti-vaccine cranks at Generation Rescue and AoA or Dr. Mercola, it’s only a COI if they say it is. Indeed, the right kind of COI can even make you a hero in their eyes, and that’s not even counting the positive reinforcement given someone like Wakefield by legions of adoring anti-vaccinationists.
The bottom line is that COIs do matter. Because science is a human endeavor, it will never be perfectly pristine, because nothing humans do is perfectly pristine. Moreover, SBM hasn’t always understood or handled COIs, both disclosed and undisclosed, real or perceived, very well, to the point where new regulations by the government may well be necessary. Moreover, there are always more intangible COIs, such as pride of ownership of research, the desire to be proven right, and the respect of one’s peers that, unlike financial COIs, can’t be quantified. As Young says in his article, the “objective of a literature relatively free of bias remains a pious but distant hope.”
Even so, I’ll paraphrase Winston Churchill’s (in)famous comment about democracy in describing SBM by saying that science-based medicine is the worst form of medicine, except for all those others that have been tried. In particular, that includes dogma-based medicine or anecdote-based medicine, two dominant forms of medicine that have been practiced since the days of ancient Egyptian physician-priests to ancient shaman medicine men through the days of barber-surgeons using bleeding as a treatment for almost everything to the physician of 200 years ago advocating purging and treatments with toxic metals like cadmium and antimony. Progress in medicine was glacial, with few advances over decades or even centuries, until science was seriously applied to medical investigation in a serious and systematic way beginning in the 19th century and exploding in the 20th. The last 50 years have seen incredible advances in medical care, thanks to science.
True, SBM is not perfect. Financial interests, COIs, and the pride of individual practitioners undermine it, and there are a depressing number of ills that it offers too little for. But it’s so much better than any alternative we have tried before. It works, and, although it does so in fits and starts, sometimes all too slowly, it’s getting better all the time. Dealing more effectively with COIs will only help it to continue to do so.

   Conflict of Interest in Medical Research
Steven Novella
Link
The cornerstone of science-based medicine is, of course, scientific research. The integrity and quality of biomedical research is therefore of critical importance and to be thoughtfully and jealously guarded, if we care about maintaining an optimal standard of care. There are many threats and hazards to the institutions of medical research – mostly ideological. One that has not been discussed much on this blog but has been in the news recently is that of conflict of interest. Upon close examination this is a more complex issue than it may at first appear.
The most recent controversy over conflicts of interest were sparked by an article published in JAMA in which the authors allege that published studies that downplayed the risks of Vioxx (A Cox-2 inhibitor marketed as a pain killer that was removed from the market for increased cardiac risk) were in fact ghost-written by employees of Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx. The names of two academic researchers were then attached to the studies to give them legitimacy. If true this is a damning episode, and no one would reasonably disagree with the contention that companies writing research on their own products represents an unacceptable conflict of interest. For the record, both Merk and the one surviving academic deny the accusations completely.
Many other forms of potential conflict of interest have also been raised in the discussion of medical research. Journals now require that authors disclose any financial ties to the subject of their research. Some of these conflicts are clear, for example – owning stock in the company who manufactures or sells the object of research, or holding a patent in the drug or technology. In any situation in which the outcome of research will affect the value of a researcher’s stock or patent there is a clear and unambiguous conflict.
Other conflicts that are fairly clear include researchers or academics who receive large sums of money for consulting fees or similar from a company that they then conduct research for. If a substantial portion of one’s income could be threatened by an unfavorable outcome of one’s research, a conflict is clear. Regarding regulatory agencies, it is clear that regulators should not be rendering decisions regarding companies from whom they are accepting consulting fees or for whom they expect to work.
Then there are more subtle or questionable forms of conflict, and this is where there is great controversy. Minor ties to companies are common for academics. For example, small speaking fees are often given to experts with reputations in their field. Recognized experts are also frequently consulted for their expertise. Experts, for example, are often consulted to help decide fruitful avenues of future research, or to design clinical trials.
In response to the recent attention given to cases of conflict of interest or the appearance of such conflict, many institutions now require full disclosure on the part of their faculty. Typically a threshold of significance – - $5,000-$10,000 for example – is often used. This is in addition to the requirements of most journals from their authors. Research consortia may also have their own disclosure requirements.
In response to worry over the appearance of conflict, many academics are simply not supplementing their earnings with the occasional lecture or consultation. It is simply easier to avoid future conflict and accusations.
Not everyone agrees that this trend toward avoiding any appearance of conflict is an unalloyed boon to medical research. Elizabeth Whelan, writing in the Washington Times, points out that frivolous accusations of conflict has a “chilling” effect on the conduct of industry research. We all benefit from a productive a collaborative relationship between industry and the best minds in medical academia. Scaring off these experts from the most minor relationship with industry could hurt the quality of research.
There is also a growing trend to use the accusation of conflict, even when it is slight and questionable, to dismiss the findings of research inconvenient to ones own interests or ideology. For example, those who claim, falsely, that there is an association between vaccines and autism have used the slightest appearance of conflict to dismiss the evidence against any role of vaccines in autism.
There also seems to be an unfair asymmetry. While mainstream medicine is wrangling with this thorny issue, those on the fringe may ignore their own conflicts. For example, Andrew Wakefield is accused of receiving consulting fees from attorneys who were suing for vaccine injuries while he was conducting research supporting such a connection.
Conclusion
The issue of conflict of interest in medical research is a serious one. The medical profession needs to resist the urge to “circle the wagons” while taking a serious and open look at this issue. I think they have largely done so, but more work is to be done.
However, we should not go so far as to stigmatize even minor connections to industry or allow the weeding out of genuine conflicts turn into a thoughtless witch hunt. We should further be critical of those who use the accusation of conflict where one does not genuinely exist as a weapon against research the results of which they dislike.
As in many things, a proper balance is optimal. I think we are evolving toward a reasonable balance. Academics and experts should be able to provide their experience and expertise to industry and be appropriately compensated for their time and efforts. But industry should be prevented from putting their thumb on the scale of medical research, to gain the outcomes they desire by the application of funding and fees.
This should not be an intractable problem as long as we are thoughtful, consider all sides of the equation, and don’t allow bias and ideology to rule over reason.

   Conflicts of Interest
Harriet Hall 
Link
When an article is published in a medical journal, the authors must disclose any conflicts of interest. This is important, because even if they think owning stock in the drug company won’t influence their scientific judgment, we know that subtle biases can creep in to somehow affect the findings of studies. It has been shown that studies funded by drug companies are more likely to get positive results for their drug than studies funded by independent sources. Andrew Wakefield, author of the infamous retracted Lancet study suggesting a relationship between MMR vaccine and autism, was severely chastised for not disclosing that he received money from autism litigators and expected to earn a fortune from his own patented products if the MMR vaccine could be discredited.
I was recently contacted by an acupuncturist who plans to critique an article I wrote. It was a commentary in the journal Pain that accompanied a systematic review of systematic reviews of acupuncture by Ernst et al. For details of Ernst’s and my articles, see my previous post. He challenged my statement that I had no conflicts of interest to report. He apparently thinks I should have said I have a conflict of interest in that I am anti-CAM and anti-acupuncture. When he writes about my article, he plans to attack me for not declaring this alleged conflict of interest and he plans to set a good example with a conflict of interest statement of his own, divulging that he makes his living practicing acupuncture, has financial investments in it and many personal relationships, that his self-identity and prestige are dependent on his belief in acupuncture’s efficacy, and that he is biased towards constructivism and away from positivism. (I think this is a fancy way of saying he favors experience over the scientific method.) I agree that he has conflicts of interest, but was I wrong to say I had no conflicts of interest? I don’t think so.
He cited the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) criteria on conflict of interest:
Public trust in the peer-review process and the credibility of published articles depends in part on how well conflict of interest is handled during writing, peer review, and editorial decision making….Conflict of interest exists when an author … has financial or personal relationships that inappropriately influence (bias) his or her actions… Financial relationships (such as employment, consultancies, stock ownership, honoraria, and paid expert testimony) are the most easily identifiable conflicts of interest and the most likely to undermine the credibility of the journal, the authors, and of science itself. However, conflicts can occur for other reasons, such as personal relationships, academic competition, and intellectual passion.
Financial relationships? Something that would make it financially advantageous for me to disparage acupuncture? Employment, consultancies, stock ownership, honoraria, paid expert testimony? Nope, nope, nope, nope, and nope. None of these apply to me. I’m retired, so I can’t even be accused of competing for patients with acupuncturists. I would have nothing to gain financially if acupuncture vanished from the earth overnight.
Personal relationships? Should Dr. Oz should divulge that his wife is a Reiki master before he pontificates about the wonders of Reiki on national television? I think he should; if it hasn’t influenced his views, I can’t imagine what his marriage is like. Do I need to state that I associate in cyberspace with other science-based writers who have questioned the evidence for acupuncture? Do I need to say that I have 3 friends who accept acupuncture and 6 who reject it? I don’t think so. Does a scientist doing a drug study need to divulge that his cousin or his next-door neighbor or one of his Facebook friends works for the drug company? I don’t think so.
Academic competition? I am not and have never been an academic. I’m a retired family physician with no ties to any academic institution.
Intellectual passion? My passion is for science and reason, not for or against acupuncture or any other particular treatment. I have no brief against acupuncture. I have had no personal experiences, good or bad, that would tend to prejudice me for or against it. My initial opinion of acupuncture was favorable. When I was in med school, the head of anesthesia, Dr. John Bonica, was enthusiastic about acupuncture and was actively investigating it as a possibly worthwhile addition to his field. He thought it worked by the gate control theory of pain. (As he studied it, his initial enthusiasm soon waned.) I believed the first reports I heard about its effectiveness for surgical anesthesia and pain relief. Through the years, I read the reports that came out in the medical literature and I perceived that the weight of evidence was gradually turning against it. I also learned about the psychology of how patients and doctors can come to believe that a treatment works when it really doesn’t, and I learned some of the things that can go wrong in research to produce results that are not valid. Eventually I came to the provisional conclusion that acupuncture probably has no specific effects but is very good at eliciting non-specific effects of treatment. I don’t say that acupuncture doesn’t work: I only say that the entire body of published evidence is compatible with the hypothesis that it doesn’t work better than placebo.
I have never seen a conflict of interest statement that mentioned the authors’ worldview. No prayer study lists “I believe in God” as a conflict of interest. No scientist is expected to state “I believe the scientific method is the best way to evaluate claims.”
If conflicts of interest make an article less credible, should we also be required to disclose factors that would tend to make it more credible? When Ernst writes an article critical of homeopathy, should he divulge that he was trained as a homeopath and used to work in a homeopathic hospital? Should we be more disposed to believe his criticisms of homeopathy because he is a “convert”? No, the content of the article can be judged on its own merits. Only significant conflicts of interest need be reported. We can keep them in the back of our mind to moderate our confidence in the study’s findings but we can never assume they mean the study is not credible.
I have no particular attachment to my provisional conclusion about acupuncture. It really makes no difference to me personally whether it works or not. Really. I would welcome proof that acupuncture works, as it would give me another option for treating any pains of my own. I am always ready to change my mind and have done so innumerable times in my career in response to better evidence. As Emerson said, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.” It can’t hurt my pride to change my mind as long as I change it in response to evidence and reason; I am proud when I have learned that I was wrong about something and was able to correct my error.
If new evidence convinced me that acupuncture worked, I would write about it and explain the evidence and my reasoning. This wouldn’t hurt my reputation. If anything, it would enhance my prestige in the skeptical community. It would demonstrate that I didn’t have an ax to grind, that I was willing to follow the evidence wherever it led.
The acupuncturist’s arguments for more complete disclosure remind me of a “complete” informed consent for surgery that was written as a joke. It advised patients of everything that could possibly happen, including an earthquake during surgery and the chance that the surgeon could die suddenly of a heart attack and fall on top of the patient. Informed consent and disclosing conflicts of interest are both important, but it’s possible to get too carried away.
In summary, the acupuncturist would have a great deal to lose if he rejected acupuncture, while I would have nothing to lose if I accepted it. He has a conflict of interest. I don’t.

   Corporate pharma ethics and you
David J Kroll
Link
Although I’m one of the few non-clinicians writing here at SBM, I think about clinical trials a great deal – especially this week.
First, our colleague, Dr. David Gorski, had a superb analysis and highly-commented post on The Atlantic story by David H. Freedman about the work of John Ioannadis – more accurately, on Freedman’s misinterpretation of Ioannadis’s work and Dr. Gorski’s comments. While too rich to distill to one line, Dr. Gorski’s post struck me in that we who study the scientific basis of medicine actually change our minds when new data become available. That is a GoodThing – I want my physician to guide my care based on the latest data that challenges or proves incorrect previously held assumptions. However, this concept is not well-appreciated in a society that speaks in absolutes (broadly, not just with regard to medicine), expecting benefits with no assumption of risk or sacrifice in reaping those benefits. Indeed, the fact that we change our minds, evolving and refining disease prevention and treatment approaches, is how science and medicine move forward.
Then, I had the opportunity to hear an excellent talk on pharmaceutical bioethics by Ross E. McKinney, Jr., MD, Director of the Trent Center for Humanities, Bioethics, and History of Medicine at Duke University School of Medicine. McKinney is a pediatrics infectious disease specialist who led and published landmark Phase I and Phase II trials zidovudine (AZT) for pediatric AIDS patients. While he continues working in this realm, McKinney also studies clinical research ethics, conflicts of interest, and informed consent. I was absolutely fascinated and refreshed by hearing from an expert who while describing and citing major ethical lapses in our system of drug development is also willing to propose solutions and do the hard thinking required for us to maximize the benefits we derive from pharmaceuticals while minimizing unethical behavior.
From his presentation abstract:
The system the United States uses to develop and approve new drugs and devices is fraught with ethical problems. On the one hand, tremendous strides have been made in the treatment of HIV, cancer, and heart disease. Drug development can work and save human lives. On the other hand, drug companies have repeatedly withheld vital information that directly affects human health. Sins of omission that cost human lives have become part of the cost of doing business. Why have we allowed this situation to evolve, and what can we do to improve ethical behavior on the part of the pharmaceutical and device industry.
(Related: See this Dr. Peter Lipson SBM post on our “tremendous strides” in heart disease.)
Evil drug companies
The primary case for discussion was the well-known Avandia episode where GlaxoSmithKline was shown in a 2007 NEJM paper by Steven Nissen to have knowledge of the increased cardiovascular risk of their PPARγ agonist diabetes drug, rosiglitazone, effects not reported for pioglitazone (Actos), a similar drug from Takeda. He then cited the 2008 Winklemeyer article in Archives of Internal Medicine that retrospectively assessed the risks of the two drugs in 28,000+ patients over 29,000+ patient-years and concluded that rosiglitazone was associated with 15% greater mortality and 13% more cases of congestive heart failure than in patients taking pioglitazone. It was in the public’s best interest that a prospective trial of the two drugs be done and while GSK ultimately tried to launch such a study, patient recruitment was hindered by news of rosiglitazone’s safety.
McKinney began by noting that we need to accept the fact that a pharmaceutical company’s primary mission is to produce a return for shareholders by bringing the most effective drugs to market for the largest population whose benefits far outweigh their adverse effects. While sitting there, I also began to think about this concept more braodly: for readers who think that “drug companies” are evil profit-mongers, I encourage you to take a look at the precise stock holdings in the mutual funds of your 401(k) or 403(b) retirement accounts.
These are my words, not Dr. McKinney’s: It’s disingenuous and intellectually lazy to say that all “drug companies” care about is profits when many, many folks – including those objectors who populate the comment threads of this blog and others – benefit financially from the business practices of the industry. Let he who is without sin cast the first stone.
What would YOU do?
What I enjoyed next was that McKinney challenged the audience to declare what they would have done next if they were working for the company and their jobs and the jobs of others depended on the sales of what had become a $3 billion/year drug. He wouldn’t just let us sit passively and – for just a brief moment – you had to really think about being in the decision making shoes. I took a moment during the talk to pull up the Nissen paper and look at the actual numbers and look at the absolute risk of adverse effects instead of the relative numbers. I encourage you right now to go to Table 3 and look at the actual numbers of myocardial infarctions and deaths from cardiovascular causes in control patients versus patients taking rosiglitazone in each of the trials. Yes, the analysis of the data as a whole showed that rosiglitazone exhibited significant risk but can you see how easy it might be to convince yourself that there wasn’t really a problem with your drug?
In another part of his talk, he challenged us (still as hypothetical company employees) to come up with designing a study to test our hypothetical new drug for mild-to-moderate pain and expressing whether we thought it best to compare against aspirin, ibuprofen, codeine, or celecoxib (Celebrex). What’s the right comparison drug to test yours against if you want to do the study correctly? Do you want to chance your $200/month drug against the pennies-per-dose aspirin or ibuprofen? Do you want to play hardball against equally-expensive Celebrex and risk that your drug might not perform better?
What’s the right study to do in the interest of patients?
What’s the right study to do in the interest of your continued employment?
Solutions?
McKinney also spent time talking about how the need for stronger disincentives for pharma management to behave unethically. The $2.4 billion that GSK had to set aside for Avandia litigation may not be large enough of a penalty. For a drug that had such a huge market, this might simply be viewed as the cost of doing business. Recent legislation to reward inside whistle-blowers personally might increase the revelations of wrongdoing similar to this week’s award, also related to GSK, to a drug manufacturing quality manager.
Finally, McKinney also spoke of the unavoidable conflicts of interest by academic investigators conducting industry-sponsored clinical trials – again reminding the uninitiated in the audience that the NIH funds vanishingly small numbers of clinical trials and that Pharma’s total clinical trial expenditures are roughly twice that of the entire NIH budget.
Caring too much can also be a COI
McKinney noted that conflicts of interest are not necessarily always nefarious or driven by money. As a physician who treats infants and kids with HIV/AIDS, McKinney stated that he has a conflict of interest in just simply wanting a new drug to work for his patients. Trying to keep kids from suffering is a strong motivator. In fact, the desire is so strong that if an investigator is not blinded, some bias may creep in on variables that are more subjective.
What can we do? We’re only addressing half the job by simply pointing out problems with the system. We have to propose and experiment with solutions. We have to work hard to minimize the introduction of any bias into studies. We have to provide strong disincentives to companies to behave unethically. But solutions will also have their own costs we must also be willing to accept. For example, if fines are levied that drive a major multinational company to bankruptcy, we must accept the loss of innovation to the collective worldwide drug discovery effort.
The solutions are not easy. The discussions are difficult. It’s just as easy to bleat that doctors don’t care if they kill patients because they take drug company money as it is to say that rainbows and unicorns flow forth from drug company research campuses. Having the discussions, pushing others to evaluate their own ethics, and thinking through tough financial and clinical decisions is grueling. I was delighted to have the opportunity this week to be pushed outside my comfort zone. It should happen more often.

   The Ethics of Deception in Medicine
Steven Novella 
Link
A recent study published in the Journal of General Internal Medicine and featured in a Time Magazine article, indicated that of 466 academic physicians in the Chicago area, 45% indicated that they have prescribed a placebo for a patient. This has sparked a discussion of the ethics of prescribing placebos in particular and deception in general in medicine.
A placebo is a biologically inactive treatment, such as a sugar pill. Any perceived benefit from taking a placebo is due to a combination of factors, mostly biased observation and non-specific effects, collectively referred to as the placebo effect. I discussed the placebo effect at length last week, and now will delve deeper into the question of deception in medicine more generally.
Historical Perspective
Prior to about 30 years ago the relationship between a physician and their patient was functionally paternalistic. This means that the physician did what they thought was best for their patients as a parent would for their child. It also meant that “benign deception” was often used, including prescribing treatments that were known to be inactive or ineffective. Sometimes the deception was one of omission – for example, not telling a patient that their disease was terminal and incurable so as not to upset them needlessly.
An illustrative example of this type of deception was the practice of prescribing methylene blue to patients as an active placebo. This substance is quickly filtered unaltered by the kidneys and will turn the urine deep blue. I was told first hand by older physicians of the practice of telling patients that their condition was caused by a benign tumor, and that the medicine (methylene blue) would entirely dissolve the tumor. The patients were told that they would know the treatment has worked when their urine turns blue. The purpose of this was to convince a patient thought to be a hypochondriac, or to have psychologically-based symptoms, that their fake ailment was treated, in the hopes that they would take comfort from this and their symptoms would resolve.
It is easy from our modern perspective to be judgmental of the paternalism of past generations, but I feel that it is proper to judge people in their own historical context. The fact that such practices seem so outrageous to modern sensibilities is not necessarily a marker of modern moral superiority but may simply reflect the general changes in American society in the last half-century.
The Physician-Patient Relationship Today
The more accepted model of the physician-patient relationship today (or health care provider-client, to be more general) is that of cooperation, with the patient as a full partner. This is based upon the principle that everyone has a right to be fully informed so that they can make the best decisions for themselves. Further, individuals generally wish to be more empowered to control their own health care. This trend has also been driven by the easy accessibility of medical information to the general public. It is not uncommon now for patients to present to their doctor with a hand full of pages printed from the internet.
In reality there is still a broad spectrum from old-fashioned paternalism to the modern cooperative model. This is partly regional – in the US the coasts tend to follow a more cooperative model, while in the mid west and a lesser degree the south still retain a degree of paternalism. It is therefore not a surprise that the above referenced study was conducted in the mid west, and I suspect that the numbers would have been different if conducted in the northeast.
There is also a generational difference, as we would expect, with older physicians tending to have an older style of practice. Superimposed upon these trends are individual differences among physicians. And, in my experience, I think that patients themselves largely determine the nature of the relationship they have with their physicians. Even when patients are fully empowered to control their health care, some will voluntarily surrender to a greater or lesser degree to the expertise of their physicians. Physicians have to, in fact, be in tune with their patient’s desires in this regard. Put simply, some patients want information, and other patients want to be told what to do, and most want some combination of both.
Deception
In the context of the modern physician-patient relationship deception is generally not acceptable. Within the practice of medicine there are various specific situations that need to be discussed.
Medical research is the easiest situation to deal with because there are specific regulations that remove most of the guesswork. Research involving humans requires adherence to strict ethical rules and the oversight necessary to enforce those rules. The guiding principle of medical research is informed consent. Subjects need to be told exactly what the potential risks of an experimental treatment are, what (if any) are the potential benefits to them, and the probability that they are receiving a placebo treatment. They need to be told exactly what will happen to them in the study, what the treatment alternatives are, what will happen if they have a negative side effect, and they need to be given the opportunity to ask any questions to their satisfaction.
Informed consent also applies to the practice of medicine outside of research. This means that patients have a right to similar information and to have any questions answered prior to agreeing to have surgery or receive a drug or treatment. However, the complexity here is that there is really no such thing as “full” disclosure. It is not practical for a physician to go over every possible consequence of a treatment prior to prescribing or initiating it. Potential side effects that are benign and/or extremely rare do not necessarily need to be discussed directly. Physicians do exercise judgment in deciding what patients need to be told.
Often, after the important facts about a new drug are discussed, patients may be referred to the package insert, which has the full prescribing information approved by the FDA. This way the patient can have as much information as they desire about a new drug, and then can ask their physician about anything that concerns them.
Keep in mind that I am not saying that what I described above is what always happens, but it is generally accepted to be good practice. Also, physicians that neglect to follow such good practices open themselves to liability if a negative outcome does occur.
Another context which is fairly straightforward is the need for full disclosure. This means that physicians are ethically required to tell patients any relevant information. In addition to having full consent prior to a treatment, patients are considered to own their health care information and have a right to access to it. Likewise, physicians have a duty to inform patients about anything relevant, such as test results or their diagnosis or prognosis.
I find this to be the most fuzzy area, however. Certainly, factual information needs to be given to patients. However, facts do not always tell the whole story, they must be put into a clinical context. Therefore, for example, a physician may emphasize the possibility for hope or they may downplay unrealistic hope in order to focus the patient on making practical decisions. Neither approach is objectively better – they represent trade offs, a balance between keeping the patient’s outlook positive to avoid depression or nihilism, while still giving them a realistic view of their condition so they can make rational decisions.
Also, when a patient is facing a difficult health decision, for example whether or not to have a risky but needed surgical procedure, the facts can often be used to support either decision. A physician may believe, and the facts may support the conclusion, that the patient’s best chance to avoid a bad outcome is to have surgery. The physician may therefore emphasize the risks of not getting the surgery. Exactly how much time and effort is spent going over the possible negative outcomes if a condition is not treated can affect the patient’s decision. In the end the physician’s clinical judgment determines what is proper disclosure to the patient.
On the other end of the spectrum, a physician may emphasize to a patient that there is ongoing research into their disease that may produce a treatment. Is this giving the patient false hope, or is this just good bedside manner?
A very common context in which the need for full disclosure comes up is when a physician believes that a patient’s symptoms are entirely psychiatric. (For the sake of this discussion I am considering situations in which the symptoms are actually psychological, not a misdiagnosis.) A brutally honest opinion given to the patient may sound something like this: “I believe that you do not have any real physical ailment. The symptoms you are having are purely psychological – they are nothing more than a delusion on your part. Therefore the real underlying problem is a mental illness, or perhaps simply a personality disorder. These are notoriously difficult to treat, but you may benefit from counseling or psychiatric treatment.”
I have, in fact, heard a colleague say almost exactly that to a patient – with perhaps just a bit more tact. There is evidence, in fact, that in certain situations brutal honesty, while uncomfortable for the physician and the patient, may result in the best outcome. The patient may protest, but then the symptoms will stop.
However, such honesty will often sacrifice the therapeutic relationship, so in most situations physicians will take a gentler approach. For example, I might state that certain symptoms are known to be caused by stress and that they tend to resolve on their own. This is completely true, but has a different tone and emphasis than the brutally honest statement above.
What about the outright deception of prescribing a known placebo to a patient? Today this is generally considered to be unethical, not only because it prevents informed consent but because it interferes with the trust that is a necessary prerequisite for the physician-patient therapeutic relationship. I agree with this position and would never prescribe a placebo or directly deceive a patient.
However, again there is a gray area. My perspective is biased in that I am a neurologist, so many of the medications I prescribe have multiple uses. A pain medication may also be an antidepressant, or a muscle relaxant may also be a sleep aid. I therefore might recommend a specific medication to a patient for one effect but partly base my choice on a secondary effect that I think will also be helpful. I may emphasize to the patient the effect they are more likely to understand and accept and will not necessarily get into all the details that led me to that specific choice. But if a patient asks me a direct question, I always give them a straight and truthful answer.
Another gray area is that physicians may be very optimistic with their patients about the potential of a new treatment in order to maximize (or so they think) the placebo effect. If a physician prescribes a legitimate pain killer for an appropriate situation and tells the patient “I think this is really going to help with your pain,” when a more accurate statement might be “there is about a 60% chance this will help with your pain” is that subtle deception justified on the grounds that it may enhance a placebo benefit from the medication? (As an aside, I am not convinced that it will, but that is a separate question.)
The same is true of negative side effects. Some physicians worry that if they go over every possible little side effect that patients will get side effects just because they are worrying about it so much or because they become hypervigilant to any slight symptom. While I disclose anything important, and point them to the package insert for full information, I may say truthfully to patients that most people I have prescribed this drug report no side effects. Again – there is wiggle room in terms of emphasis and detail.
To summarize, I think that within modern ethical medicine there is no room for deliberate outright deception. Informed consent, full disclosure, and honesty are necessary within the context of medical research and a cooperative therapeutic relationship. However, there is room for good bedside manner, compassion, and for balancing hope with realism in terms of what information is emphasized, but this is a gray area.
All of this, of course, is in the context of scientific medicine. It is impossible to apply these ethical standards when dealing with a health care system that is not evidence-based. Virtually all treatments given under the umbrella of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) or integrative medicine would be considered experimental within mainstream medicine, yet are generally given without their experimental or unproven nature being disclosed and without all the other ethical guidelines that govern mainstream medicine.
Also, many CAM treatments, like homeopathy, are nothing but placebos. Some practitioners even acknowledge this, but argue that placebos have real effects. (Again, see my prior entry for a discussion of this.) Within scientific medicine this would amount to unacceptable deception. The sectarian views of many CAM practitioners, however, often means that they believe the misinformation they give to their patients.
It is therefore difficult to impossible to have a workable system of medical ethics within an unscientific sectarian health care belief system. Some ethics can only be applied within a system that relies upon verifiable and objectively established standards. Therefore only a system based upon transparent and objective science can be truly ethical.

Is it ethical to sell complementary and alternative medicine?
Complementary and alternative medicine may be legal to sell – but is it ethical to sell?
Scott Gavura on February 11, 2016
Link


Complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) is no longer fringe, and anything but the mom-and-pop image that manufacturers carefully craft. CAM is big business, and most Americans today take some sort of supplement. The impetus for my blogging (and tilting at CAM windmills) emerged from years spent working in a pharmacy with a heavy reliance on CAM sales. If it was unorthodox, this store probably sold it. Conventional drug products (the ones I was familiar with) were hidden off in a corner, and the store was otherwise crowded with herbal remedies, homeopathy, and different forms of detox kits and candida cleanses. All of this was unlike anything I’d ever seen or heard about in pharmacy school – so I started researching.
I looked at CAM from a scientific evidence perspective, the one I was taught in pharmacy school, using the same approach I’d take when assessing a new drug. Did the evidence support the claims made about these products, or not? The answers, as you might expect, were often the same. There was little or no credible evidence to demonstrate CAM had any meaningful benefits. I started blogging my own reviews as a way of documenting my own research, while offering some information to anyone on the Interwebs who might be searching for evidence.
Over time my blogging focus expanded, as I asked myself the inevitable questions: How could implausible products with no scientific backing even be approved for sale at all? I discovered the regulatory double-standard allowed for anything considered a dietary supplement (or in Canada, a “natural health product“) and the history and politics that have made CAM the “Wild West” of health care, with a marketplace that prioritizes a manufacturer’s right to sell over a consumer’s right to purchase a product that is safe and effective. Given the retail marketplace that’s been established by regulators like the FDA and Health Canada, I’ve turned my focus on to health professionals, who have an ethical responsibility to put patient interests above that of commercial interests. From a professional practice and medical ethics perspective, I have argued that health professionals that sell or promote CAM are on ethically shaky ground, and compromise the credibility of the profession.
Despite the lack of evidence that CAM (in general) offers any health benefits at all, it’s been remarkable to watch its popularity grow, to the point where even large pharmacy chains now sell aisles of products that are implausible and often highly questionable. Generally meeting these changes with a collective shrug, the pharmacy profession has even tried to lower its own ethical standards. While I do get the occasional encouragement from some of my peers, most just say “it’s business” or “the customer wants it, and these are legal products.” My argument today is CAM fails even this lower ethical bar.
Last fall I joined Professor Chris MacDonald of Ryerson University to give a talk as part of Ryerson’s business ethics speaker series. The topic was complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), and the ethics of selling these products. (You can watch that presentation here.) I’m pleased to announce that we have now published a peer-reviewed paper on the same topic in the journal Bioethics, “Alternative Medicine and the Ethics of Commerce.” Here’s the abstract:
Is it ethical to market complementary and alternative medicines? Complementary and alternative medicines (CAM) are medical products and services outside the mainstream of medical practice. But they are not just medicines (or supposed medicines) offered and provided for the prevention and treatment of illness. They are also products and services – things offered for sale in the marketplace. Most discussion of the ethics of CAM has focused on bioethical issues – issues having to do with therapeutic value, and the relationship between patients and those purveyors of CAM. This article aims instead to consider CAM from the perspective of commercial ethics. That is, we consider the ethics not of prescribing or administering CAM (activities most closely associated with health professionals) but the ethics of selling CAM.
The paper is currently open access – so go grab a copy, read it, and come back to discuss.
An ethical framework for CAM
In our new paper, MacDonald and I pose (and answer) three primary questions:
     1.  What is the case for selling CAM? We consider the value of a diversity of choice and the benefits of a free marketplace.
     2.  What are the general ethics of commercial transactions? We outline an ethical framework that can guide an evaluation of CAM.
     3.  What does this ethical framework say about the commercial sale of CAM?
        ◦ Is CAM merchantable – does it fail to function?
        ◦ Does the sale of CAM involve deception?
        ◦ Does the sale of CAM harm third parties?
What exactly is CAM?
The question of what exactly is CAM is one that’s been discussed again and again on this blog. This is a fair question and one which we considered carefully in drafting our paper. The boundaries of CAM are always in flux as science progresses. Rather than get bogged down with a specific definition, we used a general approach:
Further, it should be acknowledged that the borders of the entire category, CAM, are fuzzy. While it includes treatments that have not yet been tested, or lack sufficient evidence to be accepted as medicine, CAM also includes treatments that have been extensively tested, demonstrated to be ineffective from a scientific perspective, and consequently rejected from conventional medicine. Consequently what’s considered CAM may shift over time…Our solution is to offer a broad framework that can be applied to any healthcare product or service – indeed, to any product or service at all. While our topic is CAM, when it comes to evaluating a particular product or service, very little hangs on whether that product or service is ‘really and truly’ an example of CAM, or on whether it is an example of complementary, as opposed to alternative, medicine. Second, the examples used below generally involve treatment modalities – such as homeopathy and acupuncture – that are typically and uncontroversially considered central examples of CAM.
The argument for CAM
The argument for CAM is one which I hear regularly from the pharmacy profession. There are two important principles that provide legitimate support for the commercial sale of CAM:
Respect for individual (consumer) autonomy: It is morally good to respect the choices that people make in marketplaces, and it is generally better to avoid paternalism. More choices in the “marketplace” for health mean more unique needs can be met. If consumers prefer CAM, then it is good that these products be available to purchase.
The respect for a competitive marketplace: Markets tend to work effectively when there are lots of choices from many vendors. Competition keeps prices low and keeps firms competitive. Restricting CAM restricts markets. By definition these products are alternatives to medicine and in particular, often considered to be legitimate substitutes for products and services considered “conventional” medicine.
An ethical framework for considering CAM
In developing an ethical framework, we strived to make the model as simple as possible. Our approach was to outline a small set of norms that we feel are assumed and effectively endorsed by those that participate in commercial transactions. We note the assumption that market transactions are ethically legitimate. We agree with this presumption, but also highlight that their ethical legitimacy is conditional, as it’s based on assumptions that participants are well informed and that beneficial outcomes are expected by the participants. We propose the following:
Participants in commerce should endeavor to:
     1.  Offer a product that works – a product that is, in the language of commercial law, ‘merchantable.’
     2.  Only sell products to people who understand their fundamental characteristics, and who are reasonably capable of understanding (either on their own or with suitable professional help) whether that product will meet their needs. This implies a general demand for honesty on the part of sellers, and a refusal to profit from the ignorance of consumers.
     3.  Take reasonable steps to ensure that third parties (those who do not consent to participate in a particular market exchange) are not harmed.
It should be fairly clear to anyone that looks at the actions of the FTC in the area of CAM that when this framework is grossly violated, regulators can and will act, prosecuting CAM vendors when products do not work or when sellers are not honest about the characteristics of their product. Green coffee bean, which I’ve blogged about extensively, is an example of rank fraud in CAM sales and marketing.
Considering the ethics of selling CAM
Does CAM work?
Any regular reader to this blog will know that there is little evidence to demonstrate that CAM offers any meaningful, beneficial medicinal effects. In fact, some CAM, such as homeopathy, is an elaborate placebo system, where most remedies contain no medicine at all – they are completely inert.
Some of the arguments for CAM efficacy are actually arguments against conventional medicine, a false dilemma suggesting that since some medical products lack efficacy, CAM must work. However, while some “conventional” medicine products may lack robust evidence of efficacy, explanations for how they might work do not rely on magical (or wishful) thinking. And while conventional medicine is far from perfect, its scientific foundation means that products can be tested for efficacy in ways that help us understand if effects are real, and if they cause harm. And we agree that this framework can also be applied to “conventional” medicinal products that may lack efficacy.
Another argument for CAM borders on post-modernism, where conventional medicine is felt to take a far too narrow view of what constitutes “evidence” of efficacy. We reject this argument:
We acknowledge that it is at least possible that some CAM modalities are not well suited to such study. However, we resist the implication that such difficulties do much to cast doubt upon the strong scientific consensus that says that most CAM treatments simply do not work. First, note that while treatment of particular patients may be highly individualized, this is true for patients of mainstream or conventional medicine too. And while treatment – whether alternative or conventional – may be highly individualized, it is inevitably based on broad clinical generalizations which ought to be susceptible to rigorous testing. Second, note that at least some clinicians who favour at least some forms of CAM believe that those forms are indeed capable of being fairly tested by means of randomized controlled trials. It should be noted noted [sic] that if CAM treatments are not rigorously tested, then ineffective CAM treatments will never be identified. But many such trials have been conducted, and on the whole the results have been dismal. Third, where there are legitimate reasons for thinking that the kind of rigour represented by the classical randomized controlled trial is out of place for testing a particular form of CAM, there remains a need for promoters of CAM to find some rigorous method – for example, something beyond intuition, tradition, and anecdote, something that goes some distance to overcoming the well-documented flaws to which personal observation is subject – for establishing efficacy. Where such non-RCT evidence is available, it is worthy of some measure of respect. But to the best of our knowledge, such credible, non-RCT evidence of effectiveness is not available for most forms of CAM.
Of course, some might object that we have too narrow a notion of what it means for a health product to ‘work.’ A particular treatment, even if it has no demonstrable physiological effect, may for example have religious, spiritual, or cultural significance. If a product satisfies the needs of some religious rite, for example, then it should count as a product that ‘works’ in the relevant sense. In some cases, such significance might constitute ethical justification for selling a product even in the absence of proof of biological efficacy. But there are strict limits to such justification. In particular, if that is the sense in which the product is expected to ‘work,’ then that must be an understanding that is shared between buyer and seller and acknowledged in communications between them. Note also that in some cases, people may perceive in CAM cultural (or other) values that simply are not there. As MacDonald, (2002) argues with regard to women’s health, for example, the popularity of CAM may be the result, in part, of a values-based rejection of modern society’s intense ‘medicalization’ of nearly everything related to women’s health. But as MacDonald argues, in some cases the use of CAM products may in fact constitute ‘the substitution of one commercialized expert understanding of women’s health and bodies for another.’12 A complex homeopathic regime offered by an ‘expert’ naturopath, perhaps at some considerable cost, may not in fact prove any less alienating than more mainstream options. Another example: homeopathy is often touted as an alternative to ‘Western’ medicine despite the fact it was invented in a western nation, namely Germany. Anyone who thinks of homeopathy as somehow part of an exotic Eastern tradition, and who values it for that reason, is not getting what they’re paying for.
But what about the vendor who truly does believe that their particular CAM does work? We do not doubt the sincerity of many providers of CAM. However, we argue that this is not an acceptable excuse:
However, it is not plausible to excuse vendors for selling a product that does not work simply because they have either not taken the time and effort to investigate whether their product works, or turned a blind eye to the evidence that is available to them. There is, after all, such a thing as willful ignorance. While the credulous seller of (for example) homeopathy may not be guilty of knowingly selling something that does not work, he or she is guilty of having culpably low epistemic standards. Such a person does not sell knowingly, but he or she does arguably sell recklessly.
We argue that vendors should be taking reasonable steps to determine if their product “works” based on the claims they are making about their product. Given the specific (and often measurable) claims made about CAM effectiveness for different conditions and circumstances, we believe it is the responsibility of the vendor to evaluate the best evidence available, taking care to ensure the statements they are making are backed by supporting evidence. If a product or service cannot be reasonably expected to deliver as promised, then ethically, a vendor should stop selling that product in the marketplace.
Does the sale of CAM involve deception, or does it profit based on the ignorance of consumers?
Many consumers lack access to good information on the effectiveness of CAM remedies. Look at the marketing of Airborne above. Airborne has no demonstrable efficacy, and even after the manufacturer settled false advertising charges, it is still sold openly (albeit without explicit claims of efficacy). Homeopathy is another excellent example. Homeopathic “remedies” are so dilute that most products don’t contain a single molecule of any medicinal ingredient – or even the ingredient that is listed on the label. Moreover, if homeopathy was to actually work, it would overturn much of what we know about biology, chemistry and physics. A similar argument can be made for acupuncture. Meridians and acupuncture points have never been shown to actually exist. There is no chi, and acupuncture is a theatrical placebo. Acupuncture doesn’t work. Yet few consumers know these facts, and regulators do not require manufacturers to provide them.
Does CAM harm third parties?
One need only look to the use of endangered species in CAM remedies to illustrate the point that CAM can definitely harm those outside commercial transactions – it is driving some species extinct. Homeopathy provides another illustrative example. Homeopaths and naturopaths sell “nosodes” which are marketed as alternative to real vaccines. These “nosodes” are inert sugar pills. Those that use “nosodes” in place of vaccines compromise public health by reducing population vaccination levels, putting some members of the population (e.g., the immunocompromised) at risk of infection. Finally there are multiple examples of children harmed by parental use of CAM in place of actual medicine.
Is selling CAM ethical?
Even setting aside medical ethics, we argue that the sale of CAM is unethical. CAM can violate all three ethical principles of commercial transactions. In order for commercial transactions to be ethical, they must involve products that work. They must be advertised and promoted fairly and honestly. Finally, these transactions must not harm innocent third parties. Much of CAM fails on one or more of these measures.

   Placebos as Medicine: The Ethics of Homeopathy
Scott Gavura 
Link
Is it ever ethical to provide a placebo treatment? What about when that placebo is homeopathy? Last month I blogged about the frequency of placebo prescribing by physicians. I admitted my personal discomfort, stating I’d refuse to dispense any prescription that would require me to deceive the patient. The discussion continued in the comments, where opinions seemed to range from (I’m paraphrasing) “autonomy, shmatonomy, placebos works” to the more critical who likened placebo use to “treating adults like children.” Harriet Hall noted, “We should have rules but we should be willing to break them when it would be kinder to the patient, and would do no harm.” And on reflection, Harriet’s perspective was one that I could see myself accepting should I be in a situation like the one she described. It’s far easier to be dogmatic when you don’t have a patient standing in front of you. But the comments led me to consider possible situations where a placebo might actually be the most desirable treatment option. If I find some, should I be as dogmatic about homeopathy as I am about other placebos?
Nicely, Kevin Smith, writing in the journal Bioethics, examines the ethics of placebos, based on an analysis of homeopathy. Homeopathy is the ultimate placebo in routine use — most remedies contain only sugar and water, lacking a single molecule of any potentially medicinal ingredient. Smith’s paper, Against Homeopathy — A Utilitarian Perspective, is sadly behind a paywall. So I’ll try to summarize his analysis, and add my perspective as a health care worker who regularly encounters homeopathy.
The first third of the paper is a concise summary of the scientific absurdity of homeopathy. Hahnemann’s “Law of Similars”, based on a single observation of the effects of quinine on malaria, is the basis for the non-scientific process of “provings” to match symptoms to substances. The results of provings are compiled in the Homeopathic Materia Medica, which homeopaths select their remedies from. (So now we have remedies based on products including “sleep”, Stonehenge, shipwrecks, ascending colons, light bulbs, and vacuum cleaner dirt.) Smith summarizes this law as:
More fundamentally, there is simply no plausible or rational basis for supposing that substances that produce particular symptoms can cure the same symptoms. The assumption that ‘like cures like’ places the onus on proponents of homeopathy to elucidate the special logic involved: to the knowledge of the present author, a satisfactory account of this logic has not been made.
Hahnemann’s second law, the “Law of Infinitesimals” is as absurd as the law of similars. That a product can gain potency and effect with dilution, and that effect persists (and even grows stronger) even after being diluted completely away defies physical laws. Smith points out the contradiction between the idea that water is touted to have a memory of the “proved” substance, yet has forgotten everything else that has every been dissolved in it:
The fact that physiological chaos does not ensure whenever we drink a glass of water provides a simple but powerful refutation of the ‘memory’ concept in homeopathy.
Smith then covers the research on homeopathy. Given its premise is implausible (or impossible), it is not surprising that the highest quality clinical trials have demonstrated no efficacy beyond placebo effects. Yet positive trials are to be expected from statistical effects alone. And when combined with bad design, weak blinding and other potential biases, it should not be surprising that a supportive clinical trials appear in the literature — and some even show up in Cochrane reviews. His conclusion is very much along the lines of the position taken by SBMers:
From Hume onward, it has been accepted that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Considering the extent to which the fundamental tenets of homeopath run counter to established rules of science and reason, empirical evidence in support of homeopathy would have to be particularly robust, in view of the fact that acceptance of homeopathy would entail a major epistemic scientific revolution.
So it’s implausible, the remedies contain no medicinal ingredients, and, not surprisingly, it works no better than a placebo. Yet it is popular, even among some physicians and scientists. But is it ethical? And here’s where we get to the meat of the ethical analysis.
Non-Invasiveness/Cost-effectiveness
Placebos, as commenters to my past post noted, do have one merit. If the alternative to antibiotics for a cold is homeopathy for a cold, then homeopathy is probably a better therapeutic choice, because “no treatment” is the preferred treatment. There are many medical conditions for which we have few effective medical therapies, and in some cases the impetus to prescribe a placebo may be simply to obtain the psychological (placebo) effects associated with their use. And given the habit (as I described last month) for some physicians to select impure placebos (those containing subtherapeutic or non-toxic ingredients), then isn’t a pure placebo like homeopathy sometimes preferable? Here’s where Smith gives homeopathy credit:
In cases where ineffective medication is considered to be in the best interests of the patient, which form of such medicine should be prescribed?
The answer to this question seems clear: the ineffective medicine that is the least invasive and least expensive should be used. On these criteria, homeopathy scores highly.
So in situations where a placebo is felt to be in the patient’s best interest, homeopathy might be felt to be favorable, particularly if an “impure” placebo has a greater potential for unwanted effects. But Smith makes a small error here: Homeopathy isn’t always the least expensive option – a point I’ll return to.
Holism
Holistic is a popular term among alternative medicine proponents and is usually used to deride science-based medicine, with the fallacious claim that various alternative treatments treat the “whole patient” while medicine does not. And as has been described elsewhere on this blog, the extended consultation offered by alternative medicine providers is probably the source of most if not all of the benefits of treatments. However the non-specific benefits of talk therapy, dialogue, empathy and reassurance are not limited to homeopathy, and can be incorporated into science-based practices. And importantly, since homeopathic “remedies” can be purchased in pharmacies and other stores without consultation, the “holistic” approach, and its benefits, are by no means certain when consultation is omitted. For these reasons, Smith rejects holism as providing any unique support for homeopathy.
Placebo effects
In the research setting, placebo effects are any measured response in patients that receive the inert (placebo) treatment. But as has been noted on this blog, there are actually multiple elements and observations that sum into what’s described as “placebo effects.” Some of what can contribute to the apparent efficacy of a placebo may not be due to patient-reported outcomes: Researcher bias, poor blinding, and weak overall study design and conduct can all add to the measurement of, and subsequent conclusion that a placebo has effects. Even a disease’s natural history, or regression to the mean can lead one to conclude a correctly-timed placebo treatment is effective.
Smith does not dive deeply into placebo effects, but makes two arguments against homeopathy’s value as a placebo. First, he notes that placebo effects are generally restricted to subjective symptoms like pain and fatigue, with no evidence supporting any meaningful disease-modifying effects. This limits the usefulness of homeopathy to those conditions for which there is some evidence to show that there may be placebo effects. Smith then raises the ethical appropriateness of a key component of successful placebo use: in order for placebos to work, patients must believe something that is untrue. From a utilitarian perspective, Smith notes that lying may be acceptable when it (on balance) is an overall positive — that is, it generates a positive utility. However, patient autonomy must also be considered — the right for patients to make an informed decision about their treatments. Smith suggests that if you personally rank autonomy above the potential placebo benefits, then the use of homeopathy is untenable from an ethical perspective.
But are homeopaths deliberately deceiving their clients? Smith argues (and I agree) that most homeopaths genuinely believe “remedies” to be effective — so they are not acting in bad faith when they advocate their use. However, the fact remains that patients that are told that homeopathy is effective are being given information that is contrary to the scientific evidence. Consequently Smith describes their actions as “ethically unacceptable” regardless of their sincere (but wrong) beliefs.
But what about placebo use by health professionals? While routine use of placebos wouldn’t be considered ethically acceptable, Smith notes that reinforcing the efficacy of a conventional medication, in a way that could enhance potential placebo effects, is acceptable. This is a routine part of the pharmacist’s dialogue with patients – understanding and addressing concerns, summarizing therapeutic effects, and managing overall treatment expectations. It can be done in a non-deceptive way that should maximize the non-specific effects. But what about pure placebos? Smith gives the example of battlefield use of saline injections for pain as a circumstance where pure placebo use would be ethically acceptable. So in situations where no other options exist, perhaps. But as a matter of course, providing pure placebos would not be considered ethically appropriate.
Autonomy
What if patients elect to choose homeopathy, despite counsel that the product is inert? I’ve encountered this situation in the pharmacy: when asked for advice, I inform the patient that the product has no active ingredients and has no medicinal effects. They’re usually grateful for that, but sometimes my advice will be challenged or ignored, and they’ll purchase it anyway. In situations where it’s clear that the patient may be avoiding appropriate consultation or treatment, I may press my argument further. But once I’ve described the scientific evidence, and given my advice, I’m comfortable letting the patient make their own purchasing decision. And that’s consistent with Smith’s analysis:
If utility is generally maximized by allowing patient autonomy, then patients should be free to choose homeopathy. Secondly, exercise of autonomy provides psychological benefits for the agent: it is well accepted that denial of free choice, or coercion, results in reduced happiness in the subjects concerned.
Smith describes the challenge of drawing lines between paternalism and autonomy, concluding that restriction of autonomy is probably reasonable when the risk of self-harm is greater — which is consistent with the case for restricting drugs to “prescription-only” status. While risks of contamination and unwanted medicinal effects do exist, the more common and real risk is probably the avoidance of proper medical treatment — which is one of the major disutilities of homeopathy.
Failing to Seek Medical Care
While some might be willing to accept the use of homeopathy in cases where placebo effects are possible and probably adequate, most draw the line when homeopathy is positioned as a substitute for effective medical treatment. Yet that’s the case when homeopathy is promoted as malaria prophylaxis, a substitute for vaccination, or even as a treatment for HIV or tuberculosis. Probably the best approach to mitigating this risk, while promoting individual patient autonomy, is to ensure that adequate information is provided to patients so that they are well informed of the lack of medicinal ingredients and the demonstrated lack of efficacy, beyond placebo, for any condition. Smith questions the ability of CAM practitioners to provide reliable advice on efficacy, and describes the promotion of a therapeutic doctrine, rather than reliable advice, as “ethically unacceptable.” He further characterizes any harms resulting in those unable to give fully informed consent (e.g., children or non-competent adults) as “ethically indefensible.”
Waste of Resources
If you’ve never bought it before, homeopathy is not cheap: its prices are comparable to conventional products with active ingredients. Given the lack of efficacy, every dollar spent on homeopathy is a waste of resources, in that it could otherwise be put to more effective use — for plausible treatments, or anything else, for that matter. So from a utilitarian perspective, Smith argues that this expenditure is unethical. Smith notes that homeopathy may not just act as a substitute for other care due to its lack of effect: When the homeopathy fails to work, conventional care may subsequently be sought.
Smith makes the same ethical evaluation of research into homeopathy, where because of a lack of “logico-scientific validity”, human trials of homeopathy are ethically contentious and an inappropriate use of resources.
Credibility Issues
One of the issues that concerns me as a pharmacist is the veneer of credibility that homeopathy gains when it’s packaged and positioned alongside conventional medicine in pharmacies. I suspect that most consumers expect the products on pharmacy shelves to contain medicinal ingredients, and to have some sort of evidence to support their sale. If I substituted placebos for prescription drugs, I’d quickly lose my license to practice. And if I sold boxes of toothpaste or tissue that were empty inside, I’d probably be out of business pretty quickly. So I’m dismayed when I see pharmacies selling cough syrups without active ingredients, sending an unwarranted message of homeopathy’s effectiveness.
Another credibility issue arises from an educational perspective, when homeopathy is “integrated” into science and and medical education as well, increasing the perception that homeopathy has medical credibility. Smith sums it up:
“…inappropriate ‘approval’ for homeopathy serves as a disutility, as it will tend to magnify several negative outcomes, namely resource wastage, risk of patients failing to seek effective healthcare, and reduced patient autonomy through the promulgation of erroneous medical knowledge”
Smith goes on to note a number of other concerns documented repeatedly at SBM, including a weakening of a societal commitment to scientifically-established treatments, as well as the confusion of ineffective treatments such as homeopathy with treatments that he describes as genuinely complementary, such as mediation, relaxation, music and exercise — something that has been described here as the CAM Trojan horse.
Conclusion
So where does that leave us? Unfortunately we cannot simply sum up the arguments in a formula to give us the ethical answer. It seems clear that the ethical downsides to homeopathy outweigh its benefits under most circumstance I can envision. Smith uses the example of an ineffective defibrillator to point out that the use of such a device device in the context of medical care would be “morally unjustifiable.” He notes,
Because it is inherently ineffective, homeopathy cannot be ethically neutral. It follows that the purchase, deployment or promotion of homeopathy is morally unacceptable.
Perhaps there may yet emerge a framework where placebos can be ethically (and judiciously) justified. Homeopathy isn’t it. So what should health professionals do? For one, we should stop promoting homeopathy, and the sale of homeopathic remedies. We should advocate against the allocation of limited health resources to researching, facilitating or providing homeopathy. We should avoid giving homeopathy undeserved credibility by selling it alongside actual medicine, or allowing it to be sold without clear labelling that describes its lack of ingredients and effectiveness. And when we’re asked, we have an ethical responsibility to explain why we believe homeopathy is no ‘alternative” at all.
Reference
Smith K (2011). Against Homeopathy – A Utilitarian Perspective. Bioethics PMID: 21320146

Should placebos be used in randomized controlled trials of surgical interventions?
Trials of new experimental drugs frequently compare them to placebo, particularly when there is a large subjective component to the disease being treated, such as pain. In contrast, placebo-controlled trials are rarely undertaken in surgery, mainly because it’s been considered ethically dicey to do sham surgery on one group. Should this change? Should we be more open to doing randomized, placebo-controlled surgery trials, complete with sham surgery?
David Gorski on May 25, 2015
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Alone of all the regular contributors to this blog, I am a surgeon. Specifically, I’m a surgical oncologist specializing in breast cancer surgery, which makes me one of those hyper-specialized docs that are sometimes mocked as not being “real” doctors. Of course, the road to my current practice and research focus was long and involved quite a few years doing general surgery, so it is not as though I am unfamiliar with a wide variety of surgical procedures. Heck, I’m sure I could do an old-fashioned appendectomy, bowel resection, or cholecystectomy if I had to. Just don’t ask me to use the da Vinci robot or, with the exception of the case of a cholecystectomy, a laparoscope, although, given the popularity of robotic surgery, I sometimes joke that I really, really need to figure out how to do breast surgery with the robot. After all, if plastic surgeons are using it for breast reconstruction, surely the cancer surgeon should get in on the action.
I keed. I keed.
Clinical trials of surgical procedures and placebo controls
I have, however, from time to time addressed the issue of science-based surgery, and this weekend seems like as good a time to do so again, given that I just came across an article in the BMJ reporting a systematic review of the use of placebos in surgical trials. It’s a year old, but worth discussing. Before I get to discussing the nitty-gritty of this particular trial, let me just note that the evaluation of surgical procedures for efficacy and safety tends to be more difficult to accomplish than it is for medications, mainly because it’s much harder to do the gold standard clinical trial for surgical procedures, the double-blind, placebo-controlled randomized clinical trial. The two most problematic aspects of designing such an RCT in surgery, as you might imagine, are the blinding, particularly if it’s a trial of a surgical procedure versus no surgical procedure, and persuading patients to agree. I’ll deal with the latter first, because I have direct personal experience with it.
Way, way back in the Stone Age of my career (around 15 years ago), there was a surgical trial going on known as the NSABP-B32 trial. This was a trial designed to test whether a procedure called sentinel lymph node (SLN) biopsy in breast cancer, which involves using dye (either radioactive or blue or both) to identify the lymph node(s) under the arm most likely to contain cancer. The idea was to determine if a patient had positive lymph nodes without doing the old standard of care, removing all the axillary lymph nodes, a procedure with a high risk of lymphedema (arm swelling due to interruption of lymphatic drainage) and other problems that made evaluating the lymph nodes more complication-prone than the surgical excision of the actual breast cancer. The problem was that we didn’t know how accurate SLN biopsy was or how often it misclassified a woman with node-positive disease as node-negative. So a trial was undertaken in which women were randomized either to (1) SLN biopsy followed by axillary lymph node dissection (removal of all the axillary lymph nodes to compare the results of the SLN biopsy) or (2) SLN biopsy alone, with an axillary lymph node dissection only if the SLN was positive for cancer. The results ultimately demonstrated that overall survival, disease-free survival, and regional control (control of the disease in the axilla) were the same in all groups, and SLN biopsy became the new standard of care in women with early stage, clinically node negative breast cancer, replacing axillary lymph node dissection.
Here’s the issue. Persuading women to be randomized was difficult. Very difficult. Most wanted the newer and less-invasive procedure, the SLN biopsy, because they feared the complication of lymphedema that axillary lymph node dissection produced. A few were risk-averse and not willing to be randomized if they might get just the “new” procedure (at the time, the SLN biopsy). And this was with a trial that had no placebo (i.e., “sham” surgery) arm and was not blinded. Of course, the B-32 trial didn’t need to be blinded because we were examining “hard” outcomes: overall survival (the “hardest” endpoint of all), disease-free survival, and recurrence in the axilla. What about trials that are not examining endpoints like this? I’ve discussed one such example before, vertebroplasty for vertebral fractures resulting from osteoporosis. Vertebroplasty, a widely used procedure to reduce pain from these fractures, basically involves injecting glue into the fracture to stabilize it. Because it wasn’t a full surgical procedure and only involved injecting glue (or not injecting glue), the two vertebroplasty trials I discussed were relatively easy to blind compared to trials of more invasive surgical procedures, and the vertebroplasty trials ultimately showed that “real” vertebroplasty is no better than placebo vertebroplasty.
Then there are the ethical and practical issues as well. For instance, in the case of a surgical procedure involving more extensive rearrangement of anatomy (as I like to put it), a blinded trial would require that at least an incision be made on the patient identical to that of the surgery, but that nothing be done. This presents an ethical dilemma, since clinical trials rely on the principle of clinical equipoise (not knowing which treatment is better or whether the treatment being tested is better than no treatment) and beneficence, which means that risk must be minimized for clinical trial subjects. Indeed, clinical equipoise is often in conflict with scientific rigor in clinical trial design. Also, from a practical standpoint, in a placebo-controlled surgical trial, the surgeons would know which subjects were in each group, which leads to the question of whether the doctors taking care of the patient postoperatively would have to be different than the ones doing the surgery. Still, as the example of the vertebroplasty trials shows, for surgical procedures designed to relieve pain or other symptoms with subjective components, it’s important to include placebo controls in clinical trials.
This latest systematic review just emphasizes this even more. This is particularly true given how prone surgeons are to adopt new procedures before they have been adequately tested, as the example of laparoscopic cholecystectomy demonstrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the widespread adoption of robotic surgery for various conditions does today. (I’m sure that by saying that I’ll tick off a surgeon who swears by robotic surgery, but I don’t care.) Unfortunately, placebo-controlled trials of surgery for such conditions remain relatively rare.
The need for more placebo-controlled trials of surgery
The systematic review that spurred this post was conducted by a group that included mainly researchers from the UK (University of Oxford, the University of Southhampton, and the National Institute of Health Research), but also a researcher from the Harvard Stem Cell Institute. The authors first note:
In considering any scientific evaluation, it is important to remember that an outcome of a surgical treatment is a cumulative effect of the three main elements: critical surgical element, placebo effects, and non-specific effects. The critical or crucial surgical element is the component of the surgical procedure that is believed to provide the therapeutic effect and is distinct from aspects of the procedures that are diagnostic or required to access the disease being treated. The placebo effects are related to the patients’ expectation and the “meaning of surgery,” whereas the non-specific effects are caused by fluctuations in symptoms, the clinical course of the disease, regression to the mean, report bias, and consequences of taking part in the trial, including interaction with the surgeons, nurses, and medical staff. It is reasonable to assume that surgery is associated with a placebo effect. Firstly, because invasive procedures have a stronger placebo effect than non-invasive ones and, secondly, because a confident diagnosis and a decisive approach to treatment, typical for surgery, usually results in a strong placebo effect.
I’ve discussed the necessity of a surgeon projecting a “decisive” and confident air to patients before and the elements of placebo effects. In any case, it does appear to be true that the more invasive the treatment, the stronger the placebo effects, which would appear to make consideration of these nonspecific effects even more important in surgery than in medical interventions. Indeed, given that surgical procedures and associated devices tend not to be as strictly regulated as drugs (in fact, surgical procedures themselves are scarcely regulated at all other than by the professional societies encompassing the relevant surgical specialties), rigorous surgical trials are critical, but unfortunately they are uncommon, as noted by the authors:
Placebo controlled randomised clinical trials of surgical interventions are relatively uncommon. Studies published so far have often led to fierce debates on the ethics, feasibility, and role of placebo in surgery. One reason for the poor uptake is that many surgeons, as well as ethicists, have voiced concerns about the safety of patients in the placebo group. Many of the concerns are based on personal opinion, with little supporting evidence. In the absence of any comprehensive information on the use of placebo controls in surgery, and the lack of evidence for harm or benefit of incorporating a placebo intervention, a systematic review of placebo use in surgical trials is warranted.
So the authors performed their systematic review. They defined surgical trials as trials testing an interventional procedure that changes the anatomy and requires a skin incision or use of endoscopic techniques. Placebo was defined as a sham surgery or imitation procedure intended to mimic the active intervention in a manner such that the patient could not tell the difference, which generally required that the patients be sedated or under general anesthesia. Examples include inserting an endoscope but doing nothing or making a skin incision. Relevant studies were identified through a search of Medline, Embase, and the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, followed by independent screening by three of the investigators for the eligibility of each trial to be included. The references were also screened to identify any recently completed or ongoing studies. Duplicates were handled by only examining the publication that reported the main outcome for the trial.
Here is the summary for the selection process:

Overall, 39 of the 53 (74%) included studies were published after 2000. One aspect of these trials is that most of them investigated relatively minor conditions that were not directly life-threatening, such as gastro-esophageal reflux (n=6; 11%). Indeed, nearly half (43%) of the included studies were trials involving endoscopy as part of the investigated procedure. Thirteen trials (25%) used some exogenous material, implant, or tissue, and a further six used balloons. Also:
Most studies reported subjective outcomes such as pain (n=13; 25%), improvement in symptoms or function (n=17; 32%), or quality of life (n=8; 15%). Less than half of the trials (n=22; 42%) reported an objective primary outcome—that is, measures that did not depend on judgment of patients or assessors. The majority of trials were small; the number of randomised participants ranged between 10 and 298, with a median of 60. No placebo controlled surgical trials investigating more invasive surgical procedures such as laparotomy, thoracotomy, craniotomy, or extensive tissue dissection were identified.
So right there we see a bias in the study towards less invasive procedures. This is not surprising, given that it is likely less ethically problematic to propose, for instance, sticking an endoscope into the rectum or stomach of a subject in the placebo-control group and looking around while doing nothing than it is to propose doing a non-therapeutic thoracotomy or laparotomy on a control subject. Be that as it may, it is useful to reference here one of the most famous surgical trials of all that utilized sham surgery, arguably the first that ever did, a randomized clinical trial of internal mammary artery ligation for angina performed in the 1950s. Beginning in the 1930s and continuing until this study, angina pectoris was sometimes treated with a surgical procedure known as mammary artery ligation. The idea was that tying off these arteries would divert more blood to the heart. The operation became popular on the basis of relatively small, uncontrolled case series. Then, two randomized, sham surgery-controlled clinical trials were published in 1959 and 1960. Both of these trials showed no difference between bilateral internal mammary artery ligation and sham surgery. Very rapidly, surgeons stopped doing this operation. More recently, a randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled trial of arthroscopic partial meniscectomy showed the same thing: Arthroscopic repair for a degenerative tear of the medial meniscus produced results indistinguishable from sham surgery. Only time will tell whether this procedure is abandoned.
So what did this review find? First, as one would expect, the authors noted that in 39 of 53 (74%) of the trials, there was improvement in the placebo arm. No surprise there. In 27 (51%) of the trials, there was no difference between the sham surgery and real surgery arms. In the remaining 26 (49%) of the trials, the authors reported that “surgery was superior to placebo but the magnitude of the effect of the surgical intervention over that of the placebo was generally small.” Overall, in 43% of the trials, the authors stated that there were no serious adverse events, although one trial didn’t report anything about adverse events. In the remaining 27 (51%) of trials, serious adverse events occurred in at least one study arm. They also noted that serious adverse events were reported in the placebo arm in 18 trials (34%) but that in many of these studies the adverse events were associated with the severity of the condition rather than the intervention itself, such as rebleeding after an attempt to stop bleeding using endoscopy, which happened in both treatment and placebo groups.
One key weakness of the study is that the chosen existing studies did not allow assessment of the magnitude of placebo effects, as only one study included an observational, “no treatment” group. The authors specifically did not include studies with wait list controls, for reasons that I find unclear. The authors state that “analysis of the placebo effect without controlling for non-specific effects of being in the trial would be flawed,” but that could be said about any analysis seeking to estimate the magnitude of placebo effects. You go with what you have, and for some reason these investigators chose not to, citing two Ted Kaptchuk papers as justification. (Yes, this Ted Kaptchuk.) I wish they had included such trials, even if the analysis ended up being somewhat “flawed.”
The authors note, as I have noted before, that the record of how physicians react to negative RCTs is mixed. (I myself have discussed this issue before.) This is how they put it:
The results of the placebo controlled surgical trials performed so far have had a varied impact on clinical care. With the exception of the trials on debridement for osteoarthritis or internal mammary artery ligation for angina, most of the trials did not result in a major change in practice. Moseley’s study on debridement for knee osteoarthritis was well received and resulted in limiting the recommendations for debridement and lavage for osteoarthritis of the knee to patients only with clear mechanical symptoms such as locking. The reaction of the medical community to the trials on tissue transplantation to treat Parkinson’s disease was also favourable. Although this treatment is not currently recommended, the need for more studies on mechanisms of disease and on tissue transplantation is recognised. These studies also provoked a discussion about ethical aspects of randomised clinical trials and placebo.
In contrast, the results of the trials on the efficacy of vertebroplasty were challenged and their authors were criticised for undermining the evidence supporting this commonly used procedure. The critics acknowledged that the injection of cement might be associated with many side effects, some of them potentially dangerous, but they argued that the treatment was justified because earlier unblinded trials had shown superiority of vertebroplasty over medical treatment. This argument against the validity of placebo controlled trials neglected any potential placebo effect of vertebroplasty.
It’s true, too. Just last fall, I noted that, five years after the resoundingly negative randomized, double-blinded clinical trials of vertebroplasty for osteoporotic vertebral fractures and nearly ten years after earlier trials suggesting that vertebroplasty does no better than placebo for such fractures, those with a vested interest in performing vertebroplasty continue to attack the studies their investigators. Indeed, I pointed out that, even though use of this procedure has decreased in the wake of negative RCTs and ultimately recommendations against it by the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, it hasn’t gone away by any means. I also pointed out how arguments for the procedure by certain radiologists were scientifically dubious and uncomfortably close to the sorts of arguments used by practitioners of “complementary and alternative medicine” who justify use of their modalities because they provoke placebo effects.
The authors conclude with a powerful argument in favor of more sham-controlled randomized trials of surgical procedures, arguing that they are as important in surgery as they are in medicine:
Placebo controlled trials in surgery are as important as they are in medicine, and they are justified in the same way. They are powerful, feasible way of showing the efficacy of surgical procedures. They are necessary to protect the welfare of present and future patients as well as to conduct proper cost effectiveness analyses. Only then may publicly funded surgical interventions be distributed fairly and justly. Without such studies ineffective treatment may continue unchallenged.
As surgery is inherently associated with some risk, it is important that the surgical treatment is truly effective and that the benefits outweigh the risks. Placebo controlled surgical trials are not free from adverse events but risks are generally minimal in well-designed trials and the control arm is much safer than the active treatment. However, this review highlighted the need for better reporting of trials, including serious adverse events and their relation to a particular element of surgical procedure.
A need exists to “demystify” and extend the use of the surgical placebo in clinical trials. These should result in a greater acceptance of this type of trial by the surgical community, ethics committees, funding bodies, and patients. In turn, this would lead to more studies, better guidelines on the design and reporting of studies, and a larger body of evidence about efficacy and the risks of surgical interventions. Placebo controlled surgical trials are highly informative and should be considered for selected procedures.
There is no doubt that carrying out randomized, sham-controlled clinical trials of surgical procedures presents challenges greater than the already formidable challenges of doing such trials in medicine. Neither is there any doubt that there will be a lot of procedures and interventions for which carrying out a sham-controlled RCT will be problematic from a standpoint of ethics and/or practicality. For these interventions, we will continue to have to rely on a combination of unblinded randomized trials and/or observational data. However, this review presents a conclusion that should not be a surprise to any surgeon: That there are a lot of procedures out there for which the evidence base is weak and that might not even do better than sham surgery. The only way to correct that is to carry out sham-controlled blinded randomized clinical trials whenever there is doubt for as many surgical procedures as is feasible. Then we surgeons have to pay attention to the results and act upon them.
And there are quite a few surgical interventions that could use this approach.

The Ethics of CAM: More Harm than Good?
A new book examines the ethics of Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM). Ernst and Smith demonstrate that CAM is inherently unethical and does more harm than good.
Harriet Hall on March 20, 2018
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Edzard Ernst is arguably the world’s foremost expert on the claims and the evidence (or lack thereof) for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM). Now he has teamed up with a medical ethicist, Kevin Smith, to co-author a new book, More Harm than Good? The Moral Maze of Complementary and Alternative Medicine. Much has been written on CAM, but this book takes a new approach. It asks if CAM is ethical, and answers with a resounding “No.”
In all areas of health care, patients are entitled to expect certain basic precepts to be satisfied:
    • Practitioners should be competent.
    • Treatments should be based on valid knowledge.
    • Educational and licensing programs should ensure that only qualified practitioners can practice.
    • Autonomy: patients should be free to choose or reject treatments based on full informed consent.
    • Honesty.
    • Absence of exploitation.
The authors say, “These basic ethical requirements are frequently neglected, ignored or willfully violated in CAM.” They address these precepts one by one, in great detail, showing how CAM fails to measure up. They support their argument with plentiful examples from the clinical practice of CAM practitioners.
The book begins with a primer on medical ethics. They discuss the frameworks of nonconsequentialism and consequentialism, and show how the framework of principlism attempts to factor in both of those approaches, resulting in four core principles:
    • Respect for autonomy
    • Nonmaleficence
    • Beneficence
    • Justice
Research fundamentals and the problems with CAM research
There is an excellent chapter on Research Fundamentals (what good research should look like). It covers pitfalls in research, p-values, placebo controls, double blinding, systematic analyses, prior probability, and other crucial topics.
The following chapter covers the problems with much of CAM research, focusing on these issues:
    • Insufficient numbers of participants
    • Lack of a control group
    • Inappropriate control group
    • Control group present but otherwise flawed
    • Use of surrogate endpoints
    • Misuse of statistics
    • “Too good to be true” results
    • Fraudulent research
They provide numerous examples of each and speculate about possible reasons for poor research design (perhaps the CAM researchers realize that a properly controlled study would show that their treatment doesn’t work). Any study with the design “A + B versus B” will guarantee a positive result, even if A is ineffective. Doing such studies is not only useless, but unethical, because it fails to answer a meaningful question and wastes resources.
They explain why anecdotal evidence is woefully inadequate: “Indeed, findings that accrue from this approach are liable to grossly misinform clinical practice; in this way, anecdotal evidence can often be worse than no evidence at all.” Much of CAM research is no better than an assemblage of anecdotal cases.
They explain the attraction of CAM, with a quote from Peter Medawar:
If a person is A) poorly, B) receives treatment intended to make him better, and C) gets better, then no power of reasoning known to medical science can convince him that it may not have been the treatment that restored his health.
Education
They argue that certain unavoidable features of CAM education render it an almost intrinsically invalid enterprise. It often resembles a religious cult. And it expropriates and corrupts core concepts from mainstream medicine. Students who enroll are not provided with accurate and sufficient information and can’t really give informed consent for their education. Chiropractic schools that teach “subluxation” have to teach a corrupted version of evidence-based medicine, because there is no evidence that subluxation is a valid concept, and there is evidence that chiropractic manipulations can lead to serious injury. Naturopaths, chiropractors, and homeopaths are poorly educated about vaccination; this has an impact on public health.
Informed consent
Informed consent requires the patient to understand the indication for the treatment, the nature of the procedure, the potential benefits and risks, and other treatment options.
A patient with asthma who is treated with spinal manipulation by a chiropractor is not likely to have given informed consent, which would require informing them that there is no evidence that spinal manipulation, and thus chiropractors, have any effect on asthma, that delaying proper conventional treatment is dangerous, that there are risks to spinal manipulation, and that other (proven) treatment options are available.
…the notion that CAM tackles the root causes of disease is a myth and an unethical distraction from the truth….We cannot name a single alternative treatment for which there is compelling evidence proving that it can produce more than symptom-relief.
Unreliable diagnostic techniques like iridology can generate both false-positive and false-negative results; sometimes false results can cost lives. “In this way invalid diagnostic tests are akin to bogus bomb-detectors.”
Genuine informed consent is unattainable for most CAM modalities.
Truth
CAM practitioners may peddle untruths for reasons ranging from honest error to deliberate fraud. The consequences to the patient are the same; falsehoods are always ethically unacceptable. Who should act to fulfill the duty of preventing falsehood-related harm? Individuals, agencies, and the government all share that responsibility.
When confronted with evidence that their CAM modality is not as effective or safe as they claim, CAM practitioners respond predictably, and Ernst and Smith predict these responses to their book:
     1.  They will state that there is evidence to the contrary.
     2.  They will suggest that the existing evidence has been misquoted.
     3.  They will say that medical research is generally so flawed that it cannot be trusted.
     4.  They will claim that scientific evidence is overruled by centuries of experience.
     5.  They will reverse the burden of proof.
     6.  They will say that a new scientific paradigm is required to explain how CAM works.
     7.  They will claim that scientific evidence and reasoning are not applicable in CAM.
     8.  They will point out how safe or inexpensive CAM is compared to conventional medicine.
     9.  They will suggest that the critic is paid by big pharma to defame CAM.
     10.  They will launch personal attacks on their critics.
To nip this in the bud, the authors have provided rebuttals to each of these arguments. And finally, they address the argument that even if CAM is only placebo, it’s justifiable to use it.
Exploitation
Finally, they discuss the ways in which CAM exploits patients, including physical damage, mental distress, financial loss, and harm to third parties.
Conclusion: CAM is unethical
        ◦ Ernst and Smith make a strong case that CAM is unethical, that it does more harm than good. Ethicists should be convinced. CAM practitioners and patients will not be, because their belief systems preclude an unbiased, rational scientific assessment. They will object as Ernst and Smith have predicted, but their objections have already been handily refuted. This book is well organized and well thought out. It was written to inform, not to entertain. It is not an easy or “fun” read, but it’s an important one.

The Ethics of Prescribing Worthless Treatments
Steven Novella on December 9, 2015
Link
Is it ever ethical for a physician to prescribe a treatment to a patient that they know to be entirely without efficacy? Is it ever possible to do this without deceiving the patient to some degree? I think the answer to both questions is a clear “no.”
Within the flipped reality of “alternative medicine,” however, it suddenly becomes acceptable to deceive patients and sell them worthless treatments, as long as the deception was minimally successful.
A recent editorial in Scientific American by Allison Bond addresses this question. She manages to hit upon many of the reasons placebo medicine is inappropriate, but her reasoning is a bit muddled and she comes, in my opinion, to the wrong conclusion. She wraps her commentary in an anecdote of a terminal patient for whom she cared who found relief from reiki. She concludes:
Of course, when it comes to treating patients with painful, life-threatening diseases, the goal of our care should be to lessen suffering, regardless of where such relief originates. A few months after Ms. W left the hospital, I learned that she had died, and the news hit me hard. I thought back to her treatment under our care and hoped that even among the misery, we had eased her suffering through our therapies—“alternative” or not.
I think that Bond goes through the same thought process that many physicians go through. She has some understanding of the trade-offs, but in the end as long as their patients say they feel better, they are OK with using placebos. This position, however, is misguided.
Ineffective treatments are not necessary
Bond acknowledges that treatments such as reiki and acupuncture may work solely through providing companionship, attention, and a moment of respite. That is, in fact, what the scientific research shows. Reiki is nothing more than a form of healing touch, promising to using non-existent energies to promote healing or the even more vague concept of “well-being.”
For both reiki and acupuncture, when studies are properly controlled they find that the treatment is no more effective than the ritual of treatment without the actual intervention, or just having someone spend time with a patient. The time and positive attention seem to be the only variables that matter.
The most logical conclusion to derive from this fact, which seems obvious to me, is that we should provide companionship and positive attention without the pseudoscientific magical claims. In fact, you can do this while administering science-based treatments, or just as an intervention in themselves. We used to call this good bedside manner, or just good nursing care, now it is marketed to patients as a separate intervention wrapped in utter nonsense.
If there is a lesson to derive here it is that, if we wish to do more for patients in terms of their mood, quality of life, and overall experience, we can formalize giving them companionship and positive attention as a thing unto itself, without the pseudoscience. This is not a new concept to hospitals, but if you think we need to do more, then do more.
The downsides of pseudoscience
Bond mentions only two negatives to relying upon ineffective treatments for their placebo effects, financial cost and opportunity cost. Delayed proper care or substitution for proper care may lead to bad outcomes. The implication is, as long as you don’t substitute alternative treatments for evidence-based care, there is no problem.
Although she mentions financial cost, she glosses over this point. When you essentially give someone license to sell magic and false hope to desperate sick people, it should come as no surprise that patients will be victimized by this. Many “alternative” clinic and practitioners charges tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars for their ineffective treatments.
The financial costs can be devastating, and they are piled on top of the costs of regular medical care. The family of a terminal patient, who are essentially emotionally blackmailed into spending money they cannot afford on a dubious treatment, are left with an additional financial burden on top of the loss of a loved-one.
False hope can also be psychologically devastating. Properly managing a terminally ill patient can be very challenging. Practitioners need to walk a fine line between keeping them focused on the positive, emphasizing any legitimate chance they have for recovery, while preparing them and their family for the worst. You have to help them navigate through horrible choices, such as choosing between extra months of survival vs quality of life, or whether or not they will find life permanently dependent on a ventilator acceptable.
Into this delicate balance comes an alternative practitioner, like a bull in a china closet, making outrageous promises of a cure, and sowing seeds of discontent with the medical system. I have seen patients go to their graves convinced the alternative treatment was the answer, even when it was obvious it was doing nothing. I have seen others realize they were had, devastated by the lost precious time and their last hopes dashed.
Rather than being eased into a position of acceptance, they were kept in denial and then dropped off a cliff.
Perhaps the most insidious negative of hospitals providing reiki or other such treatments to patients is that it legitimizes pseudoscience. Practitioners of dubious treatments are desperate for legitimacy, and association with a hospital or university is the golden ticket.
It is reasonable for patients to assume that a practice is legitimate if it has such as association. This puts them at the mercy of charlatans, who will then instill in them distrust of the medical establishment and belief in bizarre or pseudoscientific notions.
Even if initially patients are not using “alternative” treatments as a substitute for real care, the next time around (if there is a next time) they might, because they were convinced of its legitimacy by the hospital and well-meaning but naïve physicians and academics.
Finally, I think it is unethical to deceive patients. Deception robs them of their autonomy and informed consent. It is also excessively paternalistic. There is simply no alternative treatment without some level of deception. You cannot talk about non-existent “energy” or go through the ritual of acupuncture with a straight face without buying into the underlying pseudoscience to some degree.
Even avoiding direct health claims, and couching the treatment as, “some patients report they feel better,” contains implied claims that some desperate patients will latch onto.
In all other aspects of health care the standard of care is for physicians to be completely honest. (Admittedly, there are nuances here, like not unnecessarily scaring patients with premature information, but deception is never acceptable.) The fact that calling a treatment “alternative” erodes the ethics of informed consent is just one more bit of evidence that the entire “alternative medicine” movement is about eroding the standard of care in order to allow for treatments that were previously considered fraudulent.
Conclusion: No, it’s not OK to lie to patients
Physicians and academics, like Allison Bond, who have been convinced that it is OK to give patients ineffective treatments are mostly well-meaning, but profoundly naïve. They miss the extremely harmful downsides of eroding informed consent and deceiving patients while legitimizing pseudoscience and giving power to practitioners who exist along a spectrum from self-deluded to heartless con-artists.
Physicians like Bond are seeing just the tip of the iceberg, and this is by design. The face of “alternative” medicine that is presented to hospitals, universities, and also politicians is a Trojan horse. It is the soft practices, like reiki, offered as a “complementary” treatment in addition to standard care, for pure symptomatic relief.
It is meant to convince the establishment that this little deception is OK, as long as patients report that they feel better. Hospitals love it because they can charge a fee for additional services. Academics are just trying to have an open mind. Physicians like having additional options to help their patients. So what if a practitioner waves their hands over a patient and makes some vague claims about energy and healing?
This small (I would argue not-so-small) deception is the portal of entry into a world of horrible exploitation. “Alternative medicine” has been deliberately packaged as one thing, which is another deception. Legitimizing one alternative treatment is used to legitimize them all, and to promote the idea of placebo medicine and compromise patient autonomy just enough.
Physicians and academics need to hold the line. We need to be uncompromising in our advocacy of our patients, and that means zero tolerance for pseudoscience and deception. Do not be lulled by the soft veneer – beneath the surface is a world where our patients are horribly victimized by charlatans. We cannot be party to that, no matter our intentions.

   Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 1: Tu Quoque and History
Kimball Atwood
Link
Several weeks ago I argued here that a physician’s primary ethical obligation is to science and truth. In retrospect I probably should have put it a slightly different way: a physician’s primary ethical obligation is the same as everyone else’s. It is to honesty and integrity. For physicians, however, that means being true to real medical knowledge, among other things, and real medical knowledge comes from science. That is what this and the next several posts will be about.*
First, a little Tu Quoque
After reading some of the comments that followed my posting of two weeks ago, I reluctantly thought to add a few words about the medical profession’s view of physicians selling drugs. It felt tiresome to have to address the issue, because it is beside the point. The series was about “naturopathic medicine,” not about modern medicine. If readers who understand the point will excuse the interruption, I’ll quickly attempt to explain why by posing two extreme possibilities: If MDs are entirely innocent of the relevant breach of ethics, what would that have to do with naturopaths selling drugs? But if MDs are entirely guilty, two wrongs don’t make a right—demonstrating the same irrelevancy.
That is why the ”you should talk” sneer is known, in debate, as the tu quoque (“you too”) fallacy. It’s funny how parents seem to recognize it when faced with children who, in seeking permission to engage in dubious activities, invoke the parents’ own sordid histories or the equally irrelevant, alleged prerogatives of other people’s children. Yet the same parents appear to forget it in other contexts.
I was also weary and wary of those who would draw me into a strawman debate pitting the medical profession against any group of sectarian health advocates. I have only a small sense of “solidarity” with the group of people who have MD degrees, and even less so with organized medicine. My first allegiance, as I’ve explained elsewhere, is to science and reason. Those modes of inquiry, together with their obvious bearing on the integrity of all claims about nature, are the bases for my objections to naturopathy and to pseudoscience in general. The medical profession per se is related but not central to the issue. While thinking about these things, it dawned on me that a discussion of why that is might be useful.
Another tu quoque argument popular among advocates of implausible medical claims is that “medicine doesn’t know everything,” i.e., that there are still diseases left unsolved that people suffer and die from, which somehow impugns modern medicine and the basis for its best practices (science). That said, advocates want to invoke “alternative” medicine, which would be an obvious non-sequitur even if such impugning were justified, which it is not. It is the assertion that science-based medicine can’t deliver—demonstrating an extreme ahistoricity on the part of its advocates—that is the topic of this post. I’ll get to the issue of selling drugs another time.
An Essential, Very Short History of Science-Based Medicine
Economics aside, science and reason, including rational evaluations of empirical observations, have been the bases for every purposeful advance in our species’ age-old struggle with diseases, trauma, specific malnutritional states, anatomic and genetic anomalies, problems of aging, and every other problem that comes under the heading “medicine and public health.” Even before the advent of biology or medical science, empirical observations yielded occasional, useful discoveries, such as cinchona bark for marsh fever, innoculations of pus from cowpox blisters to prevent smallpox, limes for sailors to prevent or cure scurvy, food preservation and preparation by salting, cooking, smoking, cooling, or fermentation, and more. There were, undoubtedly, at least a few such advances in every place where humans lived for any length of time. The adjective “purposeful” is intended to exclude happy accidents of biology and the environment: reason did not create cinchona or vaccinia or salt or fermentation or water or fire, but it certainly led us to discover and use them.
Here are a few notions that have had no bearing, whatsoever, on advances in medicine and public health, and never will: vitalism, mysticism, demonology, voodoo, homeopathy and all other forms of sympathetic magic, qi, meridians, the five phases, the four humors, the five pranas, mysterious “energies,” astrology, psi, chiropractic “subluxations,” “craniosacral rhythms,” fanciful homunculi on the iris or the external ear or the sole of the foot, faith healing, other forms of magical thinking, and many more. To the extent that real advances may occasionally have occurred in contexts of pre-scientific practices, they were due to empirical observations, not to the “theories” themselves. More commonly, particularly in recent decades, such practices and beliefs have merely obstructed useful approaches.
Obviously we haven’t solved every medical problem yet. We’ve barely begun, in the greater scheme of things, yet we’re making progress at breakneck speed. Our species, homo sapiens sapiens, is about 200,000 years old. Our brain, the organ that allows us to reason and thus to solve medical problems, has been in its biologically modern state for at least 40,000 of those years (I remember reading somewhere), and possibly for the entire 200,000. Yet we have begun to solve medical problems in earnest only in the past 150.
A smattering of scientific bases for medicine, including systematic attempts to describe and catalog diseases, existed in antiquity. The investigations and habits that eventually culminated in science-based medicine, however, seem to have begun about 1000 years ago. Evidence for this is a rational treatise on testing medical substances, the first post-mortem dissections, by Ibn Zuhr, early investigations into physiology, and probably more. I am not a historian of medicine and I’ve not read the primary sources for the linked pages in Wikipedia; they strike me as exaggerated (how, hundreds of years before the invention of the microscope and the discovery of micro-organisms, could “bodily secretions…contaminated by ‘foul foreign earthly bodies’ ” be construed as “bacteriology and microbiology“?). Nevertheless, the assertions linked above appear to be justified by actual documents.
In the 16th century Vesalius published the first accurate human anatomy. Within a century William Harvey had described the circulation of blood, and shortly after that Antonie van Leeuwenhoek discovered micro-organisms. All the while, investigations of diseases became increasingly rigorous and reproducible because of post-mortem examinations (autopsies), so that “clinico-pathologic correlations“ were possible. The contemporary scientific revolution, in particular the rise of empiricism, led to other discoveries that set the stage for investigations in the 19th century that heralded the arrival of modern, science-based medicine.
These included the discovery of oxidation and the demonstration that living organisms obtain their energy by that mechanism, in accord with the same thermodynamic obligations that apply to combustion and other chemical reactions, microscopic pathology, cell theory, biochemistry, experimental physiology and experimental medicine, including early insights into the existence and functions of hormones, water and electrolytes in tissues, the excretory role of the kidneys, the nervous system, digestion, respiration, including the oxygen transport function of hemoglobin, the heart’s pumping function, pharmacology, statistics, inhalational anesthesia, local and regional anesthesia, the germ theory, immunology, modern surgery, epidemiology and rational public health measures, X-rays, and more. Among other effects, these fields convincingly refuted such beliefs and practices as vitalism, spontaneous generation, miasmas, the humoral theory of disease, homeopathy and other forms of sympathetic magic, bloodletting, purging, scalding, and more.
Thus real science-based medicine has been around for less than two tenths of 1% of the time that our species has existed. In that short time it has solved most of the major plagues that had previously wreaked death and sorrow upon all humans since time immemorial, and that still do so in regions where, for political or economic reasons, science-based medicine has not become widely available. It has also solved many non-epidemic infectious diseases, all of the major nutritional deficiency states, has discovered almost all of the causes and most of the cures of anemia, has provided safe, effective, and painless surgical cures for common, previously deadly diseases such as acute appendicitis, infantile pyloric stenosis, acute cholecystitis, and acute diverticulitis, has solved the most common type of peptic ulcer disease, has drastically reduced the dangers of childbirth and infant and childhood mortality (previously the sources of the greatest sorrow and suffering that our species has endured), has devised marvelous treatments for severe trauma and burns that until very recently would have meant certain death or severe disability, has solved many of the congenital anomalies that also would have meant certain death or disability, has transformed the lives of patients with previously deadly diseases such as type I diabetes and AIDS, allowing them now to thrive for years, has made other common chronic diseases, such as gouty arthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, and inflammatory bowel disease much more bearable, has made significant advances in diseases such as coronary artery disease, strokes, and cancers, that have become more prevalent now that people live longer, and much, much more.
It’s astounding to consider the tiny sliver of time during which these changes have occurred. When I was a kid in the 1950s, there were plenty of people still living who could remember life before effective, rational medicine and public health. My great-grandfather had been born in 1853 into a family of 5 children, of whom 2 died in infancy. His mother died when he was 12. That was the norm for the mid-19th century in the United States. Widespread suffering, disability, and premature death have almost certainly been the norms for every population of humans throughout the entire history of our wretched existence, and are still the norms in parts of the world that remain too poor to have reaped the benefits of science-based medicine and public health.
Here is another way of considering how recently all of this has happened: if we assume that a generation of humans corresponds to about 20 years (probably too short here and now, but not for most of our existence), there have been about 10,000 generations so far. All of the breakthroughs mentioned above, and more, have occurred during the last 6-8. More recently, within the past 2-3 generations, the stage has been set for even more astonishing breakthroughs. Molecular biology and its applications to genetics, virology, immunology, and pharmacology, for example, inevitably lead to breakthroughs in the understanding and treatment of viral diseases, cancer, hemoglobinopathies such as sickle cell disease, and more.
An example of this is the history of our understanding of AIDS, which progressed from a new, terrible, rapidly terminal disease of unknown etiology, when it was first described in the early 1980s, to one explained in complex detail, with treatments so effective that the majority of patients receiving them could expect to feel well indefinitely, barely 15 years later. Come to think of it, within a period of a few years beginning in about 1980, at least 5 serious diseases—AIDS, Legionnaires disease, Toxic Shock Syndrome, Lyme disease, and peptic ulcer disease—were solved or mostly solved. The first three of those were entirely new and scary when they first presented themselves. Imagine what our ancestors would have thought. Imagine how they might have “treated” such diseases, merely a few generations ago.
And yet as recently as 10 years ago, AIDS was a favorite playground for quacks (still is, but now the same claims are mainly for “complementary” effects). Funny: that was also true for polio, cholera, yellow fever, and every other 
Reference
†Young JH. American Health Quackery. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992

   Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 2: Tu Quoque and History
Kimball Atwood
Link
In Part 1 of this series* I asserted that a physician’s primary ethical responsibility is to honesty and integrity, which in turn must be largely based on science and reason (I apologize if that sounded preachy; if there had been more time I might have couched it in more congenial terms). I mentioned the fallacious reasoning whereby proponents of implausible medical claims (IMC) point to real and imagined weaknesses of modern medicine to justify their own agenda. I offered, as a favorite example of such proponents, science-based medicine’s having not yet solved every health problem. This week I’ll show how this version of the tu quoque fallacy has led a prestigious medical school to advocate pseudoscience-based medicine.
Modern Medicine: a Brief, Fragile Commitment to Science
First, a few more words about the title of this series. Modern medicine is not science, even if it draws upon science for its knowledge: it is an applied science similar, in that sense, to engineering. Modern medicine is also not synonymous with the “medical profession,” if the term means the collection of all people with MD degrees. That is true for the obvious reason that medicine is more than people, but also because a small but loud minority of MDs rejects modern medicine and science.
Modern medicine has made an uneven commitment to science and reason. At its best, it has formally embraced them in the faculties and curricula of medical schools, in its codes of ethics, and in its contributions to knowledge, both basic and applied, over the past 150 years or so. As discussed last week, it is because of science and reason that modern medicine has made dramatic, revolutionary advances in a very short time. That is what distinguishes it from every other “healing tradition,” and why there is no legitimate competition. The only valid medicine in the modern world is science-based medicine—not “allopathic,” “Western,” “conventional,” “regular,” “integrative,” “complementary and alternative,” or any of the so-called “whole medical systems.” The pre-scientific (and, ironically, “post-modern”) designation of “schools” or “systems” of medicine, so stridently trumpeted by quacks, is an anachronism—even if it persists in archaic, governmental edicts.
Compared to the actual sciences, however, modern medicine’s commitment to science is fragile. Its recent confusion of error-prone clinical trials with science itself—the project called “evidence-based medicine”—has been a mixed blessing. Its growing tolerance of charlatans and crackpots, at times elevating them to celebrity status, would be unthinkable in physics or biology. Its dalliances with quackery, so depressingly recounted in recent posts here, here, here, and here, are why your SBM bloggers do what we do. Biologists, other scientists, and intellectuals in general have joined the battle against the pseudoscientific travesty known as “intelligent design.” Many physicians, however, even of the brainy, academic variety, act as though the equally pseudoscientific but more dangerous travesty known as “integrative medicine” is either a good thing or, at least, is a necessary addition to medical school curricula.
The Case of Yale Medical School and David Katz
Yale Medical School provides a disturbing example. It has a new ”integrative medicine” program that touts the usual advertising slogans, including the vision of ”an integrative healthcare system that combines the best evidence-based therapeutics from both conventional and non-conventional medical systems.” It has joined the Consortium of Academic Health Centers for Integrative Medicine, a beneficiary of the wealthy Bravewell Collaborative, whose commitment to mandating quackery in all of medicine has been discussed several times on SBM. Some of the “people” in the Yale program are the conspicuous woo-meister Bernie Siegel; the lesser-known woo-meister David Katz, Director of the Yale Prevention and Research Center; and a naturopath who graduated from Bastyr University.
In April, the program hosted the 1st Annual Yale Integrative Medicine Scientific Symposium. After a full day of pablum and nonsense, the symposium came in for some well-deserved criticism, especially here, here, here, and here. It was directed mostly at two participants: Yale’s Dean of Medical Education, Richard Belitsky, whose obsequious welcoming statement had betrayed either an ignorance of science and critical thinking or an ignorance of “CAM”; and David Katz. Katz had given a talk in which he presented several disconfirming trials of IMCs and concluded that “it’s an invitation to think more fluidly about evidence.” Curiously, he had previously authored a book titled Clinical Epidemiology & Evidence-Based Medicine: Fundamental Principles of Clinical Reasoning & Research.
Dr. Katz, who can serve up tu quoque and PoMo drivel with the best of them, responded to his detractors with the “medicine doesn’t know everything” ploy:
I recently gave a talk on evidence-based holistic care at the Yale School of Medicine’s inaugural conference dedicated to ‘integrative medicine,’ generally defined as the blend of conventional and alternative medical practices. This is the model we use at the Integrative Medicine Center I run in Derby, CT (www.imc-griffin.org). I was subsequently branded a quack in certain quadrants of the blogosphere. So I am writing a defense. But not of myself, nor of my talk, nor of Yale, nor the conference. But of patients.
…
The view I expressed, and that guides our practice, is that human need goes on long after the results of randomized clinical trials start to run thin. I do not think doctor and patient should part company there. I believe that responsible use of the science we have should not preclude responsiveness to the needs of patients that fail to respond as textbooks say they should to that all-too-limited science. I believe, in other words, that patient need, not trial results, should be the ultimate master medical care must serve.
I learned devotion to evidence-based practice from my teachers and professional colleagues; I was pushed toward integrative medicine by the needs of my patients.
…
Some, apparently, see quackery in a willingness to try to help a patient feel better past the point where scientific evidence is decisively clear. But does it actually make sense to subordinate patient need to the limits of what we know with certainty, when what we strive to know through biomedical research is all in an effort to satisfy patient need? If so, I suppose I would rather be a duck than a doctor, so claims of quackery are just so much water off my back.
By Sleight of Pen: Language Distortion is Power
Many readers of that passage, even those in academic medicine, might fail to recognize its subtle language distortions. “Trial results,” “science,” and “what we know with certainty” are casually presented as interchangeable terms, with the tacit presumption that none would disagree. It follows that the limits of science are found when “the results of randomized clinical trials start to run thin.” Of course, “what we know with certainty” is “all-too-limited.” Who would disagree with that? The toolbox of a practitioner constrained by ”science” must be very small indeed.
It also follows that in the much larger realm of practices outside “that all-too-limited science,” there is no basis for distinguishing one from another. Since science has nothing to say about them, all are equally promising. All are thus fair game for the practitioner “pushed toward integrative medicine by the needs of [his] patients.”
In clinical situations where trial results do not provide clear guidance, the only alternative to “alternative medicine,” says Dr. Katz, is to abandon the patient. Such a ”when did you stop beating your wife” argument is insulting to all honest physicians, who either know or ought to learn how to deal with such situations without sacrificing their professional integrity.
What, exactly, is in store for Dr. Katz’s patients when “the results of randomized clinical trials start to run thin”? Obligingly, he directs us to the website of his Integrative Medicine Center at Griffin Hospital in Derby, CT. In addition to Dr. Katz, who refers to himself as a “nationally renowned authority,” the Integrative Medicine Center Team includes two naturopaths, a nurse practitioner who specializes in Therapeutic Touch, and a young MD from Pakistan who, having won a gold medal for being the “top medical graduate” from Baqai University, derailed an apparently promising career by selecting Griffin Hospital for his internal medicine residency.
If it Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck…
“Treatment approaches available at the IMC include:
internal medicine, naturopathic medicine, preventive medicine, nutritional counseling, nutritional supplements, nutriceuticals, herbal medicine, acupuncture, craniosacral therapy, Therapeutic Touch, homeopathy, intravenous micronutrient therapy (Myers’ Cocktail), relaxation therapies, as well as referrals to counselors, trauma therapists (EMDR), and chiropractic.
The links above, which I added, demonstrate that contrary to Dr. Katz’s assertions there is plenty of science—trials or no trials—pertaining to the corresponding methods, and that science convincingly demonstrates each to be bogus. The most obvious example is homeopathy, which is as valid as a perpetual motion machine and just as deserving of a trial. “Myers’ Cocktail,” an intravenous infusion of calcium, magnesium, and several vitamins, has all the characteristics of snake oil. There is no reason to predict that it would benefit anyone not suffering from a frank deficiency of one or more of its ingredients, the combination of which is arbitrary. All are easily absorbed through the GI tract, thus raising the question of why they are given intravenously, which is both more dangerous and more expensive than a pill.
The obvious answers are two: the “placebo effect” is enhanced by the invasive procedure, and it is more lucrative for the quack. The Myers’ Cocktail champion, Alan Gaby, a former faculty member at Bastyr University, promotes it as a near panacea:
If Dr. Katz lacks the street savvy to recognize the concoction for what it is, he might consider the results of his own trial of the Myers’ Cocktail for patients with fibromyalgia. Although his 2006 abstract tortures the data to suggest efficacy, none was found. Since the treatment is implausible in the first place, this amounts to pretty solid evidence against it. Nevertheless, nearly two years later Dr. Katz still peddles Myers’ Cocktail at the IMC, or so we gather from the website. He must have “thought more fluidly about the evidence.”
Thus by distorting language in order to bait and switch, Dr. Katz and Yale University have transformed “responsiveness to the needs of patients that fail to respond…to that all-too-limited science” into that all-too-familiar, all-too-unlimited quackery. Abracadabra!

   Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 3: Tu Quoque and History
Kimball Atwood
Link
The Ethics of Implausible Medical Claims (IMC)
In Part 2 of this series* we learned from David Katz, MD, a key member of the Yale School of Medicine’s “integrative medicine” program, that he had been “pushed toward integrative medicine by the needs of [his] patients.” We also learned that Dr. Katz’s rationale for this decision justifies a wide range of quackery—both in principle and in fact. I had previously alluded to arguments like those of Dr. Katz in a comment on SBM several months ago:
…we must be true to medical ethics, no matter what else we do. If that means losing a few patients, so be it. Patients are free agents, and we can only do so much to influence them. To the extent that we don’t do that as well as we might (which is obviously true in some cases), we might do better. But our ethical obligation is to science and truth; it is not, as many modern physicians would have it and as much as we may lament sometimes losing patients to woo, to seducing patients to stick with us no matter what, if the “what” includes engaging in a charade about “integration” or “complementary therapies”…
Realizing that some might argue that physicians’ obligations to patients ought to trump their obligations to “science and truth,” I later revised that statement:
Several weeks ago I argued here that a physician’s primary ethical obligation is to science and truth. In retrospect I probably should have put it a slightly different way: a physician’s primary ethical obligation is the same as everyone else’s. It is to honesty and integrity. For physicians, however, that means being true to real medical knowledge, among other things, and real medical knowledge comes from science.
In spite of that revision, two readers whose opinions I respect challenged my assertion. Dr. Peter Moran’s worthy efforts to educate patients about the realities of “alternative” cancer treatments are considerable. Here on SBM he has repeatedly challenged us to explain how, when confronted with testimonials of “alternative” cures, we ought to respond without using “a high-handed, ‘we know best’ stance” and thus “appear to want to distance [ourselves] from the intimate concerns of [our] patients.” I was thinking mainly of him when I wrote the revision above, because on this key topic—how to respond ethically, but with compassion, to patients who want to believe in implausible treatments—I’ve come to think of Dr. Moran as the “conscience” of Science-Based Medicine. Those with cancer, he has reminded us, “are folk very like you and me who are simply grasping at any straw that might save or prolong their lives.” His take on why IMCs are appealing to those with less ominous problems is well-developed and agrees with my own, mostly. We part ways, however, when he concludes (also here and here) that ethical physicians might have good reasons—unlike Dr. Katz’s—to entertain benign, if implausible treatments:
I thought KA was similarly slightly off-target when defining the primary ethical obligations of the physician as being to science without even mentioning the patient. That would certainly apply in an ICU or in the operating theatre, and in most specialist neurological or oncological practices (hint!), but there may be quite sound reasons why many family doctors don’t yet want to completely abandon dubious but relatively safe methods in favour of the contents of their drug cabinet.
Co-blogger David Gorski also took issue with my assertion about honesty and integrity/science and reason:
…ethically as a physician, my first obligation is to the patient and seeing that the patient is treated as effectively as she can be (sorry, Kimball, my first obligation when treating a patient is not to science or reason). Telling a patient too stridently that her dubious therapy is, well, a dubious therapy risks doing one of two things: (1) driving her away from effective science-based therapy or (2) making her reluctant to tell me everything she is taking.
Dr. Gorski and I, however, don’t really disagree. The relevant terms in his passage and in my second passage quoted above are “primary,” “first,” and “too stridently.” I have no trouble with Dr. Gorski’s description of how he responds to patients who ask about or elect dubious treatments:
As long as they tell me about it and it doesn’t interfere with scientific-based treatment, patients can do whatever they like. If they ask my my opinion, I will tell them, as non-judgmentally as possible, but I’m not going to push too hard.
My original assertion about medical ethics, quoted above, did not argue that our obligation to science and reason trumps our obligation to our patients. It argued that our obligation to science and truth (reason is also fine) trumps “seducing patients to stick with us no matter what, if the ‘what’ includes engaging in a charade [see Dr. Katz] about ‘integration’ or ‘complementary therapies’…” Later I used the term “primary ethical obligation,” which was unfortunate because the word “primary” distracted from the real point: Honesty and integrity, which in medicine must not clash with science and reason, are necessary for fulfilling our ethical obligations to our patients.
It is beside the point to quibble over whether, on some numbered list, our obligation to our patients should precede or follow our obligation to honesty and integrity. We can’t fulfill our obligation to our patients if we don’t fulfill our obligation to honesty and integrity, and we can’t do that if we overlook science and reason.
Formal Treatises
Most modern statements of medical ethics include both an obligation to patients and an obligation to honesty and integrity, which in turn is either explicitly or implicitly linked to science. The recent “Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter,” a joint project of the American College of Physicians and the European Federation of Internal Medicine, has three Fundamental Principles, the first two of which are:
Principle of primacy of patient welfare. This principle is based on a dedication to serving the interest of the patient. Altruism contributes to the trust that is central to the physician–patient relationship. Market forces, societal pressures, and administrative exigencies must not compromise this principle.
Principle of patient autonomy. Physicians must have respect for patient autonomy. Physicians must be honest with their patients and empower them to make informed decisions about their treatment. Patients’ decisions about their care must be paramount, as long as those decisions are in keeping with ethical practice and do not lead to demands for inappropriate care.
There is also a Set of Professional Responsibilities, among which are:
Commitment to professional competence. Physicians must be committed to lifelong learning and be responsible for maintaining the medical knowledge and clinical and team skills necessary for the provision of quality care. More broadly, the profession as a whole must strive to see that all of its members are competent and must ensure that appropriate mechanisms are available for physicians to accomplish this goal.
Commitment to honesty with patients. Physicians must ensure that patients are completely and honestly informed before the patient has consented to treatment and after treatment has occurred. This expectation does not mean that patients should be involved in every minute decision about medical care; rather, they must be empowered to decide on the course of therapy.
Commitment to scientific knowledge. Much of medicine’s contract with society is based on the integrity and appropriate use of scientific knowledge and technology. Physicians have a duty to uphold scientific standards, to promote research, and to create new knowledge and ensure its appropriate use. The profession is responsible for the integrity of this knowledge, which is based on scientific evidence and physician experience.
Among the more venerable AMA Principles of Medical Ethics are these:
I. A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical care, with compassion and respect for human dignity and rights.
II. A physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all professional interactions, and strive to report physicians deficient in character or competence, or engaging in fraud or deception, to appropriate entities.
V. A physician shall continue to study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge, maintain a commitment to medical education, make relevant information available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain consultation, and use the talents of other health professionals when indicated.
VIII. A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.
The AMA code also has several relevant policies:
E-3.01 Nonscientific Practitioners
It is unethical to engage in or to aid and abet in treatment which has no scientific basis and is dangerous, is calculated to deceive the patient by giving false hope, or which may cause the patient to delay in seeking proper care.
E-3.04 Referral of Patients
A physician may refer a patient for diagnostic or therapeutic services to another physician, limited practitioner, or any other provider of health care services permitted by law to furnish such services, whenever he or she believes that this may benefit the patient. As in the case of referrals to physician-specialists, referrals to limited practitioners should be based on their individual competence and ability to perform the services needed by the patient. A physician should not so refer a patient unless the physician is confident that the services provided on referral will be performed competently and in accordance with accepted scientific standards and legal requirements.
E-8.20 Invalid Medical Treatment
The following general guidelines are offered to serve physicians when they are called upon to decide among treatments: (1) Treatments which have no medical indication and offer no possible benefit to the patient should not be used (Opinion 2.035, “Futile Care”). (2) Treatments which have been determined scientifically to be invalid should not be used (Opinion 3.01, “Nonscientific Practitioners”).
E-9.132 Health Care Fraud and Abuse
The following guidelines encourage physicians to play a key role in identifying and preventing fraud: (1) Physicians must renew their commitment to Principle II of the American Medical Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics which states that “a physician shall deal honestly with patients and colleagues, and strive to expose those physicians deficient in character, competence, or who engage in fraud or deception.” (2) Physicians should make no intentional misrepresentations to increase the level of payment they receive or to secure non-covered health benefits for their patients.
H-480.963 Folk Remedies Among Ethnic Subgroups
The AMA: (1) does not recommend the sole use of unvalidated folk remedies to treat disease without scientific evidence regarding their safety or efficacy; (2) encourages research to determine the safety and efficacy of folk remedies; (3) physicians should be aware that the use of folk remedies may delay patients from seeking medical attention or receiving conventional therapies with proven benefit for disease treatment and prevention; (4) practicing physicians should routinely ask patients whether they are using folk medicine or family remedies for their symptoms. Physicians can educate patients about the level of scientific information available about the therapy they are using, as well as conventional therapies that are known to be safe and efficacious; and (5) physicians should be aware of folk remedies in use and the level of scientific information available about such remedies, and should include this information when discussing conventional treatments and therapies with their patients.
H-480.964 Alternative Medicine
Policy of the AMA on alternative medicine is: (1) There is little evidence to confirm the safety or efficacy of most alternative therapies. Much of the information currently known about these therapies makes it clear that many have not been shown to be efficacious. Well-designed, stringently controlled research should be done to evaluate the efficacy of alternative therapies. (2) Physicians should routinely inquire about the use of alternative or unconventional therapy by their patients, and educate themselves and their patients about the state of scientific knowledge with regard to alternative therapy that may be used or contemplated. (3) Patients who choose alternative therapies should be educated as to the hazards that might result from postponing or stopping conventional medical treatment.
H-480.983 Clinical Ecology
It is the policy of the AMA (1) to continue to monitor the published literature on clinical ecology and to report as appropriate; and (2) that those who support a new test, procedure, or treatment must prove by appropriately controlled peer reviewed trials that it is effective for the purposes for which it is used and that the burden should not be shifted to opponents to prove that a new test or therapy is invalid.
E-8.085 Placebo Use in Clinical Practice.
A placebo is a substance provided to a patient that the physician believes has no specific pharmacological effect upon the condition being treated. In the clinical setting, the use of a placebo without the patient’s knowledge may undermine trust, compromise the patient-physician relationship, and result in medical harm to the patient.
Physicians may use placebos for diagnosis or treatment only if the patient is informed of and agrees to its use. A placebo may still be effective if the patient knows it will be used but cannot identify it and does not know the precise timing of its use. A physician should enlist the patient’s cooperation by explaining that a better understanding of the medical condition could be achieved by evaluating the effects of different medications, including the placebo. The physician need neither identify the placebo nor seek specific consent before its administration. In this way, the physician respects the patient’s autonomy and fosters a trusting relationship, while the patient still may benefit from the placebo effect.
A placebo must not be given merely to mollify a difficult patient, because doing so serves the convenience of the physician more than it promotes the patient’s welfare. Physicians can avoid using a placebo, yet produce a placebo-like effect through the skillful use of reassurance and encouragement. In this way, the physician builds respect and trust, promotes the patient-physician relationship, and improves health outcomes (I, II, VIII).
Other pertinent entries among the AMA ethics policies are Withholding Information from Patients (Therapeutic Privilege) and several statements about Health Fraud.
Although the language could have been more definitive, it seems to me that the statements above deem it unethical for physicians to offer implausible treatments, to refer patients to others for implausible treatments, or, if asked, to fail to inform patients of the implausible nature of such treatments. They also deem it unethical to administer a placebo without the patient’s informed consent, or to mislead patients about the reasons that implausible treatments make some people feel better. Thus it is dishonest to recommend acupuncture or homeopathy in a disguised attempt to elicit a placebo effect.
I will not argue that physicians must, perforce, honor certain written edicts. On the contrary, if these treatises contained language condoning the cited practices, I would reject them. My reason for citing the statements above is not to pose as a petty, medical ethics traffic cop. It is to remind us that these ethical precepts have been considered at length by thoughtful, committed physician-ethicists, have been around long enough to have made their way into formal opinions, and have persisted in those opinions. Thus physicians practicing in disregard for them—especially those, such as Dr. Katz and other IMC enthusiasts, who have been flouting them for several years—should be aware that they have chosen to repudiate the considered opinions of wise men and women, regarding an issue that is fundamental to medical ethics: the relation of honesty and integrity to science and reason.
The medical profession as a whole ought to acknowledge that as well. The time has come for the profession to revisit those ethical precepts and decide whether they have become obsolete. If not, it’s time to clean house.

   Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 4: Tu Quoque and History
Kimball Atwood
Link
Dr. Moran Weighs In
In last week’s post, I dubbed Dr. Peter Moran the “conscience” of SBM, citing his commitment to doing what’s best for individual patients even if, in theory at least, that may involve some manner of benign but fanciful treatments. I countered with my own opinion that honesty and integrity are necessary parts of any discussion with a patient, and that they, in turn, must not conflict with science and reason.* I added passages from a couple of key medical ethics treatises to support my assertion. Dr. Moran’s response, thoughtful and provocative as always, was buried in the midst of other commenters’ tangential arguments about the theory of evolution. Rather than continue its exile there, I reprint it here to give it the exposure that it deserves:
A blatant appeal to authority, but one that I mostly agree with. The difference between us is that I insist that medicine is about an infinite number of individual contexts and I see many examples where ethical absolutes (actually these are ethical guidelines rather than directives) do not apply or don’t seem to apply very well.
We scientists are ever-so cautious when making scientific judgments about complex matters; let’s not pretend that arriving at absolutes in medical ethics is a piece of cake, especially when it is not quite clear how anything done with the undiluted welfare of the individual patient in mind can be entirely unethical. I mean, why are we obliged to consider the impact of our decisions upon the fate of the planets (or whatever) when THIS patient needs help? In fact, at least one medical ethicist has gone so far as to state that it is not unethical for a doctor to prescribe a placebo treatment, so long as the doctor believes it will benefit the patient. I don’t quite agree with that bald statement — there should be a rider specifying that this may apply to *some* contexts where there is no obviously superior evidence-based method.
Here are some examples of the intellectual minefield we have to negotiate.
1. All the doctors I know would be prepared to call in the witch-doctor if it would help assuage the fears, or help in the management, of a seriously ill primitive tribesman. It seems we are prepared to pander to the superstitions of SOME cultures while despising any similar inclinations in our own.
2. I have previously asked this question which has to do with public policy in relation to safe “alternatives”. Take my word for it that every pharmacy in Europe displays “Homeopathie” (or language equivalents) in large letters outside. Would skeptics prefer those using such remedies for their minor and self-limiting complaints to be using NSAIDs or antibiotics or antidepressants instead, treatments that will often in such contexts themselves perform no better than placebo, but at substantially greater risks? Behind the usual healthfraud position there is both an exaggeration of the capacity of modern medicine and insufficient recognition of the harm that it can do. We definitely do not yet have entirely safe and 100% effective solutions to all of mankind’s ills, and certain imperfections of everyday medical practice can heighten the risks of the use of unnecessarily powerful pharmaceuticals. So what is the safest and most pragmatically realistic position here?
3. Following on from that — what is the evidence-based answer to non-specific tiredness and unhappiness? If people feel better for taking a multivitamin or an innocuous herb, why should we care? We keep on offering the public temporary answers to these things, prescribing (historically) amphetamines, cocaine, opiates, barbiturates and phenothiazines in massive quantities, only to take them away when problems such as addiction ensue. Is it right to then turn around and say, well you didn’t really need these things anyway, even denying them any relief that they may derive from “pretend medicines”. The science that matters will be argued out in other arenas.
That’s to give you some idea of the kind of thing that I am on about. You seem to think I am talking about doctors promoting CAM or placebo treatment as a matter of policy. I am not prepared to go that far, although I think I understand why some doctors might do that.
I agree that “medicine is about an infinite number of individual contexts and [there are] many examples where ethical absolutes do not apply or don’t seem to apply very well.” Nor did I really think that Dr. Moran was “talking about doctors promoting ‘CAM’ or placebo treatments as a matter of policy.” We disagree elsewhere, but he makes some interesting points.
The most compelling, in my opinion, is his point about “calling in witch doctors.” Yes, I would not be the first exception to that rule. I do have a response, however, and it has to do with the differences between some cultures and our own: the fallacy is that there are “similar inclinations.” There is a vast difference between the traditional, deeply held opinions of a primitive tribesman and his witch doctor, on the one hand, and the addled opinions of a born, raised, and (partially) educated American or European or Australian patient and his snake oil peddling quack on the other. Those in our culture, with occasional exceptions, were not brought up to believe in “CAM.” Many quacks are themselves physicians with no acceptable excuse, who until recently were kept in check by strong professional and governmental pressures, only to have found themselves reborn in a new “golden age of quackery.” Quacks who are not physicians have also been kept in check, until recently, by governmental pressures. Their newfound endorsement by governmental edict is no more justified than would be a similar endorsement of tribal witch doctors.
My major objection, as I’ve written in my bio and elsewhere on SBM, is to “implausible claims being promoted, tacitly or otherwise, by medical schools and government” and by physicians. Patients are not the problem; they are, if you’ll excuse the drama, the victims. Even seemingly benign practices, if implausible, can be harmful (“first, do no harm”), particularly when promoted by someone who should know better. This isn’t the setting for a complete discussion, but it will surely come on SBM. In the meantime, there is the unnecessary expense, a patient later feeling betrayed by her physician when the treatment doesn’t work or the “placebo effect” wears off and she realizes that it was only a “pretend medicine” all along, other patients or physicians concluding that the treatments have validity (and possibly being convinced to forgo rational treatment), people in general losing confidence in modern medicine when it appears that many physicians can’t distinguish between the rational and the bogus, wasted research funds, human subjects unnecessarily duped and endangered, a befuddled media, a befuddled public, befuddled leglislators endorsing quacks to a befuddled public, and more.
Yes, it is true that THIS patient needs help, but if physicians held exclusively to that ethic they wouldn’t have to concern themselves with antibiotic resistance, universal immunizations, judicious use of expensive but very low yield tests that are physically harmless and paid for with pooled money, or other cost-containment issues that don’t immediately affect THIS patient, would they? It’s true that there are many examples where ethical absolutes don’t seem to apply very well.
Moving on to number 2: every pharmacy in Europe that advertises “Homeopathie” is committing fraud, plain and simple. If physicians were more attentive to science and ethics and to explaining things to patients, politicians, and the media, more people would know that. The alternatives to homeopathy for minor or self-limiting complaints, moreover, need not be “NSAIDs or antibiotics or antidepressants” unless there is a good reason for one of them. The alternative is to explain to the patient that the complaint is minor or self-limiting! Why should honesty and integrity be so difficult? That some modern physicians prescribe potent drugs solely for placebo effects (and to get patients out of their offices) is an indictment of that practice, not an argument for “CAM.”
There are, moreover, plenty of rational, nonpharmacological treatments for all manner of minor or self-limiting complaints (and even for not so self-limiting complaints, such as chronic pain), e.g., gargling with hot water or sipping hot tea, time, avoiding environmental allergens, smoking cessation, weight loss, ice packs or heat packs, rest, exercise, massage (to make muscles feel better, not to “remove toxins”), pain management, physical therapy, eating more fibre, “sleep hygiene,” and many more.
The answer to point 3 is the same as the answer to point 2, and I certainly don’t mind if “people feel better for taking a multivitamin or an innocuous herb” (if that were the extent of “CAM” we’d hardly be wasting our time here). I just don’t think that physicians should make false claims. Point 3 also brings psychotherapy to mind. It need not be introduced in an unjustified or insulting way, i.e., by implying that the patient’s symptoms are “all in her head” or are “functional” or whatever. Rather, the honest physician will admit to not being able to explain the symptoms, but acknowledge that they must be distressing and suggest that it might be helpful to discuss how they impinge on the patient’s life and how she might better cope with them.
There are plenty of modern physicians whose patients are not disposed to look elsewhere, even if those patients have “nonspecific tiredness and unhappiness” and even if those physicians don’t suggest woo. Many patients, perhaps most, expect honesty and integrity, and have a pretty good sense of when they see it and when they don’t.
Dr. Moran also added another comment, reproduced in part here:
The ethical objection to ALL use of CAM, as presented by KA, is problematic because of the unspoken assumptions –
1. That conventional medicine has adequate answers to all health problems and the public should be content with what it offers. This applies fairly well to some illnesses but not many others.
2. That “alternative” methods do nothing worthwhile for those using them, anyway. This view is also context sensitive since considerable scientific evidence suggests the likelihood of symptom relief by the placebo medicines of CAM and from interactions with CAM practitioners.
3. That science provides a clear discrimination between what works and what doesn’t. Over the long haul that is true. But what do we mean by “works”? Where does the placebo complex of influences fit in?
Point number 1 is simply incorrect. I have not assumed, nor is the assumption inherent in ethical objections to physicians promoting ”CAM,” that “conventional medicine has adequate answers to all health problems.” I reject, as I hope I made clear above, the false dichotomy that for each health problem there is either a proven treatment or there is “CAM.”
Regarding points 2 and 3, I agree that the only “value” of almost all “CAM” treatments is in their “placebo effects.” But if a physician’s quest to elicit a placebo effect from an implausible treatment means pretending that the treatment has some other effect, specific to the patient’s problem, then that is a lie. So far, I’ve seen nothing to justify such a lie.
There is a potential placebo effect involved in every patient-practitioner interaction, and it needn’t require woo. The most important elements are that the practitioner be attentive and appear to give a damn. Many patients will experience dramatic improvements in symptoms just by finding out that whatever is causing them isn’t cancer or some other serious illness—which reflects an underappreciated reality about the goal of a diagnostic “workup”: not necessarily to determine what something is, but always to determine what it isn’t. The refusal of some physicians and patients to accept that truth is, in my opinion, an important basis for a “CAM” subset, “fad diagnoses” (perhaps a topic for another time).
As a patient, I have experienced two memorable examples of what I think of as “placebo effects.” The first occurred at the age of 18 when, plagued by adolescent angst, I visited a psychiatrist exactly once who told me, “you’re not crazy and you’re not going to go crazy.” I remained an adolescent for some time, but I sure felt a hell of a lot better. The second occurred many years later and was heralded not by a conversation, but by a diagnostic test: after a couple of months of excruciating neck pain, I had a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study that showed that my cervical spine was normal. As I read the report the pain abated, never to return to its previous degree of severity.
I am glad that Dr. Moran has described his views on this topic as “tentative positions that I am exploring.” Such candor serves to maintain my view of him as our “conscience,” even as it makes me optimistic that we might dissuade him from making those positions permanent. 
The Physician as Expert Consultant
Philosophers Clark Glymour and Douglas Stalker wrote an article 25 years ago for the New England Journal of Medicine titled “Engineers, cranks, physicians, magicians.” It was later reprinted as the first chapter of a book edited by the same authors, Examining Holistic Medicine, which deserves to be on the shelf of anyone interested in the topic. At the time the article was written, the terms “Complementary and Alternative Medicine” (“CAM”) and “Evidence-Based Medicine” (EBM) had yet to enter the lexicon. Other than that it is as timely now as it was then, and is also pertinent to much of the discussion here (note to Dr. Moran: this is no longer directed at you; I know that you are aware of these things). Because the article is not available online I’ve reproduced several passages:
Medicine in industrialized nations is scientific medicine. The claim tacitly made by American or European physicians, and tacitly relied on by their patients, is that their palliatives and procedures have been shown by science to be effective. Although the physician’s medical practice is not itself science, it is based on science and on training that is supposed to teach physicians to apply scientific knowledge to people in a rational way.
The practice of medicine in the United States and in other industrialized nations is a form of consultant engineering. The subjects are people rather than bridges, but in many respects the professions of medicine and engineering are alike. We expect skilled engineers to be able to learn from experience and to get better at building bridges, because we believe that their training has subjected them to a rational discipline that has made them good learners about such matters. Sometimes, of course, we are disappointed. It is entirely the same with physicians, who must apply both explicit scientific principles and also a great deal of tacit knowledge to the treatment of their patients. Medical training is supposed to make physicians good at applying scientific knowledge to sickness, and it is also supposed to make medical doctors good at acquiring through practice an abundance of tacit knowledge useful to their craft.
There is no reason, either historically or logically, to conceive of the science used by physician engineers as necessarily physical science. Engineers need not care in principle whether the generalizations on which they rely are psychological, physical, or psychophysical; what they care about is that the generalizations be applicable and that their reliability be scientifically demonstrated. A great deal of what physicians learn consists of biologic and biochemical generalizations, broadly construed, but they also learn a substantial body of psychophysical generalizations which can be regarded as bridging the crevasse between mind and body. For example, generalizations concerning the effects of drugs, correlating the location of pain with other physical symptoms of disease, and positing the causal factors in dizziness and senility connect the mental with the physical and are thus useful for medical engineering. If physicians learn relatively fewer generalizations that are entirely psychological or social in nature or that posit psychological mechanisms for physical effects, the reason is not that such generalizations are alien to the “medical model” but that relatively few of them are applicable and scientifically warranted.
There are alternative conceptions of the physician. Some of them play a dominant part in the understanding of medicine in other societies, and some serve to qualify the conception of the physician as engineer even in our own society. One such conception is that physicians are consolers. Another is that they are magicians who exercise occult powers to bring about healing. As magicians, they possess magical powers either because of the occult knowledge they possess or simply because of who they are—for example, because they stand in some special relation to gods or demons. Again, the physician may be understood to be someone who applies a reliable body of knowledge that is not warranted by science or by magic but is simply known and, so far as the community is concerned, always has been known. The warrant behind this conception of the healer is tradition and “common knowledge.”
These distinctions are more logical than sociological, and a society may combine several of them in the roles it assigns to healers. A medicine man can combine traditional therapies with magical claims, and both with a bit of consolation. A physician engineer can act as consoler; nothing in either logic or social psychology forbids it. But certain combinations are impossible or extraordinarily unlikely. A physician engineer cannot honestly claim powers of magic or occult knowledge. The principles governing scientific reasoning and belief are negative as well as positive, and they imply that occult doctrines are not worthy of belief. Moreover, physician engineers have no immunity to moral or ethical constraints. On the contrary, they are by training and by culture enmeshed in a tradition of rational thought about the obligations and responsibilities of their profession.
Is there another, holistic, conception of medicine distinct from those described above? Certainly, many people seem to think so. In 1978, a group of medical and osteopathic physicians formed the American Holistic Medicine Association, which now publishes a journal and whose meetings have been recognized for education purposes by the American Medical Association. Popular bookstores are filled with works on “holistic medicine,” many edited by medical doctors and some recommended by such political eminences as Edward Kennedy and George McGovern. The same shelves boast best-selling books on holistic medicine authored by professors at distinguished medal schools and, in at least one case, by a physician administrator at the National Institutes of Health. The therapies described and recommended in a typical book of the genre include biofeedback, hypnosis, psychic healing, chiropractic, tai chi, iridology, homeopathy, acupuncture, clairvoyant diagnosis, human auras, and Rolfing. One of the larger books of this kind was even subsidized by the National Institute of Mental Health.
What ties together the diverse practices…? In part, a banal rhetoric about the physician as consoler;… In part, familiar and rather useless admonitions about not overlooking the abundance of circumstances that may contribute to one condition or another. Such banalities are often true and no doubt sometimes ignored, with disastrous consequences, but they scarcely amount to a distinctive conception of medicine. Holist therapies can be divided into those that are adaptations of traditional medical practices in other societies—Chinese, Navajo, and so forth—and those that were invented, so to speak, the week before last by some relatively successful crank.
Insofar as it extends beyond banality, the holistic medical movement constitutes both a deliberate attempt to substitute a magical for an engineering conception of the physician and an attack on scientific understanding and reasoning. Although the holistic movement does not contain a conception of medicine distinct from those we have discussed, it does contain a reactionary impetus to return the practice of medicine to the practice of magic and to replace logic and method with occultism and obfuscation.
Several conceptions of “holism” have been developed in the writings of holistic practitioners and their advocates. Most of them are vacuous; they are banalities of orthodox medicine, or they have no medical content and no applicability to any possible practice of medicine; they merely sound nice. Some are patently false. A much-repeated and trivial thesis, and moreover one that is said to characterize the sense in which holistic medicine is “holistic,” amounts to no more than this: mental and physical properties are interdependent. Mental states affect physical states and physical states affect mental states. No one doubts it. To make such a claim seem somehow profound, holistic writers invariably conjoin it with a discussion of Cartesian dualism, insinuating that modern medicine follow Descartes in postulating an impassable chasm between the mind and the body. Modern medicine does no such thing, and could not even if it wanted to, since Descartes held no such view.
Another doctrine said to be holistic is that one’s state of health is affected by everything. Whatever this means, it has nothing to do with any possible practice of medicine, for no one can attend to everything. If physicians cannot distinguish relevant from irrelevant factors, important from unimportant causes, then they can do nothing. A variation of this doctrine is not vacuous but merely vapid: “Fundamental to holistic medicine is the recognition that each state of health and disease requires a consideration of all contributing factors: psychological, psychosocial, environmental, and spiritual.” [Pelletier 1979] This is not a new revelation about medicine. Insofar as such multiple factors are known and believed to be important, they are routinely addressed in conventional medicine practice. Patients who suffer from coronary heart disease may be treated with beta blockers and antiplatelet drugs, and they may also be advised to change their work, their diet, their smoking habits, their exercise habits, and their living conditions.
The essay discusses assertions that “ ‘all states of health and all disorders are considered to be psychosomatic’ [Pelletier 1977]“ and that “the entire body (and psyche) can be treated or diagnosed through the treatment or observations of a special part of the anatomy.” Because of such notions,
…holistic practitioners…are under no obligation, they believe, to reconcile their claims about therapy with what is known about the causal pathways of the body.
The holistic practitioner sees the body in much the same way that magicians of old viewed the universe. The body becomes the last bastion of magic.
The authors expose the fallacy of the argument that “holistic medicine has not really been investigated, that funds ought to be made available for conducting tests of holistic practices, and that meanwhile we should keep our minds open about holistic techniques.” Although they couldn’t have foreseen the scientific blind spot that would soon hamper academic medicine in the form of “evidence-based medicine,” the authors portend discussions of Prior Probability:
Although it might be interesting to know more about the physiological pathways that are correlated with such processes as the placebo effect, this has nothing do with taking seriously the claims advanced by iridologists or zone therapists or even chiropractors. The claim to diagnose by examining the eye or to cure by massaging the foot is completely bogus; we know more than enough about the workings of the body to be reasonably certain that geometric features of the iris, for instance, do not provide the specific information about disorders that iridologists claim they do….Of course, it is conceivable that the beliefs of scientific medicine are in error about one or another of these matters, but that is no reason for using public funds to investigate holistic claims. One cannot justify spending other people’s money simply because one can imagine something to be true. The mere fact that holistic medicine is widespread and enduring is no reason to take its claims seriously; superstition, self-deception, stupidity, and fraud are ubiquitous and always have been.
The authors refute the charge that “the lack of evidence concerning the specific curative powers of holistic therapies is the result of a conspiracy of disinterest.” They dispense with cultural relativism, another favorite refuge of IMC advocates, and demolish the ”differing paradigms of Thomas Kuhn” contrivance:
Holistic advocates repeatedly cite Kuhn and claim that holistic medicine is an alternative paradigm with its own standards, one that cannot be understood or assessed by the practitioners of orthodox medicine. If the claim were valid, holistic practice would have to constitute a scientific tradition, albeit one in competition with the tradition of orthodox medicine. However, holistic medicine is not a scientific tradition. It has no paradigmatic work, no recognized set of problems, and no shared standards for what constitutes a solution to those problems; it also lacks the critical exchange among its practitioners that is characteristic of the sciences. Cranks have been common throughout the history of science, as Kuhn, a distinguished historian of science, knew well. The work of cranks does not constitute a scientific revolution, and no cranks appear among Kuhn’s many examples.
Glymour and Stalker were prescient in their conclusion:
If holistic-health advocates were content with encouraging sensible preventive medicine or with criticizing the economic organization of American medicine, we might be enthusiastic, but they are not. If the movement were without influence on American life, we would be indifferent, but it is not. Holistic medicine is a pablum of common sense and nonsense offered by cranks and quacks and failed pedants who share an attachment to magic and an animosity toward reason. Too many people seem willing to swallow the rhetoric—even too many medical doctors—and the results will not be benign. At times, physicians may find themselves in sympathy with the holistic movement, because some fragment of the rhetoric rings true, because of certain practices and attitudes they encounter in their daily work with colleagues and patients, or because of dissatisfaction with the economic and social organization of medicine. One hopes they will speak bluntly, but it does no good to join forces with cranks and quacks, magicians and madmen.
Amen to that.
In last week’s post, I dubbed Dr. Peter Moran the “conscience” of SBM, citing his commitment to doing what’s best for individual patients even if, in theory at least, that may involve some manner of benign but fanciful treatments. I countered with my own opinion that honesty and integrity are necessary parts of any discussion with a patient, and that they, in turn, must not conflict with science and reason.* I added passages from a couple of key medical ethics treatises to support my assertion. Dr. Moran’s response, thoughtful and provocative as always, was buried in the midst of other commenters’ tangential arguments about the theory of evolution. Rather than continue its exile there, I reprint it here to give it the exposure that it deserves:
A blatant appeal to authority, but one that I mostly agree with. The difference between us is that I insist that medicine is about an infinite number of individual contexts and I see many examples where ethical absolutes (actually these are ethical guidelines rather than directives) do not apply or don’t seem to apply very well.
We scientists are ever-so cautious when making scientific judgments about complex matters; let’s not pretend that arriving at absolutes in medical ethics is a piece of cake, especially when it is not quite clear how anything done with the undiluted welfare of the individual patient in mind can be entirely unethical. I mean, why are we obliged to consider the impact of our decisions upon the fate of the planets (or whatever) when THIS patient needs help? In fact, at least one medical ethicist has gone so far as to state that it is not unethical for a doctor to prescribe a placebo treatment, so long as the doctor believes it will benefit the patient. I don’t quite agree with that bald statement — there should be a rider specifying that this may apply to *some* contexts where there is no obviously superior evidence-based method.
Here are some examples of the intellectual minefield we have to negotiate.
1. All the doctors I know would be prepared to call in the witch-doctor if it would help assuage the fears, or help in the management, of a seriously ill primitive tribesman. It seems we are prepared to pander to the superstitions of SOME cultures while despising any similar inclinations in our own.
2. I have previously asked this question which has to do with public policy in relation to safe “alternatives”. Take my word for it that every pharmacy in Europe displays “Homeopathie” (or language equivalents) in large letters outside. Would skeptics prefer those using such remedies for their minor and self-limiting complaints to be using NSAIDs or antibiotics or antidepressants instead, treatments that will often in such contexts themselves perform no better than placebo, but at substantially greater risks? Behind the usual healthfraud position there is both an exaggeration of the capacity of modern medicine and insufficient recognition of the harm that it can do. We definitely do not yet have entirely safe and 100% effective solutions to all of mankind’s ills, and certain imperfections of everyday medical practice can heighten the risks of the use of unnecessarily powerful pharmaceuticals. So what is the safest and most pragmatically realistic position here?
3. Following on from that — what is the evidence-based answer to non-specific tiredness and unhappiness? If people feel better for taking a multivitamin or an innocuous herb, why should we care? We keep on offering the public temporary answers to these things, prescribing (historically) amphetamines, cocaine, opiates, barbiturates and phenothiazines in massive quantities, only to take them away when problems such as addiction ensue. Is it right to then turn around and say, well you didn’t really need these things anyway, even denying them any relief that they may derive from “pretend medicines”. The science that matters will be argued out in other arenas.
That’s to give you some idea of the kind of thing that I am on about. You seem to think I am talking about doctors promoting CAM or placebo treatment as a matter of policy. I am not prepared to go that far, although I think I understand why some doctors might do that.
I agree that “medicine is about an infinite number of individual contexts and [there are] many examples where ethical absolutes do not apply or don’t seem to apply very well.” Nor did I really think that Dr. Moran was “talking about doctors promoting ‘CAM’ or placebo treatments as a matter of policy.” We disagree elsewhere, but he makes some interesting points.
The most compelling, in my opinion, is his point about “calling in witch doctors.” Yes, I would not be the first exception to that rule. I do have a response, however, and it has to do with the differences between some cultures and our own: the fallacy is that there are “similar inclinations.” There is a vast difference between the traditional, deeply held opinions of a primitive tribesman and his witch doctor, on the one hand, and the addled opinions of a born, raised, and (partially) educated American or European or Australian patient and his snake oil peddling quack on the other. Those in our culture, with occasional exceptions, were not brought up to believe in “CAM.” Many quacks are themselves physicians with no acceptable excuse, who until recently were kept in check by strong professional and governmental pressures, only to have found themselves reborn in a new “golden age of quackery.” Quacks who are not physicians have also been kept in check, until recently, by governmental pressures. Their newfound endorsement by governmental edict is no more justified than would be a similar endorsement of tribal witch doctors.
My major objection, as I’ve written in my bio and elsewhere on SBM, is to “implausible claims being promoted, tacitly or otherwise, by medical schools and government” and by physicians. Patients are not the problem; they are, if you’ll excuse the drama, the victims. Even seemingly benign practices, if implausible, can be harmful (“first, do no harm”), particularly when promoted by someone who should know better. This isn’t the setting for a complete discussion, but it will surely come on SBM. In the meantime, there is the unnecessary expense, a patient later feeling betrayed by her physician when the treatment doesn’t work or the “placebo effect” wears off and she realizes that it was only a “pretend medicine” all along, other patients or physicians concluding that the treatments have validity (and possibly being convinced to forgo rational treatment), people in general losing confidence in modern medicine when it appears that many physicians can’t distinguish between the rational and the bogus, wasted research funds, human subjects unnecessarily duped and endangered, a befuddled media, a befuddled public, befuddled leglislators endorsing quacks to a befuddled public, and more.
Yes, it is true that THIS patient needs help, but if physicians held exclusively to that ethic they wouldn’t have to concern themselves with antibiotic resistance, universal immunizations, judicious use of expensive but very low yield tests that are physically harmless and paid for with pooled money, or other cost-containment issues that don’t immediately affect THIS patient, would they? It’s true that there are many examples where ethical absolutes don’t seem to apply very well.
Moving on to number 2: every pharmacy in Europe that advertises “Homeopathie” is committing fraud, plain and simple. If physicians were more attentive to science and ethics and to explaining things to patients, politicians, and the media, more people would know that. The alternatives to homeopathy for minor or self-limiting complaints, moreover, need not be “NSAIDs or antibiotics or antidepressants” unless there is a good reason for one of them. The alternative is to explain to the patient that the complaint is minor or self-limiting! Why should honesty and integrity be so difficult? That some modern physicians prescribe potent drugs solely for placebo effects (and to get patients out of their offices) is an indictment of that practice, not an argument for “CAM.”
There are, moreover, plenty of rational, nonpharmacological treatments for all manner of minor or self-limiting complaints (and even for not so self-limiting complaints, such as chronic pain), e.g., gargling with hot water or sipping hot tea, time, avoiding environmental allergens, smoking cessation, weight loss, ice packs or heat packs, rest, exercise, massage (to make muscles feel better, not to “remove toxins”), pain management, physical therapy, eating more fibre, “sleep hygiene,” and many more.
The answer to point 3 is the same as the answer to point 2, and I certainly don’t mind if “people feel better for taking a multivitamin or an innocuous herb” (if that were the extent of “CAM” we’d hardly be wasting our time here). I just don’t think that physicians should make false claims. Point 3 also brings psychotherapy to mind. It need not be introduced in an unjustified or insulting way, i.e., by implying that the patient’s symptoms are “all in her head” or are “functional” or whatever. Rather, the honest physician will admit to not being able to explain the symptoms, but acknowledge that they must be distressing and suggest that it might be helpful to discuss how they impinge on the patient’s life and how she might better cope with them.
There are plenty of modern physicians whose patients are not disposed to look elsewhere, even if those patients have “nonspecific tiredness and unhappiness” and even if those physicians don’t suggest woo. Many patients, perhaps most, expect honesty and integrity, and have a pretty good sense of when they see it and when they don’t.
Dr. Moran also added another comment, reproduced in part here:
The ethical objection to ALL use of CAM, as presented by KA, is problematic because of the unspoken assumptions –
1. That conventional medicine has adequate answers to all health problems and the public should be content with what it offers. This applies fairly well to some illnesses but not many others.
2. That “alternative” methods do nothing worthwhile for those using them, anyway. This view is also context sensitive since considerable scientific evidence suggests the likelihood of symptom relief by the placebo medicines of CAM and from interactions with CAM practitioners.
3. That science provides a clear discrimination between what works and what doesn’t. Over the long haul that is true. But what do we mean by “works”? Where does the placebo complex of influences fit in?
Point number 1 is simply incorrect. I have not assumed, nor is the assumption inherent in ethical objections to physicians promoting ”CAM,” that “conventional medicine has adequate answers to all health problems.” I reject, as I hope I made clear above, the false dichotomy that for each health problem there is either a proven treatment or there is “CAM.”
Regarding points 2 and 3, I agree that the only “value” of almost all “CAM” treatments is in their “placebo effects.” But if a physician’s quest to elicit a placebo effect from an implausible treatment means pretending that the treatment has some other effect, specific to the patient’s problem, then that is a lie. So far, I’ve seen nothing to justify such a lie.
There is a potential placebo effect involved in every patient-practitioner interaction, and it needn’t require woo. The most important elements are that the practitioner be attentive and appear to give a damn. Many patients will experience dramatic improvements in symptoms just by finding out that whatever is causing them isn’t cancer or some other serious illness—which reflects an underappreciated reality about the goal of a diagnostic “workup”: not necessarily to determine what something is, but always to determine what it isn’t. The refusal of some physicians and patients to accept that truth is, in my opinion, an important basis for a “CAM” subset, “fad diagnoses” (perhaps a topic for another time).
As a patient, I have experienced two memorable examples of what I think of as “placebo effects.” The first occurred at the age of 18 when, plagued by adolescent angst, I visited a psychiatrist exactly once who told me, “you’re not crazy and you’re not going to go crazy.” I remained an adolescent for some time, but I sure felt a hell of a lot better. The second occurred many years later and was heralded not by a conversation, but by a diagnostic test: after a couple of months of excruciating neck pain, I had a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study that showed that my cervical spine was normal. As I read the report the pain abated, never to return to its previous degree of severity.
I am glad that Dr. Moran has described his views on this topic as “tentative positions that I am exploring.” Such candor serves to maintain my view of him as our “conscience,” even as it makes me optimistic that we might dissuade him from making those positions permanent. 
The Physician as Expert Consultant
Philosophers Clark Glymour and Douglas Stalker wrote an article 25 years ago for the New England Journal of Medicine titled “Engineers, cranks, physicians, magicians.” It was later reprinted as the first chapter of a book edited by the same authors, Examining Holistic Medicine, which deserves to be on the shelf of anyone interested in the topic. At the time the article was written, the terms “Complementary and Alternative Medicine” (“CAM”) and “Evidence-Based Medicine” (EBM) had yet to enter the lexicon. Other than that it is as timely now as it was then, and is also pertinent to much of the discussion here (note to Dr. Moran: this is no longer directed at you; I know that you are aware of these things). Because the article is not available online I’ve reproduced several passages:
Medicine in industrialized nations is scientific medicine. The claim tacitly made by American or European physicians, and tacitly relied on by their patients, is that their palliatives and procedures have been shown by science to be effective. Although the physician’s medical practice is not itself science, it is based on science and on training that is supposed to teach physicians to apply scientific knowledge to people in a rational way.
The practice of medicine in the United States and in other industrialized nations is a form of consultant engineering. The subjects are people rather than bridges, but in many respects the professions of medicine and engineering are alike. We expect skilled engineers to be able to learn from experience and to get better at building bridges, because we believe that their training has subjected them to a rational discipline that has made them good learners about such matters. Sometimes, of course, we are disappointed. It is entirely the same with physicians, who must apply both explicit scientific principles and also a great deal of tacit knowledge to the treatment of their patients. Medical training is supposed to make physicians good at applying scientific knowledge to sickness, and it is also supposed to make medical doctors good at acquiring through practice an abundance of tacit knowledge useful to their craft.
There is no reason, either historically or logically, to conceive of the science used by physician engineers as necessarily physical science. Engineers need not care in principle whether the generalizations on which they rely are psychological, physical, or psychophysical; what they care about is that the generalizations be applicable and that their reliability be scientifically demonstrated. A great deal of what physicians learn consists of biologic and biochemical generalizations, broadly construed, but they also learn a substantial body of psychophysical generalizations which can be regarded as bridging the crevasse between mind and body. For example, generalizations concerning the effects of drugs, correlating the location of pain with other physical symptoms of disease, and positing the causal factors in dizziness and senility connect the mental with the physical and are thus useful for medical engineering. If physicians learn relatively fewer generalizations that are entirely psychological or social in nature or that posit psychological mechanisms for physical effects, the reason is not that such generalizations are alien to the “medical model” but that relatively few of them are applicable and scientifically warranted.
There are alternative conceptions of the physician. Some of them play a dominant part in the understanding of medicine in other societies, and some serve to qualify the conception of the physician as engineer even in our own society. One such conception is that physicians are consolers. Another is that they are magicians who exercise occult powers to bring about healing. As magicians, they possess magical powers either because of the occult knowledge they possess or simply because of who they are—for example, because they stand in some special relation to gods or demons. Again, the physician may be understood to be someone who applies a reliable body of knowledge that is not warranted by science or by magic but is simply known and, so far as the community is concerned, always has been known. The warrant behind this conception of the healer is tradition and “common knowledge.”
These distinctions are more logical than sociological, and a society may combine several of them in the roles it assigns to healers. A medicine man can combine traditional therapies with magical claims, and both with a bit of consolation. A physician engineer can act as consoler; nothing in either logic or social psychology forbids it. But certain combinations are impossible or extraordinarily unlikely. A physician engineer cannot honestly claim powers of magic or occult knowledge. The principles governing scientific reasoning and belief are negative as well as positive, and they imply that occult doctrines are not worthy of belief. Moreover, physician engineers have no immunity to moral or ethical constraints. On the contrary, they are by training and by culture enmeshed in a tradition of rational thought about the obligations and responsibilities of their profession.
Is there another, holistic, conception of medicine distinct from those described above? Certainly, many people seem to think so. In 1978, a group of medical and osteopathic physicians formed the American Holistic Medicine Association, which now publishes a journal and whose meetings have been recognized for education purposes by the American Medical Association. Popular bookstores are filled with works on “holistic medicine,” many edited by medical doctors and some recommended by such political eminences as Edward Kennedy and George McGovern. The same shelves boast best-selling books on holistic medicine authored by professors at distinguished medal schools and, in at least one case, by a physician administrator at the National Institutes of Health. The therapies described and recommended in a typical book of the genre include biofeedback, hypnosis, psychic healing, chiropractic, tai chi, iridology, homeopathy, acupuncture, clairvoyant diagnosis, human auras, and Rolfing. One of the larger books of this kind was even subsidized by the National Institute of Mental Health.
What ties together the diverse practices…? In part, a banal rhetoric about the physician as consoler;… In part, familiar and rather useless admonitions about not overlooking the abundance of circumstances that may contribute to one condition or another. Such banalities are often true and no doubt sometimes ignored, with disastrous consequences, but they scarcely amount to a distinctive conception of medicine. Holist therapies can be divided into those that are adaptations of traditional medical practices in other societies—Chinese, Navajo, and so forth—and those that were invented, so to speak, the week before last by some relatively successful crank.
Insofar as it extends beyond banality, the holistic medical movement constitutes both a deliberate attempt to substitute a magical for an engineering conception of the physician and an attack on scientific understanding and reasoning. Although the holistic movement does not contain a conception of medicine distinct from those we have discussed, it does contain a reactionary impetus to return the practice of medicine to the practice of magic and to replace logic and method with occultism and obfuscation.
Several conceptions of “holism” have been developed in the writings of holistic practitioners and their advocates. Most of them are vacuous; they are banalities of orthodox medicine, or they have no medical content and no applicability to any possible practice of medicine; they merely sound nice. Some are patently false. A much-repeated and trivial thesis, and moreover one that is said to characterize the sense in which holistic medicine is “holistic,” amounts to no more than this: mental and physical properties are interdependent. Mental states affect physical states and physical states affect mental states. No one doubts it. To make such a claim seem somehow profound, holistic writers invariably conjoin it with a discussion of Cartesian dualism, insinuating that modern medicine follow Descartes in postulating an impassable chasm between the mind and the body. Modern medicine does no such thing, and could not even if it wanted to, since Descartes held no such view.
Another doctrine said to be holistic is that one’s state of health is affected by everything. Whatever this means, it has nothing to do with any possible practice of medicine, for no one can attend to everything. If physicians cannot distinguish relevant from irrelevant factors, important from unimportant causes, then they can do nothing. A variation of this doctrine is not vacuous but merely vapid: “Fundamental to holistic medicine is the recognition that each state of health and disease requires a consideration of all contributing factors: psychological, psychosocial, environmental, and spiritual.” [Pelletier 1979] This is not a new revelation about medicine. Insofar as such multiple factors are known and believed to be important, they are routinely addressed in conventional medicine practice. Patients who suffer from coronary heart disease may be treated with beta blockers and antiplatelet drugs, and they may also be advised to change their work, their diet, their smoking habits, their exercise habits, and their living conditions.
The essay discusses assertions that “ ‘all states of health and all disorders are considered to be psychosomatic’ [Pelletier 1977]“ and that “the entire body (and psyche) can be treated or diagnosed through the treatment or observations of a special part of the anatomy.” Because of such notions,
…holistic practitioners…are under no obligation, they believe, to reconcile their claims about therapy with what is known about the causal pathways of the body.
The holistic practitioner sees the body in much the same way that magicians of old viewed the universe. The body becomes the last bastion of magic.
The authors expose the fallacy of the argument that “holistic medicine has not really been investigated, that funds ought to be made available for conducting tests of holistic practices, and that meanwhile we should keep our minds open about holistic techniques.” Although they couldn’t have foreseen the scientific blind spot that would soon hamper academic medicine in the form of “evidence-based medicine,” the authors portend discussions of Prior Probability:
Although it might be interesting to know more about the physiological pathways that are correlated with such processes as the placebo effect, this has nothing do with taking seriously the claims advanced by iridologists or zone therapists or even chiropractors. The claim to diagnose by examining the eye or to cure by massaging the foot is completely bogus; we know more than enough about the workings of the body to be reasonably certain that geometric features of the iris, for instance, do not provide the specific information about disorders that iridologists claim they do….Of course, it is conceivable that the beliefs of scientific medicine are in error about one or another of these matters, but that is no reason for using public funds to investigate holistic claims. One cannot justify spending other people’s money simply because one can imagine something to be true. The mere fact that holistic medicine is widespread and enduring is no reason to take its claims seriously; superstition, self-deception, stupidity, and fraud are ubiquitous and always have been.
The authors refute the charge that “the lack of evidence concerning the specific curative powers of holistic therapies is the result of a conspiracy of disinterest.” They dispense with cultural relativism, another favorite refuge of IMC advocates, and demolish the ”differing paradigms of Thomas Kuhn” contrivance:
Holistic advocates repeatedly cite Kuhn and claim that holistic medicine is an alternative paradigm with its own standards, one that cannot be understood or assessed by the practitioners of orthodox medicine. If the claim were valid, holistic practice would have to constitute a scientific tradition, albeit one in competition with the tradition of orthodox medicine. However, holistic medicine is not a scientific tradition. It has no paradigmatic work, no recognized set of problems, and no shared standards for what constitutes a solution to those problems; it also lacks the critical exchange among its practitioners that is characteristic of the sciences. Cranks have been common throughout the history of science, as Kuhn, a distinguished historian of science, knew well. The work of cranks does not constitute a scientific revolution, and no cranks appear among Kuhn’s many examples.
Glymour and Stalker were prescient in their conclusion:
If holistic-health advocates were content with encouraging sensible preventive medicine or with criticizing the economic organization of American medicine, we might be enthusiastic, but they are not. If the movement were without influence on American life, we would be indifferent, but it is not. Holistic medicine is a pablum of common sense and nonsense offered by cranks and quacks and failed pedants who share an attachment to magic and an animosity toward reason. Too many people seem willing to swallow the rhetoric—even too many medical doctors—and the results will not be benign. At times, physicians may find themselves in sympathy with the holistic movement, because some fragment of the rhetoric rings true, because of certain practices and attitudes they encounter in their daily work with colleagues and patients, or because of dissatisfaction with the economic and social organization of medicine. One hopes they will speak bluntly, but it does no good to join forces with cranks and quacks, magicians and madmen.
Amen to that.

   Science, Reason, Ethics, and Modern Medicine Part 5: Tu Quoque and History
Kimball Atwood
Link
My Discussion with Dr. P
After last week’s post, Dr. Peter Moran answered with more salient points. I’ll spend this week discussing those, because I share Dr. Moran’s “interest in examining the kind of messages we are putting out.” Acknowledging the inequality inherent in his not being the blog author, I’ll offer the last word to Dr. Moran by ending this series* and letting whatever comments he may have in response to today’s post be the last, at least for now.
Here is Dr. Moran’s response to my response:
The standard healthfraud position is that even if CAM may sometimes be helpful to people, it is a bad thing regarding which there can be no compromise.
It is a bad thing because, to quote KA, “implausible claims being promoted, tacitly or otherwise” leads to “unnecessary expense, a patient later feeling betrayed by her physician when the treatment doesn’t work or the ‘placebo effect’ wears off and she realizes that it was only a ‘pretend medicine’ all along, other patients or physicians concluding that the treatments have validity (and possibly being convinced to forgo rational treatment), people in general losing confidence in modern medicine when it appears that many physicians can’t distinguish between the rational and the bogus, wasted research funds, human subjects unnecessarily duped and endangered, a befuddled media, a befuddled public, befuddled leglislators endorsing quacks to a befuddled public,” [and more].
Superficially this is a powerful line of argument, because we can fairly easily find instances where such predictions are fulfilled. Yet I have suggested that healthfrauders routinely exaggerate the risks of CAM, that some potential dangers are not realized much in practice, and it again needs to be said that the medical risks depend very much upon the specific “quack” claim. Also, some of these outcomes, if as truly awful as implied, may be thought of as mainly exposing a puzzling lack of reach for more rational voices. This is the very reason why I have an interest in examining the kind of messages we are putting out.
And there is considerable evidence against some of the above. Surveys routinely show that the majority of CAM-using patients express great satisfaction with them. Despite this, nearly all also use conventional methods, and are satisfied with that. Even in this heyday of CAM, very few of the public use CAM exclusively.
The Scots are an interesting case study. They don’t seem to be vastly worse off health-wise or science-wise, or even exceptionally befuddled, yet 50% of their doctors prescribe homeopathic remedies and a further 10% use herbs.
What this adds up to is that the public may not be (generally) as indiscriminate in their use of alternative methods and as in need of protection from unscientific concepts as we healthfrauders like to think. Maybe we skeptics encounter a disproportionate amount of the dangerous and nutty extremes of “alternative” medicine because we go looking for it and we hang about on forums that gather it. We are also fairly obviously more deeply offended by it than most, which can lead to confirmation bias.
Which brings me to this: in science-based medicine we are quite accustomed to evaluating medical options in terms of benefits vs. risks. We normally try to quantify them so that we can reach a reasonable balance. An example is studies designed to determine the optimum dose of a noxious chemotherapeutic agent, so that cancer remissions are produced at acceptable risk. These days such studies even often include quality-adjusted life year (QALY) measurements so that all aspects of patient life can bear upon a precise, measurement-based, final judgment.
That’s how we normally operate. Not so, apparently, when it comes to CAM. In relation to that we adopt the meanest, least flexible possible position, even while lacking any clear evidence-based handle on the medical or psychosocial benefits or the social functions of unconventional and folk medical activity, or their risks. All we know, having completely dismissed all the anecdotal evidence, is that they usually don’t work obviously better than placebo when put to the test in the banal environment of the typical controlled trial. We don’t care that they may be being used mainly when there is no entirely satisfactory evidence-based treatments for the complaint, nor that some of the methods may simply have not yet been subjected to sufficient study to be quite sure whether they have intrinsic medical activity or not. It’s all one, if it is seen to be “alternative”.
Is the resort to ethical argument about the use of placebo medicines a lazy way of justifying such a globally rigid approach? The ethical card has some force, even when set against other primary ethical obligations of doctors towards their patients, but in reality it can only apply to that select few who have a clear enough grasp of the scientific evidence to be as certain as can be that any given CAM treatment IS a placebo. But Healthfraud has to also deal with what a lot of other practitioners think and what our patients are often trying out on their own initiative. It is a waste of time talking ethics to those who don’t share quite the same scientific convictions, and that applies to almost everyone.
KA seems to help my argument with personal medical experiences that are reminiscent of some of stories of “alternative” testimonial. I was quite struck by them, for I have had very similar personal experiences and observed them in many patients. They illustrate how there can be a complete disconnection between the benefits of medical interactions and their scientific content, and, indeed, any treatment content.
We have no basis on which to assume that similar benefits are not regularly occurring within CAM, especially when a lot of people are telling us so. In fact, KA elsewhere is arguing the reverse, that while CAM may be offering placebo and other non-specific medical benefits these can equally well occur within the 5-15 minute hurly-burly of the typical present day medical practice, I am sure they can, with good doctors, but I would love to be quite sure about the “equally”. Depending on the condition, and with as much reluctance and regret as anyone here, my money would be on the practitioner who is not hamstrung by what science says, and in consequence has a confident explanation for everything and never runs out of remedies. Sure, some of his clients may eventually realize that he is actually a nutcase, but even most of those will probably find ways in which they think he has helped them.
The reason I am being a bit stubborn about these matters is that I have what is as yet merely a vague inkling that they are important — that they may, despite initial appearances, help rather than damage our purposes.
Those who we might wish to influence in various ways may not have sufficient familiarity with science and medicine to be able to articulate the line of argument I am developing (it is difficult enough for me and I know I have a long haul ahead of me even if I am entirely right), but one of the reasons for our distressing inability to have the influence we desire may well be that people of ordinary intelligence and experience can nevertheless almost instinctively sense the weaknesses and exaggerations in some of our habitual arguments. They switch off. We may be able to do better with a change of tack that might actually be more in touch with medical realities.
Be reassured that looking at CAM methods in strict cost/risk/benefit terms will definitely not change most of our judgments concerning CAM. The main difference would be in the emphasis of argument and some of the rhetoric. We would still be able to describe Hulda Clark as a dangerous and severely deluded cancer quack, or, if you prefer, an unspeakable criminal fraud.
My Response to His Response to My Response
Let me say, again, that I am not trying to prohibit free citizens from pursuing whatever “CAM” they feel like pursuing. What I’m against is physicians violating their own ethical mandates, and governments and medical schools tacitly or explicitly promoting pseudomedicine. If 50% of Scots use homeopathy, so be it, even if it illustrates a deficit of science education in Scotland (I agree that “some of these outcomes…may be thought of as mainly exposing a puzzling lack of reach for more rational voices.” We’ve discussed that before: it argues for a better reach for rational voices, not for rational voices condoning the irrational). If “50% of [Scottish] doctors prescribe homeopathic remedies,” that is a different and real problem, both for medical ethics and for the regulation of physicians in Scotland. If Scots are not ”vastly worse off health-wise,” that is a triumph of modern public health and scientific medicine in spite of homeopathy, not because of it. Scots are obviously worse off “science-wise” for homeopathy, whether or not this has been measured, just as Americans would be worse off science-wise if “intelligent design” advocates had their way.
Yes, “we can fairly easily find instances where such [dire] predictions are fulfilled.” We on SBM have written about many of them. How many such instances does it take to counteract the (possibly) many more instances of patients expressing “great satisfaction” with “CAM”? Very few, it seems to me. I think that the public is in need of protection from unscientific concepts, both because some people are not as capable of discriminating as others, and for the larger societal reasons listed above. Even if that were not the case, my point in these posts is that physicians ought not to be dishonest. The border between what a physician can and cannot ethically recommend must be the point at which honesty and integrity are compromised, not the point at which some arbitrary distinction is made between “safe” and unsafe implausible treatments—even if pseudoscience might make some patients feel better.
A Digression
A regular column in the New York Times Magazine is “The Ethicist,” by Randy Cohen. Readers send real examples of ethical dilemmas for commentary by Mr. Cohen, who is very good at providing it. The July 27th issue included a non-medical illustration that “little white lies” are not the best policy:
The Ethicist
Hidden Opinions
By RANDY COHEN
Published: July 27, 2008
A friend, a nonwriter, retired after a distinguished career, asked me to read his screenplay because I am a published author. It was terrible: poorly written with no plot. Worse, it was clearly autobiographical, abounding in self-aggrandizement and intimate sexual details. To be kind, I told him merely that it was too personal. Recently he met a literary agent. I fear he will share this document with the agent and be humiliated. Must I now tell him my full opinion? — NAME WITHHELD, ARIZONA
If we rejected every work of fiction marred by vanity or cringe-worthy self-exposure, miles of shelf space would be left vacant at Barnes & Noble. And as a commercial matter, it is curious to discourage your friend from writing about himself in an era when memoirs proliferate like kudzu, which had sex with some other kudzu, to which it was not married. But it is in neither your literary judgment nor your commercial savvy that you most failed your friend — and fail him you did — but in your lack of candor. If he requested your honest opinion (and not just praise, another possibility), you should have provided it, as gently as possible. To be misleading is not to be kind.
It’s no picnic telling a friend that you don’t think much of his work, but you agreed to give him your professional assessment, and that’s what you should have done…
To be fair, I make the following disclosure. I asked Mr. Cohen’s permission to include that quotation in this blog, briefly suggesting to him how I would use it. He kindly gave his permission, but with this caveat:
I’m not sure I agree that the editor-writer relationship is analogous to the doctor-patient relationship, and I should also mention that many people—many writers—disagree with me here. Several said they’d absolutely lie to a non-writer friend who sought their opinion; they’d cosset the non-writer with praise.
I think that Mr. Cohen should give himself more credit. If anything, the doctor-patient relationship requires more ethical rigor, as it were, than does an informal interaction in the “outside world.” What many writers say they would do, moreover, is only barely relevant to the ethics of the situation. I agree that “to be misleading is not to be kind,” and also that there is a gentle, constructive way to be honest in such situations. That applies to writers talking to non-writers and to physicians talking to patients.
Digression Complete
Back to Dr. Moran. I’m not sure I understand his point about “quality-adjusted life year (QALY) measurements.” How can chemotherapy, a rational treatment whose effects, both good and bad, are well documented, be compared to “balancing qi”? We know a lot about implausible treatments. We know that they are implausible. We need to know about their “social functions” as much or as little as we need to know about the social functions of our patients’ religious beliefs. Sometimes that may be considerable (as in Dr. Moran’s previous example of the witch doctor), other times not at all, but never does it mean that we ought to promote such social functions—any more than we would promote religious beliefs.
“CAM” is not necessarily “all one, if it is seen to be ‘alternative’.” The occasional “CAM” treatments that are plausible—some molecules, mainly—deserve the same consideration from physicians as do plausible new drugs that have not yet been approved for general use: we should favor appropriate investigations but not premature recommendations, except in extraordinary circumstances. Other treatments that are typically labeled “CAM” but are not, such as relaxation, exercise, some diets, and some manual therapies, are perfectly rational and are not at issue here.
Was Dr. Moran referring to physicians when he wrote of the “select few who have a clear enough grasp of the scientific evidence…”? If so, that is a sad commentary on recent medical training. It also may reflect a little-appreciated deficiency of Evidence-Based Medicine, i.e., its failure to acknowledge the necessity of scientific plausibility. Regarding the charge that to “resort to ethical argument about the use of placebo medicines” is “lazy,” I think that in the current cultural environment, the easier and therefore lazier stance for physicians is to acquiesce to the “CAM” fad (just as to “cosset the non-writer with praise” is the lazier stance for writers). This is evidenced by the widespread encroachment of “CAM” onto medical school campuses and the almost complete lack of formal opposition.
Regarding the “placebo effects” that I reported having experienced (my “personal medical experiences”), I don’t see how those help Dr. Moran’s argument. The whole point of those experiences was that they occurred in the context of rational medicine. I don’t see any “disconnection between the benefits of medical interactions and their scientific content” in those experiences. On the contrary, it was the rational content of the information that I got from those interactions that made me feel better. Even if other people might get similar comfort from irrational content, so what? I have not denied that in any of these discussions; I have argued that physicians ought not to steer patients in that direction by subterfuge or ignorance, and that rational medicine has a similar, if sometimes unrealized capacity for comforting patients.
Dr. Moran’s next paragraph is the most troublesome. He surely knows that impugning the “5-15 minute hurly-burly of the typical present day medical practice” can only be an argument for changing the way present day medicine is practiced, not an argument for “CAM.” Regarding non-specific medical benefits that might accrue from “the practitioner who is not hamstrung by what science says, and in consequence has a confident explanation for everything and never runs out of remedies,” what is new or worthy about that? It’s a perfect description of the classical quack. It is remiscent of a passage quoted previously on SBM, whose very authors appeared to have missed the point:
Chiropractic finds its voice exactly where biomedicine becomes inarticulate. Too often, biomedicine fails to affirm a patient’s chronic pain. Patients think their experience is brushed aside by a physician who treats it as unjustified, unfounded, or annoying, attitudes that heighten a patient’s anguish and intensify suffering. Chiropractors never have to put a patient’s pain in the category of the “mind.” They never fail to find a problem. By rooting pain in a clear physical cause, chiropractic validates the patient’s experience.
Should MDs aspire to similar, deceptive practices, merely because they “validate the patient’s experience”? I’m sure Dr. Moran will agree that the passage does not constitute an argument for that. All it does is portray chiropractors as sleazy salesmen.
Conclusion
If rational medical practitioners need “a change of tack that might actually be more in touch with medical realities,” such a change might include offering patients more time, better explanations, more honesty, more sympathy, and a more creative range of rational treatments. All of Dr. Moran’s points argue for those. None argues for “CAM.”

   The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part I)
Kimball Atwood
Link
Introduction
On Feb. 25, 2008, the federal Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) cited Columbia University Medical Center (CUMC) for violating Title 45, Part 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations: Protection of Human Subjects (45CFR§46). The violations involved Columbia’s administration of the NIH-sponsored trial of the bizarre “Gonzalez Regimen” for treating cancer of the pancreas.† The OHRP’s determination letter to Steven Shea, MD, the Director of the Division of General Medicine and Senior Vice-Dean at CUMC, cited ethical problems of a serious kind:
We determine that the informed consent for the 40 of 62 subjects referenced by CUMC was not documented prior to the start of research activities, nor was the requirement for documentation waived by the CUMC IRB for subjects in this study.
It was the second time that the OHRP had cited Columbia for its dubious management of the “Gonzalez” trial. The first occurred in Dec. 2002, after investigators had determined that the trial’s consent form “did not list the risk of death from coffee enemas.” The OHRP listed several other violations at that time, but “redacted” them from the letter that it made available to the public.
The “Gonzalez Regimen”
The full name of the trial, which began in 1999, is:
Prospective Cohort Study of Gemcitabine Versus Intensive Pancreatic Proteolytic Enzyme Therapy With Ancillary Nutritional Support (Gonzalez Regimen) in Patients With Stage II, III, or IV Adenocarcinoma of the Pancreas
The trial ostensibly investigates a “detoxification” regimen advocated by Nicholas Gonzalez, a physician who has been found “guilty of negligence and incompetence on more than one occasion” and has been ordered to pay large, justified malpractice settlements on others. The regimen includes pancreatic enzymes taken by mouth—which, according to the National Cancer Institute (NCI) description, “may help kill cancer cells”—and the following:
Coffee enemas are performed twice a day, along with skin brushing daily, skin cleansing once a week with castor oil during the first 6 months of therapy, and a salt and soda bath each week. Patients also undergo a complete liver flush and a clean sweep and purge on a rotating basis each month during the 5 days of rest.
Writer Michael Specter described the regimen’s oral medications for an article in the New Yorker several years ago:
The list of supplements that Gonzalez hands out to most patients with solid tumors runs to four single-spaced pages. It includes, in part, sixty freeze-dried, porcine-pancreatic enzyme pills (swallowed in six batches, all of which must be taken with water, and none of which may be taken with food or within an hour of a meal). During breakfast and dinner, each patient must swallow capsules of adrenal medulla, amino acids, bone marrow, selenium 50, thyroid, Vitamin A 10,000, and Vitamin E succinate.
There are separate pills for the lymph, liver, and kidney–all to help balance deficiencies caused by lack of enzymes, or because the body is overwhelmed fighting cancer. During lunch, each patient must take a pill with twenty-five thousand units of beta carotene, as well as pills with copper gluconate, manganese glycerophosphate, potassium citrate, and Vitamin D. Twice each day, whenever it’s convenient, patients must dilute a mixture of black-walnut formula in water and drink it. Patients who suffer from metal toxicity also need to take nine pills of sodium alginate.
In all there are about 150 pills per day. The regimen is “alternative,” not “integrative.”
An “Eccentric” Dentist
Gonzalez inherited most of this regimen and his ideas about cancer from a dentist in Texas. He frequently recounts his experience, beginning as a medical student at Cornell, interviewing
…my mentor, Dr. William Kelley, the eccentric and controversial dentist who, over a 20-year period, developed a very intensive way of treating cancer using diet, supplements, large doses of pancreatic enzymes, the controversial detoxification routines, such as coffee enemas.
[...]
I learned about Dr. Kelley in 1981, after my second year of medical school at Cornell. I was fortunate at the time that I was already kind of being taken under the wing of Robert Good, who, at that time, was president of Sloan-Kettering Cancer Institute.
[...]
I had met Kelley in the summer of 1981. Again, the details of which aren’t important for this session. At that time, he was very controversial. He was just coming off of that Steve McQueen fiasco. Steve McQueen, the actor who did Kelley’s program.
Kelley was desperate to have his work tested. This is 1981, before the NCI had an Office of Alternative Medicine, before there was a National Center for Alternative Medicine, before any of those things were up and running.
It was a very controversial time to be treating cancer patients with nutrition, particularly if you were a dentist and not a physician, so there were all kinds of legal issues involved.
When I met Kelley, he expressed one interest and one intention. Whatever’s said about him or isn’t said about him, whatever people may think or not think about him today in 2000, in 1981 he had one intention. He wanted his work properly evaluated by the orthodox medical community.
He believed he was doing something of value. He also said in our first session that if he was doing something of value it needed to be tested properly so it could be mainstreamed into orthodox medicine where any big therapy belongs. I thought that was a very noble and honorable intention, and he maintained that intent through the next 5 years.
Under Dr. Good’s direction, initially, as a medical student, but subsequently as an immunology fellow in his research group which, at that point, eventually moved to the University of South Florida, I completed an intensive investigation of Kelley’s work.
[...]
We were confronted with an alternative practitioner in 1981, who had treated literally over 10,000 patients using this nutritional program over a 20-year period. It was a mass of information.
One of the first things Kelley did for which I respect him to this day enormously, is he opened all his records to me. There were no secrets. His successes, his failures, the people that loved him, the people that wrote him hate letters, all that stuff was opened to me from the time I first started investigating his work. There were no secrets.
We were confronted with a mass of records. Half of them were in Dallas, where we had an office, half of them were in Washington state; some of them went back 25 years. At one point, he had had a fire in his house, some of his records were destroyed. And I was confronted with this enormous project that Dr. Good was encouraging me to do without the slightest idea how to do it.
[...]
It took eventually 5 years to do that. Of course, I began the study while I was a medical student, continued it extensively while I was a fourth-year medical student. I had a 4-month block of time to really get involved with this. Then during my 2-year immunology fellowship this is primarily what I did.
To the day I die, will be grateful to Dr. Good that he allowed me to do this while I was doing my immunology training. I eventually went through 10,000 of Kelley’s records, evaluated over 1,000 very intensively. By intensive evaluation, I mean, we got complete medical records. I interview all his patients, over 1,000. Of this group, we were able to select 455 that we felt at least met the initial criteria for the second part of the research study. Terrible prognosis, biopsy-proven, radiographic studies either ──── survival or tumor regression. We eventually selected that down to 50 patients that we evaluated — that I evaluated extensively. Some of these patients I interviewed 6, 8, 10 times. Some of them I actually went to their home. We got complete medical records.
I apologize for that voluminous and tedious quotation, but it amounts to a small fraction of a recurrent litany of name-dropping, euphemism, false modesty, other acts of pseudo-self-deprecation, and unfalsifiable claims.
According to Dr. Gonzalez, the result of his 5-year investigation of Kelley’s practice was a 500-page manuscript that he never published: “One Man Alone: An Investigation of Nutrition, Cancer, and William Donald Kelley.” It consisted of detailed case reports of the above-mentioned 50 patients. That manuscript, however, was examined in detail by six physician reviewers for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), as reported in 1990. The OTA reviewers found that
In all cases,…documentation presented in the manuscript was inadequate to confirm critical details of the narrative, and in many cases, it appeared that critical pieces of information did not exist in the medical record at all (e.g., confirmation of metastatic disease), mainly because the patients had not been followed up with tests and scans to determine the status of their disease.
The OTA’s assessment of both Kelley’s regimen and the similar regimen of Max Gerson did not suggest real evidence of efficacy.
Dr. Gonzalez’s CV reveals that he spent much of his 4th year of medical school pursuing his interest in Kelley, and that his postgraduate clinical training consisted solely of an internship (1 year) in internal medicine at Vanderbilt. Above, he admits to having spent most of his ”2-year immunology fellowship” poring over Kelley’s records and writing his manuscript. Thus Dr. Gonzalez’s implicit claims to clinical expertise in general, to specific expertise in oncology, and to expertise in conducting clinical trials are unwarranted.
Or maybe just a Garden-Variety Quack
It is instructive to compare Dr. Gonzalez’s statements about Kelley to statements written by two veteran and savvy health fraud investigators, Stephen Barrett, MD, the acerbic founder and editor of Quackwatch, and his frequent co-author, the late hematologist and nutritionist Victor Herbert, MD, JD:
In the 1960s, William Donald Kelley, D.D.S., developed a program for cancer patients that involved dietary measures, vitamin and enzyme supplements, and computerized “metabolic typing.” Kelley classified people as “sympathetic dominant,” “parasympathetic dominant,” or metabolically “balanced” and made dietary recommendations for each type. He claimed that his “Protein Metabolism Evaluation Index” could diagnose cancer before it was clinically apparent and that his “Kelley Malignancy Index could detect “the presence or absence of cancer, the growth rate of the tumor, the location of the tumor mass, prognosis of the treatment, age of the tumor and the regulation of medication for treatment.”
In 1970, Kelley was convicted of practicing medicine without a license after witnesses testified that he had diagnosed lung cancer on the basis of blood from a patient’s finger and prescribed dietary supplements, enzymes, and a diet as treatment. In 1976, following court appeals, his dental license was suspended for five years. However, he continued to promote his methods until the mid-1980s through his Dallas-based International Health Institute. Under the institute’s umbrella, licensed professionals and “certified metabolic technicians” throughout the United States would administer a 3,200-item questionnaire and send the answers to Dallas. The resultant computer printout provided a lengthy report on “metabolic status” plus detailed instructions covering foods, supplements (typically 100 to 200 pills per day), “detoxification” techniques, and lifestyle changes.
Basic Science: Implausible
As is true for Gonzalez, Kelley also did not concoct the ideas that were the bases for his treatments, but borrowed them from fanciful notions that had begun early in the 20th century. The history is recounted in Mr. Specter’s New Yorker article and in the NCI’s “PDQ Summary,” but is best explained in an article by the late Sloan-Kettering biochemist Saul Green. Green’s essay dismantles each component of the “Kelley/Gonzalez” claim and exposes its most fundamental defect: it fails to acknowledge that cancer is a genetic disease; thus the “daughters” of cancer cells are themselves cancer cells.
What that means is that the Kelley/Gonzalez “detoxification” regimen, even if it were what its name implies (it isn’t), even if it were capable of removing carcinogens (it is not), and even if its several other tenets were valid (they are not), would already be too late once cancer has begun. From the standpoint of basic science, several unanimously unlikely sub-claims add up to a vanishingly unlikely whole.
Empirical Evidence: Implausible
But what about empirical evidence? It is the claim of clinical successes, after all, that constitutes the formal rationale for the study. In public, it seems, Gonzalez is careful not to offer quantitative rates of cure or survival times for patients on his regimen. In numerous places, however, he implies miracle cures of patients who had been on death’s door when he (or Kelly, before him) met them. Such statements can be found on his website, in the New Yorker article, and in lectures. According to a 1998 article by Victor Herbert, moreover, information discovered in the course of a successful $2.65 million malpractice case against Gonzalez suggests that what he tells patients is different from what he tells the press.¹ Dr. Herbert had been one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses, and thus had access to the evidence:
Gonzalez’s own tape and his subpoenaed office records showed that he stated to [the plaintiff] that he cured 75% of all cancers with his ‘detoxification’ therapy.
He said that the only people he could not cure were those whose ability to be detoxified was destroyed by chemotherapy and/or radiation. He talked her out of the regime, which was scheduled pelvic irradiation to destroy residual endometrial cancer following hysterectomy. Gonzalez represented to her that hair analysis showed that she was full of cancer and cancer toxins, and he would detoxify her by prescribing daily about 150 supplements plus 6 coffee enemas and by doing monthly hair analysis to show her progression to cure.
Subpoena revealed that Gonzalez’s hair analyses for non-existent cancer toxins were carried out on a word processor, not on a hair analyzer. He said her ‘cancer indicators’ were falling, without naming any toxin or indicator…¹
There has been one previous “study,” reported by Dr. Gonzalez himself, purporting to demonstrate a favorable effect of the “Gonzalez regimen” on cancer of the pancreas. According to the NCI,
…a prospective nonconsecutive case series conducted by the developer and an associate, included 11 patients diagnosed with adenocarcinoma of the pancreas (stage II or stage IV). None of the patients had received chemotherapy or radiation therapy, and none had undergone surgical resection with curative intent. All the patients had pancreatic tumors that were either unresected or partially resected. Survival from the time of diagnosis was the only study endpoint, and all 11 patients (including one who left the study) were included in this survival analysis.
The investigators reported a median survival time of 17 months and a mean survival time of 25.2 months for these patients. Nine patients (82%) survived 1 year, five patients (45%) survived 2 years, and four patients (36%) survived 3 years. At the time the study was reported, two patients were alive: one who had survived 3 years, and one who had survived 4 years. The researchers concluded that the 1-year and 2-year survival percentages for this group of patients were superior to those observed for other U.S. patients diagnosed with adenocarcinoma of the pancreas (1-year survival, all stages = 25%; 2-year survival, all stages = 10%).
The key phrase in that summary is “nonconsecutive case series,” which means that Dr. Gonzalez and his associate did not enroll every patient with pancreatic cancer who came along, but selected among them. According to the abstract of his case series, the 11 subjects were accrued over 3 years, between January 1993 and April 1996. Although we don’t know how many potential subjects there were during that time, Gonzalez reported in 1999:
I have followed thousands of patients over the years who have done coffee enemas in some cases for decades: virtually all patients report an increase sense of well being. I have done them myself daily since first learning about them in 1981.
Since he didn’t begin to follow others “doing coffee enemas” until 1987, he must have averaged nearly 200 or more “coffee enema” patients/year over 12 years. They may not all have had cancer of the pancreas, but there may have been many more than 200/yr, and it seems likely that patients with untreatable cancers would have been preferentially attracted by Gonzalez’s claims. Of the four most common malignant tumors—those of colon, lung, breast, and pancreas—that of the pancreas is the least likely to be treatable at the time of its discovery. By these criteria, Dr. Gonzalez may have seen as many as several hundred patients per year with pancreatic cancer, but probably no fewer than 50/yr.
Elsewhere, however, Dr. Gonzalez disputes this, and seems to contradict his previous assertion about “coffee enemas”:
Over the years, I have repeatedly heard the claim that Dr. Isaacs and I must be processing and treating thousands and thousands of new cancer patients each year to obtain the results illustrated by these case reports. In fact, a good friend of mine recently remarked that I must be seeing “350-450” new cases of pancreatic cancer yearly, because we are well known for our success with this particular illness. This is simply not the case. In reality, we see no more than 3-5 new cases a year.
Maybe yes, maybe no. It matters, of course, because the 11-subject case series is meaningless without a denominator, i.e., the total number of patients from which the 11 were culled. I’ve known plenty of patients who lived with cancer of the pancreas for more than one year, a few who lived 2 years, and one who lived 4 years, and I’m not even a cancer specialist. None of those patients “did” the “Gonzalez regimen,” but if they had it would have been a simple matter to compile their case histories in such a way as to cast a favorable light on it. We’ve mentioned such “selective reporting” previously on SBM.
In an article in 1995, philosopher Douglas Stalker argued that such reporting of “best” cancer cases is inevitably misleading:
It is almost axiomatic that if a therapy has been in use for a period of time, some patients will have received the therapy and will also have experienced a positive outcome of their medical problem. The therapy may have caused the positive outcome, or it may not have. A positive case does not tell us about cause and does not distinguish the true from the false therapy hypothesis; positive cases alone do not change the prior probability of a hypothesis.
Stalker showed that the NCI had no idea how to respond to positive case reports, including those involving Laetrile and the first 3 that Gonzalez himself had offered in the early 1990s. Stalker demonstrated the fallacy of the NCI’s “Best Case Series Program” to evaluate “alternative” cancer claims, which began in 1991. It is still in force and does not require that the cases be “consecutive” or that a denominator be reported. He predicted, correctly, that the program was likely to result in the NIH awarding grants for trials of methods for which the evidence was less favorable than that for many plausible chemotherapy regimens that had been automatically dismissed after failing the standard uncontrolled screening test of the day, the Gehan two-stage trial.
How could the NIH have ever allocated $1.5 million of taxpayers’ money for a trial of the “Gonzalez regimen”?
Reference
[1] Herbert V. The Continuing Case of Nicholas Gonzalez. Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine 1998;2(2):43-44

   The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part II)
Kimball Atwood
Link
Laetrile and the Politics of NIH-Sponsored trials of “Alternative Cancer Treatments”
Part I of this blog ended by asking how, in light of the implausible and arduous nature of the “Gonzalez regimen” for cancer of the pancreas, and the unconvincing “best case series,” the NIH could ever have decided to fund a trial of it.† This entry will begin to answer that question. In so doing it may seem to veer from the original subject, but hold on to your seats: what you’ll find here is a piece of the treasure map that leads to the Mother Lode of Fool’s Gold that is government-sponsored “CAM” research.
All historical accounts of the encroachment of implausible claims into the research agenda of the NIH must begin with Laetrile. By that is meant all implausible claims, not merely those having to do with cancer. Elsewhere we have traced the history of “chelation therapy” for coronary artery disease, and have shown that its origins as a political movement, eventually leading to an unethical, $30 million, 2000 subject NIH trial, were intimately associated with people and organizations advocating Laetrile—the most lucrative health fraud ever perpetrated in the United States. In that essay we offer evidence that the creation of the NCCAM itself was at least partly attributable to the history of Laetrile and its advocates. Several good histories or partial histories of the Laetrile debacle are available online, including here, here, here, here, here, and here. The best,¹ but one that does not seem to be available online, is by the recently deceased dean of historians of American quackery, James Harvey Young.
If Young were still alive, I suspect that he would agree that the NCI’s decision in the late 1970s to fund a trial of Laetrile to settle the matter “once and for all,” in the words of Director Arthur Upton,¹ was a mistake. The initial attempt to solicit case reports from Laetrile-prescribing physicians yielded only a tiny fraction of the cases that the NCI had expected. Nevertheless, the sum of information thus generated, together with what was already known about Laetrile, should have convinced the NCI to go no further. The NCI, however, arrived at the opposite conclusion, in part because it had no idea how to evaluate such cases, as Douglas Stalker explained in his 1995 article cited in Part I of this blog. The eventual prospective trial, an uncontrolled but well-performed case series, was headed by the Mayo Clinic cancer researcher Charles Moertel, who had been the first to call for a Laetrile study. It showed, beyond any reasonable doubt, that Laetrile was both dangerous and a complete failure.
Hard-core Laetrile advocates rejected that finding, as expected after Laetrile kingpin Robert Bradford had brought an unsuccessful lawsuit attempting to block the study before it was completed, and after disparaging statements made by other advocates before it had begun.¹ ² Upon publication of Moertel’s report in 1982, Bradford opined:
The whole thing is a put-up deal to discredit Laetrile. It was a phony test, and I’m not surprised at the results.¹
That was the opinion of Laetrile advocates in general and, although stated with less vehemence, of a few apologists in academia. Even Linus Pauling, who had become a crank in his old age, wrote an opposing letter to the New England Journal of Medicine.² Notwithstanding those opinions, some think that the Moertel study was the prototype for demonstrating the social value of trials of implausible medical claims (IMC). The late NCCAM Director Stephen Straus, for example, in attempting to refute our fellow blogger Wally Sampson’s arguments against the NCCAM’s agenda, claimed in 2001 that the demand for Laetrile had “abated markedly only after competent studies showed it to be ineffective.”
The Early Courtship of an Odd Couple: Quackery and EBM
In fact, the demand (or at least the supply, and hence the public health menace) had abated markedly in 1979, after the Supreme Court’s decision in the Rutherford case had upheld the FDA’s decision to regulate Laetrile as a “new drug.” That ruling, for practical purposes, made Laetrile illegal.¹ ² In the history of Laetrile, however, we can detect both roots of the political “CAM” movement—in the virulent, paranoid, but well-organized and well-funded Laetrile advocacy organizations, virtually every one of whose principals was a member of the arch-right-wing John Birch Society—and the more subtle harbingers of what would become Evidence-Based Medicine’s (EBM) self-imposed, if unwitting failure to reckon with implausible claims. Those harbingers can be found, for instance, beginning on p. 16 of FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy’s Decision in 1977 to declare Laetrile a “new drug”:
1. Objective Evidence of Effectiveness
The courts have thus determined that, as a matter of law, no ‘general recognition’ of a drug’s effectiveness can exist absent adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations…. There are no clinical investigations of Laetrile’s effectiveness, published or otherwise…
There is…an apparent lack of public understanding of what the required studies consist of and why they are required. The Commissioner will thus include in this opinion a discussion of what adequate and well-controlled studies are and why they are needed.
That language must have seemed utterly reasonable at the time, particularly in the context of a much larger statement that included overwhelming evidence against Laetrile. It is now clear, however, that IMC advocates eventually came to view access to taxpayer-sponsored trials of their pet claims as a right of citizenship—not as a decision rightfully based on scientific promise. In this era of EBM and its tunnel-vision for controlled clinical trials to the near-exclusion of all other evidence, the words of the Commissioner, of Moertel , and of a few other scientists at the time could be interpreted as an invitation to such folly.
If that sounds farfetched, consider the Authors’ Conclusions in the abstract of the 2006 Cochrane Review of “Laetrile Treatment for Cancer”:
The claim that Laetrile has beneficial effects for cancer patients is not supported by data from controlled clinical trials. This systematic review has clearly identified the need for randomised or controlled clinical trials assessing the effectiveness of Laetrile or amygdalin for cancer treatment.
That astonishing statement is due to the singular blind spot in EBM’s “evidence” calculus, as originally discussed here and here. The abstract of the Cochrane Review for Laetrile, without any apparent sense of irony, also offers this:
OBJECTIVES: The aim of this review was to assess the alleged anti-cancer effect and the possible harms of Laetrile as a sole or adjunctive therapy in cancer treatment.
SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomized clinical trials (RCTs) and non randomized controlled clinical trials (non-RCTs).
MAIN RESULTS: No RCTs or non-RCTs were found, so no abstraction of outcome data could be performed in this systematic review.
The absurdity of the marriage of EBM and IMC is again exposed. It seems plain—but not, apparently, to the Cochrane authors and like-minded EBM puppets. Can they really believe that absent “RCTs or non-RCTs” there is no basis upon which to judge “the alleged anti-cancer effect and the possible harms of Laetrile as a sole or adjunctive therapy in cancer treatment?” Laetrile is one of the most well-considered quack claims in history. The evidence against it, even without considering Moertel’s study—its extreme biological implausibility, its persistence having been an obvious matter of lucrative health fraud, its advocates having been sociopathic criminals, its “miraculous” cures having been revealed as illusory, its ineffectiveness and risk of cyanide toxicity having been demonstrated in prospective animal studies performed by real scientists and by numerous unfortunate cases of desperate cancer sufferers—is overwhelming.
One of the authors of the Cochrane Laetrile review was Edzard Ernst, whose enigmatic views are illustrated by that review and by his previously quoted, perfectly fallacious dismissal of “a priori plausibility,” which stand in sharp contrast to his considerable insight into the process of IMC advocacy:
A[n]…important point relates to a repetitive pattern in the scientific investigation of “bogus” therapies. Proponents first manage to mobilize supporters to campaign in their favor. This brings financial gain. When skeptics ask about the evidence, the burden of proof is swiftly put on their shoulders, and the lack of evidence is made to look like a “conspiracy” of orthodoxy against the alternative. If scientists then decide to rigorously test the method, its proponents would celebrate this as a breakthrough for their method. Again, this amounts to financial gain. Subsequently, a study may prove that the method is ineffective. Proponents now claim that the research was flawed, did not adhere to their protocol, or was wrongly analyzed. The press coverage yet again brings financial gain. This pattern repeats itself with depressing regularity, e.g., when Laetrile or Di Bella’s cancer cure were promoted.
Ernst is absolutely correct about that “repetitive pattern.” Then how can he ignore its obvious conclusions? One is that scientists should NOT “decide to rigorously test [a 'bogus'] method” other than for the same reason that they propose to test any other method: that there is genuine scientific promise. In particular, noisy, obnoxious, and even well-funded and politically-connected advocacy is, in the absence of scientific promise, a terrible reason to decide to rigorously test a method. That lesson is the legacy of the NCI’s Laetrile trial and why we can now judge it to have been a mistake. Another obvious conclusion is that emotional advocacy—by scientifically-naive individuals who, for various reasons not relevant to natural processes, believe in the IMC in question—must count against the prior probability of the claim being valid. Douglas Stalker called that a “source reason for prior probability ranking” and gave several examples.
The Odd Couple Ties the Knot
I cannot, in this entry or even in several, present a comprehensive history to convince you, dear readers, of my assertion about Laetrile and government-sponsored IMC research in the U.S. It is my hope that someone with more time and historical savvy than I have, perhaps the scholarly heir to James Harvey Young, will eventually do that. Instead I’ll offer a few more clues next week—no, more than clues: compelling, albeit incomplete pieces of evidence. I’ll present them not according to chronology, but in such a way as to induce each to help explain the next to be discussed, and so on. Forgive me if that doesn’t work.
References
1. Young JH. Laetrile in Historical Perspective. In: Young JH. American Health Quackery. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press 1992, pp. 205-55
2. Bross IDJ; Pauling L; Culbert ML. Laetrile. NEJM 1982;307(2):118-19

   The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part III)
Kimball Atwood 
Link
A Reminder (Mainly to Myself): this Blog will Eventually get back to Discussing the NIH Trial of the “Gonzalez Regimen” for Treating Cancer of the Pancreas†
Which, if you’ll recall, is an arduous dietary and “detox” regimen that includes 150 pills per day, many of which contain pancreatic enzymes, two “coffee enemas” per day, ”a complete liver flush and a clean sweep and purge on a rotating basis each month during the 5 days of rest,” and more. In Part II I ventured off on a tangent about Laetrile and government sponsorship of trials of implausible cancer “cures.” That became more involved than I had planned (but also more enlightening, or so I hope), and Part III continues on that tangent.
The Politics of “Alternative Cancer Treatments”: the Lamentable Legacy of Laetrile (cont.)
The whole tide is beginning to turn toward metabolic therapy for degenerative disease and preventive medicine. Laetrile…has been the battering ram that is dragging right along with it…B-15,…acupuncture, kinesiology, …homeopathy and chiropractic…And we’ve done it all by making Laetrile a political issue.”
-Michael Culbert, editor of The Choice, the newsletter of the Committee for Freedom of Choice in Medicine. Quoted in 1979.¹
The Next Step: IAT Spawns the OTA Report on “Unconventional Cancer Treatments”…
In 1985, not long after the demise of Laetrile, pushers of implausible cancer treatments were in the news again. This time the treatment was the “immuno-augmentative therapy” (IAT) of Lawrence Burton. According to the 1990 Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Report on Unconventional Cancer Treatments,
Treatment consists of daily self-injections of processed blood products, continuing for the life of the patient.
…
At least four IAT products may be prescribed to treat human cancer patients. The IAT brochure states that some of these are manufactured from the pooled blood of cancer patients and others from the pooled blood of human donors who do not have cancer.
The brochure describes IAT products as:
Deblocking Protein (DP) —an alpha 2 macroglobulin [etc.]
Tumor Antibody 1 (TA1) —a combination of alpha 2 macroglobulin, IgG, IgM, and IgA [etc.]
Tumor Antibody 2 (TA2) —differs from TA1 in potency and possibly composition of immunoglobulins [etc.]
Tumor Complement (TC)…Described as complement C3 that is uniquely active in activating TA1 and TA2. [etc.]
There is no record of Burton’s carrying out biochemical analyses of these materials to identify their components, and his patents describing their manufacture prescribe no tests for identity. Nor has independent analysis of IAT materials been reported from samples provided directly by Burton.
…
NCI analyzed IAT treatment materials provided by the family of a deceased IAT patient in 1984. According to the NCI analysis, all the treatment materials were dilute blood proteins, in which the major component was albumin, and all were reported to be devoid of the components described in the IRC brochure.
In 1985, according to the OTA report, Burton’s clinic in the Bahamas had been
closed by the Bahamian Government at the recommendation of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), after contamination of IAT treatment materials with hepatitis B and the AIDS virus was reported.
Shortly thereafter a group called the “IAT Patients Association” (IATPA) was founded by Frank Wiewel, “whose father-in-law was a patient of Burton,” and whose name would become better known within a few years. According to the OTA Report,
IATPA was founded in July 1985 with the single goal of re-opening the Immunology Researching Centre (IRC), a clinic in the Bahamas at which Lawrence Burton offers IAT…The leadership of IATPA also persuaded then-Congressman Guy Molinari to hold public hearings on IAT…
Since the reopening of the IAT clinic in March 1986, IATPA leaders and a member of Congressman Molinari’s staff, acting as principal members of the Coalition (and later the Alliance for Alternative Medicine), helped to rally congressional interest, culminating in the request for OTA’s case study of IAT.
Thus it was the closing of the Burton’s IAT clinic that led shortly to the congressional request that the OTA prepare a report on “Unconventional Cancer Treatments.” Molinari’s original request, signed by 40 other legislators, was only for the OTA to design a study of IAT. Representative John Dingell asked that it include “unconventional” cancer treatments in general. (see also here and here for explanations of the OTA Report). The OTA bent over backwards to please advocates, placing on its Advisory Panel 8 members (out of 18) who were “generally supportive of unconventional treatments.”
…Which Tweaks the National Cancer Institute (NCI)
The OTA Report made several recommendations about “Evaluating Unconventional Cancer Treatments.” Among these were criteria for “Best Case Reviews,” which were adopted by the NCI in 1991 and are still in force. The OTA also designed a trial for IAT, as had been its charge, and went out of its way to try to persuade Lawrence Burton to participate in the planning:
OTA enlisted the assistance of academically-based experts in clinical trials, an oncologist from NCI and one from FDA, and asked Burton for his participation. Burton appointed a resident patient who was active in the IATPA, to represent him on this “IAT Working Group.” Burton himself would not participate except at interim and final decision points. As is turned out, this was a significant handicap.
It went downhill from there. At the first meeting in the Bahamas,
Burton’s participation in the discussion was limited mainly to the first morning. At that time, he characterized the OTA draft as “childish and inane.”
There was never a trial of IAT. There was never a case series suggesting safety or efficacy. There were several looks at records and documents by outsiders, including our own Wally Sampson, suggesting ineffectiveness. There were also several cases of hepatitis associated with the treatment, an incidence of skin abscesses at injection sites of 4.5/100 between 1983 and 1984, and evidence that some of the “blood products” had been contaminated with HIV. (All discussed and referenced here)
John Birch Lives: Paranoid IMC Advocates Play the “Freedom Card”
So much for good-faith attempts by the “establishment” to give advocates of Implausible Medical Claims (IMC) their day in court. Once again, however, the good guys failed to learn that lesson. As had been the case with Laetrile, IAT supporters blamed the government and the OTA for Burton’s failings:
…an IATPA member indicated, “in the course of these events, we [IATPA] became convinced that a conspiracy exists which suppresses evaluation of unconventional treatments and have become more broadly politically active in response to this.”
Michael Culbert, the veteran of the Laetrile wars and the author of the quotation that opened this blog entry, was succinct in his assessment of the entire OTA Report:
The document refers several times to the interesting phrase, “scientific medicine,” and therein lies not only the fallacy of the document, but indeed, of the entire thought system of the American medical establishment. We wonder when medicine stopped being an art and became a science. Orthodoxy cannot escape its blind allopathic paradigm; one based on, essentially, discarded Newtonian mechanistic principles.
It cannot any more grasp the concept of individualized, integrated, total metabolic protocols in the management of cancer than it can abandon its obsession with animal tumor systems, cell lines, tumor types, etc.
As Americans drop like flies to the pandemic of cancer, it should be clear that what we need is a new paradigm; a multi-factorial view of cancer causation; a body-wide concept of its management, and an abandonment of the status quo which has ill-served the nation.
Nothing could be more obscene than the spectacle of dying Americans denied freedom of choice in therapy having to go underground, go abroad, or do without. Nothing is more disturbing than the spectacle of government power being used to arrest, harass, chasten, and destroy physicians and researchers who, by adopting so called alternative approaches, are only trying to help their patients.
The vicious system which, on the one hand says “we cannot cure you,” and on the other hand says, “but don’t try some unproven remedy” and warns you always not to sneak off to Tijuana, must come to an end. It is blatantly immoral. And along with it is the randomized, placebo controlled, double-blind study. I can’t think of anything more immoral than using that as a rational scientific exercise.
The solution to all this, of course, is not scientific. It is political. If people have to take to the streets to secure what should be their birthright, freedom of choice in medicine, against the tyrannical concentration of economic and vested interests, then they will.
“Medical writer” Ralph Moss also addressed the OTA. He stated that he had worked at Memorial Sloan-Kettering as “assistant director of public affairs” from 1974-77. He claimed that he had “[blown] the whistle on [Sloan-Kettering's] cover-up” of an animal study, performed by Dr. Kanematsu Sugiura, which found that “in the control animals 80% had lung metastases but only 20% had them in the treated animals.” Moss chastised the OTA for allegedly not having acknowledged the “cover-up”:
This report on “Unconventional Cancer Treatments” was supposed to investigate a coverup. Instead it has become part of that coverup. In its present form, it will set back the study of non-toxic cancer treatments for years to come.
…
People are dying of cancer in this country. You remind me of that Ron Cobb cartoon of a little child dying of malnutrition. There are 8 or 10 doctors standing around its crib, pointing and questioning and rubbing their chins, like “What’s going on? We have to get the medical reports on this.”
People are dying.
We cremated Ron Wolin this week. It’s a very interesting story. Ron was co-founder of the Patients’ Rights Legal Action Fund and a patient of Dr. Burzynski. He was lying on a couch in Dr. Burzynski’s office in Houston when the FDA came in and seized 220,000 documents from Burzynski’s office. They took 11 filing cabinets, loaded them onto a U-Haul and drove away. And the very same day, Dr. Burton’s clinic was shut down in the Bahamas, July 17, 1985.
Now, I know what’s going on here and I’m not fooled. And I’ll tell you something: repression breeds resistance. Ron Wolin watched those records go out the door, then he founded an organization which forced the government to a standstill in the courts. And the same day, by coincidence, Frank Wiewel was in Dr. Burton’s clinic. You know, just a guy, with his father-in-law. And he watched Burton’s clinic closed and look, here he is. He’s the head of two cancer organizations. And I was just a guy who happened to be in the right place at the right time.
So, I’m not afraid of you, and I’m not afraid of what you’re doing. You’ll continue with this? Fine. We’ll continue to fight you.
Compare Moss’s account of the Sloan-Kettering “cover-up” with the account given on p. 23 of FDA Commissioner Kennedy’s 1977 report.
Moss reported the opinion of another person whose views would be heard again:
Gar Hildenbrand, who was both an Advisory Panel member and an outspoken activist, called on supporters of the Gerson diet and cancer patients in general to practice civil disobedience outside the meeting.
“On March 9th,” he wrote, “hundreds of people with cancer, people recovering from cancer, and worried well people will walk into the streets. In the early morning, at the Office of Technology Assessment, cancer patients will lie down in front of the doors to tell Congress: ‘You allow this system to go unchallenged OVER MY DEAD BODY.’ “
Hildenbrand was, and is, a conspicuous proponent of Gerson Therapy, another “dietary” and “detoxification” scheme that relies heavily on coffee enemas. His own views (“As a medication, the coffee enema is in a class by itself”) and links to other such opinions can be found here.
The “Harkinites” are Born
Iowa Congressman Berkley Bedell was one of the signatories of Rep. Guy Molinari’s request to the OTA. The above-mentioned Frank Wiewel may have helped Bedell find “alternative” treatments after Bedell had found out that he had prostate cancer. Bedell was not quite as rabid in his views as were Wiewel, Hildebrand, and Moss, but was every bit as ignorant of biology and science. Those four—Bedell, Wiewel, Moss, and Hildebrand—would soon become known as the “Harkinites”: the “experts” hand-picked by Iowa Senator Tom Harkin to advise the Director of the NIH Office of Alternative Medicine, the brainchild of Harkin and Bedell.
References
1. Bruzelius N. The Merchants of Laetrile. New England (magazine section), Boston Sunday Globe, June 17, 1979. Quoted in: Young JH. Laetrile in Historical Perspective. In: Young JH. American Health Quackery. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press 1992, p. 245.

   The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part IV)
Kimball Atwood
Links
A Review; then Back to the Gonzalez Regimen†
Part I of this blog introduced the topic of the “Gonzalez regimen” for treating cancer: “Intensive Pancreatic Proteolytic Enzyme Therapy With Ancillary Nutritional Support” and “detoxification” with twice daily coffee enemas, daily “skin brushing,” “a complete liver flush and a clean sweep and purge on a rotating basis each month,” and more. The topic was occasioned by the federal Office for Human Research Protections having recently cited Columbia University, for the second time, for violations of human subject protections in its NIH-funded trial of Gonzalez’s method as a treatment for cancer of the pancreas.
Part I discussed the implausible and bizarre regimen and cited Gonzalez’s troubles with malpractice suits and with the New York medical board during the 1990s. It ended by wondering what could have induced the NIH to give a $1.5 million grant to Columbia University to study the method.
Parts II and III began to answer that question, tracing some of the key events and individuals from the Laetrile wars in the 1970s to the NCI-funded trial of Laetrile reported in 1982, to the ”immuno-augmentative therapy” (IAT) battles of the mid-’80s, to the Report on “Unconventional Cancer Treatments” by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1990, which in turn led to the NCI adopting its “Best Case Series Program” in 1991.
The end of Part III hinted that the conspiracy mongering that had greeted every attempt by the government to explain its positions on implausible cancer treatments, from Laetrile to the OTA report, ultimately led to the creation of the Office of Alternative Medicine (OAM) at the NIH, also in 1991. There is plenty of evidence for that, both from the conspiracy mongers themselves and from more level-headed observers. Each time the government acted—to fund a trial of Laetrile, to solicit the OTA report and propose a study of IAT, to establish the NCI “Best Case Series” program, and to establish the OAM—it was not because of scientific or medical considerations, but because of political pressure. More on that from time to time, but now back to Dr. Gonzalez.
A Helping Hand from the OAM
In September, 1992, the nascent OAM convened a “Workshop on Alternative Medicine.” The resulting report, “Alternative Medicine: Expanding Medical Horizons,” has correctly been called “an uncritical catalog of virtually every dubious and unproven treatment method of the past 100 years.” Physicist Robert Park called it “surely the most credulous document ever offered in the name of medical science” (NY Times, 7/9/1995). The report referred to Gonzalez’s unpublished, 500 page manuscript describing cases culled from the records of his “mentor,” the Texas dentist William Donald Kelley (discussed in Part I of this blog):
This case series has been singled out by proponents as one of the most convincing in support of an unconventional cancer treatment.
No surprise, then, what happened next. According to Dr. Gonzalez,
In July of 1993, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) invited me to present case reports from my practice, detailing patients with appropriately diagnosed poor-prognosis cancer who had enjoyed tumor regression or unusual survival while following my therapy. Dr Isaacs and I put together 25 cases for the session, which was attended by a large group of NCI scientists and lasted 3 hours. After the meeting, I was asked to pursue as a next step a pilot study evaluating my approach in 10 patients diagnosed with advanced adenocarcinoma of the pancreas.
Curiously, although the OAM report was dated September 14-16, 1992, it also has this:
Gonzalez recently submitted to NCI a meticulously documented best case series (Friedman 1993).”
Suddenly, Dr. Gonzalez had become a minor celebrity. According to Victor Herbert, it happened just in time:
The New York State licensing agency attempted to revoke [Gonzalez's] license [in 1994]. Revocation was prevented by testimony from defenders, such as Harvard’s George Blackburn, MD, and American Health Foundation’s Ernst Wynder, PhD. Blackburn and Wynder testified that Gonzalez’s cancer therapy, particularly his oral pancreas-extract supplement, was promising as a cancer cure. The testimony and the licensing board ignored the 1990 Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report to Congress that Gonzalez’s claims have no basis in fact.¹
Perusing the documents generated by the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct, in the matter of Dr. Gonzalez, is not for the faint of heart. The Findings of Fact reveal a practitioner who is beyond incompetent. In the cynical vernacular of medical shop talk, he is “007: licensed to kill.” That the eventual consent order let him off scot-free, for practical purposes, is a sad commentary on the capacity of the medical profession to regulate itself and to protect the public. Gonzalez himself learned nothing, as evidenced by his words at the White House Commission on Complementary and Alternative Medicine Policy in 2000:
…the very day I was in Switzerland presenting to Pierre Gastri’s [ph] group was the very day the medical board served my office with a subpoena announcing they were going to try and close my office down because to sum it up in non-legalese terms, I basically represented a subhuman pond scum that was, you know, taking money from unsuspecting cancer patients. All the time while I was trying to present my work and getting funding and doing clinical trials, the medical board relentlessly tried to basically close my office down. We eventually prevailed…
According to Victor Herbert, Columbia University opened its arms to Gonzalez at about the same time:
Gonzalez was subsequently hired by Fredi Kronenberg, PhD, director of Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons’ “alternative” medicine course. Gonzalez and other advocates of pseudoscience-based medicine were hired by Dr. Kronenberg to give one-hour lectures promoting their practices as legitimate. Kronenberg and Medical School dean Herbert Pardes refused requests to withdraw the invitation or to allow alumni Stephen Barrett or me to be present when Gonzalez spoke, for rebuttal.¹
The Pilot Study Considered Again
Dr. Gonzalez eventually reported his “pilot study” of cancer of the pancreas in 1999, as discussed in Part I. He claimed that his outcomes for 11 patients had been markedly better than those typically found for comparable patients who receive “conventional” treatments. His report is vulnerable to several objections, the most obvious of which is that he selected the “best cases” from a larger pool, possibly a much larger pool—as mentioned in Part I. Other objections have to do with the cases themselves. Intrepid reader Dr. Peter Moran (thank you for calling my attention to this, pmoran) examined Gonzalez’s report and observed:
Case H was almost certainly a bile duct cancer, which has a far better prognosis than cancer of the pancreas. . .
Case J had a Whipple’s procedure for an early pancreatic cancer. This case should not have been included, as the fact that the cancer was deemed operable indicates a more favourable prognosis…
Case K is not certainly pancreatic cancer. The diagnosis rests upon a surgeon’s opinion from palpation of an unbiopsied pancreatic mass…
Case L could well be a better prognosis duodenal or ampullary adenocarcinoma…
Some may regard these concerns as trivial, but those four cases happen to have the more prolonged survivals (37-47 months). The 10-29 month survival in the other seven patients is good but not overly convincing evidence of a treatment effect in a such a highly selected group.
Similar objections apply to cases that Dr. Gonzalez reported in Alternative Therapies in 2007. Six patients, designated “#26-#31,” were said to have presented with cancer of the pancreas. They were alive and well 15, 10, 10.5, 6, 5.5, and 24 years later, respectively. Patient #26, however, reportedly had a biopsy of a lung nodule but not of his pancreas; the presumption that his cancer had begun in the pancreas had been based on uncertain CT findings. Dr. Gonzalez gave no details about where this man’s diagnostic work-up had been done. Patient #27 also lacked a biopsy to prove cancer of the pancreas; the diagnosis was based on even flimsier radiologic evidence than in the previous case.
Patient #28 reportedly had a biopsy of a mass in the pancreas, but it was reported to be a rare “carcinoid-islet cell” tumor—a very different sort from the standard adenocarcinoma of the “exocrine” pancreas, and one that, according to the Washington Manual of Oncology, can have “long periods of disease stability.” Patient #30 had no biopsy of his pancreas, only radiologic evidence of a pancreatic mass. Prior to pursuing Dr. Gonzalez’s regimen he had completed 3 of the 4 cycles of chemotherapy that had been recommended to him, and a CT scan had shown “marked improvement” after only the second cycle. Patient #31 was a “24-year Kelley Survivor,” i.e., a case report that Gonzalez had taken from Kelley’s records. We can therefore assume that in the case of patient #31, “…documentation…was inadequate to confirm critical details of the narrative….”
Dr. Gonzalez Goes to Washington—Again
Representative Dan Burton (R-IN), the former chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform, has been one of the most virulent and influential proponents of implausible cancer treatments and other IMCs. Burton had fought to legalize Laetrile in his home state of Indiana during the 1970s, and later used his committee chairmanship for the advocacy of homeopathy for bioterrorism and other purposes, “detoxification” and “supporting the vital force” for cancer, the herbal mixture “PC-SPES” for prostate cancer (since found to be adulterated by prescription pharmaceuticals), acupuncture for “end of life” care, and “antineoplastons” for medulloblastoma.
Burton has also championed the cause of those who claim that vaccinations and mercury amalgams cause autism and ADHD, argued against FDA regulation of “dietary supplements,” including ephedra, and argued that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should have an “Associate Secretary for Complementary or Alternative Medicine.” For his many hearings on these topics he has invited such expert witnesses as actress Jane Seymour, whose advocacy of homeopathy on the national stage followed her experience as Dr. Quinn, Medicine Woman.
“Dr.” Ralph Moss, introduced in Part III, is one of the original “Harkinites” (a term coined by Joseph Jacobs, the first full-time Director of the Office of Alternative Medicine). His degree is in classics, but he has styled himself as an expert in cancer—mainly “alternative” cancer treatments. Moss was a long-time member of the NCCAM’s Cancer Advisory Panel for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAPCAM). In 2004 he wrote a glowing eulogy for rabid Laetrile promoter Michael Culbert, who had been a vice-president of the Committee for Freedom of Choice in Medicine, the major Laetrile advocacy organization. Moss has recently written approvingly of Mexican cancer clinics that continue to peddle Laetrile, although he is careful to add that “there are no reliable ‘miracle cures’ for cancer in Tijuana or elsewhere.”
In 2000 Moss recounted, with considerable satisfaction, how the Director of the National Cancer Institute (NCI) had caved to political arm-twisting:
After stormy hearings of Rep. Dan Burton’s House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, NCI Director Richard Klausner, MD, changed NCI’s direction and asked members of the CAM community to advise NCI on the evaluation of new therapies.
Elsewhere we find that one of those “stormy hearings” had apparently taken place in the relative privacy of Burton’s office:
In his campaign to win federal support, Gonzalez got a boost from Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.), the chairman of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee and a longtime alternative medicine ally. Burton held a June 1998 meeting in his office that brought together Gonzalez and NCI Director Richard Klausner to discuss a study of the regimen.
Shortly thereafter, the NIH announced its grant of $1.4 million for a controlled trial of the “Gonzalez Regimen.” It was in trouble almost immediately, as will be discussed next week.
References
[1] Herbert V. The Continuing Case of Nicholas Gonzalez. Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine 1998;2(2):43-44

               The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part V)
Kimball Atwood
Link
Part IV of this blog ended by observing that the NIH-funded trial of the “Gonzalez regimen” for cancer of the pancreas,† to have begun in March, 1999, was in trouble almost as soon as it started. As originally designed, it was to have been a randomized, controlled trial comparing gemcitabine, the standard chemotherapy, to the “Gonzalez regimen” of pancreatic enzymes, “supplements,” twice-daily coffee enemas, and other purported methods of “detoxification.” By June, 1999, according to Dr. John Chabot, the Columbia University surgeon acting as Principal Investigator (PI) of the trial, only 3 of the first 50 potential subjects had agreed to be randomized, and none of the three met the eligibility criteria. By January, 2000 it had become clear that the trial would not accrue a sufficient number of subjects if it remained randomized, because almost all of the potential subjects were intent on being in the “nutritional,” ie, the Gonzalez arm.
Trouble with Randomizing
The investigators at Columbia therefore decided to change the protocol to a “single-armed, non-randomized case-cohort study where patients will only be enrolled in what was the nutritional arm.” Paradoxically, PI John Chabot had recently explained, at the 1999 Comprehensive Cancer Care Conference of James Gordon’s Center for Mind-Body Medicine, why this would not be a scientifically sound design:
Would it be possible to allow patients to choose what arm of the trial they want to be on?
Giving individualized treatment in a non-random fashion is more realistic than randomizing, but unfortunately, randomizing was necessary to maintain the validity and integrity of the study in the face of traditional criticism.
Language similar to Chabot’s gratuitous, final phrase has become a staple gesture used by academic researchers speaking to “CAM” audiences. It appears to answer the perpetual special pleading of IMC advocates by passing the buck to unnamed “traditional critics,” as if the issue were not really one of “validity and integrity.” Chabot himself later admitted to being one of those critics, at a 2001 meeting of the White House Commission on Complementary and Alternative Medicine Policy, chaired by Gordon:
The vast majority of people who call with interest are only interested in alternative medicine approaches. Patients who express interest in this protocol are generally healthier than the overall population of patients that I see in my practice with advanced pancreatic cancer. The way this protocol, and, I suspect, many are designed, the patients who meet the eligibility criteria are clearly healthier than the general population of advanced pancreatic cancer patients.
One has to be very careful coming to any conclusions comparing these patients with the general population of pancreatic cancer patients.
I will stop at my third observation. The effects of psychosocial support and delivering hope to these patients is not insignificant. In the absence of a blinded, randomized trial, separating these effects from the physiologic and pharmacologic effects will be a major challenge in trial design.
Trouble with Regulators
It was not long after the protocol was changed that the trial began to draw the attention of the federal Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP). In 2002, a determination letter from the OHRP to Columbia stated:
OHRP finds that the informed consent documents reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for this study did not list the risk of death from coffee enemas.
The 2002 OHRP letter listed 7 additional complaints, but each of these was “redacted” from the public copy. We would love to know what they were. In 2003 the OHRP sent another determination letter to Columbia, revealing problems that the agency itself likely did not recognize as being as worrisome as they were. Among them:
(1) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations at 45 CFR 46.110(b)(2) permit use of expedited procedures for review of minor changes to previously approved research during the period for which approval is authorized. OHRP finds that the CUHS institutional review board (IRB) employed expedited procedures to review changes that exceed this limitation. On January 20, 2000, the CUHS IRB received a request from the principal investigator to approve an amendment to the protocol that included eliminating the randomization and adding a patient questionnaire. It appears that approval of this amendment was done in an expedited manner.
…
(3) OHRP finds that the informed consent documents reviewed and approved by the CUHS IRB for this study failed to adequately address the following elements required by HHS regulations at 45 CFR 46.116(a)(1):
(a) An explanation of the purposes of the research. The IRB-approved protocol stated that “primary endpoint is survival….” However, the informed consent document stated that “the purpose of this research study is to determine whether enzyme-nutritional therapy is as effective as a drug called gemcitabine for treating pancreatic adenocarcinoma.”
(b) A complete description of the procedures to be followed, and identification of any procedures which are experimental.
(i) The protocol included an evaluation of nutritional status by a “subjective global assessment” questionnaire and a questionnaire regarding quality of life. These assessments were not mentioned in the informed consent document.
(ii) The informed consent document referred to the alternative regimen as “pancreatic proteolytic enzyme therapy” or “enzyme-nutritional therapy” and throughout referred to the study as involving “treatment” and “therapy.” The only treatment or therapy available on the protocol was gemcitabine; therefore it appears that the experimental procedures were not accurately described in the informed consent document.
Corrective Action: OHRP acknowledges that the informed consent document will be revised to state the purpose of the study more directly, to refer specifically to the questionnaires and assessments noted above, and replace the words “treatment” and “therapy” with the term “experimental regimen” or similar. OHRP finds that these corrective actions adequately address the above finding and are appropriate under the CUHS FWA.
(4) HHS regulations at 45 CFR 46.116 require that informed consent information be in language understandable to the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative. OHRP finds that the informed consent document approved by the CUHS IRB for this study appeared to include complex language that would not be understandable to all subjects, such as alleviating, persist, emesis, anorexia, myalgias, arthralgias, transient intolerance, abdomen and pelvis.
…
A Troubling Case History
Readers who know something about both human studies ethics and the nature of the Gonzalez regimen will have sensed, while reading the charges quoted above, the pungent aroma of rat. This blog will discuss the ethics of the trial at length, but first it will summarize the experience of an unsuspecting artist in his 40s, the father of two boys, who was diagnosed in March of 2002 with cancer of the pancreas and made the mistake of submitting himself to the trial. The story can be told only because a friend of the patient, mathematician Susan Gurney, wrote and published it in the Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine:
My friend’s wife was a believer in homeopathic medicine. She and others in her community suggested that he look into a protocol run by Nicholas Gonzalez, MD….His protocol was being funded by the National Institutes of Health and the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine and implemented at Columbia Presbyterian. My friend’s surgeon [Dr. Chabot] was one of the investigators.
…my friend decided that the Gonzalez protocol seemed to offer the most hope for survival…[he] arranged to meet with Dr. Gonzalez during the 2 weeks that followed his recovery from surgery to determine whether or not he was eligible for the trial. He was encouraged when he was found to be acceptable. Dr. Gonzalez told him that in order to meet the criteria one had to be still strong enough to follow an arduous regimen…
…
During this time I also investigated the Gonzalez protocol. I had obtained a copy of an article by Michael Specter in the February 5, 2001 issue of the New Yorker magazine. The article seemed to indicate that although this protocol had been funded by the NIH, there was some debate as to its value by physicians at Columbia Presbyterian. I was disturbed to read that Dr. Gonzalez had been successfully sued and that New York State had made attempts to remove his license…I placed a call to Dr. Chabot’s office. It was not returned.
…
Dr. Gonzalez advised my friend to have fillings from his teeth removed by a dentist in Connecticut, which he did on April 16. He had just begun the vitamin and enzyme protocol, which was very time-consuming…His wife was by that time already extremely busy obtaining all the pills and food that were required for the Gonzalez regimen.
That same day I called Karen Antman, MD, head of oncology at Columbia Presbyterian…she said that my friend had been offered many different treatment options, and had chosen the Gonzalez one. She encouraged me to do further research.
On April 17 I once again called Dr. Chabot’s office and spoke with his secretary, saying that I had some questions about the Gonzalez trial. I was informed that I should speak to Michelle Gabay, the nurse who was running the protocol…[but] she had no answers to my questions about Gonzalez protocol results.
…
My friend was determined to try as hard as he could to maintain the regimen, which is extremely difficult. He had been told that pain might be an indication that the tumors were being dissolved, and that he could expect weight loss as he was detoxifying his body. I saw him on April 26, when he told me that he was in more pain. It was obvious that he had lost a significant amount of weight. In the next few weeks he was to describe himself to his mother as looking like “a concentration camp victim from Auschwitz.”
He was having difficulty sleeping. Whether this was because of coffee enema stimulation or because he was experiencing ever-increasing pain and stress, I do not know…but [he] said that he was going to stick with this regimen until the next appointment, when he would get the results. He was determined to give it his utmost effort.
I told him that I was going to attend the annual conference of the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) and would report on other options to him. Once at ASCO, I learned quickly and definitively that the Gonzalez protocol was a fraud; no mainstream doctors believed it was anything else and they were surprised that anyone with education would be on it.
…
During the following month, my friend lost 30-40 pounds and became so weak that he could no longer walk his dog around the block. The pain was becoming unbearable, and he was eager to be evaluated and have another scan.
…
My friend was not scanned until Sunday, June 2, when he received bad news. The tumors had progressed. The Gonzalez regimen had not worked.
On Monday he made an appointment with Dr. Sherman, the oncologist at Columbia Presbyterian…
By this time my friend was extremely thin and weak. He was given prescriptions for pain medication and chemotherapy, and scheduled for additional intravenous therapy the following week.
….He felt better in June,…[but although he] started eating regular food and sipping concentrated food supplements, he was unable to gain weight and did not show an obvious early response to his 3 chemotherapy treatments…
Over the Fourth of July weekend…his lungs filled with fluid. He was rushed to [the] hospital….Over the course of that month he stabilized somewhat, but he continued to weaken. He went home on July 26, intending to talk to his doctor, who had been away that week. He did not live to have the conversation.
…
By Sunday, hospice care was called in and he died a few days later, in the early morning of August 1, 2002. That he died was not surprising, as pancreatic cancer is a terminal disease. That he died as quickly and brutally as he did, however, is tragic.
…
We had [had] many conversations about treatment options…but the Gonzalez protocol quickly overwhelmed him; first by being impossibly time-consuming and then by being so physically debilitating. Had he realized this in early April, he would have had a real chance to examine his options. But once the decision was made to begin the Gonzalez protocol, with the apparent support of those involved in his care at Columbia Presbyterian, he became committed to it.
By remaining neutral about the Gonzalez regimen, physicians at Columbia Presbyterian who place patients in this trial effectively preclude them from starting other options, because of the demands it places on patients and their families. If physicians believe they are truly being neutral by not fully explaining the Gonzalez protocol’s nature to cancer patients, it is they who are in denial.¹
Physicians may quibble slightly with Ms. Gurney’s assessment, noting that the course of her friend’s illness—the pain, weakness, insomnia, weight loss, and early death—was entirely consistent with that of untreated cancer of the pancreas alone. That is true, but it is still possible that his particular course was made worse by the arduous regimen. There is no denying that his pain could have been largely mitigated, that he would have had more useful time during his last few months if he hadn’t been on the Gonzalez regimen, and that he would have had a better chance of responding to standard treatment or to a rational nutritional regimen if these had begun earlier.
Troubles with Human Studies Ethics
“A Clinically Competent Medical Person”?
It is also clear that some of the medical practices reported by Ms. Gurney amounted to incompetent nonsense. An example was Gonzalez’s having instructed the patient to have his fillings removed, almost certainly to relieve presumed mercury poisoning from dental amalgams—a common “CAM” canard (was that part of the protocol?). Also included were Gonzalez’s having told the patient that “pain might be an indication that the tumors were being dissolved, and that he could expect weight loss as he was detoxifying his body.”
Such claims are similar to those that the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct had described in its Findings of Fact in 1994:
For all patients A through F, the Hearing Committee found that Respondent failed to correctly interpret signs and symptoms of disease progression…, in some cases attributing symptoms of cancer progression to non-compliance with his protocol.
…
The Hearing Committee…finds that Respondent’s treatment of Patients A through F was incompetent within the meaning of New York State Education Law Section 6530 (5) in that it demonstrated a lack of requisite skill and knowledge.
…
…the Hearing Committee sought both training appropriate for Respondent’s practice, the vast majority of whose patients have some form of cancer, and experience in a setting that would acquaint Respondent with the broader aspects of practice, including the entire cycle of death and available palliative aspects of treatment of the terminally ill.
The 1998 Consent Order agreed:
In the treatment of all the patients in this case, the Respondent demonstrated that he lacked the basic understanding of the disease from which all the patients were suffering. For example, in the case of Patient C, the Respondent describe the Patient as being stable, doing fine or in a rebuilding process, when the Patient was suffering increasing pain and showing other symptoms which demonstrated the marked progression of her disease. In the case of Patient F, the Patient showed symptoms such as progressive inflammation, crusting and weeping of the breast and increased pain, which were the result of metastatic disease, but which the Respondent attributed to toxicity and a repair and rebuilding process.
The Review Board sustains the Hearing Committee’s Determination ordering the Respondent to undergo retraining in oncology.
Relevant human studies treatises stipulate certain qualifications for investigator/practitioners. The Helsinki Declaration is explicit:
Medical research involving human subjects should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons and under the supervision of a clinically competent medical person. The responsibility for the human subject must always rest with a medically qualified person and never rest on the subject of the research, even though the subject has given consent.
The physician may combine medical research with medical care, only to the extent that the research is justified by its potential prophylactic, diagnostic or therapeutic value. When medical research is combined with medical care, additional standards apply to protect the patients who are research subjects.
The Belmont Report requires that IRBs consider the practices of the pertinent physician, with the implication that those practices meet acceptable standards of care:
Research and practice may be carried on together when research is designed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of a therapy. This need not cause any confusion regarding whether or not the activity requires review; the general rule is that if there is any element of research in an activity, that activity should undergo review for the protection of human subjects.
The NIH also has certain requirements for investigator/practitioners, although these are more difficult to find. According to the 2001 Request for Applications (RFA) for another NCCAM-sponsored trial:
Biographical sketches for all key investigators must be provided. In addition, applications must name a Senior Investigator for each trial site in the consortium that will be responsible for on-site clinical and scientific implementation, direction and management of the trial protocol….Senior Investigators must have substantial experience in the treatment and management of CAD and in the design, implementation and evaluation of clinical trials.
If we change “CAD” to “cancer of the pancreas,” it seems likely that similar requirements should have applied to Gonzalez (the trial corresponding to the RFA quoted above is also in violation of those requirements, but that is another story).
The New York Board’s opinions quoted above should have been part of the deliberations of any committee—the scientific review group at the NIH or the Columbia Institutional Review Board (IRB), for example—charged with passing judgment on the trial. We can safely assume that either Gonzalez’s history was not made available to those committees or, if it was, that the committees reneged on their responsibilities.
Uninformed Consent, Inappropriate Subject Selection, and Lack of Clinical Equipoise
We have already seen, in the OHRP’s determination letters of 2002 and 2003, that until at least 2003 the Gonzalez trial’s consent information was woefully inadequate. I wonder if the new one is any better. In 2003, using the Gonzalez regimen as an example, I argued that the information offered to prospective subjects of trials of implausible claims is likely to be misleading:
Plausibility also figures in informed consent language and subject selection. How many subjects who are not wedded to “alternative medicine” would be likely to join a study that independent reviewers rate as unlikely to yield any useful results, or in which the risks are stated to outweigh the potential benefits? Are informed consents for such studies honest? In at least one case cited in the following paragraph, the answer is “no.” Nor may subjects who prefer “alternative” methods be preferentially chosen for such research even if they seek this, because “fair subject selection requires that the scientific goals of the study, not vulnerability, privilege, or other factors unrelated to the purposes of the research, be the primary basis for determining the groups and individuals that will be recruited and enrolled” (Emanuel et al. 2000).
The Office for Human Research Protections recently cited Columbia University for failure to describe serious risks on the consent form of its “Gonzalez” protocol for cancer of the pancreas, funded by the NCCAM (OHRP 2002). The study proposes to compare the arduous “Gonzalez” method, which is devoid of biological rationale, to gemcitabine, an agent acknowledged by the investigators to effect “a slight prolongation of life and a significant improvement in . . . quality of life.” Nevertheless, a letter from Columbia to prospective subjects states, “it is not known at the present time which treatment approach is best [sic] overall” (Chabot 1999). The claim of clinical equipoise, or uncertainty in the expert medical community over which treatment is superior–necessary to render a comparison trial ethical–is not supported by the facts (Freedman 1987).
Ms. Gurney’s article provides additional, compelling evidence that the Gonzalez protocol did not meet the standard of clinical equipoise:
…at ASCO, I learned quickly and definitively that the Gonzalez protocol was a fraud; no mainstream doctors believed it was anything else and they were surprised that anyone with education would be on it.
The “mainstream doctors” of the American Society of Clinical Oncology must be judged representatives of the pertinent “expert medical community.”
I am aware that “clinical equipoise,” as a prerequisite for a trial being judged ethical, has been challenged. Nevertheless, the challenges do not impinge upon the points made here, nor have they resulted in a consensus opinion that “clinical equipoise” no longer be considered a requirement for a trial.
There are many other reasons that the Gonzalez trial is unethical, but I will limit this discussion to three more: scientific reasons, the fallacy of popularity, and the need for independent review.
Science and Ethics
There is a consensus, among those who consider human studies ethics, that a study must be scientifically sound in order to be ethical. According to the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (CIOMS; Geneva, Switzerland:1993. Quoted here):
Scientifically unsound research on human subjects is ipso facto unethical in that it may expose subjects to risks or inconvenience to no purpose.
The Helsinki Declaration agrees:
Medical research involving human subjects must conform to generally accepted scientific principles, be based on a thorough knowledge of the scientific literature, other relevant sources of information, and on adequate laboratory and, where appropriate, animal experimentation.
There is no body of basic science or animal experimentation that supports the claims of Gonzalez.
Emanuel and colleagues, writing in JAMA in 2000, asserted:
Examples of research that would not be socially or scientifically valuable include clinical research with…a trifling hypothesis…
I assert that highly implausible claims ought to be viewed as “trifling hypotheses.”
The Fallacy of Popularity
Virtually all of the research agenda of the NCCAM has been justified by the assertion that implausible claims that are popular require research, merely because people are using them. Referring to the opinions of the late NCCAM Director Stephen Straus, Science Magazine wrote in 2000:
Scientific rigor is sorely needed in this enormously popular but largely unscrutinized field….Most of these substances and treatments have not been tested for either safety or efficacy.
As surprising as it may be to some, however, a method’s popularity may not supercede the interests of individual trial subjects. According to the Helsinki Declaration:
In medical research on human subjects, considerations related to the well-being of the human subject should take precedence over the interests of science and society.
The Belmont Report agrees:
Risks and benefits of research may affect the individual subjects, the families of the individual subjects, and society at large (or special groups of subjects in society). Previous codes and Federal regulations have required that risks to subjects be outweighed by the sum of both the anticipated benefit to the subject, if any, and the anticipated benefit to society in the form of knowledge to be gained from the research. In balancing these different elements, the risks and benefits affecting the immediate research subject will normally carry special weight.
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations is unequivocal:
The IRB should not consider possible long-range effects of applying knowledge gained in the research (for example, the possible effects of the research on public policy) as among those research risks that fall within the purview of its responsibility. (CFR §46.111)
The Requirement for Independent Review
As explained by Emanuel and colleagues:
Investigators inherently have multiple, legitimate interests—interests to conduct high-quality research, complete the research expeditiously, protect research subjects, obtain funding, and advance their careers. These diverse interests can generate conflicts that may unwittingly distort the judgment of even well-intentioned investigators regarding the design, conduct, and analysis of research.
…[thus] for much of clinical research, review should be done by a full committee of individuals with a range of expertise who have the authority to approve, amend, or terminate a study.
Emanuel and colleagues suggested that it is IRBs that provide such independent reviews, but we have already shown that IRBs can only be expected to act according to the information made available to them by the investigators. We have shown, in addition, that the ”expert medical community” need be involved in such independent reviews. Individuals with the requisite expertise may or may not be members of the pertinent IRB.
Reference
1. Gurney S. Socially Harmful but Unapparent Effects of the NCCAM-Columbia University-Gonzalez Protocol. Sci Rev Alt Med 7 (2):74-77 (Fall/Winter 2003-4)

   The Ethics of “CAM” Trials. Gonzo (Part VI)
Kimball Atwood
Link
Part V of this Blog argued that the NCCAM-sponsored trial of the “Gonzalez regimen” for cancer of the pancreas is unethical by numerous criteria.† To provide an illustration, it quoted a case history of one of the trial’s subjects, who had died in 2002.¹ It had been written by the subject’s friend, mathematician Susan Gurney. A similar story was told on ABC 20/20 in 2000, albeit not about a trial subject. Each of these cases demonstrates the wide breadth of Gonzalez’s quackery, as did his brush with the New York medical board during the 1990s.
This entry addresses some aspects of how those in charge of the trial failed in their duty to protect human subjects. By implication, it suggests what is necessary to prevent similar travesties in the future. It also addresses, to the small extent that the information exists, what appear to be the final ethical violations: first, that the trial will never be completed, thus having “expose[d] subjects to risks or inconvenience to no purpose.” Second, that Columbia University and the responsible investigators have no intention of explaining why.
Science and Medical Need, not Politics, should Determine Human Studies Agenda
Recall that the impetus for the government to fund a trial of the Gonzalez regimen came not from the NIH itself or from any legitimate scientist, but from the office of an old Laetrile warrior, Indiana congressman Dan Burton. Burton is a well-known bully and shill for implausible medical claims. Stephen Barrett of Quackwatch has justifiably called him “quackery’s best friend in congress.” Burton is a sponsor of the annually-defeated “Access to Medical Treatment Act,” which is a euphemism for Freedom to Defraud You. To illustrate how cozy he is with the tiny world of politically-connected quacks, consider Burton’s glowing recommendation of Rashid Buttar, about whom Dr. Gorski wrote on Monday.
For years, Burton was the chairman of the powerful House Committee on Government Reform. Hearings of that committee, particularly during the 106th and 107th Congresses, were littered with pitches for implausible medical claims and diatribes against immunizations and other rational public health measures. Together with Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), the creator of the NCCAM, Burton and a few other congressmen have managed to scare NIH scientists and administrators away from their proper concerns with scientific and ethical issues. Thus Richard Klausner, the former director of the National Cancer Institute, eventually caved to the pressure, as reported in Part IV of this blog. So did Claude Lenfant, the former director of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (bullied here by Burton; caved here).
Shortly after the late Stephen Straus was appointed the first director of the NCCAM in 2000, he revealed in an interview with Science Magazine that he, too, now viewed the scientific and ethical rules of human studies as optional:
Yet principles aside, Straus also has to follow the mandate of Congress–and some of its, well, less-than-scientific members. NCCAM is stuck funding a 5-year, $1.4 million trial of an unusual protocol designed to treat terminal pancreatic cancer by physician Nicolas Gonzalez. The so-called Gonzalez Protocol–a hodgepodge of pancreatic enzymes, coffee enemas, and up to 150 dietary supplements a day–caught the attention of Representative Dan Burton (R-IN), who in 1998 encouraged the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to study it. Even though Straus considers the evidence just an “aggregate of interesting anecdotes,” he defends the trial –albeit lukewarmly. “I’m more comfortable and find it easier to approach and fund things that already make a lot more sense to me,” he admits. “But the mandate here is … to be willing to take more risks for things that are novel.”
Except that Straus did not have to follow the mandate of Congress to its inevitable collision with human studies ethics. Political pressure, “mandates,” alleged popularity of a method, and even laws may not force biomedical scientists to expose human subjects to risks and discomforts that would not otherwise occur. The Helsinki Declaration, which is, in effect, the consensus of world opinion on the subject, addresses the issue explicitly:
Research Investigators should be aware of the ethical, legal and regulatory requirements for research on human subjects in their own countries as well as applicable international requirements. No national ethical, legal or regulatory requirement should be allowed to reduce or eliminate any of the protections for human subjects set forth in this Declaration.
Such language did not happen by accident. It was a purposeful response to the infamous excuse offered at the Nuremberg Trials. Did it occur to Dr. Straus that a very small number of ignorant Congressmen were attempting to require hapless, desperate human subjects, such as Ms. Gurney’s friend, to “be willing to take more risks?” In the US, any NIH scientist not wishing to violate human studies ethics may simply refuse to do so or, if necessary, resign his post. He needn’t worry about being shot.
In less public circumstances, Dr. Straus did not appear to have qualms about the ethics of the trial. At a meeting of the Cancer Advisory Panel for Complementary and Alternative Medicine in 2001,
A long discussion ensued about the Kelley/Gonzalez criteria and efficacy of study; and the potential dampening effect of a failure of this study. Dr. White noted that the eligibility criteria may be too strict. Although the study has been highly publicized, only about 10% of referrals qualify. Possible solutions were discussed without clear answers, since publicity has not been the problem. Dr. Straus noted that in the future, with best case series data, we can have other trials with easier recruitment of patients and less stringent criteria…. Dr. Straus said, “Our ability to reach out and be open-minded about alternative therapies is constantly impugned by traditional medicine and others. We must press on, because this is groundbreaking and important.”
The “it’s out of my hands” plea at the NIH was also apparent at Columbia. Michael Specter, author of the 2001 New Yorker article about Gonzalez, interviewed Karen Antman, who at the time was the chief of Columbia’s division of medical oncology and a past president of the American Society of Clinical Oncology:
I asked if it would be right to infer that she thought the trial wouldn’t work. She shook her head. I asked if she had an idea why it might work. She said no. Did she have any opinions at all about the potential of nutritional therapy or the Gonzalez regime? “I have lots of opinions,” she told me, “but none of them matter.”
Could any reader who imagines that a chief ought to be a chief, or who is aware of the concept of clinical equipoise (discussed last week) not shudder at such an abdication of professional and ethical responsibility? John Chabot, the principal investigator, suggested on several occasions that he was not happy with the trial (here and here, and contradicted his own claim of equipoise here) but proceeded anyway. Susan Gurney argued that the refusal of such authorities to come clean with their views had contributed to the suffering of her friend:
He was an artist—a painter and a sculptor—and he had little scientific knowledge. When Dr. Chabot was neutral about the Gonzalez protocol, and when Dr. Antman said nothing adverse about it, my friend assumed that they must genuinely believe that the treatment could work.¹
Ms. Gurney later wrote me about something she had not included in her article: that James Gordon, the chairman of the White House Commission on Complementary and Alternative Medicine Policy at the time, had “paid a personal visit to my friend’s house – and praised the Gonzalez protocol to him.” The poor subject was a victim of both government-sponsored experts and government appointed pseudo-experts. He could not have known the difference, of course.
The Non-Outcome of the Gonzalez Trial
In anticipation of this blog series I wrote Susan Gurney to ask if she had a copy of the consent form and if she had learned more about the trial over the past few years. I was surprised, but not terribly so, by her reply:
I do not have the Gonzalez consent form….Columbia Presbyterian has been completely consistent in refusing to come forward and publish the study results, or air any of this sad business. John Chabot, the principal investigator, is now head of the Pancreatic Center of Excellence, and in between ski trips I hear that he supposedly does perform skillful and agressive surgery on pancreatic cancer patients. Al Neugut, head of the Herbert Irving Cancer Center, shrugs and says it wasn’t his idea, and pointed the finger at Karen Antman, who I think is now Provost at BU Medical School, and thriving. Victor Grann is in charge of the data, and is helping cover it up and won’t talk. William Sherman, who initially warned me about the study, but in the end could do nothing to stop it and wasn’t willing to rock the boat over it, is still practicing oncology to the best of his rather admirable ability, but it is a sore point and when we speak – which is now infrequent- I do not mention it.
I have called four reporters, written to two, obtained partial records from the NIH, and even paid a lawyer who said he could get me a story – and I have failed completely to get this study reported to the public in any way.
I know from the web that Gonzalez is as active politically about the rights of free trade, vitamin business, etc. as ever – I can only imagine that he is also thriving.
I wondered whether Columbia “refusing to publish the study results” was nothing more than the usual, long delay between the end of subject accrual and the publication of the paper. Gonzalez himself, however, had provided the answer more than a year ago, in an interview for Alternative Therapies:
AT: Let’s talk about the NCI study on your work. Has that been completed?
Dr Gonzalez: I’ve been working on this for more than 7 years. In 1998, we got the first approval for the study, and I started the project in 1999. I thought the project was designed incorrectly from the beginning. The administrators of the study initially set it up as a randomized study in which patients would be randomized into our treatment or chemotherapy. The patients had no choice about treatment. The administrators insisted the study had to be designed this way.
I argued that no one’s going to agree to do that because patients who are interested in the study only want to get my therapy….They spent a year trying unsuccessfully to get it to work as a randomized study. No one wanted to enter, so eventually they had to change the format so patients could choose the therapy they wanted, either ours or chemo. We ran into many other problems, including the predictable bias from the oncology profession. Many patients were discouraged from considering this study by their original oncologists, and a number were discouraged from continuing even after they had entered.
There was a constant undercurrent of hostility toward the study that really had a deleterious effect. Right now, the project is on hold, and government officials are looking into the way the study was set up and run by the people at NCI and Columbia. I can’t go into the details at this point, but I certainly would have run it differently. Our input regarding the design was very often ignored, so there were design flaws in the study that I believed helped undermine the study.
AT: You’re not hopeful some of those issues will be resolved and you’ll be able to move forward with the study?
Dr Gonzalez: I don’t think so. Right now, as far as I’m concerned, it won’t happen. What the NCI or the National Institutes of Health will decide to do, I can’t say, but I’ll tell you, after spending 7 years trying to get the study to work and fighting at every step, I would not want to go through that again….If I really felt that the NCI was serious about looking into alternative therapies, I would reconsider. But after 7 years, I believe they’re just not interested if the treatment wasn’t developed by them or at a major academic institution…
AT: Is it politics or a particular bias?
Dr Gonzalez: I think it’s a question of research bias and experts who surprisingly can’t do anything outside of their particular area of expertise. Natural treatments like mine are not just another chemotherapy, and you can’t design clinical studies to test them as if they were. We don’t offer a chemo drug, where the patient shows up and gets to watch TV and eat ice cream while nurses inject the medication. In our case, the patient has to change his or her entire life, so compliance becomes a major issue. You’re held hostage by patient compliance… This was chemo vs Gonzalez, and the oncology profession by and large rallied against it…For this study to have worked, the NCI needed to rise to the occasion and deal with the pervasive bias within the oncology profession. But they never did. They never did anything. I don’t know whether it was indifference or that they just didn’t care. But they didn’t do what needed to be done, in my opinion.
AT: Is this a case of the methodologies not being appropriate for this type of research or these types of protocols?
Dr Gonzalez: That’s correct. The NCI operates on a drug model and wants natural products to fit into a drug model, and natural therapies don’t. With chemotherapy, patients need only show up. With our therapy, patients have to change their whole life. Should the NCI ever wish to test an alternative dietary or nutritional approach again, they must ensure that the bias of the oncology profession, which in our case influenced accrual and compliance of accepted patients, be effectively countered.
AT: Have you considered writing a book about your treatment plan?
Dr Gonzalez: We’ve just finished a book about the NIH clinical study because so many people wanted to know what happened after 7 years of work. I was asked by some of my congressional supporters to document all the mistakes that were made, and it turned into a book. And we think that should be published.
It is hard to imagine, reading Dr. Gonzalez’s words, that he and Susan Gurney were talking about the same trial. Yet they appear to agree that it has come to a dead end. Gonzalez seems to believe that the reason has to do with “the pervasive bias within the oncology profession” convincing subjects not to be compliant with his regimen. Ms. Gurney’s information suggests a different take: the academics at Columbia were at first altogether too willing to foist patients into the trial, but when it became clear that it was a horrible experience they had second thoughts. Possibly because they realized what a terrible mistake they had made, but almost certainly because the OHRP (Gonzalez’s “government officials,” apparently) came knocking for the third time, Columbia decided to circle the wagons:
…for the record, although Sherman warned me about the trial to begin with – in the end nobody would come forward. I will be happy to be quoted about the sad situation – I have spoken to Chabot in person, who will not come forward and say anything publicly ‘according to the advise of his lawyers’ -which from what I understand are the Columbia Institution lawyers. This is simply being covered up – and the data are not going to be released- publicly – is what I believe. As well, they think that Gonzalez has friends in Congress – so they claim that he would only make Columbia look bad again and they wouldn’t defeat him – only end up taking the blame.
‘Enlightened self-interest’ I believe is the term I heard used.
‘Spineless wonders’ is the phrase that I myself would use.
Epilogue
Gonzalez claimed that the “oncology profession” had influenced not only compliance, but accrual of subjects. The latest OHRP determination letter, however, suggests that there were at least 62 subjects and possibly more than 113—a range consistent with the originally planned goal of 90. So why will there, apparently, not be a report? We have suggested a possible reason above, but that does not deal with the fact that there still must have been outcomes. Even Gonzalez’s claim, that subjects were not compliant, does not excuse the investigators from reporting the results. An “intention to treat” analysis is all the more important for a method that is notoriously difficult for subjects to complete.
What if the outcomes were what most experts would expect, ie, that subjects on the Gonzalez regimen did no better that comparable patients with cancer of the pancreas who were untreated, and worse than those who received standard treatments? That would present an obvious, but embarrassing conclusion: that the New York Office of Profession Medical Conduct had been correct about Gonzalez all along. The only reasonable actions would now be for New York to strip him of his medical license, for the NIH and Columbia University to admit publicly that they had made a terrible mistake in making him responsible for experimental subjects in an NIH-funded trial, and to thereby expose fundamental ethical problems with human trials of implausible medical claims. If the responsible institutions find themselves at odds with Gonzalez’s “friends in Congress,” so be it. Let the debate go public.
It seems that Columbia and the NIH have backed themselves into a corner: the “potential dampening effect of a failure of this study.” Will we be hearing from them anytime soon?
1. Gurney S. Socially Harmful but Unapparent Effects of the NCCAM-Columbia University-Gonzalez Protocol. Sci Rev Alt Med 7 (2):74-77 (Fall/Winter 2003-4)

   The “Gonzalez Trial” for Pancreatic Cancer: Outcome Revealed
Kimball Atwood
Links
A Review
Dr. Lipson’s “detoxification” post on Thanksgiving Day and Dr. Gorski’s recent post about “Gerson Therapy” were timely, because last weekend I noticed something that I should have noticed months ago. Before delivering the punch line, let me remind you, Dear Reader, of the nature of the topic. The regimen advocated by Nicholas Gonzalez is a variation of a “detoxification” treatment for cancer that has been around, in one form or another, for more than 50 years (“Gerson Therapy” is another example).† Here is the National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) description:
Patients receive pancreatic enzymes orally every 4 hours and at meals daily on days 1-16, followed by 5 days of rest. Patients receive magnesium citrate and Papaya Plus with the pancreatic enzymes. Additionally, patients receive nutritional supplementation with vitamins, minerals, trace elements, and animal glandular products 4 times per day on days 1-16, followed by 5 days of rest. Courses repeat every 21 days until death despite relapse. Patients consume a moderate vegetarian metabolizer diet during the course of therapy, which excludes red meat, poultry, and white sugar. Coffee enemas are performed twice a day, along with skin brushing daily, skin cleansing once a week with castor oil during the first 6 months of therapy, and a salt and soda bath each week. Patients also undergo a complete liver flush and a clean sweep and purge on a rotating basis each month during the 5 days of rest.
As unlikely as it may seem, in 1999 American taxpayers began paying for people with cancer of the pancreas to be subjected to that regimen, in a trial sponsored by the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) and the NCI, conducted under the auspices of Columbia University. Gonzalez provided the treatments. A few months ago I presented a multi-part treatise on the “Gonzalez regimen” and the trial. It demonstrated that all evidence, from basic science to clinical, including the case series that supposedly provided the justification for the trial, had failed to support any real promise (the case series had previously been considered by reader Dr. Peter Moran, who also found them wanting).
It showed that the impetus for the trial, as has been true for other regrettable trials of implausible health claims, can be traced not to science but to the reactionary politics of anti-intellectual populism: initially to Laetrile and to the “Harkinites,” and more recently to the Honorable Dan Burton (R-IN). It reported that there were major problems with the Gonzalez trial from the outset, and that for at least one subject the regimen was more torture than therapy. It reported that for unclear reasons the trial had come to a halt a couple of years ago, and that it appeared that there would never be a report of its findings.
Ethical Breaches
That series of posts also argued what was later summarized here: that, for clear-cut reasons, the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct had nearly revoked Dr. Gonzalez’s medical license during the 1990s—only to retreat from that position after two misguided academics testified that his regimen might benefit cancer patients.
The apparent “non-outcome” of the Gonzalez trial would be the final insult among its numerous, serious ethical violations. These were discussed, at some length, here and here. Several readers subsequently lamented that the results might never be made public: these included Drs. Moran and Gorski, and even an admirer of Nicholas Gonzalez, who identified himself as one of his patients.
The Outcome Revealed
The last post in that series occurred on May 2, 2008. One month later, the federal Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) issued yet another determination letter regarding the Gonzalez trial. I gave it a cursory look in June, but I must have been distracted by other topics at the time; last weekend I hauled it out and couldn’t believe what I saw at point number “4″ (emphasis added):
The complainant alleged that a minimum of 72 subjects were to be enrolled under the IRB-approved protocol, but that the study was terminated with only 62 enrolled subjects, in violation of HHS regulations… CUMC [Columbia University Medical Center] reported that the Data Safety and Monitoring Committee (DSMC) for this protocol recommended that the study be terminated before it reached its full enrollment of 72 subjects. At its September 30, 2005 meeting, the DSMC recommended that the study be terminated due to predetermined stopping criteria. This information was submitted to the CUMC IRB on October 17, 2005, and the study termination was approved by the IRB. Termination of the study in response to the DSMC recommendation was appropriate.
Most of you will immediately recognize the significance of those words. For those who don’t, let me explain, with slight oversimplification. A human trial of an investigational treatment is “terminated due to predetermined stopping criteria” for only one of two possible reasons:
A. At some point during the trial the investigational treatment is found to be superior to the standard (control) treatment, to an extent sufficient to render the remainder of the planned trial incapable of refuting this finding. Thus the trial is halted because the favorable outcome is certain and it would now be unethical to withhold the investigational treatment from the control group. It would also be unethical not to make this information public as soon as is realistically possible.
B. At some point during the trial the investigational treatment is found to be inferior to the standard (control) treatment, to an extent sufficient to render the remainder of the planned trial incapable of refuting this finding. Thus the trial is halted because the unfavorable outcome is certain and it would now be unethical…you know the rest. “Inferior,” by the way, needn’t mean merely “not as effective.” More commonly, it means “more dangerous.”
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, I ask the reader to imagine which outcome applied to the Gonzalez trial. If ”A” had been the case, wouldn’t it have been splashed all over the front pages of newspapers everywhere, way back in 2005? Of course it would have. It is certain that ”B” was the explanation for the trial having been halted. This is not the least bit surprising, in light of what we already knew about the onerous regimen.
More Evidence
For the benefit of paranoiacs who believe that modern medicine is in cahoots with drug companies to deprive honest people of effective therapies, let’s consider more evidence that ”B” above must have been the trial’s outcome. In Part VI of my original series on the Gonzalez matter, I quoted from a 2007 interview published in Alternative Therapies:
AT: Let’s talk about the NCI study on your work. Has that been completed?
…
Dr Gonzalez: …We ran into many other problems, including the predictable bias from the oncology profession. Many patients were discouraged from considering this study by their original oncologists, and a number were discouraged from continuing even after they had entered.
There was a constant undercurrent of hostility toward the study that really had a deleterious effect. Right now, the project is on hold, and government officials are looking into the way the study was set up and run by the people at NCI and Columbia. I can’t go into the details at this point, but I certainly would have run it differently. Our input regarding the design was very often ignored, so there were design flaws in the study that I believed helped undermine the study.\
AT: You’re not hopeful some of those issues will be resolved and you’ll be able to move forward with the study?
Dr Gonzalez: I don’t think so. Right now, as far as I’m concerned, it won’t happen. What the NCI or the National Institutes of Health will decide to do, I can’t say, but I’ll tell you, after spending 7 years trying to get the study to work and fighting at every step, I would not want to go through that again…
…Natural treatments like mine are not just another chemotherapy, and you can’t design clinical studies to test them as if they were. We don’t offer a chemo drug, where the patient shows up and gets to watch TV and eat ice cream while nurses inject the medication. In our case, the patient has to change his or her entire life, so compliance becomes a major issue. You’re held hostage by patient compliance…
…With our therapy, patients have to change their whole life. Should the NCI ever wish to test an alternative dietary or nutritional approach again, they must ensure that the bias of the oncology profession, which in our case influenced accrual and compliance of accepted patients, be effectively countered.
AT: Have you considered writing a book about your treatment plan?
Dr Gonzalez: We’ve just finished a book about the NIH clinical study because so many people wanted to know what happened after 7 years of work. I was asked by some of my congressional supporters to document all the mistakes that were made, and it turned into a book. And we think that should be published.
Do those sound like the words of someone whose mavericky treatment has recently been exonerated?
The Complainant Probably Revealed
Within that quotation is a statement that is interesting for another reason:
…government officials are looking into the way the study was set up and run by the people at NCI and Columbia. I can’t go into the details at this point, but I certainly would have run it differently.
Dr. Gonzalez appears to have been referring to the OHRP’s investigation that eventually resulted in its determination letter of June 2, 2008, quoted above. Further evidence for this is the preliminary determination letter of Feb. 25, 2008, which was part of the same investigation. The June 2 letter, moreover, includes several “complainant allegations”—numbers 3-7—that, in summary, charge that Columbia University had enrolled subjects who were either too sick or too emotionally unstable to comply with the “Gonzalez Regimen,” and that the DSMC’s decision to stop the trial had been wrong. The OHRP found, however, that each of these allegations was without merit.
All of this suggests that the complainant in this case was not someone who recognized the trial as unethical for all the reasons discussed here months ago, but rather someone who knew that the results of the trial were not flattering to the “Gonzalez Regimen,” and was rather desperately trying to make that inconvenient fact go away. Someone, that is, such as Gonzalez himself, or a surrogate believing himself to be acting in Gonzalez’s interest.
Another relevant statement, previously quoted but now perhaps more revealing than it seemed then, is from mathematician Susan Gurney, who had written an account of one subject’s unfortunate experience in the trial:
…for the record, although Sherman warned me about the trial to begin with – in the end nobody would come forward. I will be happy to be quoted about the sad situation – I have spoken to Chabot in person, who will not come forward and say anything publicly ‘according to the advise of his lawyers’ -which from what I understand are the Columbia Institution lawyers. This is simply being covered up – and the data are not going to be released- publicly – is what I believe. As well, they think that Gonzalez has friends in Congress – so they claim that he would only make Columbia look bad again and they wouldn’t defeat him – only end up taking the blame.
‘Enlightened self-interest’ I believe is the term I heard used.
‘Spineless wonders’ is the phrase that I myself would use.
Finally, consider this excerpt from a comment by a reader calling himself “CAMCENTRAL.” It appeared in October, months after the final posting of my original series:
The reason there has been no data published is that the study was poorly managed by the NIH and Columbia. The principal investigator at Columbia has been found guilty by the Office of Human Subject Protections for among other things failing to follow federal guidelines on obtaining written informed consent from patients for a majority of the patients. Among the many problems that doomed this study were that the principal investigator, Dr. John Chabot, not Dr. Gonzalez was in complete charge of patient referral to the nutritional arm and repeatedly referred patients who did not fit within the protocol and who never fully participated in the treatment. The truth on this will one day come out, but the fault on this study lays clearly at the fit [sic] of the NIH staff responsible for managing this study and of the principal investigator Dr. John Chabot…that he continues to be allowed to be involved in clinical trials is a real travesty.
A New Epilogue
We now know considerably more than we did in May. The Gonzalez trial was stopped early, in 2005, after the DSMC found that the data convincingly demonstrated that the regimen was inferior to standard treatment for cancer of the pancreas. This information has been available to the public since June 2, 2008, but until now could be found only in the esoteric OHRP determination letter. The reason that the results of the trial have not been reported in the usual way, or otherwise made public by the relevant sponsoring and investigating institutions or individuals, appears to be that Gonzalez or someone close to him, likely with the aid of lawyers and “friends in Congress,” has managed to suppress them. Ironically, Gonzalez (or his surrogate) seems to have shot himself in the foot: the unsuccessful appeal to the OHRP to cast doubt on the trial results is the only reason we know that the trial was “terminated due to predetermined stopping criteria.”
Isn’t it odd that government websites, including the National Cancer Institute and ClinicalTrials.gov (“Last updated: October 18, 2008″), continue to portray the Gonzalez trial as ongoing? Time to come clean, fellas: your cover is blown. We the taxpayers, not Gonzalez or Burton or Columbia University or the NCI or the NCCAM, own this trial. We know the main outcome in spite of Gonzo and/or his friends attempting to silence it, and in spite of spineless wonders who seem all too willing to be silenced. Now we want the details.

   Evidence-Based Medicine, Human Studies Ethics, and the ‘Gonzalez Regimen’: a Disappointing Editorial in the Journal of Clinical Oncology Part 1
Kimball Atwood
Link
Background: the distinction between EBM and SBM
An important theme on the Science-Based Medicine blog, and the very reason for its name, has been its emphasis on examining all the evidence—not merely the results of clinical trials—for various claims, particularly for those that are implausible. We’ve discussed the distinction between Science-Based Medicine (SBM) and the more limited Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) several times, for example here (I began my own discussion here and added a bit of formality here, here, and here). Let me summarize by quoting John Ioannidis:
…the probability that a research finding is indeed true depends on the prior probability of it being true (before doing the study), the statistical power of the study, and the level of statistical significance.
EBM, in a nutshell, ignores prior probability† (unless there is no other available evidence) and falls for the “p-value fallacy”; SBM does not. Please don’t bicker about this if you haven’t read the links above and some of their own references, particularly the EBM Levels of Evidence scheme and two articles by Steven Goodman (here and here). Also, note that it is not necessary to agree with Ioannidis that “most published research findings are false” to agree with his assertion, quoted above, about what determines the probability that a research finding is true.
The distinction between SBM and EBM has important implications for medical practice ethics, research ethics, human subject protections, allocation of scarce resources, epistemology in health care, public perceptions of medical knowledge and of the health professions, and more. EBM, as practiced in the 20 years of its formal existence, is poorly equipped to evaluate implausible claims because it fails to acknowledge that even if scientific plausibility is not sufficient to establish the validity of a new treatment, it is necessary for doing so.
Thus, in their recent foray into applying the tools of EBM to implausible health claims, government and academic investigators have made at least two, serious mistakes: first, they have subjected unwary subjects to dangerous but unnecessary trials in a quest for “evidence,” failing to realize that definitive evidence already exists; second, they have been largely incapable of pronouncing ineffective methods ineffective. At best, even after conducting predictably disconfirming trials of vanishingly unlikely claims, they have declared such methods merely “unproven,” almost always urging “further research.” That may be the proper EBM response, but it is a far cry from the reality. As I opined a couple of years ago, the founders of the EBM movement apparently “never saw ‘CAM’ coming.”
The “Gonzalez” Trial
One such dangerous and unnecessary trial was “Evaluation of Intensive Pancreatic Proteolytic Enzyme Therapy with Ancillary Nutritional Support Versus Gemcitabine Chemotherapy in the Treatment of Inoperable Pancreatic Adenocarcinoma,” begun in 1999. It was funded by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM), and was conducted by Nicholas Gonzalez and investigators at Columbia University. The ‘enzyme therapy’ part of the trial is more commonly known as the “Gonzalez Detoxification Regimen”:
Patients receive pancreatic enzymes orally every 4 hours and at meals daily on days 1-16, followed by 5 days of rest. Patients receive magnesium citrate and Papaya Plus with the pancreatic enzymes. Additionally, patients receive nutritional supplementation with vitamins, minerals, trace elements, and animal glandular products 4 times per day on days 1-16, followed by 5 days of rest. Courses repeat every 21 days until death despite relapse. Patients consume a moderate vegetarian metabolizer diet during the course of therapy, which excludes red meat, poultry, and white sugar. Coffee enemas are performed twice a day, along with skin brushing daily, skin cleansing once a week with castor oil during the first 6 months of therapy, and a salt and soda bath each week. Patients also undergo a complete liver flush and a clean sweep and purge on a rotating basis each month during the 5 days of rest.
More than two years ago I wrote a series of posts* discussing Gonzalez, the regimen, the history leading to the funding of the trial, and aspects of the trial itself. In summary, Gonzalez appears to be a dangerous quack who should have had his medical license stripped by the state of New York during the 1990s, but was saved at the 11th hour by naïve “alternative medicine” enthusiasm; the regimen was highly implausible; there were no prior animal or clinical studies sufficient to warrant a human trial; its real impetus was the gathering political strength of the anti-intellectual “health freedom” movement in the aftermath of the Laetrile wars, culminating in Congressman Dan Burton’s bullying of NCI Director Richard Klausner; the NCI and Columbia subsequently justified the trial by citing a dubious case series provided by Gonzalez himself; the trial was unethical in numerous ways, amounting to torture-until-death for at least one hapless subject who, desperate for anything that might work, had stumbled into it because of his own scientific naïveté and because his consent was uninformed by existing knowledge—which, of course, the Columbia investigators should have provided him.
Shortly after my first series of posts it became clear that the Columbia investigators had found the Gonzalez regimen sufficiently inferior to the standard chemotherapy regimen to have stopped the trial early, in 2005. Finally, in August of 2009, the report of the trial, by John Chabot and colleagues (Gonzalez’s name was conspicuously missing from the report), was published by the Journal of Clinical Oncology (JCO): subjects in the Gonzalez arm had fared terribly, not only much worse than subjects in the chemotherapy arm, but also worse than 20,000 historical controls gleaned from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program of the National Cancer Institute.
In my last post on the topic, I explained numerous problems with the formal report, contrasting it with the Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT), which the JCO expects authors to honor. I explained that the results were nevertheless sufficient to disqualify the Gonzalez Regimen once and for all, Gonzalez’s own objections notwithstanding. I explained why Gonzalez’s name had not appeared in the article. I reiterated that the trial was unethical in the extreme, and lamented the JCO’s decision to publish the report—in direct violation of this statement in the Declaration of Helsinki, to which the JCO claims allegiance:
30. Authors, editors and publishers all have ethical obligations with regard to the publication of the results of research… Reports of research not in accordance with the principles of this Declaration should not be accepted for publication.
I mentioned ways in which the results of the trial could have been made public without violating that important statement. Since things had not turned out that way, I hoped that the JCO would eventually publish “an editorial acknowledging the ethical problems with the trial and the dilemma involved in choosing to publish the report.” I sent an email to an acquaintance who was a member of the JCO editorial board, asking that he or Editor-in-Chief Daniel Haller would recognize that the issue oughtn’t be ignored. I cited the pertinent SBM posts. I was ignored. When no editorial or other comment appeared in the JCO over the next few months, I stopped looking.
The Editorial
Only recently I noticed that the JCO had solicited an editorial after all; authored by Dr. Mark Levine of McMaster University, it appeared online in March, 2010. The title offered a bit of hope that the journal had finally “got it”:
Conventional and Complementary Therapies: A Tale of Two Research Standards?
Alas, ‘twas not to be. The first clue is found at the beginning of the essay:
In the early 1990s, I began to notice that some patients were choosing alternatives to the mainstream or conventional treatments. These so-called alternative therapies included a range of interventions, such as dietary and behavioral interventions, vitamin supplements and herbs, and traditional systems such as Chinese and homeopathic medicines. Most of these were not supported by sound scientific methods.
Notice the word “methods.” Dr. Levine didn’t write, “most of these were not supported by sound science.” This suggests that he was partially blinded by the EBM understanding of “evidence” and “scientific.” The next clue consists of the entire second paragraph, a series of bland restatements of proponents’ definitions (from the NCCAM, in this case) and ambiguous assertions about “CAM” that have come to be typical for medical academics who ought to know better. But I venture from the main point.
In the third paragraph, Dr. Levine verifies what we had suspected above:
I am fortunate to have spent my entire academic career at McMaster University (Hamilton, Ontario, Canada), the birthplace of evidence-based medicine, and to have had the privilege of learning from colleagues such as David Sackett, MD, and Gord Guyatt, MD.
Before proceeding, let me acknowledge—particularly for the benefit of Dr. Levine or any other EBM aficionados who may read this—that his essay is, in some ways, a good one. He was asked to comment on two reports of “CAM” treatments that had appeared in the JCO: the Gonzalez trial and a trial of acupuncture for hot flashes in women receiving anti-estrogen therapy for breast cancer. In each case he made valid criticisms of the methods and of the authors’ conclusions. He stressed that the authors hadn’t specified the questions that they were trying to answer. He wrote that “non-inferiority” studies require larger sample sizes than “superiority” studies, but that the authors of these reports hadn’t offered power calculations to justify their (small) sample sizes. He pointed out that the “control” intervention in the acupuncture trial, venlaxafine (Effexor), doesn’t work very well, thus implying that it may mean very little to judge a novel treatment similarly efficacious.
Nevertheless, in regard to the Gonzalez trial Dr. Levine faltered even as he applied what would usually be a solid EBM-style criticism:
The question addressed in the original randomized trial by Chabot et al was not specified. Was the hypothesis that chemotherapy is better than enzyme therapy, or was it that enzyme therapy is no worse than chemotherapy? My answer to this is, “I do not know.”
While this is technically correct, it misses the more important point, which can only be appreciated by looking beyond the trial itself: the interesting question, given the implausible nature of the method, is whether “enzyme therapy” for cancer of the pancreas is anything like what Gonzalez and his patrons had cracked it up to be prior to the trial. The most reasonable cohort to compare this group to, then, is not the chemotherapy arm reported in the JCO article, but Gonzalez’s case series that had ostensibly justified the trial in the first place:
As of 12 January 1999, of 11 patients entered into the study, 9 (81%) survived one year, 5 (45%) survived two years, and at this time, 4 have survived three years. Two patients are alive and doing well: one at three years and the other at four years.
Contrast those results with the 32 “enzyme-group” subjects reported in the JCO: 7 were alive at 10 months, 2 at 20 months, 1 at 30 months, and none at 40 months. Median survival was 4.3 months. We do not need formal statistics or a new, randomized trial with a larger sample size to justify dismissing the Gonzalez regimen.

   Evidence-Based Medicine, Human Studies Ethics, and the ‘Gonzalez Regimen’: a Disappointing Editorial in the Journal of Clinical Oncology Part 2
Kimball Atwood
Link
At the end of Part 1, I wrote:
We do not need formal statistics or a new, randomized trial with a larger sample size to justify dismissing the Gonzalez regimen.
In his editorial for the JCO, Mark Levine made a different argument:
Can it be concluded that [the] study proves that enzyme therapy is markedly inferior? On the basis of the study design, my answer is no. It is not possible to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.
That conclusion may be correct in the EBM sense, but it misses the crucial point of why the trial was (ostensibly) done: to determine, once and for all, whether there was anything to the near-miraculous claims that proponents had made for a highly implausible “detoxification” regimen for cancer of the pancreas. Gonzalez himself had admitted at the trial’s inception that nothing short of an outcome matching the hype would do:
DR. GONZALEZ: It’s set up as a survival study. We’re looking at survival.
SPEAKER: Do you have an idea of what you’re looking for?
DR. GONZALEZ: Well, Jeff [Jeffrey White, the director of the Office of Cancer Complementary and Alternative Medicine at the NCI—KA] and I were just talking a couple weeks ago. You know, to get any kind of data that would be beyond criticism is—-always be criticism, but at least three times.
You would want in the successful group to be three times — the median to be three times out from the lesser successful groups.
So, for example, if the average survival with chemo, which we suspect will be 5 months, you would want my therapy to be at least — the median survival to be at least 15, 16, 17 months, as it was in the pilot study.
We’re looking for a median survival three times out from the chemo group to be significant.
Recall that the median survival in the Gonzalez arm eventually turned out to be 4.3 months.
It would not surprise me if Dr. Levine, the author of the JCO editorial, were to take issue with what I’ve written so far. I would be remiss, for example, to leave readers with the impression that he called for another, larger trial, performed not as a cohort study but as a randomized, controlled trial, in order to prove whether (or not) “enzyme therapy is markedly inferior” to chemotherapy for cancer of the pancreas. He specifically did not make that recommendation; instead he argued, reasonably, “Given the scarcity of resources for cancer research, there are many more important questions to address.” I’ll come back to that statement, because although it hints that Dr. Levine has intuitively recognized the need for invoking prior probability when considering health research policy, he still appears confused by a strict, EBM perspective.
Human Studies Ethics: why Science Matters
Dr. Levine may also feel misrepresented by my emphases on the pseudoscientific nature of the Gonzalez regimen and the ethics of the trial. Near the beginning of his editorial, possibly to distance himself from those very issues, he wrote:
The goal of this discussion is not to debate the merits of conventional medicine versus CAM.
Let’s cut to the chase: “the merits of conventional medicine versus CAM,” at least insofar as the phrase refers to public perceptions or individual choices of patients or even physicians, are not the issues here. The overwhelming issues are ethical and scientific, and the two are not distinct: human studies ethics must be informed by science. I’ve explained this in some detail elsewhere in this long series. In summary, the Gonzalez trial repeatedly violated the Helsinki Declaration and other human studies treatises, including those established by the NIH itself and offered by NIH ethicists: it made Gonzalez, who is neither “a scientifically qualified person” nor “a clinically competent medical person,” responsible for human subjects; it did not minimize risks or enhance potential benefits, nor did “the potential benefits to individuals and knowledge gained for society … outweigh the risks” (it was a “trifling hypothesis”); it did not have “respect for enrolled subjects,” as evidenced by the horrible experience of at least one subject whose story was told by his friend, mathematician Susan Gurney; it did not “conform to generally accepted scientific principles…based on a thorough knowledge of the scientific literature, other relevant sources of information, and on adequate laboratory and, where appropriate, animal experimentation”; instead, it justified itself by citing a flawed, non-consecutive case series offered by Gonzalez himself, which both Dr. Peter Moran and I deconstructed with only a bit of effort (see also here), and by the “popularity” fallacy.
Perhaps most disturbing, even to people who aren’t familiar with the literature of human studies ethics, is that the trial investigators almost certainly failed to provide prospective subjects with the knowledge necessary for informed consent. Such knowledge would have consisted of the cancer biology known at the time, which overwhelmingly predicted that Gonzalez’s regimen would have no beneficial effect on cancer of the pancreas; of an accurate, honest assessment of his case series; and of his history of peddling pseudoscientific claims and providing incompetent care. I’ve written “almost certain” because I haven’t seen more than a short excerpt possibly from the trial’s consent form, although I’ve tried to do so (hint: if anyone reading this has a copy please send it on). I can’t imagine, however, that the consent form included comprehensive information because if it had, no competent IRB would have approved the study and very few subjects would have enrolled.
The history told by Susan Gurney about her friend, moreover, strongly suggests that he had not been adequately informed:
I told him that I was going to attend the annual conference of the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) and would report on other options to him. Once at ASCO, I learned quickly and definitively that the Gonzalez protocol was a fraud; no mainstream doctors believed it was anything else and they were surprised that anyone with education would be on it…
By remaining neutral about the Gonzalez regimen, physicians at Columbia Presbyterian who place patients in this trial effectively preclude them from starting other options, because of the demands it places on patients and their families. If physicians believe they are truly being neutral by not fully explaining the Gonzalez protocol’s nature to cancer patients, it is they who are in denial.
Michael Specter, who wrote about Gonzalez for the New Yorker in 2001, reported similar faux neutrality from Karen Antman, then the chief of Columbia’s division of medical oncology and a past president of the American Society of Clinical Oncology, who would be a co-author of the eventual JCO report. First, she showed him the excerpt that I mentioned above, which Mr. Specter characterized as “instructions that Columbia gives patients interested in the Gonzalez study”:
Many Americans who develop advanced cancer for which standard treatments have little to offer, turn to alternative or complementary therapies….There is no current conventional medical support for the theories and assumptions underlying the use of Nutritional Therapy. The Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons does not support its use except as part of a properly conducted clinical trial.
If that bland statement was all prospective subjects were told about “conventional medical support” for the Gonzalez regimen, it hardly constituted a responsible explanation. Mr. Specter himself, who is not a physician or scientist, sensed that as well:
I asked if it would be right to infer that she thought the trial wouldn’t work. She shook her head. I asked if she had an idea why it might work. She said no. Did she have any opinions at all about the potential of nutritional therapy or the Gonzalez regime? “I have lots of opinions,” she told me, “but none of them matter.”
Except that such opinions do matter, as any human study investigator is expected to know. Susan Gurney explained why they would have mattered to her friend:
He was an artist—a painter and a sculptor—and he had little scientific knowledge. When Dr. Chabot was neutral about the Gonzalez protocol, and when Dr. Antman said nothing adverse about it, my friend assumed that they must genuinely believe that the treatment could work.
The trial’s Principal Investigator, John Chabot, was also reticent to offer subjects accurate information about the Gonzalez regimen, as evidenced by a 1999 “Dear Prospective Patient” letter. These findings—that oncologists in general thought that “the Gonzalez protocol was a fraud,” but that the Columbia investigators failed to disclose that fact, and the reasons for it, to subjects—exposes another ethical violation that I’ve previously discussed: the trial lacked clinical equipoise.
Finally, it is clear, as discussed here and elsewhere in this series, that the underlying impetus for the trial was political, not scientific. Shouldn’t that have also been included in the consent form?
EBM Gets it Wrong
Keeping all that in mind, let’s revisit the quotation from Dr. Levine explaining the goal of his editorial, this time putting it into the context of the entire paragraph:
I am fortunate to have spent my entire academic career at McMaster University (Hamilton, Ontario, Canada), the birthplace of evidence-based medicine, and to have had the privilege of learning from colleagues such as David Sackett, MD, and Gord Guyatt, MD. The goal of this discussion is not to debate the merits of conventional medicine versus CAM. Rather, the objectives are to consider whether these two paths of medicine should be held to the same standards of evidence in terms of clinical and policy decision making and to determine whether a model that historically has been based on weak evidence can be reconciled with the new paradigm of the requirement for high-quality evidence.
Yes! A thousand times yes! They should be held to the same standards of evidence. But that means that they should be required to meet the same preliminary standards before being accepted for high-quality human trials, and those standards are about scientific evidence: evidence from basic science, evidence from the biology of the disease in question, evidence from animal studies, and evidence from whatever preliminary human case reports or uncontrolled trials there may be. The Gonzalez regimen failed all of those requirements, and the trial was thus scientifically unjustified and unethical from the start.
Dr. Levine, however, is misled by the limited EBM understanding of “evidence,” as is suggested by the last line of the paragraph. Later, he leaves no doubt:
This is one of the most challenging editorials I have had to write. Wearing the hat of a clinical epidemiologist, it is difficult not to find fundamental flaws in both of these trials. Not too long ago, I would have dismissed them out of hand. However, as a clinician, I recognize that many of my patients seek CAM therapies, and many are using them and afraid to tell me. I am troubled by the lack of evidence for many of these therapies and the costs that patients incur in using them. In the past, there was a reluctance to subject CAM therapies to the same standards of evaluation as those for conventional therapies. Should CAM therapies undergo the same type of rigorous evaluation to which conventional therapies are subjected? Absolutely! When authors submit clinical trials to JCO, they are instructed to follow specific guidelines. These guidelines should be the same whether the intervention is chemotherapy, radiation, an herbal remedy, or a psychosocial intervention.
Yes, there are specific guidelines for publishing reports in the JCO, and in the case of the Gonzalez report, they were violated. I wonder why Dr. Levine didn’t mention CONSORT? Clearly, the “type of rigorous evaluation” to which he is referring is a clinical trial. Otherwise, there would be little trouble subjecting scientifically incoherent methods (not ‘CAM therapies,’ which begs the question) to the same standards of evaluation as those for scientifically coherent methods (not ‘conventional,’ which has irrelevant social connotations). The beginning of such an evaluation is to judge how plausible the method might be, and the way to do that is by considering scientific evidence. This, Dr. Levine, is evidence.
Similarly, there was not merely a “lack of evidence” for the Gonzalez regimen; there was abundant evidence against it. As suggested above, Dr. Levine must understand this at some level: although he argued, incorrectly and irrelevantly, that the trial had failed to prove that “enzyme therapy is markedly inferior” to gemcitabine, he nevertheless opined that “Given the scarcity of resources for cancer research, there are many more important questions to address.” How could he assign even a qualitative measure of “importance” without considering prior probability?
Yet again he retreats to the safe haven of EBM, failing to recognize the ethical mischief wrought by ignoring science:
Chabot et al should be congratulated on their persistence and determination to compare pancreatic enzymes versus [sic] chemotherapy.
No! A thousand times no! Compare Dr. Levine’s statement with my own:
The authors of the report should be scrutinized by the OHRP and the NIH. They should be banned from being investigators in any NIH-sponsored trial for some finite period, and their involvement in the Gonzalez trial should become a noticeable smear on their reputations.
Here is Dr. Levine’s final paragraph. Rather than comment further, I’ve provided pertinent hyperlinks:
Recently, there has been a shift from single CAM modalities for cancer management to a more comprehensive approach called integrative oncology, which is “an evolving, evidence-based specialty that uses CAM therapies in concert with biomedical cancer treatments to enhance its efficacy, improve symptom control, alleviate patient distress and reduce suffering.” I am encouraged that the leaders of the Society of Integrative Oncology (Dundas, Ontario, Canada) have developed evidentiary levels to gauge the strength of evidence for CAM therapies. It is not surprising that these levels are based on the foundational principles of evidence-based medicine established by Sackett et al. I look forward to future well-designed clinical trials that provide high-quality evidence on how CAM therapies can improve the quality of life of our patients.

Of the Trial to Assess Chelation Therapy, Bayes, the NIH, and Human Studies Ethics
Kimball Atwood on May 30, 2014
Link
An experiment is ethical or not at its inception; it does not become ethical post hoc—ends do not justify means.~ Henry K. Beecher
A couple of weeks ago, Dr. Josephine Briggs, the Director of the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM), posted a short essay on the NCCAM Research Blog touting the results of the Trial to Assess Chelation Therapy (TACT) (italics added):
The authors found that those receiving the active treatment clearly fared better than those receiving placebo. The accompanying editorial in the AHJ reminds readers about the value of equipoise and the need to “test our beliefs against evidence.”
Most physicians did not expect benefit from chelation treatment for cardiovascular disease. I readily admit, initially, I also did not expect we would find evidence that these treatments reduce heart attack, strokes, or death. So, the evidence of benefit coming from analyses of the TACT trial has been a surprise to many of us. The subgroup analyses are suggesting sizable benefit for diabetic patients—and also, importantly, no benefit for the non-diabetic patient. Clearly subgroup analyses, even if prespecified, do not give us the final answer. But it is also clear that more research is needed to test these important findings.
And TACT findings are indeed a reminder of the importance of retaining equipoise [sic], seeking further research aimed at replicating the findings, and neither accepting nor rejecting findings based on personal biases. The scientific process is designed to weed out our preconceived notions and replace them with evidence.
Dr. Briggs concluded:
So, TACT is a reminder—an open mind is at the center of the scientific method.
Dr. Briggs’s title was “Bayes’ Rule and Being Ready To Change Our Minds”, a reference to a recent editorial that had accompanied one of the TACT papers. That editorial, by Dr. Sanjay Kaul, a physician and statistician from UCLA, begins with this quotation:
Preconceived notions are the locks on the door to wisdom.~ Merry Browne
Here is the relevant passage from Dr. Kaul’s editorial (italics added):
Sixth, it has been argued that the trial was unethical because there was no compelling clinical or preclinical evidence that chelation therapy has significant efficacy against atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, and given that chelation therapy can cause harm, the risk was not minimal. A Bayesian analysis would not look kindly on the results because of the low prior probability of treatment effect (the so-called implausibility argument).6 This is an uncharitable (and unwarranted) interpretation of the data because previous systematic reviews concluded, “insufficient evidence to decide on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of chelation therapy in improving clinical outcomes among people with atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.” It is axiomatic that absence of evidence of efficacy is not the same as evidence of the absence of efficacy.
From a Bayesian perspective, the strength of evidence is often summarized using a Bayes factor, which is a measure of how well 2 competing hypotheses (the null and the alternate) predict the data. The Bayes factor and the corresponding strength of evidence for the primary end point result in TACT overall, and diabetic cohorts are shown in Table 1. The p-value of 0.035 for TACT overall cohort translates into a Bayes factor of 0.108, which means the evidence supports the null hypothesis ≈1/9th as strongly as it does the alternative. This reduces the null probability from 50% pretrial (justified by suspension of one’s belief in treatment effect) to 10% post-trial. Although this does not represent strong evidence against the null, it does reduce the level of skepticism surrounding chelation therapy. In the diabetic cohort, the nominal p-value of 0.0002 translates into a Bayes factor of 0.002 (1/500), which reduces the extremely skeptical prior null probability of 95% to 4% post- trial, indicating very strong evidence against the null.
In concluding, Dr. Kaul states:
Finally, TACT highlights the double standard when it comes to accepting inconvenient results not aligned with our preconceived notions on so-called dubious quack cures such as chelation…
Closed minds?
Dr. Kaul’s reference “6” above is to a lengthy article that we published in 2008 titled “Why the NIH Trial to Assess Chelation Therapy Should Be Abandoned”. So, it seems, both Drs. Briggs and Kaul were chastising us for our biased, preconceived beliefs about so-called dubious quack cures. Our minds were, apparently, not open. Let’s examine this contention. 
Here is the relevant passage from our 2008 article (references in the original, italics added now):
The Likely OutcomeEven if the TACT is completed, which it should not be, it is unlikely to reduce the promotion of reckless uses of Na2EDTA. Whatever the outcome, chelationists have already positioned themselves to continue the practice: By virtue of ridding the body of toxic heavy metals, they claim, chelation is useful for more than 70 conditions. Without exception, chelationists have refused to accept previous results that contradict their beliefs. Their response to the TACT, should it yield definitive, negative results, is unlikely to be different.
The trial, moreover, is unlikely to yield “an informative negative result” even though chelation is almost certainly ineffective for CAD (coronary artery disease). It is more likely to yield ambiguous results. There are multiple endpoints, including subjective quality-of-life measures, and several subgroup analyses. The variety of trial settings increases the likelihood of heterogeneity of procedures and reporting. Promotions of chelation by TACT co-investigators have already introduced unacceptable bias into the trial. There is ample, additional opportunity for mischief, and ample reason to think that several co-investigators are inclined to make it. The statistical analyses will not be Bayesian.
Thus, merely on the basis of chance and bias, it is likely that some outcome data in some subgroups will differ sufficiently, between those receiving Na2EDTA and those receiving placebo, to reassure chelationists that chelation “works” and to sustain “lingering questions of efficacy” in the minds of apologists. Dr. Lamas himself has made much of 2 or 3 “tantalizing positive secondary outcomes” of a previous trial in which only 15 subjects received Na2EDTA, and in which the remaining 30 secondary outcomes and all 7 primary outcomes were unequivocally negative. The all-but-inevitable “tantalizing positive secondary outcomes” of the TACT would likely lead to years of additional, unnecessary trials or, at the very least, unremitting peddling of chelation by practitioners armed with fresh fodder in their perpetual battle against rational standards of care.
Preconceived? Or perhaps just prescient? Dr. Kaul correctly cites our paper as having “argued that the [TACT] was unethical (etc.).” He then opines that our argument was “uncharitable and unwarranted,” because systematic reviews (published after the TACT grant had been approved!) concluded that there was insufficient evidence either for or against chelation for atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.
Clinical equipoise?
He misses the point, and also missed the pre-existing evidence of the absence of efficacy. The point was made by the TACT investigators themselves, in their pitch for the grant. While acknowledging that every RCT of Na2EDTA for atherosclerotic disease had failed to show an effect, they argued:
The very large number of published case reports and case series support a hypothesis that EDTA chelation therapy provides clinical benefits in atherosclerotic vascular disease.
A very small number of trials of very small sample size have randomized 275 patients in aggregate, a number far too small to reliably detect or exclude the most plausible benefits.
Thus the case for clinical equipoise was not based on previous trials having been too small to exclude a small effect, but on “thousands” of confirming case reports and case series contradicting the disconfirming data from those clinical trials.
Even this, however, was wrong. In our paper we reviewed the purportedly confirming case reports and case series (ours is the only such review that we are aware of), and showed that they were neither credible nor accurately represented by the TACT protocol (the most charitable interpretation is that its authors had never read those case reports). That left only the RCT data and a couple of credible but disconfirming case series, which, even if inadequate to exclude a small effect, were more than adequate to exclude the huge effect claimed by chelationists, including those involved with the TACT—which, after all, was the only reason the trial was being done. They were also more than adequate to exclude, in the absence of favorable phase I and II trials, a $30 million, phase III trial, particularly according to the NCCAM’s own language. These and other considerations also argued strongly against a state of clinical equipoise, as we discussed at some length.
Both Drs. Briggs and Kaul seem innocent of the meaning of clinical equipoise. Dr. Briggs, in particular, appears to believe that “retaining equipoise” is akin to “maintaining an open mind” or “withholding judgment” and, furthermore, that there is value or virtue in doing so. Such are not the case. The long-accepted understanding is as follows:
According to this concept of “clinical equipoise,” the requirement is satisfied if there is genuine uncertainty within the expert medical community—not necessarily on the part of the individual investigator—about the preferred treatment.
Thus one cannot simply choose to “retain equipoise” or “suspend one’s (dis)belief in the treatment effect” in order to be less “uncharitable” than the alternative. Clinical equipoise—necessary to render a clinical trial of an unproven treatment ethical—either does or doesn’t exist for a particular treatment, even if the expert medical community is not unanimous in its opinion, and even if it isn’t always possible to know what that opinion is. In the case of EDTA chelation for CAD, the expert medical community was overwhelmingly skeptical, as we documented (that a small effect of EDTA had not been utterly disproved—what Dr. Kaul calls “the uncertainty associated with the possible benefit of chelation therapy”—is beside the point).
Henry Beecher understood, even if Drs. Briggs and Kaul do not, that this fact cannot be changed retroactively.
Bayes and human studies ethics
Regarding Bayes, our implication that the prior probability of a favorable treatment effect for Na2EDTA ought to be very low was based on a warranted interpretation of the existing data, which were entirely disconfirming, and on theoretical considerations discussed in our paper. It was also based on a lack of trust in the judgments of the only practitioners who believed that chelation works: those practitioners also peddle homeopathy, laetrile, Nambudripad’s Allergy Elimination Technique, and myriad other pseudoscientific nonsense, and have a rich history of corrupt, even criminal, behavior (many of them were also TACT investigators).
All of this is meticulously documented and referenced in our paper. We suggest that of all those who have published papers in the medical literature about the TACT, we are the only ones sufficiently open-minded and unbiased to have comprehensively reviewed the prior evidence and the history of the trial—and that includes the TACT investigators themselves.
We don’t see how Dr. Kaul can justify a “suspension of one’s belief in treatment effect” and thus arrive at a prior probability of 0.5 (or even 0.05). Systematic reviews notwithstanding, there were substantial prior trial data, even discounting our other reasons for judging the treatment implausible. If pushed to do so, we would have chosen a prior considerably less than 0.01. Na2EDTA still has a very low probability of being therapeutic for CAD, even if our opinion is now slightly less skeptical (for diabetics only), as Bayes Theorem dictates.
Laetrile and internal mammary artery ligation
Regarding NIH policy and human studies ethics, the existing evidence against chelation for atherosclerotic disease, as we explained in our paper, was considerably stronger than the evidence against many once-popular claims—we cited laetrile for cancer and internal mammary artery ligation for coronary disease—that no responsible scientist or ethicist would now consider subjecting to human trials. Drs. Kaul and Briggs might consider that if their post hoc reasoning about the TACT were to become the norm at the NIH, numerous dubious claims would be fair game for large human trials, each awaiting only the political arm-twisting that was the real impetus for a chelation trial. Then again, that’s why Congress created the NCCAM. Silly me.
Ironically, the TACT also violated the NCCAM’s own, stated intention to “to elucidate mechanisms of action and conduct small, well-developed phase I and II trials” prior to phase III trials. In 2002, prior to the enrollment of TACT subjects, that plan included “studies of the biology of EDTA chelation therapy in animal models,” which, although dubious, would have been more in accordance not only with sound science and public policy but with accepted ethical preconditions for a large human trial. Those studies, apparently, never happened.
The small effect that the TACT authors have now reported, limited to diabetics, may or may not be real, as Drs. Kaul and Briggs (sort of) acknowledge. Here’s hoping that the NIH doesn’t waste more public money pursuing it, unless some legitimate scientific clue suggests doing so, perhaps stemming from the sort of work described in the previous paragraph.
TACT: the real winners
Dr. Kaul is reassured because he thinks, based on formal reports, that “the presumption that the TACT trial [sic] provides actionable evidence for clinical practice is not endorsed even by the TACT investigators…” Alas, he and most academics have little idea whom they’re dealing with. Here is TACT investigator L. Terry Chappell on his own website (italics added):
The Trial to Assess Chelation Therapy (TACT) showed statistically significant benefits for patients with heart disease…This is the first major randomized clinical trial on chelation for vascular disease, and it is a positive study…
I cannot wait to share with our patients and friends what TACT and previous studies mean to current medical science and to those who could benefit from them…
Our experience is that chelation can reduce your chances for blindness, kidney failure, amputation and other vascular complications of diabetes. I believe that ALL diabetics should take chelation, starting about age 30…
I believe that chelation is the most powerful prevention intervention that we have. Everyone should take it to improve his or her chances for living a disease-free life. Scientific evidence is accumulating to back me up…
You do not have to be a doctor, nurse or paramedic to save lives. Just share the vital information contained in this message with others. Bring them to our clinic. Or ask them to set up a free phone consultation with me (Dr. Chappell) to discuss whether we can be of help. See to it that they know what they should know so that they can save their lives too!
Chelation is not just a treatment that is slowly emerging into the spotlight. It is a movement against the forces that are resisting change, especially from powerful economic interests…
TACT is the breakthrough study we needed. More studies will follow, but that will take years…but we want to help people now. Join the movement. Spread the word.
Isn’t it clear what has happened here? It was Dr. Chappell who—as President of the American College for Advancement in Medicine (ACAM), a group of several hundred chelationists—made the original pitch to congressman Dan Burton, who subsequently bullied NHLBI Director Claude Lenfant into accepting a chelation trial. Chappell was also a member, contrary to the NIH conflict of interest policy, of the scientific review committee that approved Dr. Lamas’s application—the same application that had named the ACAM the “the world’s largest and most respected organization of physicians who employ chelation therapy” and Dr. Chappell a “prominent expert.”
Chelationists seem to have got exactly what they’d hoped for from the TACT: a free pass to peddle their favorite, lucrative ‘remedy’—which they tout not only for CAD but for COPD, dementia, schizophrenia, skin wrinkles, and 70 other disparate indications—without being inconvenienced by pesky regulators. If a double standard is highlighted here, it’s a double standard of care, unwittingly encouraged by naive medical academics and a cowardly NIH.
There are numerous additional reasons that the TACT was unethical, including an almost universal lack of informed consent and incompetent medical care given by practitioner/investigators. These will be further explained in future postings.

The Nuances of Informed Consent
Steven Novella on November 13, 2013
Link
Modern medical ethics are built upon the concept of informed consent. This is not, however, as straightforward a concept as it may seem.
Physicians and health care providers have a duty to provide informed consent to their patients or their patients’ guardians, which means that they have to inform them appropriately about the risks and benefits of their recommendations and interventions. This includes informing them about the risks of not treating an illness.
This principle is, in turn, based largely upon the principle of autonomy – people have the right to control their own lives, and one cannot have control without information.
This is all simple enough, but where it becomes tricky is in deciding how much information to give patients, and how to present it.
A recent study looks at how physicians talk to vaccine-hesitant parents about vaccinating their children. The study found two interests things – the first is that when physicians began their discussion with, “Your child needs to get his shots,” (presumptive style) the success rate (percentage of hesitant parents who accepted vaccines) was significantly higher than when they began, “what do you want do to about giving shots?” (participatory style).
In both cases physicians were meeting both the letter and spirit of the requirement for informed consent, and parents ultimately made the decision. The difference was in presentation style. Therefore, within the parameters of ethical informed consent, there is wide room for different behaviors that have a significant effect on the ultimate decision made by parents.
One might think of this as manipulative, which is true in the trivial sense that all social interaction is potentially psychologically manipulative. In any case, no one style is objectively more ethical than the other, and both have a psychological effect on decision-making.
This brings up the deeper point – is the duty of the physician only to provide information or is it also to steer their patient toward what they think is the best decision? How much “steering” is ethically acceptable? At some vague and fuzzy point a recommendation becomes pressure, and at some point pressure becomes unethical.
I don’t think the presumptive approach constitutes undue pressure. It is simply one way of a physician to state their recommendation, which is as much part of their duty as informed consent.
Let me give another example – how much do you disclose to patients about your differential diagnosis? It’s generally accepted that you do not mention the most horrible and scary things on the list up front, especially when they are unlikely. If a patient presents to me with headache, it is very unlikely that they have a brain tumor. Still, if they meet criteria, I will order imaging to rule out a tumor or other underlying cause. What if the patient refuses imaging?
Certainly I am not going to tell every one of my headache patients that there is a very small chance they may have brain cancer. I’ll just get the MRI scan and rule it out. This is a case in which giving a patient more information will only serve to cause unnecessary anxiety. But if the patient refuses imaging, for whatever reason, then my duty changes. Now I have to tell them how important it is that we image their brain. I am, in fact, obligated to keep increasing the amount of information I give the patient to more and more scary details until either they agree to the scan or I have done everything I can to convince them to get it.
Style and context therefore matter to informed consent. Another significant factor is – how much information is enough? When I prescribe a drug to a patient I discuss with them common side effects, any potentially serious side effect, and other options, including not treating at all. However, I have to choose from professional experience and judgement which details are important. There are not enough hours in the day, let alone time in an office visit, to discuss the entire list of potential interactions and side effects of every possible treatment option. To some extent the patient relies upon the physician to hit the highlights.
If the patient is still uncertain, or they want more information, then I can direct them to the package insert or to online information where they can read up to their heart’s content all the information they want. I can then help them put that information into clinical perspective.
Also – and this is very tricky – it is possible that more information may cause unnecessary anxiety and actually confuse decision-making. Marketing research shows that people want choices and information, but too many choices and too much information causes anxiety and paralyzes their decision-making.
In the context of medicine, a patient may read about a rare but scary side effect of a medication and decide not to take it, even though the risks of not taking the medication vastly outweigh the risk of that potential side effect. People do not necessarily weigh risks rationally.
This brings us to the ultimate context of this topic of informed consent – the notion of informed consent assumes that people are rational actors who will make the best decisions in their own self-interest if they are properly informed. I agree, from an ethical standpoint, this is a reasonable approach.
However, a century of psychological research has shown that this is not true. People are not rational actors, we are psychosocial actors. We make decisions from a host of cognitive biases, motivations, and social influences. This includes, most pertinent to medical decision-making, risk aversion and loss aversion. People, for example, may expose themselves to a greater risk because they are averse to a much smaller but psychologically more dramatic risk.
The role of the health-care provider in terms of informed consent, therefore, is not only to provide raw information to their patients but to present it in a way that puts that information in the proper context, including psychological context. The physician is the lens that puts that information into proper scale and focus.
Of course, for this to be the case the physician has to first have the information in proper context, which means stepping back from all the cognitive biases of human psychology and looking at the information from a rational and statistical perspective. Physicians have to understand their own psychology and biases as well as those of their patients.
In short, good physicians need to be skeptics. Informed consent requires nothing less.

Informed Consent and CAM: Truth Not Optional
Jann Bellamy on February 23, 2012
Link
In three recent posts, Drs. Novella, Gorski and Atwood took the Bravewell Collaborative to task over a report on its recent survey of U.S. “integrative medicine” centers. As Dr. Novella noted,
So what is integrative medicine? When you strip away the rebranding and co-opting of features and treatments of mainstream medicine, you are left with the usual list of pseudoscientific practices that have been trying to insert themselves into mainstream medicine for decades through a series of marketing and propaganda strategies. Bravewell has positioned itself at the forefront of that effort.
Among these pseudoscientific practices listed in a chart from the report included by Dr. Gorski in his post were acupuncture, TCM, reiki, therapeutic touch, naturopathy, homeopathy and reflexology.
Dr. Novella continued,
At the end of the report, under the category ‘next steps,’ they write:
‘Providing funding for analysis of these data, which could provide important information about the efficacy of integrative medicine approaches as well as the treatment of chronic health conditions, should be a priority for funding sources and institutions.’
Let me translate that for you, in the context of the whole report: Isn’t it wonderful that integrative medicine methods are being used, now let’s go see if they actually work. If there is anything that defines alternative, complementary, integrative medicine it’s putting practice before evidence. In fact, the evidence is irrelevant to practice. Practice is philosophy-based, not science-based. Evidence is an obstacle, used only for marketing purposes, not for determining which treatments are effective. That is why they keep trying to redefine scientific evidence in medicine. They need science to change to accommodate their treatments, not conform treatments to the science.
And, as Dr. Atwood noted, in response to the claim that the IM practitioner “puts the patient at the center:”
That implies ‘patient-centered care,’ which requires that practitioners provide honest, comprehensive information about the methods in question. IM practitioners are universally dishonest about such matters. They have to be, because otherwise they’d have to tell patients the truth: that the methods are worthless.
Which, in my mind, brings up an interesting legal and ethical issue of consequence to the “integrative physician:” Does an M.D. or D.O prescribing a “CAM” treatment have a legal or ethical duty to disclose scientific implausibility as a part of informed consent process? How about lack of efficacy? My answers are “yes” and “yes.”
Informed Consent: Legal and Ethical Duty
First, a brief review of the law of informed consent. An early, and often quoted, formulation of informed consent came from the eloquent pen of Judge Benjamin Cardozo, then sitting on the Court of Appeals of New York, later to become an associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. (1)
Courts today characterize the unconsented treatment as the tort of battery – an intentional, unconsented to touching — rather than an assault. Actions for battery may be brought when there is no patient consent or where the physician goes beyond the scope of the consent. (2)
Typical of these are “wrong site” surgery cases where the patient, for example, has consented to a right knee replacement and the surgeon instead replaces the left knee. Or, in an example of “beyond the scope of consent,” a surgeon gets into a case and decides an operation different from the one the patient consented to is necessary. The latter example can be effectively eliminated by written consent covering this situation signed by the patient prior to surgery.
However, in certain cases insufficient disclosure can negate consent, thereby subjecting the physician to an action for battery. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 892B(2) (1979),
If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.
Translation: if the physician knows he is mistaken in informing the patient about the treatment, or misrepresents the treatment to the patient, the patient has not effectively consented to the treatment.
As the jurisprudence of informed consent continued to develop in the last century, courts also recognized a negligence theory upon which plaintiffs could recover for lack of informed consent. Where the patient consents to a certain treatment and the physician in fact performs that treatment, but fails to disclose a material risk to the patient, and that risk materializes, the patient can sue for negligence in failing to warn of the risk. The physician’s duty to disclose has been expanded to include disclosure of other treatments available for the patient’s condition, and the risks and benefits of each. (3)
One important distinction between a battery theory of recovery and a negligence/malpractice theory should be noted. A patient cannot recover for negligence unless he has actually been harmed in some way – e.g., an undisclosed but known risk of spinal surgery causes paralysis. Under a battery theory, the unconsented touching is harm in and of itself, although the plaintiff would still have to prove damages.
When risks and benefits of a proposed treatment are disclosed, as well as the risks and benefits of other possible treatments, the patient is able to make an autonomous choice. But this leaves an important question undecided: who makes the decision as to what sort of information should be disclosed? Two standards have emerged and jurisdictions are now about evenly split between the two.
Under the “physician standard,” a physician has a duty to disclose information that a reasonably prudent physician in the same or similar circumstances would disclose. Expert testimony is required to establish the standard. Under the “patient standard,” a physician has a duty to disclose information that a reasonably prudent patient in the same or similar circumstances would consider material in making a decision about whether to consent to the proposed medical or surgical procedure. (4)
While cases brought under either standard most typically revolve around a failure to disclose risk, it is important to remember the linchpin of informed consent is patient autonomy, not a mere risk/benefit analysis. This respect for patient autonomy is not simply a legal duty the breach of which will subject the physician to liability. It is also an ethical duty which must be observed whether or not actionable harm ensues. The fact that the patient doesn’t sue the physician for battery or malpractice does not retroactively absolve the physician from breach of this ethical duty. As Beauchamp and Childress state:
Respect for autonomy obligates professionals in health care and research involving human subjects to disclose information, to probe for and ensure understanding and voluntariness, and to foster adequate decision-making.
Further, in applying the moral duty of veracity to health care professionals, Beauchamp and Childress continue:
Veracity in the health care setting refers to comprehensive, accurate, and objective transmission of information, as well as to the way the professional fosters the patient’s or [research] subject’s understanding. Three arguments contribute to the justification of obligations of veracity. First, the obligation of veracity is based on respect owed to others. . . . [R]espect for autonomy provides the primary justificatory basis for rules of disclosure and consent. . . . Second, the obligation of veracity has a close connection to obligations of fidelity and promise keeping. . . . By entering into a relationship in therapy or research, the patient or subject enters into a contract or covenant that includes a right to the truth regarding diagnosis, prognosis, procedures, and the like . . . . Third, relationships between health care professionals and their patients and between researchers and their subjects ultimately depend on trust, and adherence to rules of veracity is essential to foster trust.(5)
Law of Informed Consent and CAM
As has been discussed many times at SBM, complementary, alternative, and integrative medicine proponents have co-opted science-based modalities, such as nutrition, exercise and stress reduction, as their own:
That’s what we here at SBM mean when we describe the ‘bait and switch’ of CAM/IM. Plausible, potentially science-based treatments are reborn as CAM/IM and then used as evidence that CAM works. They’re also the Trojan horse that CAM/IM proponents use to trick the guardians of SBM into bringing into fortress of academia. After these modalities have been accepted as ‘CAM,’ out jumps the real woo, such as ‘energy healing,’ to take over.
Here our discussion will be confined to the “real woo” and the physician’s duty of disclosure.
One feature of CAM that should be immediately obvious to the physician trained in “conventional” medicine is that CAM modalities are not based on the same sort of logically cohesive, science-based understanding of human functioning that they learned in medical school. (To say the least.) Of course, this should be a big red flag.
However, should that not be enough to stop the M.D./D.O. in his/her tracks, it is fairly simple to look at the evidence, or lack thereof, for the efficacy of CAM treatments. As has also been discussed extensively on SBM, the evidence just isn’t there for acupuncture, naturopathy, reiki, reflexology, homeopathy, subluxation-based chiropractic, and so on. We also know that lack of plausibility must be factored into any review of efficacy literature, as positive results must be viewed with reference to implausibility. In fact, SBM has made it easy for the practicing physician. He doesn’t even have to bother with PubMed or Medline searches. Much of the evidence has been expertly distilled right here on this blog.
Returning to the questions presented, must the M.D. or D.O. legally disclose the lack of plausibility and efficacy evidence for CAM procedures before recommending or performing them?
In answering that question, consider this hypothetical. An FDA-approved drug – we’ll call it “Mendax” — is later discovered to have gained that approval through manipulation of data in clinical trials. Those trials actually show that Mendax lacks efficacy for its proposed use. But the deception goes even deeper than that. The description of Mendax’s proposed mechanism of action is shown to have been falsified. As it turns out, it is implausible that Mendax would work as proposed. Although Mendax has been removed from the market, Dr. A has a supply of trial packets of Mendax furnished by a drug rep prior to removal from the market.
Putting aside other legal and ethical questions raised by prescribing a drug removed from the market, would a reasonably prudent physician in the same or similar circumstances disclose the fact that Mendax’s proposed mechanism of action is implausible and that it is not efficacious for its intended use? Would the reasonably prudent patient want to know this information in making an informed choice as to whether to take Mendax?
When put in the context of “conventional” medicine, these questions seem silly. Of course the physician would have to disclose this information. Of course the patient would want to know this in order to make an informed choice. What, then, is it about CAM treatments that would change the answer to these questions? What about CAM might exempt a physician from the duty to disclose implausibility and inefficacy?
The only possible argument I can think of is the fact that the CAM modality in question might be within the legal scope of practice of the physician or the CAM practitioner to whom the patient is referred. But that would require reading into all the physician and CAM practice acts an implied statutory abrogation of the well-developed law of informed consent. Under normal rules of statutory construction, one could not read such a purpose into these statutes without a more explicit directive to do so on the part of the state legislatures. In other words, if the state legislatures were aiming to substantially alter the law of informed consent, they would have said more directly that is what they were doing. (6)
Ethical Duty of Informed Consent and CAM
Although it is not my field, medical ethics appears, not surprisingly, to require the same result. Professor Kathleen M. Boozang has written that certain treatments should not be offered to patients, even if the physician believes they are unlikely to result in harm to the patient. According to Prof. Boozang, these include any treatment which:
a. is implausible on a priori grounds (because its implied mechanisms or putative effects contradict well-established laws, principles, or empirical findings in physics, chemistry or biology),
b. lacks a scientifically acceptable rationale of its own,
c. has insufficient supporting evidence derived from adequately controlled outcome research, or
d. has failed in well-controlled studies done by impartial evaluators and has been unable to rule out competing explanations for why it might seem to work in uncontrolled settings. (7)
Prof. Boozang refreshingly calls such treatments “quackery” and says unequivocally that “doctors should not truck with quackery” and that “physicians should not offer or accede to patient demands for unproven treatments.” (8) In an observation that tackles head on the notion that patients see CAM as more responsive to a need for intangibles like comfort, she states:
Patients have a range of expectations of their physicians, with different patients looking for different things, which may include hope, compassion and comfort. However, patients universally seek effective and safe treatment; they want to be cured. Consequently, the legal and ethical systems that establish the parameters within which physicians practice must demand at the very least that physicians utilize their skills and knowledge to offer patients treatment which they reasonably believe will actually treat the condition from which they suffer. This minimum requirement precludes physicians form offering as medicine something that is not – even if it will, in a psychological or emotional sense, make the patient ‘feel better.’ To do otherwise misleads the patient about what ultimately matters — that she is receiving treatment for her condition. . . . The very fact that it is a physician who prescribes the therapy will endow the treatment with a false sense of legitimacy. . . . [Patients] do not expect physicians to succumb to fads or illegitimate pressure to provide treatment that has no reasonable chance of helping the patient. In medicine, that hope is inspired by scientific proof, whether or not the treatment is conventional or alternative. (9)
If offering CAM to patients is ethically contraindicated, and the basis of that conclusion is, in part, a physician’s fiduciary obligation to be truthful with their patients, and the corresponding desire of patients for treatments that are actually beneficial, then, a fortiori, a physician offering implausible and unproven CAM treatments would have an ethical obligation to tell patients about that very implausibility and lack of efficacy.
Conclusion
The intrusion into “conventional” medicine of implausible and unproven treatments by supporters of CAM, and those who will benefit from their support, does not alter the ethical and legal obligations of physicians to be truthful with their patients. Medical ethics demand that such treatments not be offered. If they are recommended, ethically the physician has, at the very least, a duty to disclose implausibility and lack of evidence of effectiveness. Legally, physicians offer such treatments at the risk of being sued for battery based on the claim that patient consent is nullified by misrepresentation if implausibility and lack of effectiveness are not disclosed. Alternatively, if the CAM treatment results in harm, physicians risk suit under a negligence theory. It should be easy enough to prove by expert testimony, under the physician standard of disclosure, that implausible and ineffective treatments would not be offered by a reasonably prudent physician. Under the patient standard, a jury would be hard pressed to conclude that a reasonable patient would find it immaterial to that the proffered treatment lacked scientific plausibility and evidence of effectiveness.
Notes
(1) Schloendorff v. The Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y.125, 129-30 (1914).
(2) Jesson LE, Tovino SA, Complementary and Alternative Medicine and the Law, Carolina Academic Press (2010), 157-178.
(3) Id.
(4) Id.
(5) Beauchamp TL, and Childress, JF, Principals of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University Press (5th Ed. 2001), 64, 283-284.
(6) See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 253, 189-191 (1978).
(7) Boozang, KM, Western Medicine Opens the Door to Alternative Medicine, 24 Am. J. L. and Med. 185, 204 (1998).
(8) Id., at 204, 208.
(9) Id., at 205, 209.

True Informed Consent Is Elusive
Harriet Hall on November 20, 2012
Link
Most of us would agree that doctors should not treat patients without their consent, except in special cases like emergency care for an unconscious patient. It’s not enough for doctors to ask “Is it OK with you if I do this?” They should get informed consent from patients who understand the facts, the odds of success, and the risk/benefit ratio of treatments. The ethical principle of autonomy requires that they accept or reject treatment based on a true understanding of their situation and on their personal philosophy. Numerous studies have suggested that patients are giving consent based on misconceptions. There is a failure of communication: doctors are not doing a good job of providing accurate information and/or patients are failing to process that information. I suspect it is a combination of both.
An article in The New England Journal of Medicine reports that while the great majority of patients with advanced lung cancer and colorectal cancer agree to chemotherapy, most of them have unreasonable expectations about its benefits. For some cancers chemotherapy can be curative, but for metastatic lung or colorectal cancer it can’t. For these patients, chemotherapy is only used to prolong life by a modest amount or to provide palliation of symptoms. Patients were asked questions like “After talking with your doctors about chemotherapy, how likely did you think it was that chemotherapy would… help you live longer, cure your cancer, or help you with problems you were having because of your cancer?” A whopping 69% of lung cancer patients and 81% of colorectal cancer patients believed it was likely to cure their cancer, and most of these thought it was very likely.
False beliefs were:
    • More common in colorectal cancer than in lung cancer
    • Three times as high for non-white and Hispanic patients
    • Twice as high for patients who rated their communication with their physician very favorably.
There was no correlation between inaccurate beliefs and educational level, income, functional status, or the patient’s role in decision-making.
It’s ironic in a way. These patients thought chemotherapy was better than it really is, but generally chemotherapy has had a very bad press. It has been so demonized that some patients reject it out of hand, and those who accept it often find it nowhere near as bad as they had been led to believe. An e-mail correspondent wanted to label chemotherapy “quackery” because he said it only offered a 2-5% benefit for cancer survival. I had to explain to him that “quackery” refers to treatments with zero benefit, that it is meaningless to speak of cancer as a single entity, that the benefits of chemotherapy depend on the type and stage of cancer, that chemotherapy is curative for some types of cancer, and that it is also used for its adjuvant and palliative effects.
He also asked, “Surgery for cancer has a much greater success rate than 2-5% right?” I explained that it is meaningless to talk about the success rate of “surgery for cancer.” You have to look at specific types and stages of cancer. The success rate for breast cancer surgery in ductal carcinoma in situ stage 0 is 98% for 10-year survival. For pancreatic cancer, virtually all patients are dead within 7 years of surgery. It makes a huge difference whether metastasis has already occurred at the time of surgery. And some cancers, like blood cancers (leukemia, etc.), are not treatable with surgery.
I don’t think oncologists are deliberately lying to patients about chemotherapy. But I suspect they may be carefully choosing their words to put it in a more favorable light, since they naturally want to do something and to offer the patient hope. This may not be operating on a conscious level. And the very fact that they are offering chemotherapy to a patient gives it credibility, no matter what they say.
Whether or not the oncologist offers subtly biased information, the patients’ own biases contribute to poor communication. They want to survive. They want to have hope. It is only natural for them to put a positive slant on what they are told; they may not try to understand the negatives or they may minimize their importance. In some cases, they simply refuse to hear the facts and continue to believe what they want to believe. This study suggests that patients perceive physicians as better communicators when they convey a more optimistic view of chemotherapy.
Should we accept these misunderstandings because they give patients hope? Should we be concerned that they have not met the standard for giving informed consent for their treatment? Other studies have shown that patients with advanced cancer would accept toxic treatment for even a 1% chance of cure but would be unwilling to accept the same treatment for a substantial increase in life expectancy without cure. So if they are accepting chemotherapy on the basis of these misunderstandings, they are not doing what they say they want to do. The misunderstandings might even interfere with end-of-life planning and care. Previous studies have shown substantial discrepancies between patients’ and doctors’ estimates of their life expectancy.
Another recent study published in the Annals of Family Medicine showed patients have similar misunderstandings about the value of screening tests and preventive treatments.
    • 90% overestimated the effect of breast cancer screening
    • 94% overestimated the effect of bowel cancer screening
    • 82% overestimated the effect of hip fracture preventive medication
    • 69% overestimated the effect of preventive medication for cardiovascular disease.
Doctors also have some serious misunderstandings in these areas. Ina study by Gigerenzer et al. researchers did a survey of 160 gynecologists attending a continuing education session in 2007. They described a patient who has a positive mammogram and who asks her gynecologist whether that means she has cancer for sure, or what the chances are. What would they tell her? They were given the pertinent information (1% prevalence in that population, 90% of women with cancer test positive, 9% of women without cancer test positive). They were given a multiple-choice question with 4 answers: 81%, 90%, 10%, and 1%. The correct answer, which could be easily calculated from the statistics provided, was 9%. The other answers were wrong by an order of magnitude. They could derive the answer from the statistics or they could simply recall what they should have known anyhow. The gynecologists gave answers ranging from 1% to 90%; the majority of them grossly overestimated the probability of cancer as 90% or 81%, and only 21% answered correctly (not even as good as chance). I don’t know about you, but I find that positively frightening.
Conclusion
Doctors and patients have misconceptions about the value of chemotherapy, screening tests, and preventive measures. And probably a lot of other things! If patients are to give truly informed consent, doctors must have accurate science-based information and must find ways of effectively communicating their knowledge to patients without losing their patients’ trust and regard and without destroying hope.

   Ethics in human experimentation in science-based medicine
David Gorski
Link
Science-based medicine depends upon human experimentation. Scientists can do the most fantastic translational research in the world, starting with elegant hypotheses, tested through in vitro and biochemical experiments, after which they are tested in animals. They can understand disease mechanisms to the individual amino acid level in a protein or nucleotide in a DNA molecule. However, without human testing, they will never know if the end results of all that elegant science will actually do what it is intended to do and to make real human patients better. They will never know if the fruits of all that labor will actually cure disease. However, it is in human experimentation where the ethics of science most tend to clash with the mechanisms of science. We refer to “science-based medicine” (SBM) as “based” in science, but not science, largely because medicine can never be pure science. Science has resulted in amazing medical advances over the last century, but if there is one thing that we have learned it’s that, because clinical trials involve living, breathing, fellow human beings, what is the most scientifically rigorous trial design might not be the most ethical.
About a week ago, the AP reported that experiments and clinical trials that resemble the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study and the less well known, but recently revealed Guatemala syphilis experiment were far more common than we might like to admit. As I sat through talks about clinical trial results at the Society of Surgical Oncology meeting in San Antonio over the weekend, the revelations of the last week reminded me that the intersection between science and ethics in medicine can frequently be a very tough question indeed. In fact, in many of the discussions, questions of what could or could not be done based on ethics were frequently mentioned, such as whether it is ethically acceptable or possible to do certain followup trials to famous breast cancer clinical trials. Unfortunately, it was not so long ago that such questions were answered in ways that bring shame on the medical profession.
More than Tuskegee and Guatemala
The most notorious of highly unethical human experiments outside of Nazi Germany and the Japanese empire during World War II is the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study. This study, conducted by our very own Public Health Service (PHS) was conducted between 1932 and 1972 and examined the natural progression of untreated syphilis in poor black men who received free health care from the government. In 1932, when this study was conceived it was not inherently unethical. At the time there were precious few treatments for syphilis, and none of them worked very well. Consequently, observing the progression of syphilis, using the treatments available at the time, and following the subjects prospectively constituted a reasonable trial design. However, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, penicillin became available, and by 1947 was the standard of care for treating syphilis. When campaigns to eradicate syphilis came to the county in which most of the subjects, study researchers prevented their subjects from participating. In essence, even after an effective treatment for syphilis had become widely available, study still researchers denied it to their subjects. By the end of the study in 1972, of the original 399 men in the study, 28 had died of syphilis; 100 were dead of related complications; 40 wives had been infected with syphilis; and 19 children had been born with congenital syphilis. The rationale for not providing effective treatment for these men and even discouraging them from undergoing such treatment? This:
Such individuals seemed to offer an unusual opportunity to study the untreated syphilitic patients from the beginning of the disease to the death of the infected person. An opportunity was also offered to compare the syphilitc process uninfluenced by modern treatment, with the results attained when treatment had been given.
Worse, there was no informed consent, and considerable inducements were offered to the men to join the study.
The Tuskegee syphilis study, unfortunately, is not the only abuse committed by the PHS. About six months ago, it was revealed that these sorts of experiments had been more widespread than commonly believed. Indeed, in the 1940s in Guatemala, the PHS had gone one better in that they had deliberately infected prison inmates in Guatemala with syphilis. As I described in a lot more detail when the revelations first hit the press, prostitutes who had tested positive for syphilis were recruited to visit the men in prison. The hypothesis to be tested was whether prophylactic penicillin treatment could prevent infection, and the other purpose was to define the response of syphilis to penicillin treatment. Again, there was no real informed consent. Worse, subjects were intentionally infected with a potentially fatal disease. True, they were treated, but treatment is not 100% effective, and one has to wonder if the prisoners, a vulnerable population, understood the nature of the risks they were being induced to take.
On Sunday, AP medical writer Michael Stobbe published a long article detailing the sordid history of medical research in the U.S. before the 1970s. His timing was not coincidental, because on Tuesday in Washington, DC, there was a meeting of a presidential bioethics committee, the Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, triggered by the revelations last fall about the Guatemala syphilis experiment 65 years ago. Those revelations led the AP to do an exhaustive review of reports from medical journals and press clippings, and the AP found at least 40 studies similar to the Guatemala syphilis study in that patients were put at risk for serious disease or, even worse, healthy people were intentionally made ill to study disease. Some of these abuses are well known, others much less so.
Here are some examples from the AP article:
The AP review of past research found:
A federally funded study begun in 1942 injected experimental flu vaccine in male patients at a state insane asylum in Ypsilanti, Mich., then exposed them to flu several months later. It was co-authored by Dr. Jonas Salk, who a decade later would become famous as inventor of the polio vaccine.
Some of the men weren’t able to describe their symptoms, raising serious questions about how well they understood what was being done to them. One newspaper account mentioned the test subjects were “senile and debilitated.” Then it quickly moved on to the promising results.
In federally funded studies in the 1940s, noted researcher Dr. W. Paul Havens Jr. exposed men to hepatitis in a series of experiments, including one using patients from mental institutions in Middletown and Norwich, Conn. Havens, a World Health Organization expert on viral diseases, was one of the first scientists to differentiate types of hepatitis and their causes.
A search of various news archives found no mention of the mental patients study, which made eight healthy men ill but broke no new ground in understanding the disease.
Researchers in the mid-1940s studied the transmission of a deadly stomach bug by having young men swallow unfiltered stool suspension. The study was conducted at the New York State Vocational Institution, a reformatory prison in West Coxsackie. The point was to see how well the disease spread that way as compared to spraying the germs and having test subjects breathe it. Swallowing it was a more effective way to spread the disease, the researchers concluded. The study doesn’t explain if the men were rewarded for this awful task.
A University of Minnesota study in the late 1940s injected 11 public service employee volunteers with malaria, then starved them for five days. Some were also subjected to hard labor, and those men lost an average of 14 pounds. They were treated for malarial fevers with quinine sulfate. One of the authors was Ancel Keys, a noted dietary scientist who developed K-rations for the military and the Mediterranean diet for the public. But a search of various news archives found no mention of the study.
For a study in 1957, when the Asian flu pandemic was spreading, federal researchers sprayed the virus in the noses of 23 inmates at Patuxent prison in Jessup, Md., to compare their reactions to those of 32 virus-exposed inmates who had been given a new vaccine.
Government researchers in the 1950s tried to infect about two dozen volunteering prison inmates with gonorrhea using two different methods in an experiment at a federal penitentiary in Atlanta. The bacteria was pumped directly into the urinary tract through the penis, according to their paper.
The men quickly developed the disease, but the researchers noted this method wasn’t comparable to how men normally got infected — by having sex with an infected partner. The men were later treated with antibiotics. The study was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, but there was no mention of it in various news archives.
Stobbe goes on to point out the “Holy Trinity” of news stories in the 1960s and early 1970s that brought to light the sorts of activities that we now consider abuses in medical research. The last of these was, of course, the Tuskegee syphilis study. The first of these occurred in 1963, when it came to light that researchers had injected cancer cells into elderly debilitated patients at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn to discover whether their bodies would reject them. With our knowledge of tumor immunology now, we can look back on this experiment and know that the odds of any harm were quite small because tumors, with very, very rare exceptions, are not transplantable in humans. Our bodies recognize cells from another person to be foreign, whether they are cancer or not, and quickly destroy them. However, at the time, based on what was known, undoubtedly the scientists thought that there was at least a chance that these tumor cells would form cancers in the patients into whom they were injected, the denial of the hospital director who deemed the cells “harmless,” notwithstanding. (Indeed, the hospital director strikes me as either lying or deluded.) Otherwise, why seek to answer the question? Just as bad, there was no informed consent, the justification being that the cells were thought to be “harmless.” More details can be found here. The outcome was that the Board of Regents censured the researchers and suspended the licenses of two of the doctors involved. Later, however, they stayed the suspensions and instead put the doctors on probation for one year. There were no repercussions for the hospital or for Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, where one of the investigators was on faculty.
The third of the “Holy Trinity” was an infamous experiment in Staten Island at the Willowbrook State School, which was a school for children with mental retardation. During the mid-1960s, children there were intentionally infected with hepatitis in order to determine whether gamma globulin could cure it. Besides the targeting of a vulnerable population (children and teens with profound mental retardation), this study demonstrated a number of problematic issues as well. First, the investigators rationalized infecting these children by rationalizing that hepatitis was so endemic in the facility due to the fact that most of the children there were incapable of being toilet trained that over 70% of new residents became infected within a year. This, of course, leads to the obvious question, namely: If that were the case then why not study the effect of gamma globulin on children who were infected normally? More disturbing, again investigators played fast and loose with informed consent, the form being worded in a vague and ambiguous manner that played down the fact that the children were going to be intentionally infected with hepatitis and implying that the serum they would be given would be an experimental vaccine. Finally, as is the case in many such studies, there was an element of coercion. Willowbrook at the time was very crowded, with long waiting lists for children to be admitted. At times, there was only room in the experimental wing. For parents who could not afford to take care of their children, this situation could bring considerable pressure to bear to “persuade” them to “do the right thing.”
Changing ethics
In studying the history of medicine and clinical trials, what never ceases to amaze me is the different attitudes that physicians and scientists had towards their human subjects not all that long ago. Remember, it was primarily in the 1960s and 1970s when attitudes began to change. Before the 1970s, for instance, researchers thought little of using prisoners for experiments, even though prisoners are correctly considered a population that is vulnerable and for whom true informed consent without coercion is difficult to obtain without special attention to making it happen. Indeed, in his news story Stobbe recounts an anecdote of a man at Holmesburg Prison in Philadelphia who agreed in exchange for cigarette money to have the skin peeled off of his back and searing chemicals painted on the open wounds in order to test a drug. Similarly, as the Willowbrook story shows us, it was not really all that long ago when scientists apparently felt justified in infecting profoundly mentally retarded children with hepatitis on the basis of at best dubious ethical justification.
Arguably, this willingness to experiment on children who were not normal and who were never going to be able to contribute to society was a holdover from the eugenics movement earlier in the 20th century. It’s important to remember that, however much eugenics was discredited by the Nazis, prior to the Holocaust Hitler was actually quite the admirer of American eugenics policies, drawing inspiration from them. Another factor that is frequently invoked as an explanation for the willingness of American scientists to flout ethical considerations is war, particularly World War II and then the Cold War, the resulting idea that it was “us against them,” and that for us to win would require shared sacrifice in the name of the nation. After all, the scientific primacy of the U.S. was viewed as one of the most critical sources of our economic and military strength. Moreover, the concept of the Cold War could be generalized to other “wars,” such as the “war on disease” or the current “war on cancer” that I’ve written about twice in the last month. As Stobbe put it:
Attitudes about medical research were different then. Infectious diseases killed many more people years ago, and doctors worked urgently to invent and test cures. Many prominent researchers felt it was legitimate to experiment on people who did not have full rights in society — people like prisoners, mental patients, poor blacks. It was an attitude in some ways similar to that of Nazi doctors experimenting on Jews.
“There was definitely a sense — that we don’t have today — that sacrifice for the nation was important,” said Laura Stark, a Wesleyan University assistant professor of science in society, who is writing a book about past federal medical experiments.
There was clearly also more than a little hubris at play as well:
It was at about this time that prosecution of Nazi doctors in 1947 led to the “Nuremberg Code,” a set of international rules to protect human test subjects. Many U.S. doctors essentially ignored them, arguing that they applied to Nazi atrocities — not to American medicine.
Finally, with the rise of large pharmaceutical companies in the 1940s and 1950s, increasingly there was more of a profit motive than a purely scientific one. Drugs needed to be tested, and prisoners provided a convenient source of young, healthy men upon which to test new products. Hubris, profit, and a wartime attitude that sacrificing for the good of the nation all swirled together into a mixture toxic to medical ethics during World War II and well into the postwar period. In having defeated the Nazis, we failed to learn a lesson from what had happened in Germany, where one of the most technologically and medically advanced societies then on the face of the earth did horrible things in the name of its ideology.
Yes, it is true that American scientists did not intentionally expose prisoners to freezing water in experiments designed to find better ways of rewarming pilots shot down over frigid waters or sailors who survived the sinking of their ship, as Nazi doctors did. It is also true that American scientists did not intentionally irradiate men’s testicles and women’s ovaries in order to develop a means of rapid sterilization, causing horrific bowel and bladder complications, especially in women, as Nazi scientists did, although American scientists did subject many to various radioactive substances in the name of research. Nor did American scientists inject dyes into the eyes of children in order to try to turn them blue, as Dr. Mengele did. On the other hand, American scientists did, as we have seen, intentionally infect prisoners and mentally retarded children (the same sort of children that the Nazis would have called “life unworthy of life”) with diseases and then treat them, just as Nazi physicians intentionally infected concentration camp inmates with various diseases in order to determine the efficacy of different treatments or as Japanese physicians did when they intentionally broke the limbs of prisoners and contaminated them with bacteria-laden dirt. American offenses were different in scale and horror, but not significantly different in kind. Unfortunately, it was not until the 1970s, years after the international Helsinki Declaration was first published, until the Belmont Report was adopted and then not until the 1990s when The Common Rule became the basis of all federal regulations protecting human research subjects, as I have described before.
Could it happen again?
Fortunately, as one who now participates in clinical trials and clinical trial development, given the current level of regulation on human subjects research by the federal government, I have a hard time imagining how abuses such as the one’s I’ve described could happen again now. The amount of paperwork, regulation, and oversight of clinical trials has become so burdensome and complex that sometimes I wonder why I or anyone else would want to continue doing clinical research. Unfortunately, Stobbe doesn’t sound too optimistic. Actually, it’s not so much Stobbe, but rather the presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, as Stobbe documents in a followup story:
Speakers noted that over the last several decades, as many as 1,000 rules, regulations and guidelines have been enacted worldwide to ensure the ethical conduct of medical research. In the United States, there are rules to protect people in every study done by federal scientists, funded by federal agencies or those testing a product requiring federal approval to be sold.
But that oversight is inconsistent — ethical rules can vary among federal agencies. What’s more, if federal funding or review is not involved, an unethical study could be done and no one in authority would ever know about it.
“We have a leaky system,” said Eric Meslin, director of the Indiana University Center for Bioethics.
Dr. Robert Califf, Duke University’s vice chancellor for clinical research, agreed there are weaknesses.
“It’s night and day and what you could do in the ‘good old days’ with no one knowing about it. But there’s no 100 percent guarantee. There still will be bad things that will happen,” he said.
In terms of pharmaceutical companies, there are clearly loopholes when it comes to overseas studies. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies have been doing more and more studies overseas. Although federal law states that such studies, if they are funded by the federal government or if they are to be used as part of an application for FDA approval of a drug, that is not always enough of a guarantee of oversight:
Last year, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ inspector general reported that between 40 and 65 percent of clinical studies of federally regulated medical products were done in other countries in 2008, and that proportion probably has grown. The report also noted that U.S. regulators inspected fewer than 1 percent of foreign clinical trial sites.
Clearly, this is an unacceptable level of oversight, particularly outside of developed countries, such as those in Europe, where clinical trial oversight is comparable to that in the U.S.
Ironically, two examples come to mind of clinical trials that show the holes in our regulatory system for human subjects protection, both of which I have written about right here on SBM before. The first trial was a trial of homeopathic remedies for infants with infectious diarrhea in Honduras, as I wrote about here and Wally Sampson wrote about here. At the time I couldn’t figure out how the investigators at the University of Washington managed to get this study through their IRB, but somehow they did, demonstrating that an IRB is not a guarantee against the approval of totally unethical and scientifically worthless experiments. Fortunately, as far as I can tell, no infant was injured, but the potential was definitely there. Then, let’s not forget the Gonzalez trial, a trial of a regimen of what can best be described as pure quackery consisting of up to 150 supplement pills a day, various nutritional pseudoscience, and daily (or more) coffee enemas. The results were devastating, in that subjects on the standard-of-care chemotherapy arm lived three times longer than those on the Gonzalez protocol arm. Such is the effect of the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) on research ethics.
The more disturbing example is Mark and David Geier, the father-son tag team of anti-vaccine activists who fervently believe that mercury in vaccines causes autism and somehow came up with an idea that can only be described as dangerously wacky, namely that by suppressing testosterone with a powerful drug (Lupron) they could make the quackery known as chelation therapy “work better” at chelating mercury from the brains of autistic children. The reason? Because “testosterone sheets” bind mercury and keep it from being chelated! In pursuing this research, the Geiers have created an IRB stocked with their cronies and fellow anti-vaccinationists to “oversee” the research, as Kathleen Seidel has so thoroughly documented. In the process, autistic children were subjected to a powerful drug that depresses their sex hormone levels, which is why its use is often referred to as “chemical castration.” Predictably, Anne Dachel, Media Editor over at the anti-vaccine crank blog Age of Autism, has leapt all over this story as “evidence” that vaccines must be dangerous and that unethical scientists have been lying all along about the science showing tthat there is no evidence that vaccines cause autism:
Either Stobbe is a naïve and trusting soul and can’t consider that the same government that allowed horrific medical experiments in the past also allowed our children to become vaccine guinea pigs, or he’s afraid of an issue that’s just too controversial to talk about here and now. It’s much safer to attack what went on in the last century.
Maybe 70 years from now, some enterprising reporter will bring up the ethics of injecting known neurotoxins in pregnant women, babies, and small children.
Maybe around 2080, they’ll ask why no one ever demanded independent studies on the cumulative effect of so many vaccines, so soon, on the health of a baby. Or why there was never a simple vax-nonvax comparison study looking at autism rates.
Or maybe in 2050, Dachel will understand that this is the sort of work that’s been replicated so many times and done in so many different countries that even if you were to throw out all the U.S. data it wouldn’t change the conclusion that vaccines do not cause autism. She also overlooks the fact that the vast majority of the studies that have failed to find a link between vaccines and autism were performed after the adoption of the Common Rule and much-increased federal oversight over clinical trials. Of course, stories like Stobbe’s make it easier for cranks to attack the entire U.S. clinical research enterprise as corrupt and unethical. However, that is not the reason why we need to close the loopholes in our current clinical trial regulations. We need to do it because it is the right thing to do.
We at SBM argue that medicine should be based on science, rather than be a science, because we realize that medicine can never be completely scientific. There are too many human variables, not the least of which are patient values, individual patient situations, and resources. Another reason is the clinical trial process itself. Sometimes the most scientifically rigorous clinical trial design is not the most ethical design; indeed, sometimes it might be downright unethical. One example is, as I have pointed out, the aforementioned study of vaccinated versus unvaccinated children that seems to be every anti-vaccine activist’s most fervent dream. The most scientifically rigorous design for such a study would be a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial. However, such a trial would leave half of its participants completely unprotected against potentially deadly childhood infectious diseases, making it totally unethical to perform, even if it could be scientifically and fiscally justified based on existing preliminary data, which it really cannot.
Perhaps a better example is how placebo-controlled trials have almost gone the way of the dodo in cancer chemotherapy trials. Most oncology trials are now designed to test a new drug against the current standard of care or the new drug plus the standard of care versus standard of care alone. This is because our ethical considerations have evolved such that we now no longer consider giving placebos to cancer patients to be ethical unless there truly is no existing effective treatment for their cancer or if we truly do not know if the proposed treatment is better than observation alone and observation alone is currently the standard of care. As I have described before, in clinical trials, there must be clinical equipoise; i.e., based on the scientific evidence as it is known at the time the trial begins, a reasonable scientific assessment of the risks and benefits must conclude that the risks to the experimental group are either minimal or outweighed by the potential benefits. Here’s another thought to chew on. Experiments in which people were intentionally exposed to infectious agents and then subjected to various treatments to cure the disease thus caused are potentially the most scientifically rigorous way of all to test such treatments in humans because they allow control of the start of the infection, the amount of bacteria injected, and many other variables that can’t be so easily controlled in “wild” cases of infectious disease. However, because such experiments violate the precept of, “First, do no harm,” they are utterly unethical and now properly condemned by any physician with a shred of ethics. That we should require laws, rules, and regulations to prevent such unethical experiments by scientists is unfortunately, but scientists are no different than any other person. Not all of them are ethical; some are completely unethical. Some can be corrupted.
There will always be unethical scientists, at least as long as there are unethical people. That’s why we need laws to protect human subjects. However, we must also remember that the protection of human subjects is a balancing act. Go too far in the direction of lax regulation, and incidents such as those described in Stobbe’s article will start to happen again. Go too far in the other direction, and the pace of discovery will grind to a halt. Key to finding the balance is to respect patient autonomy and to provide true informed consent that accurately balances risks versus benefits and to protect patients from any form of coercion. Doing so without making the clinical trial process so onerous that researchers flee the field while at the same time protecting patients from foreseeable harms will be the challenge.

   Human subjects protections and research ethics: Where the rubber hits the road for science-based medicine
David Gorski
Link
Arguably the most difficult aspect of science-based medicine is where the rubber hits the road, so to speak. That’s where scientists and physicians take the results of preclinical studies performed in vitro in biochemical assays and cell culture models and in vivo in animal models to humans. There are numerous reasons for this, not the least of which that preclinical models, contrary to what animal rights activists would like you to believe, do not predict human responses to new therapeutic agents as much as we would like. However, the single biggest reason that we cannot answer questions in human studies as easily as we can in cell culture and animal studies is ethics. Of course, answering questions using cell culture and animal studies is not “easy,” either, but performing studies using human beings as subjects is an order of magnitude (at least) more difficult because the potential to cause harm exists, and if harm is caused by the experimental treatment under study, that harm will be done to human beings, rather than cells in a dish or mice bred for research.
The “gold standard” type of study that we do to test the efficacy of a new drug is known as the randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blinded study, often abbreviated RCT. Indeed, this remains the gold standard and is accorded the highest level of “power” in the framework of evidence-based medicine. Of course, as we have argued time and time again, using the RCT to test therapies that are incredibly implausible on a strictly scientific basis (homeopathy or reiki, for instance) inevitably leads to numerous “false positives” in which the therapy appears to produce results statistically significantly better than the control. John Ioannidis has done numerous clever analyses that demonstrate how easily clinical research is led astray if it is not grounded in scientific plausibility. Indeed, the probability of false positive studies increases, the more improbable the modality. It is for these very reasons that we have proposed the concept of science-based medicine, which takes into account estimates of prior probability based on preclinical studies and basic scientific principles, rather than evidence-based medicine, which does not. Indeed, Wally Sampson has even proposed a “plausibility scale” for rating RCTs, and Steve Novella has pointed out how difficult it can be to interpret the medical literature.
Leaving aside all of these issues, to which a whole series of posts could be devoted (and, indeed, to which a whole series of posts has been devoted by Kimball Atwood, Steve Novella, and Wally Sampson), I want to look at the ethical precepts that guide clinical trials and why they render it much more difficult to answer some questions. To the shame of the medical profession, these ethical precepts are a relatively recent phenomenon dating back only a few decades at most. Some of the impetus for these rules derived, not surprisingly, from the horrific medical experiments that the Nazis and Japanese performed on prisoners during World War II. Virtually everyone’s heard, for instance, of Dr. Mengele and his experiments on twins, but there was more–so much more–that the Nazis did, including testing the effects of immersion in ice water to simulate what sailors forced to abandon ship or pilots shot down over the ocean might experience and to test ways to rewarm them and save their lives; placing prisoners in vacuum chambers to test the effects of high altitude (which had obvious applications to how their pilots could deal with high altitude); sewing glass, foreign objects, or gauze impregnated with bacteria into wounds in order to test means of preventing and treating gangrene; smashing prisoner’s bones with a hammer in order to simulate more realistically war wounds; and the use of radiation aimed at the ovaries in order to sterilize quickly Jewish women and other “undesirables,” at the cost of horrific radiation injury to the surrounding bowels because the technology to aim radiation beams was very crude then. The Japanese were no slouches at depraved medical experiments, either, performing “dissections” on prisoners while they were still alive; testing phosgene gas on prisoners; decapitating prisoners to test the sharpness of blades; amputating limbs to study shock due to hemorrhage; performing gastrectomies and testing reattachments of the esophagus to various parts of the intestinal tract; and testing the effect of various pathogenic microorganisms on prisoners to see what inoculum was necessary to cause disease.
Then there was the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, formally known as The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male. Carried out between 1932 and 1972 by the U.S. Public Health Service, the study involved 399 African-American men with syphilis who were studied to determine the effects of untreated syphilis in black men as opposed to whites, the hypothesis being that whites experience more neurological complications due to syphilis, whereas blacks were thought to be more susceptible to cardiovascular damage. What horrified the nation in 1972, when details of the experiment were first reported Jean Heller of the Associated Press, was that the study continued after the 1940s, when penicillin had been validated as curative for syphilis. The experiment also involved considerable deception:
By the end of the experiment, 28 of the men had died directly of syphilis, 100 were dead of related complications, 40 of their wives had been infected, and 19 of their children had been born with congenital syphilis. How had these men been induced to endure a fatal disease in the name of science?
To persuade the community to support the experiment, one of the original doctors admitted it “was necessary to carry on this study under the guise of a demonstration and provide treatment.” At first, the men were prescribed the syphilis remedies of the day —bismuth, neoarsphenamine, and mercury— but in such small amounts that only 3 percent showed any improvement.
These token doses of medicine were good public relations and did not interfere with the true aims of the study. Eventually, all syphilis treatment was replaced with “pink medicine” —aspirin.
To ensure that the men would show up for a painful and potentially dangerous spinal tap, the PHS doctors misled them with a letter full of promotional hype: “Last Chance for Special Free Treatment.” The fact that autopsies would eventually be required was also concealed.
As a doctor explained, “If the colored population becomes aware that accepting free hospital care means a post-mortem, every darky will leave Macon County…” Even the Surgeon General of the United States participated in enticing the men to remain in the experiment, sending them certificates of appreciation after 25 years in the study
It wasn’t until 25 years after the revelation of the ethics violations that had occurred during the Tuskegee syphilis experiment were revealed that the U.S. government acknowledged how wrong the experiment had been and then President Clinton formally apologized.
In response to these sorts of abuses, efforts were undertaken, both in the U.S. and internationally, to codify ethical principles that would prevent such atrocities and abuses. In the aftermath of World War II, the first major effort to regulate medical research was the Nuremberg Code, which was developed from the verdict of the Doctors’ Trial in 1947. There were ten points
     1.  The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment. The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
     2.  The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
     3.  The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.
     4.  The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.
     5.  No experiment should be conducted where there is a prior reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
     6.  The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
     7.  Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
     8.  The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.
     9.  During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible.
     10.  During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.
(Taken from the Wikipedia entry reprinted from Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 2, pp. 181-182. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949.)
Next was the Declaration of Helsinki developed by the World Medical Association in 1964 and The Belmont Report in the United States. It in essence expanded upon the principles of the Nuremberg Code (more on how later). In the aftermath of the Tuskegee experiment and in response to other ethical violations in human subjects research, the former United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (renamed to Health and Human Services) produced a document entitled “Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research,” more commonly called The Belmont Report, for the Belmont Convention Center, where the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1974-1978) met to draft the report.
The Belmont Report identified three essential aspects of any human subjects research:
     1.  Respect for persons. This principle demands that persons be treated as autonomous agents with self-determination and that persons unable to exercise autonomous self-determination (children, the mentally ill) or who could be easily coerced (prisoners) are entitled to protections for their interests. In brief, this means that research subjects must be accorded full understanding of the risks and potential benefits of participating in a research study, as well as full autonomy (i.e., the right to refuse to participate without fear of repercussions or that their medical care may be compromised).
     2.  Beneficence. This principle can be boiled down to (1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms. Thus, the scientific design of the experiment must not be excessively risky for participants and must have sound science behind it suggesting that a therapy is likely to be of benefit.
     3.  Justice. Research must be fair, including (and potentially benefiting) as many groups as possible. Key quote: “For example, the selection of research subjects needs to be scrutinized in order to determine whether some classes (e.g., welfare patients, particular racial and ethnic minorities, or persons confined to institutions) are being systematically selected simply because of their easy availability, their compromised position, or their manipulability, rather than for reasons directly related to the problem being studied. Finally, whenever research supported by public funds leads to the development of therapeutic devices and procedures, justice demands both that these not provide advantages only to those who can afford them and that such research should not unduly involve persons from groups unlikely to be among the beneficiaries of subsequent applications of the research.”
Based on the Belmont Report, the U.S. Government eventually formulated the Common Rule (full DHHS regulations here), which mandates that all federally-funded human research and all human research designed to obtain FDA approval must be overseen by committees known as Institutional Review Boards, independent bodies that guarantee that human subjects are protected according to the Belmont Report and all applicable federal regulations.
Finally, the Helsinki Declaration represents an ongoing international effort to come up with a set of ethical principles to guide human subjects research. It is not a legally binding treaty but nonetheless now serves as the cornerstone of document in human research ethics. Despite its not being codified as a treaty, the Helsinki Declaration draws its power and authority based on how much of it has been codified into legislation and regulations in a large number of countries. The first version, released in 1964, promulgated ten principles based upon the original ten principles of the Nuremberg Code. Since then the Helsinki Declaration has undergone six revisions, the most recent of which occurred in October 2008. The first revision, in 1975, introduced the concept of an independent oversight board for all human subjects research, which influenced the requirement for an IRB in the Common Rule in the United States. In its current form, the Helsinki Declaration has introduced additional protections that are relevant to this blog:
12. Medical research involving human subjects must conform to generally accepted scientific principles, be based on a thorough knowledge of the scientific literature, other relevant sources of information, and adequate laboratory and, as appropriate, animal experimentation. The welfare of animals used for research must be respected.
We have discussed this time and time again on SBM: the concept of prior probability. It is the very reason that so much research on complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) is, at the very least, of dubious ethics, especially for highly improbable modalities like homeopathy and reiki. The reason is that testing these modalities on human subjects does not conform to generally accepted scientific principles and is not based on proper preclinical experimentation. Indeed, a discussion of this very issue has broken out in the comments of a post here at SBM about a trial of massage therapy for HIV/AIDS, and I expressed grave concern over the ethics of a trial of homeopathy for infectious childhood diarrheal diseases in a Third World country.
More importantly, here’s one reason why placebo-controlled research is becoming more and more uncommmon:
32. The benefits, risks, burdens and effectiveness of a new intervention must be tested against those of the best current proven intervention, except in the following circumstances:
    • The use of placebo, or no treatment, is acceptable in studies where no current proven intervention exists; or
    • Where for compelling and scientifically sound methodological reasons the use of placebo is necessary to determine the efficacy or safety of an intervention and the patients who receive placebo or no treatment will not be subject to any risk of serious or irreversible harm. Extreme care must be taken to avoid abuse of this option.
This is the very reason why most clinical trials now examine the addition of a new drug to the standard of care or a new drug versus the standard of care, rather than true placebo-controlled trials. Exceptions occur for self-limited conditions, such as hot flashes during menopause or headach therapies, but not for more serious conditions and certainly not for life-threatening conditions like cancer. Indeed, very few cancer therapy trials have a placebo control.
Considering the totality of ethical considerations that must be applied to human subjects research, it is easy to understand why we cannot always do the “definitive” experiment to answer a scientific question about the efficacy of a new therapy. For example, in surgical trials, with rare exceptions, it is not ethically acceptable to do “sham” surgery on a control group because that subjects patients to all risks and no benefit, as I have discussed before for trials of total mesorectal excision for rectal cancer and a clinical trial testing the routine use of nasogastric tubes for GI surgery.
That’s not to say that sham surgery controls haven’t been used before. Indeed, they have. For example, a randomized, sham surgery-controlled trial is how it was originally determined that poudrage for revascularizing the heart and treating angina was no better than placebo. First developed in the 1930s, poudrage was based on the concept that irritating the pericardium would provoke an inflammatory response that would lead to the influx of blood vessels into the heart muscle, and this irritation was accomplished by opening the chest and sprinkling sterile talcum powder in the pericardial sac surrounding the heart. (In the era before heart-lung bypass technology, it was not possible to consider revascularizing the heart directly.) As is the case for so many CAM modalities, results, as far as relieving the symptoms of angina, looked good–-in uncontrolled studies. Poudrage was the rage as a treatment for angina for at least a decade. Then, in the 1950s, a randomized trial was performed with a sham surgery control arm in which one group of patients had their chests opened, but no powder sprinkled in the pericardial sac around the heart. The other got standard poudrage. There was no difference in symptoms or other measures of cardiac symptomatology between the two groups. (Surgery itself is a very powerful placebo.) This was one of the very first and most famous randomized trials of a surgical intervention with sham surgery as the control. Poudrage was abandoned, and it is now relegated to being a historical curiosity in the history of surgery. It was not the only procedure for angina pectoris found when actually tested to have effects based primarily on the placebo effect of surgery.
As you may imagine, based on the latest iteration of the Helsinki Declaration, it is unlikely–to say the least–that such a study would be approved by an IRB in the U.S., although two more recent trials have been done, as this excellent discussion of the ethics of sham surgery in surgical clinical trials mentions:
There have been very few sham controlled surgical trials to date. In 1959, Cobb published a study showing no difference in improvement between patients undergoing internal mammary artery ligature versus a sham operation for treatment of angina pectoris. In recent years, two studies were done to evaluate the intracranial implantation of fetal neural cells for Parkinson’s disease. These studies had some of the study patients randomized to a sham operation that required simulating all aspects of the surgery, including the drilling of burr holes on the skull under anesthesia. In the field of orthopaedics, Moseley et al. in 2002 evaluated the effectiveness of arthroscopic surgery for arthritis of the knee. In this study, one group received a full arthroscopic debridement, one group underwent arthroscopic lavage with irrigation fluid alone, and the last group had three one-centimeter sham incisions but no actual procedure performed. This study concluded that arthroscopic surgeries done for advanced arthritis were no more effective than the sham operation.
The ethical rules laid down by a combination of the Nuremberg Code, the Belmont Report, and the Helsinki Declaration are also the reason why one of the latest talking points of antivaccinationists, a “randomized” study of unvaccinated versus vaccinated children, is ethically not permissible. The reasons are obvious. it would require that the control group of children in the placebo-controlled group be intentinoally left completely unprotected against vaccine-preventable diseases. There would also be the practical issue that antivaccine parents wouldn’t sign up for such a study because their irrational fear of vaccination would prevent them from agreeing to the possibility of randomization to the vaccination group, and parents grounded in science-based medicine would never be foolish enough to allow their children to be randomized to the no vaccine placebo group. Indeed, not too long ago an antivaccine commenter on this very blog proposed just such a study, and I told him why it would be unethical in no uncertain terms.
Meanwhile, true to form, after making a brain-meltingly specious analogy that he seems to think a slam-dunk, Generation Rescue founder and anti-vaccine zealot extraordinaire J.B. Handley makes a huge straw man out of the ethical and scientific arguments against doing a “vaxed versus unvaxed” study:
    • Looking at unvaccinated kids is either impossible (due to confounders) or unethical
    • Looking at adverse events based on giving children 6 vaccines, the way we do in the actual schedule, has never happened and never will, because of the “Helsinki Declaration”
No one ever said that comparing the rates of neurodevelopmental disorders like autism in unvaccinated children compared to vaccinated children is impossible or unethical. What we argue is that looking at unvaccinated children in the manner demanded by anti-vaccine zealots like J.B. Handley is unethical (the randomized, placebo-controlled “vaxed versus antivaxed” study some anti-vaccine zealots demand) or far more difficult to control for confounders than those as full of the arrogance of ignorance as J.B. Handley assume. Indeed, Prometheus has written three excellent posts [1, 2, 3 (of the three, #3 is the most detailed) describing what it would take to do a scientifically and epidemioligcally rigorous study comparing neurodevelopmental outcomes in vaccinated versus unvaccinated children. Suffice it to say, that such a rigorous study is not what the antivaccine movement wants and that doing such a study would be far more complicated, expensive, and difficult than the simplistic view of our commenter or J.B., who seems to view ethical concerns as nothing more than made-up impediments to his getting his way rather than what they are: Legitimate rules designed to protect research subjects. I also suspect that J.B. knows this but keeps demanding such a study because to the ignorant it gives him the appearance of being on the scientific high ground. An alternate explanation for the insistence by anti-vaccine zealots is that the truly believe that vaccines are so harmful that it’s more ethical not to administer them than it is to administer them. In other words, to them the unvaccinated group would be less likely to incur harm) than to administer them.
As I’ve said time and time again, where the “rubber meets the road” (so to speak) in science-based medicine is the clinical trial. Part of that ethical framework, in my view and I daresay the views of my co-bloggers, is that, before subjecting any human being to the potential risks of a clinical trial, there must be nothing but the most rigorous science supporting the hypothesis to be tested, backed up by preclinical data in the form of biochemistry, cell culture, and animal studies. In addition, because the subjects of such trials are human beings, even when there is a scientifically compelling and well-supported hypothesis being tested, the welfare of the subjects must take precedence over rigorous scientific design whenever there is a conflict between the two. Over 100 years of surgical research shows that it is possible to produce compelling evidence for the efficacy of a surgical procedure without necessarily having a sham surgery placebo control group and double-blinding of the participants (given that it’s nearly always impossible to blind the operating surgeon to the operation done), but it is much more difficult. Non-blinded prospective trials or sometimes retrospective trials need to be used, requiring many more trials to show a pattern that can overcome the confounding factors inherent in such designs.
Similarly, when it comes to issues like vaccination, although we do rigorously test each new vaccine added to the current recommended vaccination schedule in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration precepts, we cannot ethically do a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of “vaccinated versus unvaccinated” children because that would involve leaving the control group unprotected against vaccine-preventable disease. That is a failure to provide the best standard of care as the minimum that research subjects receive. In addition, such a trial would fail from an ethical standpoint in another way. Because the hypothesis that vaccines cause autism is not supported by the weight of current evidence, such a trial would be testing a scientifically dubious (at best) hypothesis, which also goes against the Helsinki Declaration. What we are left with, then, are retrospective trials or prospective non-randomized trials requiring large numbers of subjects and careful controls for confounders. The good news is that enough of these trials can be as convincing as the gold standard. Indeed, critics of the RCT sometimes argue that sound epidemiological studies, properly done, can in some cases replace the need for RCTs.
As trite as it may seem, what this all boils down to is the observation that science-based medicine is hard. Even if you leave aside the questions of how to come to a conclusion regarding the best treatment for a patient based on science, just answering a single question requires not just loads of preclinical data in cell culture and animal models, but well-designed clinical trials. But a well-designed clinical trial is not enough; it has to be ethical. Moreover, the bioethics has been in general evolving towards ever more protection of human research subjects. Indeed, I’m reminded of an HBO movie Something The Lord Made (an excellent, albeit a bit conventional and predictable, movie about one of the “gods” of surgery Alfred Blalock and the poor black carpenter whom he hired as an assistant whose surgical skills were invaluable to Dr. Blalock in achieving what he did). The movie dramatized surgical research in the 1940s, the development of the Blalock-Taussig shunt, and the relationship between Blalock and Thomas. Watching the movie, I remember being amazed at how little it took in the way of discussion and permissions for Dr. Blalock to try out his procedure on infants. Of course, there was no procedure to save such infants back then, who inevitably died, and his assistant Vivien Thomas and he had worked out the procedure in dogs, but the difference between then and now was striking. Indeed, studies that were approved 20 or even 10 years ago might not be approved today.
Although no one, least of all I, would argue that human subjects protections are what they should be (which may be the topic for a future post), I find that comforting.

Did Facebook and PNAS violate human research protections in an unethical experiment?
David Gorski on June 30, 2014
Link

Ed. Note: NOTE ADDENDUM
I daresay that I’m like a lot of you in that I spend a fair bit of time on Facebook. This blog has a Facebook page (which, by the way, you should head on over and Like immediately). I have a Facebook page, several of our bloggers, such as Harriet Hall, Steve Novella, Mark Crislip, Scott Gavura, Paul Ingraham, Jann Bellamy, Kimball Atwood, John Snyder, and Clay Jones, have Facebook pages. It’s a ubiquitous part of life, and arguably part of the reason for our large increase in traffic over the last year. There are many great things about Facebook, although there are a fair number of issues as well, mostly having to do with privacy and a tendency to use automated scripts that can be easily abused by cranks like antivaccine activists to silence skeptics refuting their pseudoscience. Also, of course, every Facebook user has to realize that Facebook makes most of its money through targeted advertising directed at its users; so the more its users reveal the better it is for Facebook, which can more precisely target advertising.
Whatever good and bad things about Facebook there are, however, there’s one thing that I never expected the company to be engaging in, and that’s unethical human subjects research, but if stories and blog posts appearing over the weekend are to be believed, that’s exactly what it did, and, worse, it’s not very good research. The study, entitled “Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks“, was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), and its corresponding (and first) author is Adam D. I. Kramer, who is listed as being part of the Core Data Science Team at Facebook. Co-authors include Jamie E. Guillory at the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco and Jeffrey T. Hancock from the Departments of Communication and Information Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
IRB? Facebook ain’t got no IRB. Facebook don’t need no IRB! Facebook don’t have to show you any stinkin’ IRB approval!” Sort of.
There’s been a lot written over a short period of time (as in a couple of days) about this study. Therefore, some of what I write will be my take on issues others have already covered. However, I’ve also delved into some issues that, as far as I’ve been able to tell, no one has covered, such as why the structure of PNAS might have facilitated a study like this “slipping through” despite its ethical lapses.
Before I get into the study itself, let me just discuss a bit where I come from in this discussion. I am trained as a basic scientist and a surgeon, but these days I mostly engage in translational and clinical research in breast cancer. The reason is simple. It’s always been difficult for all but a few surgeons to be both a basic researcher and a clinician and at the same time do both well. However, with changes in the economics of even academic health care, particularly the ever-tightening drive for clinicians to see more patients and generate more RVUs, it’s become darned near impossible. So clinicians who are still driven (and masochistic) enough to want to do research have to go with where their strengths are, and make sure there’s a strong clinical bent to their research. That involves clinical trials, in my case cancer clinical trials. That’s how I became so familiar with how institutional review boards (IRBs) work and with the requirements for informed consent. I’ve also experienced what most clinical researchers have experienced, both personally and through interactions with their colleagues, and that’s the seemingly never-ending tightening of the requirements for what constitutes true informed consent. For the most part, this is a good thing. However, at times it does appear that IRBs seem to go a bit too far, particularly in the social sciences. This PNAS study, however, is not one of them.
The mile high view of the study is that Facebook intentionally manipulated the feeds of 689,003 English-speaking Facebook users between January 11th-18th, 2012 in order to determine whether showing more “positive” posts in a user’s Facebook feed was an “emotional contagion” that would inspire the user to post more “positive” posts himself or herself. Not surprisingly, Kramer et al found that showing more “positive” posts did exactly that, at least within the parameters as defined, and that showing more “negative” posts resulted in more “negative” posting. I’ll discuss the results in more detail and problems with the study methodology in a moment. First, here’s the rather massive problem. Where is the informed consent? This is what the study says about informed consent and the ethics of the experiment:
Posts were determined to be positive or negative if they contained at least one positive or negative word, as defined by Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software (LIWC2007) (9) word counting system, which correlates with self-reported and physiological measures of well-being, and has been used in prior research on emotional expression (7, 8, 10). LIWC was adapted to run on the Hadoop Map/Reduce system (11) and in the News Feed filtering system, such that no text was seen by the researchers. As such, it was consistent with Facebook’s Data Use Policy, to which all users agree prior to creating an account on Facebook, constituting informed consent for this research. Both experiments had a control condition, in which a similar proportion of posts in their News Feed were omitted entirely at random (i.e., without respect to emotional content).
Does anyone else notice anything? I noticed right away, both from news stories and when I finally got around to reading the study itself in PNAS. That’s right. There’s no mention of IRB approval. None at all. I had to go to a story in The Atlantic to find out that apparently the IRB of at least one of the universities involved did approve this study:
Did an institutional review board—an independent ethics committee that vets research that involves humans—approve the experiment?
Yes, according to Susan Fiske, the Princeton University psychology professor who edited the study for publication.
“I was concerned,” Fiske told The Atlantic, “until I queried the authors and they said their local institutional review board had approved it—and apparently on the grounds that Facebook apparently manipulates people’s News Feeds all the time.”
Fiske added that she didn’t want the “the originality of the research” to be lost, but called the experiment “an open ethical question.”
This is not how one should find out whether a study was approved by an IRB. Moreover, news coming out since the story broke suggests that there was no IRB approval before publication.
Also, what is meant by saying that Susan Fiske is the professor who “edited the study” is that she is the member of the National Academy of Sciences who served as editor for the paper. What that means depends on the type of submission the manuscript was. PNAS is a different sort of journal. As I’ve discussed in previous posts regarding Linus Pauling’s vitamin C quackery, about which he published papers in PNAS back in the 1970s. Back then, members of the Academy could contribute papers to PNAS as they saw fit and in essence hand pick their reviewers. Indeed, until recently, the only way that non-members could have papers published in PNAS was if a member of the Academy agreed to submit their manuscript for them, then known as “communicating” it—apparently these days known as “editing” it—and, in fact, members were supposed to take the responsibility for having such papers reviewed before “communicating them” to PNAS. Thus, in essence a member of the Academy could get nearly anything he or she wished published in PNAS, whether written by herself or a friend. Normally, this ability wasn’t such a big problem for quality, because getting into the NAS was (and is still) so incredibly difficult and only the most prestigious scientists are invited to join. Consequently, PNAS is still a prestigious journal with a high impact factor, and most of its papers are of high quality. Scientists know, however, that sometimes Academy members used to use it as a “dumping ground” to publish some of their leftover findings. They also know that on occasion, when rare members fall for dubious science, as Pauling did, they could “communicate” their questionable findings and get them published in PNAS unless they’re so outrageously ridiculous that even the deferential editorial board can’t stomach publishing them.
These days, submission requirements for PNAS are more rigorous. The standard mode is now called Direct Submission, which is still not like that for any other journal in that authors “must recommend three appropriate Editorial Board members, three NAS members who are expert in the paper’s scientific area, and five qualified reviewers.” Not very many authors are likely to be able to achieve this. I doubt I could, and I know an NAS member who’s even a cancer researcher; I’m just not sure I would want to impose on him to handle one of my manuscripts. Now, apparently, what used to be “contributed by” is referred to as submissions through “prearranged editors” (PE). A prearranged editor must be a member of the NAS:
Prior to submission to PNAS, an author may ask an NAS member to oversee the review process of a Direct Submission. PEs should be used only when an article falls into an area without broad representation in the Academy, or for research that may be considered counter to a prevailing view or too far ahead of its time to receive a fair hearing, and in which the member is expert. If the NAS member agrees, the author should coordinate submission to ensure that the member is available, and should alert the member that he or she will be contacted by the PNAS Office within 3 days of submission to confirm his or her willingness to serve as a PE and to comment on the importance of the work.
According to Dr. Fiske, there are only “a half dozen or so social psychologists” in the NAS out of over 2,000 members. Assuming Dr. Fiske’s estimate is accurate, my first guess was that this manuscript was submitted with Dr. Fiske as a prearranged editor because there is not broad representation in the NAS of the relevant specialty. Why that is, is a question for another day, but apparently it is. Oddly enough, however, my first guess was wrong. This paper was a Direct Submission, as stated at the bottom of the article itself. Be that as it may, I remain quite shocked that PNAS doesn’t, as virtually all journals that publish any human subjects research, explicitly require authors to state that they had IRB approval for their research. Some even require proof of IRB approval before they will publish. Actually, in this, PNAS clearly failed to enforce its own requirements, which require that:
    • Authors must include in the Methods section a brief statement identifying the institutional and/or licensing committee approving the experiments, and
    • All experiments must have been conducted according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki
The authors did neither.
While it is true that Facebook itself is not bound by the federal Common Rule that requires IRB approval for human subjects research because it is a private company that does not receive federal grant funding and was not, as pharmaceutical and device companies do, performing the research for an application for FDA approval, the other two coauthors were faculty at universities that do receive a lot of federal funding and are therefore bound by the Common Rule. So it’s a really glaring issue that, not only is there no statement of approval from Cornell’s IRB from Jeffrey T. Hancock, but there is also no statement from Jamie Guillory that there was IRB approval from UCSF’s IRB. If there’s one thing I’ve learned in human subject ethics training at every university where I’ve had to take it, it’s that there must be IRB approval from every university with faculty involved in a study.
IRB approval or no IRB approval, the federal Common Rule has several requirements for informed consent in a checklist. Some key requirements include:
    • A statement that the study involves research
    • An explanation of the purposes of the research
    • The expected duration of the subject’s participation
    • A description of the procedures to be followed
    • Identification of any procedures which are experimental
    • A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject
    • A description of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably be expected from the research
    • A statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained
    • A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits, to which the subject is otherwise entitled
The Facebook Terms of Use and Data Use Policy contain none of these elements. None. Zero. Nada. Zip. They do not constitute proper informed consent. Period. The Cornell and/or UCSF IRB clearly screwed up here. Specifically, it screwed up by concluding that the researchers had proper informed consent. The concept that clicking on an “Accept” button for Facebook’s Data Use Policy constitutes anything resembling informed consent for a psychology experiment is risible—yes, risible. Here’s the relevant part of the Facebook Data Use Policy. Among the other expected functions, there are the usual uses of your personal data that you might expect, such as measuring the effectiveness of ads and delivering relevant ads to you, making friend suggestions, and to protect Facebook’s or others’ rights and property. However, at the very end of the list is this little bit, where Facebook asserts its right to use your personal data “for internal operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, research and service improvement.”
Now, I realize that in the social sciences, depending on the intervention being tested, “informed consent” standards might be less rigorous, and there are examples where it is thought that IRBs have overreached in asserting their hegemony over the social sciences, a concern that dates back several years. What Facebook has is not “informed consent,” anyway. As has been pointed out, this is not how even social scientists define informed consent, and it’s certainly nowhere near how medical researchers define informed consent. Rather, as Will over at Skepchick points out correctly, the Facebook Data Use Policy is more like a general consent than informed consent, similar to the sort of consent form a patient signs before being admitted to the hospital:
Or, if we want to look at biomedical research, which is the kind of research that inspired the Belmont Report, Facebook’s policy is analogous to going to a hospital, signing a form that says any data collected about your stay could be used to help improve hospital services, and then unknowingly participating in a research project where psychiatrists are intentionally pissing off everyone around you to see if you also get pissed off, and then publishing their findings in a scientific journal rather than using it to improve services. Do you feel that you were informed about being experimented on by signing that form?
That’s exactly why “consents to treat” or “consents for admission to the hospital” are not consents for biomedical research. There are minor exceptions. For instance, some consents for surgery include consent to use any tissue removed for research.
In fairness, it must be acknowledged that there are criteria under which certain elements of informed consent can be waived by an IRB. The relevant standard comes from §46.116 and requires that:
    • D: 1. The research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects;
    • D: 2. The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects;
    • D: 3. The research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration; and
    • D: 4. Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information after participation.
Here’s where we get into gray areas. Remember, all of these conditions have to apply before a waiver of informed consent can occur, and clearly all of them do not. D1, for instance, is likely true of this research, although from my perspective D2 is arguable at best, particularly if you believe that users of a commercial company’s service should have the right to know what is being done with their information. D3 is arguable either way. For example, it’s not hard to imagine sending out a consent to all Facebook users, and, given that Facebook has over a billion users, it’s not unlikely that hundreds of thousands would say yes. In contrast, D4 appears not to have been honored. There’s no reason Facebook couldn’t have informed the actual users who were monitored after the study was over what had been done. Even if one could agree that conditions D1-3 were already met, the IRB should have insisted on D4, because there’s no reason to suspect that doing so would have been inappropriate in the sense of altering the outcome of the experiment. No matter how you slice it, there was a serious problem with the informed consent for this study on multiple levels.
Even Susan Fiske admits that she was “creeped out” by the study. To me, that’s a pretty good indication that something’s not ethically right; yet she edited it and facilitated its publication in PNAS anyway. She also doesn’t understand the Common Rule:
“A lot of the regulation of research ethics hinges on government supported research, and of course Facebook’s research is not government supported, so they’re not obligated by any laws or regulations to abide by the standards,” she said. “But I have to say that many universities and research institutions and even for-profit companies use the Common Rule as a guideline anyway. It’s voluntary. You could imagine if you were a drug company, you’d want to be able to say you’d done the research ethically because the backlash would be just huge otherwise.”
No, no, no, no! The reason drug companies follow the Common Rule is because the FDA requires them to. Data from research not done according to the Common Rule can’t be used to support an application to the FDA to approve a drug. It’s also not voluntary for faculty at universities that receive federal research grant funding if those universities have signed on to the Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects (as Cornell has done and UCSF appears to have done), as I pointed out when I criticized Dr. Mehmet Oz’s made-for-TV green coffee bean extract study. Nor should it be, and I am unaware of a major university that has refused to agree to “check the box” in the FWA promising that all its human subjects research will be subject to the Common Rule, which makes me wonder how truly “voluntary” it is to agree to be bound by the Common Rule. Moreover, as I was finishing this post, I learned that the study actually did receive some federal funding through the Army Research Office, as described in the Cornell University press release. [NOTE ADDENDUM ADDED 6/30/2014.] IRB approval was definitely required. I note that I couldn’t find any mention of such funding in the manuscript itself.
The study itself
The basic finding of the study, namely that people alter their emotions and moods based upon the presence or absence of other people’s positive (and negative) moods, as expressed on Facebook status updates, is nothing revolutionary. It’s about as much a, “Well, duh!” finding as I can imagine. The researchers themselves referred to this effect an “emotional contagion,” because their conclusion was that Facebook friends’ words that users see on their Facebook news feed directly affected the users’ moods. But is the effect significant, and does the research support the conclusion? The researchers’ methods were described thusly in the study:
The experiment manipulated the extent to which people (N = 689,003) were exposed to emotional expressions in their News Feed. This tested whether exposure to emotions led people to change their own posting behaviors, in particular whether exposure to emotional content led people to post content that was consistent with the exposure—thereby testing whether exposure to verbal affective expressions leads to similar verbal expressions, a form of emotional contagion. People who viewed Facebook in English were qualified for selection into the experiment. Two parallel experiments were conducted for positive and negative emotion: One in which exposure to friends’ positive emotional content in their News Feed was reduced, and one in which exposure to negative emotional content in their News Feed was reduced. In these conditions, when a person loaded their News Feed, posts that contained emotional content of the relevant emotional valence, each emotional post had between a 10% and 90% chance (based on their User ID) of being omitted from their News Feed for that specific viewing. It is important to note that this content was always available by viewing a friend’s content directly by going to that friend’s “wall” or “timeline,” rather than via the News Feed. Further, the omitted content may have appeared on prior or subsequent views of the News Feed. Finally, the experiment did not affect any direct messages sent from one user to another.
And:
For each experiment, two dependent variables were examined pertaining to emotionality expressed in people’s own status updates: the percentage of all words produced by a given person that was either positive or negative during the experimental period (as in ref. 7). In total, over 3 million posts were analyzed, containing over 122 million words, 4 million of which were positive (3.6%) and 1.8 million negative (1.6%).
The results were summed up in a single deceptive chart. Why do I call the chart deceptive? Easy, because charts were done in such a way as to make the effect look much larger by starting the y-axis at 5.0 in the graph that shows a difference between around 5.3 and 5.25 and starting it at 1.5 for a graph that showed a difference between 1.75 and maybe 1.73. See what I mean by looking at Figure 1:
This is another thing the authors did that I can’t believe Dr. Fiske and PNAS let them get away with, as messing with where the y-axis of a graph starts in order to make a tiny effect look bigger is one of the most obvious tricks there is. In this case, given how tiny the effect is, even if it was a statistically significant effect, it’s highly unlikely to be what we call a clinically significant effect.
But are these valid measures? John M. Grohol of PsychCentral was unimpressed, pointing out that the tool that the researchers used to analyze the text was not designed for short snippets of text, asking snarkily, “Why would researchers use a tool not designed for short snippets of text to, well… analyze short snippets of text?” and concluding that it was because the tool chosen, the LIWC, is one of the few tools that can process large amounts of text rapidly. He then went on to describe why it’s a poor tool to apply to a Tweet or a brief Facebook status update:
Length matters because the tool actually isn’t very good at analyzing text in the manner that Twitter and Facebook researchers have tasked it with. When you ask it to analyze positive or negative sentiment of a text, it simply counts negative and positive words within the text under study. For an article, essay or blog entry, this is fine — it’s going to give you a pretty accurate overall summary analysis of the article since most articles are more than 400 or 500 words long.
For a tweet or status update, however, this is a horrible analysis tool to use. That’s because it wasn’t designed to differentiate — and in fact, can’t differentiate — a negation word in a sentence.
Let’s look at two hypothetical examples of why this is important. Here are two sample tweets (or status updates) that are not uncommon:
“I am not happy.”“I am not having a great day.”
An independent rater or judge would rate these two tweets as negative — they’re clearly expressing a negative emotion. That would be +2 on the negative scale, and 0 on the positive scale.
But the LIWC 2007 tool doesn’t see it that way. Instead, it would rate these two tweets as scoring +2 for positive (because of the words “great” and “happy”) and +2 for negative (because of the word “not” in both texts).
That’s a huge difference if you’re interested in unbiased and accurate data collection and analysis.
Indeed it is. So not only was this research of questionable ethics, it wasn’t even particularly good research. I tend to agree with Dr. Gohol that most likely these results represent nothing more than “statistical blips.” The authors even admit that the effects are tiny. Yet none of that stops them from concluding that their “results indicate that emotions expressed by others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via social networks.” Never mind that they never measured a single person’s emotions or mood states.
“Research” to sell you stuff
Even after the firestorm that erupted this weekend, Facebook unfortunately still doesn’t seem to “get it”, as is evident from its response to the media firestorm yesterday:
This research was conducted for a single week in 2012 and none of the data used was associated with a specific person’s Facebook account,” says a Facebook spokesperson. “We do research to improve our services and to make the content people see on Facebook as relevant and engaging as possible. A big part of this is understanding how people respond to different types of content, whether it’s positive or negative in tone, news from friends, or information from pages they follow. We carefully consider what research we do and have a strong internal review process. There is no unnecessary collection of people’s data in connection with these research initiatives and all data is stored securely.
This is about as tone deaf and clueless a response as I could have expected. Clearly, it was not a researcher, but a corporate drone who wrote the response. Even so, he or she might have had a point if the study were strictly observational. But it wasn’t. It was an experimental study; i.e., an interventional study. An intervention was made directed at one group as compared to a control group, and the effects measured. That the investigators used a poor tool to measure such effects doesn’t change the fact that this was an experimental study, and, quite rightly, the bar for consent and ethical approval is higher for experimental studies. Facebook failed in that and still doesn’t get it. As Kashmir Hill put it, while many users may already expect and be willing to have their behavior studied, they don’t expect that Facebook will actively manipulate their environment in order to see how they react. On the other hand, Facebook has clearly been doing just that for years. Remember, its primary goal is to get you to pay attention to the ads it sells, so that it can make money.
Finally, there is one final “out” that Facebook might claim by lumping its “research” and “service improvement” together. In medicine, quality improvement initiatives are not considered “research” per se and do not require IRB approval. I’m referring to initiatives, for instance, to measure surgical site infections and look for situations or markers that predict them, the purpose being to reduce the rate of such infections by intervening to correct the issues discovered. I myself am heavily involved in just such a collaborative to examine various factors, most critically adherence to evidence-based guidelines, as an indicator of quality.
Facebook might try to claim that its “research” was in reality for “service” improvement, but if that’s the case that would be just as disturbing. Think about it. What “service” is Facebook “improving” through this research? The answer is obvious: Its ability to manipulate the emotions of its users in order to better sell them stuff. Don’t believe me? Here’s what Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook’s chief operations officer, said recently:
Our goal is that every time you open News Feed, every time you look at Facebook, you see something, whether it’s from consumers or whether it’s from marketers, that really delights you, that you are genuinely happy to see.
As if that’s not enough, here it is, from the horse’s mouth, that of Adam Kramer, corresponding author:
Q: Why did you join Facebook?A: Facebook data constitutes the largest field study in the history of the world. Being able to ask–and answer–questions about the world in general is very, very exciting to me. At Facebook, my research is also immediately useful: When I discover something, we can use this to make improvements to the product. In an academic position, I would have to have a paper accepted, wait for publication, and then hope someone with the means to usefully implement my work takes notice. At Facebook, I just message someone on the right team and my research has an impact within weeks if not days.
I don’t think it can be said much clearer than that.
As tempting of a resource as Facebook’s huge amounts of data might be to social scientists interested in studying online social networks, social scientists need to remember that Facebook’s primary goal is to sell advertising, and therefore any collaboration they strike up with Facebook information scientists will be designed to help Facebook accomplish that goal. That might make it legal for Facebook to dodge human subjects protection guidelines, but it certainly doesn’t make it ethical. That’s why social scientists must take extra care to make sure any research using Facebook data is more than above board in terms of ethical approval and oversight, because Facebook has no incentive to do so and doesn’t even seem to understand why its research failed from an ethical standpoint. Jamie Guillory, Jeffrey Hancock, and Susan Fiske failed to realize this and have reaped the whirlwind.
ADDENDUM: Whoa. Now Cornell University is claiming that the study received no external funding and has tacked an addendum onto its original press release about the study.
Also, as reported here and elsewhere, Susan Fiske is now saying that the investigators had Cornell IRB approval for using a “preexisting data set”:
I just heard back from the Facebook study editor on the question of whether researchers used an IRB. pic.twitter.com/kCoEp1LNJ8
— Adrienne LaFrance (@AdrienneLaF) June 30, 2014
Also, yesterday after I had finished writing this post, Adam D. I. Kramer published a statement, which basically confirms that Facebook was trying to manipulate emotions and in which he apologized, although it sure sounds like a “notpology” to me.
Finally, we really do appear to be dealing with a culture clash between tech and people who do human subjects research, as described well here:
Academic researchers are brought up in an academic culture with certain practices and values. Early on they learn about the ugliness of unchecked human experimentation. They are socialized into caring deeply for the well-being of their research participants. They learn that a “scientific experiment” must involve an IRB review and informed consent. So when the Facebook study was published by academic researchers in an academic journal (the PNAS) and named an “experiment”, for academic researchers, the study falls in the “scientific experiment” bucket, and is therefore to be evaluated by the ethical standards they learned in academia.
Not so for everyday Internet users and Internet company employees without an academic research background. To them, the bucket of situations the Facebook study falls into is “online social networks”, specifically “targeted advertising” and/or “interface A/B testing”. These practices come with their own expectations and norms in their respective communities of practice and the public at large, which are different from those of the “scientific experiment” frame in academic communities. Presumably, because they are so young, they also come with much less clearly defined and institutionalized norms. Tweaking the algorithm of what your news feed shows is an accepted standard operating procedure in targeted advertising and A/B testing.
This, I think, accounts for the conflict between the techies, who shrug their shoulders and say, NBD, and medical researchers like me who are appalled by this experiment.

Is Homeopathy Unethical?
Harriet Hall on August 4, 2015
Link

“A gentle ethical defence of homeopathy” by Levy et al. was recently published in an ethics journal. A full-text preprint is available online. They say:
Utilitarian critiques of homeopathy that are founded on unsophisticated notions of evidence, that adopt narrow perspectives on healthcare assessment, and that overstate the personal, social and ontological harms of homeopathy, add little to our understanding of the epistemology of medicine. But when they are used to denounce the ethics of homeopathy – they are not only ill-considered and counterproductive, but philosophically and socially perverse.
I found their arguments unconvincing.
They acknowledge that the evidence base for homeopathy is “insufficient” and its “efficacy cannot be broadly demonstrated.” Proponents have argued that homeopathy has utilities such as non-invasiveness, cost-effectiveness, holism and agent autonomy. Critics have argued that any benefits are minimal compared to negative features like failure to seek effective healthcare, waste of resources, promulgation of false beliefs, and a weakening of commitment to scientific medicine. Others have argued that homeopathy does not and cannot work except through contextual (“placebo”) effects, and that homeopaths are unethical because they deceive their patients by claiming specific effects.
And homeopathy is ethical because…?
Levy et al. argue that homeopathy is ethical because:
    • It offers significant value and benefits to patients [based on reports of patient satisfaction rather than on any objective measurements of outcomes. Translation: patients say they like it. Argument from popularity.]
    • It facilitates a diagnostic process that culminates in treatment or referral. [I don’t see how that claim could be substantiated. Homeopathic diagnosis is based on mythical miasms, homeopathic treatments are based on principles that are not valid, and they present no evidence that homeopaths give appropriate referrals to other providers or that they can even recognize conditions that would warrant referrals. How many of them even use a stethoscope?]
    • It is founded on a caring, therapeutic relationship between the clinician and patient. [True, but that is true of all good science-based clinicians too, and of charlatans, and of medieval blood-letters. That doesn’t mean it is ethical to use any random snake oil or to perform bloodletting to balance the humors. A caring relationship isn’t worth much by itself unless it is accompanied by an effective treatment.]
    • It is guided by the freedom of choice of consenting patients [essentially the old autonomy/health freedom argument. I would argue that patients can’t choose freely and rationally unless they are aware of all the pertinent facts and able to give truly informed consent].
Most of their claims refer to treatment by a homeopath. There is no diagnostic process or caring relationship involved in over-the-counter sales of homeopathic remedies to self-diagnosed customers in pharmacies.
Tu quoque and other fallacies
They argue that placebo or contextual effects of treatment are not valueless or irrelevant, and they are not equivalent across all healthcare contexts. They say homeopathy privileges time, listening, and therapeutic relationships, while conventional medical practice is systematically unable to attend to these domains of care and so to manifest these benefits. To my mind, that is not an argument for homeopathy but an argument for reducing time constraints and improving bedside manner in conventional medicine.They downplay homeopathic deaths and failures to refer, claiming that conventional medicine commits the same sins, and that many thousands of patients die each year from medical errors and adverse events. This is the old tu quoque and “death by medicine” fallacy. Examination of harms mustn’t be separated from examination of benefits, and the subjective benefits of patient satisfaction with homeopathy can’t begin to compete with the objective benefits of science-based treatments.
They argue that homeopaths are guided by both moral and professional virtues in their practice. I’m willing to accept that most homeopaths truly believe in the efficacy of their treatments and believe they are doing what’s best for their patients. But is belief enough?
They argue that conventional doctors often mislead patients too, and overstate their claims of efficacy. They say “the absence of evidence may not mean that the therapy does not work,” and that many mainstream health practices are not based on definitive evidence. Clearly, it is unethical for anyone to mislead patients by making claims that go beyond the evidence. But don’t essentially all the claims of homeopaths go beyond the evidence?
Autonomy, experience, anything but evidence
They argue that the choice to seek care from a homeopath can be just as valid and as ethically sound as any other healthcare choice. But can the choice be truly valid if it is based on a misunderstanding? They decry paternalism, but is it paternalistic to assist others in identifying misinformation from biased sources so they can give truly informed consent? I don’t see paternalism there; I see true autonomy and respect.
Finally, they want to re-define “evidence” to suit their own purposes, to include nebulous things like “values,” personal experience, and patient satisfaction.
Conclusion
In my opinion their arguments are fallacious and amount to a kind of tortured special pleading. They don’t even try to answer the criticisms of homeopathy that they list. They offer no evidence from controlled studies, only vague platitudes. They say it is non-invasive and cost effective; but how can it be cost effective if it isn’t effective?
It is unethical for any health care provider to lie to patients or to go beyond the evidence in representing the efficacy of their treatments. If homeopaths truly believe what they tell patients, they are not deliberately lying and so may be considered to be acting ethically. But it could be argued that it is unethical to withhold pertinent information, to not fully inform patients about how mainstream science views homeopathy, and about its incompatibility with the established body of scientific knowledge. And surely it is unethical for those who understand that homeopathic remedies have no specific effects to recommend them without full disclosure. For instance, I consider it unethical for pharmacists to put Oscillococcinum on the same shelf as Tylenol, Advil, and FDA-approved cold remedies.
Finally, the real question is whether a homeopath has anything to offer that couldn’t be better provided by the kind of science-based clinician who truly cares for the whole patient and knows how to take best advantage of the contextual effects of the therapeutic encounter. In my opinion, the answer to that question is a resounding “NO.” Science-based medicine is clearly more effective than homeopathic remedies; isn’t it unethical to provide second-rate treatment?

Is the use of “Open-Label” Placebo Ethical in the Treatment of Children?
Is the use of “open-label” placebo ethical in pediatric medical care, or any care for that matter? A recent article in Pediatrics discussing this issue comes to a flawed conclusion based on a misunderstanding of placebo and of the literature on placebo without deception.
Clay Jones on August 25, 2017
Link

I was delighted to find an article on the ethics of “open-label” placebo use in the pediatric population in the August issue of Pediatrics, particularly one partially penned by Arthur Caplan and Perri Klass. The primary author, however, appears to be Brit Trogen, a medical anthropologist currently studying medicine at NYU School of Medicine with an accomplished background in science journalism. Sadly I was more than a bit disappointed in their discussion of the subject, as it revealed a poor understanding of placebo, making the common mistake of confusing what we see in clinical trials with real world practice. But it wasn’t all bad.
The concept of placebo comes up frequently in discussions of both science-based medical practice and the seemingly infinite array of pseudomedical approaches to healthcare we write about here on SBM, and there is certainly some room for disagreement between reasonable people. Trogen, Caplan, and Klass make this clear, and they accurately point out some of the potential pitfalls of incorporating “open-label” placebo into pediatric treatment protocols. But they give placebo effects too much credit in my opinion, and rely too heavily on studies performed by Ted Kaptchuk, who frequently proselytizes the existence of “placebo without deception” based on studies that use deception.
I’ll run through the main points made by the authors since most readers will be unable to access the full article.
They start with a general description of what a classic placebo response is:
Placebos (sham treatments such as sugar pills or saline injections) are thought to elicit improvements in clinical outcomes by mimicking medical therapies, thereby improving patients’ expectations of getting better
This is overly simplistic.
Later in the article they add a bit more nuance:
The term “placebo effect” is often used colloquially to describe a small, confounding, or insignificant response. In both child and adult populations, however, placebos can reduce the frequency and severity of disease symptoms in patients at a level on par with many pharmacologically active drugs.
And this is extremely misleading.
Placebo in the context of a clinical trial is a combination of many factors, such as regression to the mean and the natural course of subjective complaints, and largely an artifact of the way we run clinical trials and measure outcomes. Patients in the placebo arm of a trial may appear to have symptom reduction on par with the treatment group, but it’s mostly an illusion. Patient expectation likely plays a very small role and, when it is compared to patients in a “no treatment” group, often doesn’t amount to much at all. In fact, the longstanding belief in the existence of a significant true placebo effect in clinical trials is based on some highly dubious research.
Placebo in clinical trials doesn’t result in the improvement of objective outcomes. Patients may subjectively believe that their pain, which is where there is the most potential for actual clinically meaningful benefit, is improved but they won’t have much in the way of improved function. I’m not saying that there might not be a role for improved patient perception in certain circumstances, but this can be achieved without sacrificing patient autonomy or parent authority.
The authors even mention this fact:
While the placebo effect plays a role in virtually every clinical intervention, the use of placebos as stand-alone treatments within medicine has largely been discouraged due to concerns about patient deception.
A deception that is unethical in my opinion. Unfortunately they follow this statement with the increasingly common narrative of the “placebo without deception”, or “open-label” placebo. They claim that these “concerns have been addressed” by research over the past decade, research primarily belonging to Harvard’s Ted Kaptchuk, who is trotted out whenever NPR or some other news organization wants a comment on how magical placebo can be. They describe “open-label” placebo as a “powerful new methodology” that involves full transparency and patient awareness, in the same breath as they admit that patients are lied to:
Patients also are told, however, that such placebos have been found to produce benefits in individuals with their condition, preserving positive patient expectations.
They claim that “open-label” placebo has been determined to be consistent with the ethical principles of informed consent and patient autonomy. This determination was made by, you guessed it, Ted Kaptchuk. So the man whose focus in life appears to be the justification of incorporating placebo into clinical practice agrees with himself.
I found the following claim very interesting:
Although studies of open-label placebos in pediatrics are scarce, reviews and meta-analyses generally find that children have higher placebo-response rates than adults, suggesting pediatric populations may benefit at least as much, and perhaps more, from attempts to implement placebo treatments into clinical practice.
I would have assumed that this would be the case. Remember that these responses are seen only in subjective outcomes. It makes sense to me that there would be higher risk of study artifacts resulting in the perception of improvement in kids, who are also more amenable to improvement with distraction/TLC. And there might be added artifact because of the necessity of parental assessment of outcomes. And higher placebo response in clinical trials does not automatically mean that they would have clinically meaningful responses outside of the context of a trial.
Remember that this is supposed to be an unbiased assessment of the ethics of “open-label” placebo in pediatric care when you read the following statement:
Based on these considerations, the a priori prohibition of placebos from clinical practice may deprive patients of a potentially effective mode of treatment, while simultaneously exposing them to the heightened side effects, uncertain efficacy, and higher financial costs associated with pharmacologically active medications.
This bold claim, and some blatant fearmongering about prescribing drugs “off-label” in children, is supported by a pilot study on “open-label” placebo in children with ADHD. The results weren’t impressive and it only involved 26 kids and a 2 week observation period. I don’t think it’s fair to make any causal claims, especially regarding ethical considerations, even if the parents in the study were big fans of placebo. I don’t think they would have signed their child up for the trial if they weren’t.
Now the good parts.
When it comes to potential problems with the use of “open-label” placebo, the authors do much better. After claiming that the “functional mechanism” of placebo is poorly understood and a rather silly mention of possible “nocebo effects” that is. I agree with them, however, when they raise the concern that increased use of placebo, deceptive or not, might add to the common belief that all complaints require a medical or pharmaceutical treatment of some kind. We might condition even more parents to seek medical care for minor pediatric complaints that are self-limited and benign.
They also raise the concern that widespread use of “open-label” placebo might interfere with the establishment of trusting relationships between patients and their medical providers, particularly if done in a haphazard fashion. It might be interpreted by some as an implication that the complaint is all in the patient or parent’s head. It may seem as if the doctor is giving up.
They absolutely nail the final potential problem with this approach, so much so that I’ll just quote the entire paragraph because I couldn’t put it better myself:
More concerning is the possibility that placebo use could lead patients to develop false or misguided beliefs either about the placebo compound itself or the concept of “mind-body healing” overall. It is possible that patients and/or parents could equate the benefits they receive from placebos with a legitimization of other forms of so-called alternative medicines, or develop the inaccurate belief that “positive thinking” is sufficient to cure all manner of serious illnesses, forgoing proven treatments. Similarly, on learning of the benefits of placebos from their physician (or, just as likely, from the Internet or by word of mouth), individuals could feasibly attempt to “self-prescribe” inert substances to themselves or their children to lessen their use of other medications. Particularly in situations in which drug dosages must be maintained above critical levels over time, such as for antiseizure or hypothyroid medications, independent and unsupervised attempts to cut back or eliminate drug dosages could pose a serious health risk.
Other than the whole, “lying to patients is unethical” issue, that right there is my biggest fear. Practitioners of various forms of irregular medicine who truly believe in their own implausible nonsense have denied that their treatments rely on the various placebo effects historically. But as scientific evidence has time and time again proven their magical thinking wrong, many proponents have shifted focus over to placebo. In particular, many so-called integrative medicine providers working in academic settings, as well as folks like Ted Kaptchuk, not only want us to believe in placebo, they need us to believe in placebo without deception.
Conclusion: A mixture of good and bad
Trogan, Caplan, and Klass don’t appear to have a good grasp of the concept of placebo effects, but they ultimately do not endorse the widespread implementation of “open-label” placebo in pediatric medical practice. They do suggest a “possible limited role” instead, and one that is “closely monitored.” And, naturally, more research to better sort this out. In my opinion, the available research does not support claims that placebo has clinically meaningful benefits outside of what can be achieved through good science-based care, or that “placebo without deception” even exists.

   Does alternative medicine have alternative ethics?
Peter Lipson
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Kimball Atwood has an interesting series of posts on the ethics of alternative medicine which I strongly encourage you to read. He does a great job examining the ethical implications of certain alternative medicine practices, and has a terrific dialog with Peter Moran, a frequent commenter here. At my other online locale, I make frequent forays into the morass of medical ethics, with an emphasis on specific clinical scenarios. Today, though, I’d like to take a step back and examine the nature of medical ethics as they apply to so-called alternative medicine.
First, and perhaps most important, I am not an ethicist. I do not have the depth of reading, the knowledge of terminology, or the specific education to lead a formal discussion on ethics. What I am is a practicing internist, who must make ethical decisions on a daily basis. Most of these decisions are of necessity made “from the heart”, but it is not infrequent that I must evaluate a situation more formally and fall back on some of the ethical principles of my profession.
Ethics are not static. They are not a divine gift bestowed on each of us as we don our white coats. They are a living part of our specific cultures, and of the profession we serve. Some of the modern principles of medical ethics are newer than others. Beneficence, non-maleficence, and confidentiality are ancient principles of medical ethics, which continue to be relevant today. Patient autonomy is a more recent value, reflecting a shift in how society views the relationship between patient and physician. These ethics must be mutable, as the profession itself is ever-changing. Despite this fluidity, there is an identifiable line of “doctor-hood” that has existed for at least the last century, and the members of this guild have always tried to adhere to some type of code of behavior.
Alternative medicine poses real challenges to the principle of medical ethics. First, we’ll discuss who, in fact, is bound by these principles, then the way in which alternative medicine is or is not compatible with medical ethics.
Who is a physician?
The identity of “physician” in North America is generally understood as referring to someone who has completed medical school, other requisite training, and is practicing medicine. In other cultures, there are other types of healers (such as curanderos) and how our ethics may apply to them is unclear.
What about people who present themselves as doctors, but do not practice the science-based medicine that we teach and practice? They may have an M.D. or D.O. degree, they may even be board-certified, but if they are practicing outside of the standard of care, are they still bound by the same system of ethics as their more traditional colleagues?
Absolutely. Anyone who presents themselves as a doctor must behave in a way concordant with medical ethics. A patient seeking help should expect the same ethical treatment from all practitioners. No doctor is exempt from our ethical principles.
What about a doctor who believes in the implausible medical claims that they practice? Since they believe that they are helping the patient, aren’t they behaving ethically?
If intention were the only principle of medical ethics, well, sure. But good intentions do not excuse incompetence, and one of our responsibilities as physicians is to strive for excellence in our knowledge and practice. This means maintaining our science-based education.
What about non-physicians who offer quasi-medical services? Professionals such as nurse practitioners have their own codes of ethics, but often enough non-professionals such as homeopaths, acupuncturists, and others present themselves as healers. Patients have a responsibility to educate themselves and protect themselves from harm, but people who are suffering are vulnerable, and non-professional healers take advantage of this vulnerability. While they are not bound by the same medical ethics that I am, they are bound by the same ethical principles that all of us are as members of a larger society. As a society, we generally frown upon folks pretending to be experts and futzing around with people’s health and hopes. We only tolerate “alternative healers” because their deceptions extend beyond their victims—we sometimes believe they are doing good, even if they are not.
Alternative medicine is prima facie unethical
To the extent that alternative practitioners are bound by medical ethics, alternative medicine is unethical. It violates most of the commonly agreed-upon precepts of our profession. Medicine is based on the humane application of science-based practices. Standards of care are based on either what has been shown to work, or when insufficient data is available, what we as a profession agree is likely to work. There are written resources that any doctor can look up in minutes. Altmed practitioners don’t “slip” away from real medicine, they intentionally turn away from it, sometimes with good intentions, sometimes not. So-called alternative medicine practices are ethical failures on many levels. As to the principle of beneficence, the most benefit they may offer is emotional comfort, something real medicine could just as easily offer. When it comes to non-maleficence, it fails miserably, in that it often deprives patients of real treatments, or subjects them to ineffective ones.
When it comes to patient autonomy and truthfulness, however, it really hits a wall. For a patient to exercise autonomy, they must be as informed as possible. If an altmed practitioner were to truthfully inform patients that the wares they are peddling have never been shown to be useful, are shunned by real doctors, and may in fact harm, patients would knock each other down to get out the door. But they don’t. When they do give lip service to the unproven nature of their practices, it is always with a wink and a spiteful nod to those silly non-believers at the hospital.
Even the most heartfelt modern shaman is an unethical sham. Alternative medicine, that is medicine that is outside the embrace of science-based practice, is inherently unethical, and it’s time to call it what it is—a blight on our profession, and so far as we tolerate it, a blight on us all.
Ethics resources 
The American Medical Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics
The Charter on Medical Professionalism
Ethics at University of California San Francisco

Followup: Benedetti on Placebo Ethics
Harriet Hall on June 19, 2012
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A few months ago I wrote about Fabrizio Benedetti’s research on the neurobiology of the placebo response, and a discussion about placebos and ethics ensued in the comments. Now Dr. Benedetti has written about that issue in a “Perspective” article in the journal World Psychiatry, “The placebo response: science versus ethics and the vulnerability of the patient.”
We have learned that verbal suggestions can activate neurotransmitters and modulate pain perceptions, and positive expectations can activate endogenous opioid and cannabinoid systems. A complex mental activity has objective effects on body physiology. Words and drugs can activate the same mechanisms. Drugs are less effective without therapeutic rituals. We are delving deep into human foibles and vulnerable traits at the center of human interactions. What implications do these insights into mind-body interactions have for patient care?
Things used to be simpler. Placebos are inert by definition. Prescribing an inert treatment constituted lying to a patient, implying that it would have a specific effect when the provider knew it would not. It might fool the patient into thinking he felt better, but it would not actually improve the course of illness, and it involved deception. Prescribing placebos was unethical, period. 
But now we are learning that while the placebo itself is inert, the act of giving a placebo is not: it can produce actual physiological effects through suggestion and expectation. So is it legitimate to prescribe sugar pills or lie to patients if we know it can produce objective health benefits? What was once black and white has now become a gray area.
Another question arises: how can we apply this knowledge to mainstream medicine? When we prescribe drugs, should we be using rituals and words to ensure that they are maximally effective? What limitations or guidelines might govern that practice?
Benedetti says:
If a syringe filled with distilled water and handled by a doctor may induce expectations of benefit, then the same expectations can be induced by talismans, mascots and bizarre rituals carried out by quacks and shamans…Deception is at the very heart of a placebo procedure, and indeed it makes no difference if this deception comes from a doctor or a quack or a shaman.
New knowledge about neurophysiology is being used to justify using any procedure that increases expectations and beliefs, no matter where it comes from. This is worrisome, to say the least. CAM and quackery are trying to exploit this new knowledge in ways that tend to throw medicine back to its pre-scientific days. Acupuncturists who have acknowledged that their procedures are no better than placebo have argued that we ought to use them anyway, since placebos really do work to make patients feel better. Manufacturers of bogus health products have argued in court that they know their products can only have placebo effects but placebo effects help people and they have to lie in their advertising in order to elicit those placebo benefits. What if this line of reasoning were carried over to pharmaceutical research? If a new drug fails in clinical trials, might the manufacturer try to justify marketing it anyway for the placebo effect?
My personal opinion is that lying to patients or misrepresenting the state of the evidence in any way is always unethical and must be scrupulously avoided. Telling the patient that what you are prescribing is a placebo wouldn’t excuse you, because the very fact that you are giving it has persuasive meaning for the patient. I think attempts to elicit a placebo effect should be only used in conjunction with an effective treatment. Words should be used carefully, and the focus should be on general measures that bolster the doctor/patient relationship and enhance the patient’s trust, like spending more time with the patient and showing a greater interest and sympathy.
We face two major challenges. First, we need to improve the ways in which we communicate the results of placebo research so the public won’t think we are willy-nilly recommending placebo deceptions of any kind in clinical practice. Second, we need to answer some difficult questions about the ethical limits of taking various actions to increase expectations. The answers will not be easy. Let the discussion begin.

Selling complementary and alternative medicine: An business ethics perspective
Is it ethical to sell complementary and alternative medicine? This presentation — by a philosopher and a pharmacist — considers CAM from the perspective of commercial ethics.
Scott Gavura on January 31, 2015
Link

I joined Professor Chris MacDonald at Ryerson University earlier this week to participate in Ryerson’s business ethics speaker series. The topic was CAM:
Is it ethical to market complementary and alternative medicines? Complementary and alternative medicines (CAM) are medical products and services outside the mainstream of medical practice. But they are not just medicines (or supposed medicines) offered and provided for the prevention and treatment of illness. They are also products and services – things offered for sale in the marketplace. Most discussion of the ethics of CAM has focused on bioethical issues – issues having to do with therapeutic value, and the relationship between patients and those purveyors of CAM. This presentation — by a philosopher and a pharmacist — aims instead to consider CAM from the perspective of commercial ethics. That is, we consider the ethics not of prescribing or administering CAM (activities most closely associated with health professionals) but the ethics of selling CAM.
If it’s not embedded above, you can watch the whole presentation on CAM and business ethics with this link.
It was great to see so many public members attend and participate. There was an extended Q&A afterwards, with some very thoughtful audience questions. Outside of blogs like this, and those of CAM critics like Edzard Ernst, the practical ethics of CAM provision are rarely discussed. Watch for more on this topic in the future.

When doctors betray their patients and science-based medicine for money
David Gorski on August 12, 2013
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We spend a lot of time on this blog discussing failures of the medical system. Usually, we such discussions occur in the context of how unscientific practices and even outright quackery have managed to infiltrate what should be science-based medicine (SBM) in the form of so-called “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) or “integrative medicine,” in which the quackery of alternative medicine is “integrated” with SBM. Our attitude towards this practice is, of course, completely in tune with that of fellow SBM blogger Mark Crislip when he so famously wrote, “If you integrate fantasy with reality, you do not instantiate reality. If you mix cow pie with apple pie, it does not make the cow pie taste better; it makes the apple pie worse.” However, as grave a threat to SBM as CAM and integrative medicine are, there is a threat at least as grave here in the U.S. (and, I presume, in many places in the world). It has little or nothing to do directly with CAM, but often CAM practitioners benefit from it. What I am referring to is the utter ineffectiveness of most state medical boards in reining in quackery and bad physician behavior that endangers patients. A recent story about a prominent Detroit area oncologist named Farid Fata, MD, who has been arrested and charged with administering unnecessary chemotherapy and of diagnosing patients with cancer who turned out not to have cancer in order to defraud Medicare, has led me to think that now might be a good time to revisit this issue. Then I heard about an Ohio spine surgeon indicted for performing unnecessary surgeries to defraud insurance companies, and I knew that now is a good time to revisit the issue.
I’ve discussed this issue before with respect to various practitioners over the years. One that comes to mind immediately is Dr. Rolando Arafiles at the Winkler County Memorial Hospital in Kermit, TX. Basically, a CAM-friendly physician was practicing substandard medicine, and two nurses reported him anonymously to the Texas Medical Board. Dr. Arafiles was a business partner with Winkler County Sheriff Robert Roberts, who left no stone unturned to discover who had complained about his good buddy, leading to the prosecution of the two whistleblowing nurses for violation of patient privacy, even though Texas law explicitly said that using patient information to report substandard care is not a violation of patient privacy. The entire medical establishment seemed to be trying to come down on the two brave nurses like the proverbial ton of bricks. Ultimately, the Texas Medical Board did the right thing, but it took a long time, and two responsible nurses who couldn’t bear seeing Dr. Arafiles continue to betray patient trust. There are many other examples, such as that of Dr. Rashid Buttar, a North Carolina doctor known for using “alternative” treatments for autism and cancer who got off with a slap on the wrist for some truly horrendous violations of the standard of care.
And don’t even get me started on the utter failure of the Texas Medical Board to put a stop to Dr. Stanislaw Burzynski’s unethical abuse of clinical trials and use of an unproven cancer drug for over 36 years or on how it took decades to finally put a stop to Dr. Mark Geier’s autism quackery in the United States. So what about these recent cases have in common? It’s that they were both busted by the feds. The relevant state medical boards in Michigan and Ohio (both states in which I hold a medical license) did not detect the medical misadventures and did, as far as I can tell, basically nothing to stop it.
Farid Fata, MD
To all appearances, prior to his arrest and indictment last week, Dr. Farid Fata was a hugely successful oncologist and businessman with impeccable medical credentials. According to his practice’s website, after graduating from Lebanese University in 1992, he went to medical school at Cornell Medical College, did an internal medicine residency at Maimonides Medical Center in Brooklyn, NY, and then completed a medical oncology fellowship at one of the premier cancer centers in the world, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center. In 2005, Dr. Fata founded Michigan Hematology Oncology (MHO), which rapidly grew to seven locations with 60 employees throughout some of the more affluent northern suburbs of Detroit; his hospital affiliations grew to include Crittenton Hospital, Rochester (his main affiliation); St. Joseph Mercy Oakland Hospital, Pontiac; Lapeer Regional Medical Center, Lapeer; Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, Pontiac; and Doctor’s Hospital, Pontiac. In addition, Dr. Fata has published 20 articles indexed on PubMed for which he is primary or co-author and has widely lectured at local hospitals. He’s a member of the usual list of medical organizations, including the American College of Physicians, American Medical Association, American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO), and American Society of Hematology (ASH), plus the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Alumni Association, and Hour Detroit Magazine named him one of the “Top Docs” in oncology in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012.
Not only all of that, but Dr. Fata founded a charity, Swan for Life, a nonprofit organization whose purpose is to provide “support, education and resources to cancer patients and their families” and whose mission is described thusly:
Swan for Life Cancer Foundation exists so no person affected by cancer will feel alone in their journey.
Swan for Life serves cancer patients and those who love them. Swan for Life nurtures, supports and encourages healing of the whole person; mind, body and spirit.
Swan for Life runs programs that range from support groups and educational workshops for patients and their families, to various medical services. Unfortunately, as is so often the case for “supportive service” groups, Swan for Life appears to “integrate” acupuncture into its evidence-based medical services, but such is medical life in these days of “integrating” cow pie with apple pie. In any case, Swan for Life generally raises money through fashion shows, a gala ball, a 5K run, and, of course, direct donations.
So how did it all go so very wrong? What is Dr. Fata accused of doing? For that, I have to reference some local news stories, such as this one from WXYZ-TV:
And this story from WDIV-TV:
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In this story, arguably the most shocking example of patient mistreatment is the man who had head and neck cancer and was treated inappropriately with chemotherapy while receiving radiation, leaving him disfigured. Perhaps the most useful way for me (and perhaps for you) to understand the full scope of the charges is to peruse a summary published on Medscape on Friday, the actual criminal complaint against Dr. Fata, and the memorandum in support of detention that characterizes Dr. Fata as a flight risk and asks the court to keep him in custody until trial. There are dozens of examples of wrongdoing described, and the activities of which Dr. Fata is accused fall into these general categories:
     1.  Administration of unnecessary chemotherapy to patients in remission
     2.  Deliberate misdiagnosis of patients as having cancer to justify unnecessary cancer treatment
     3.  Administration of chemotherapy to end-of-life patients who will not benefit from the treatment
     4.  Deliberate misdiagnosis of patients without cancer to justify expensive testing
     5.  Fabrication of other diagnoses such as anemia and fatigue to justify unnecessary hematology treatments
     6.  Distribution of controlled substances to patient without medical necessity
The details of the allegations, obtained from various employee whistleblowers, range from the mundane to the truly horrific, and the amount of money involved is truly staggering, $35 million. Some of the mundane examples include charges such as this:
68. The unlicensed doctors are generally assigned to examine Dr. Fata’s patients and complete write-ups of their exam. Dr. Fata typically sees his patients for only a few minutes at the end of their typical 2-4 hour visit to the clinic. The rest of the patients’ time is spent with the unlicensed doctors and other MHO staff. This arrangement allows Fata to routinely see between 50-70 patients per day while other doctors in his practice see between 5 and 10.
Not to mention upcoding the billing to collect as much money as possible from Medicare. The general pattern in the complaints is that Dr. Fata would see large numbers of patients per day but bill every patient at the highest possible billing code, even though he spent only 3-5 minutes with each patient. For those of you not in the medical field, there are generally five levels of patient visits for billing purposes, from quick visits designed to look at one problem to highly complex visits that take over an hour. Upcoding visits (billing for a higher level visit than is justified by what was actually done at the visit) is common, and not all of it is with nefarious intent, mainly because the billing guidelines are confusing and complex. However, when a physician consistently bills at the highest levels for every patient, there’s no way that’s anything but intentional:
79. Dr. Fata typically sees 30-60 patients in a single day. Because of the volume, unlicensed doctors and nurse practitioners divide up his load, examine the patients, and create courses of treatment. Dr. Fata sees the patients for a cursory exam and often changes the course of treatment. EE-6 [one of the whistleblower employees] believes he bills the two highest level office visit codes under his own number.
The only thing that puzzles me here is how Dr. Fata could possibly have gotten away with this over so many years, if he is in fact found guilty. Medicare pays very close attention to the percentage of patients billed at each level. If a physician bills for every patient at level 4 or 5, that’s a huge red flag.
Another mundane charge against Dr. Fata is that he ran a self-referral setup with an imaging company that he owned, much the same way that Stanislaw Burzynski required his patients to get their chemotherapy from a pharmacy that he owned:
81. According to EE-7, Dr. Fata opened a company known as United Diagnostics to perform medical testing. Since he opened United Diagnostics, the percentage of patients in his practice receiving PET scans she estimates has increased from 30% to 70%.
Another whistleblower reported:
64. EE-1 advised that all patients referred to MHO, even those referred only for hematology issues, are prescribed PET scans and blood tests. EE-1 advised that two MHO medical assistants questioned him about the practice of giving all patients PET scans, even those referred only for anemia or other hematology issues.
One notes that Dr. Fata also had a relationship with a pharmacy that he always liked to use for his patients when he prescribed oral chemotherapy agents. Indeed, in the criminal complaint up until now the charges are basically for running your standard Medicare scam in which inflated bills are submitted for services rendered and there are incestuous relationships between imaging centers, pharmacies and the physician’s practice. This sort of thing is sadly all too common. However, such shenanigans, although they are designed to enrich the doctors who run them and frequently lead to overuse of services, don’t necessarily grossly endanger patients (at least not all the time), as it’s quite possible that the pharmacies involved can be qualified and that the imaging center provides quality imaging. If this were all that Dr. Fata was charged with and ultimately convicted of, he’d be a greedy bastard but not the monster he is accused of being. The charges go far beyond his being just a greedy bastard, though.
If the federal charges are correct, where Dr. Fata took it to the “next level” was in the brazenness and callousness of it all. His practices, the feds charge, grossly endangered and injured patients. For instance, in the complaint we learn that he appears to have been the living embodiment of an old (and rather offensive) joke about oncologists that goes something like this: Why do they nail the coffins of cancer patients shut? So that the oncologist stop trying to give them chemotherapy. Sadly, with Dr. Fata, that old joke appears not to have been (much of) an exaggeration:
46. In two instances, Dr. Fata directed that chemotherapy be administered to patients who had other serious medical conditions that required immediate treatment before he would permit them to go to the hospital.
47. In one instance, a male patient fell down and hit his head when he came to MHO. Dr. Fata directed EE-4 that he must receive his chemotherapy before he could be taken to the emergency room. MHO administered the chemotherapy, after which the patient was taken to the emergency room. The patient later died from his head injury.
48. In the second instance, a patient came to MHO with extremely low sodium levels, which can be fatal. Dr. Fata again directed that the patient must first receive chemotherapy before being taken to the emergency room. MHO administered the chemotherapy and the patient was taken to the emergency room and hospitalized.
Consistent with the case above and that horrible old joke, Dr. Fata is accused of administering chemotherapy to patients with late stage and terminal cancer who could not conceivably have benefited from the treatment. For such patients and, of course, for patients who don’t have cancer in the first place, chemotherapy can only cause harm because, depending on the specific regimen, it’s very toxic.
Other charges against Dr. Fata’s include ordering chemotherapy inappropriately for patients in remission and falsifying cancer diagnoses:
42. In addition, Dr. Fata falsifies cancer diagnoses to justify cancer treatments. Where a test falls in a “grey” area, he will diagnose cancer in order to start cancer treatment. EE-4 explains that it is easier for the doctor to do this for blood cancers, where the doctor has more discretion to interpret blood test results vs. tumors, for which it is harder to falsify diagnoses.
One of the whistleblowers quit because Dr. Fata had instructed her to falsify cancer diagnoses in order to justify ordering PET scans. While he was in the process of opening his imaging center, Dr. Fata also allegedly delayed PET scans that were actually medically indicated so that he could have them done at his new facility. He was also reported to become quite angry when his staff failed to follow through on these instructions.
As for chemotherapy, Dr. Fata is accused of not just of ordering it inappropriately for patients who had urgent medical conditions requiring attention before any conceivable need to give chemotherapy or for patients at the ends of their lives, but he is accused of ordering it inappropriately for many other reasons and, even when the chemotherapy was indicated, prescribing too much of it. For example, he is accused of routinely ordering “maintenance” chemotherapy for patients who did not need it. Indeed, one medical assistant quoted Dr. Fata as telling patients that once they had chemotherapy, “they had to have it for the rest of their lives,” which is utterly unnecessary for nearly all cancers. That’s how he is thought to have racked up nearly $25 million worth of chemotherapy charges over the last couple of years. Finally, one offense that I hadn’t thought of before but that I came across in an article yesterday is that Dr. Fata wasted chemotherapy drugs on people who didn’t need them, harming those people, but also potentially denying those drugs to people who could benefit from them. There have been shortages of certain drugs, and one wonders how much of these drugs could have helped other people. Causing harm both to the patient through unnecessary treatment and to others through potentially making it harder for them to get the drugs they need is a double whammy on Michigan cancer patients.
Again, if these charges hold up, not only did Dr. Fata commit Medicare fraud (which is the least of the charges against him, as far as I’m concerned), he betrayed, endangered, and injured his patients. He betrayed the trust and enormous privilege given to him as a physician by society, all for money, all at enormous cost to his patients and society. Already, stories are coming out of patients who died under Dr. Fata’s care whose families are now not sure whether they actually had cancer and died of chemotherapy complications or whether they died of their cancers. Hundreds of patients currently under treatment now don’t know where to go.
Abubakar Atiq Durrani, MD
Abubakar Atiq Durrani, MD is a spine surgeon in the Cincinnati area who, if federal authorities are correct, suffers a similar lack of ethics as Dr. Fata. Instead of administering unnecessary chemotherapy to patients, Dr. Durrani is accused of doing unnecessary surgeries on patients through his private practice, Center for Advanced Spine Technologies (CAST), all to bill insurance companies and Medicare:
A federal grand jury indicted Abubakar Atiq Durrani on Wednesday on five counts of health care fraud and five counts of making false statements in health care matters, according to prosecutors.
Durrani’s fraud scheme resulted in serious injuries in some cases, with many patients treated by Durrani for back and neck pain left in worse pain because of unnecessary surgery, the indictment states. Durrani also would tell some patients the medical situation was urgent and that back surgery was needed immediately, according to the indictment.
“For cervical spine patients, Durrani would often tell a patient that there was a risk of paralysis or the head would fall off if the patient was in a car accident because there was almost nothing attaching the head to the patient’s body,” the indictment states.
Dr. Durrani collected over $10 million from Medicare and private insurers for services rendered. Earlier this year, 88 of Dr. Durrani’s former patients sued him for doing “criminal … medically unnecessary, experimental spine surgeries” without informed consent in order to sell Infuse Bone Graft for Medtronic, for which Dr. Duranni is accused of taking kickbacks from Medtronic. Some of the civil complaints can be found at this link, as well as the response by Dr. Durrani’s lawyer. There are also several patients of his defending him in the comments. Since February, the number of patients suing has ballooned to 150.
As was the case for Dr. Fata, I think a local news report gives the flavor of what’s going on:
FOX19.com-Cincinnati News, Weather 
The federal grand jury indictment can be found attached to this news story. The indictment lumps the charges into these categories:
     1.  DURRANI would persuade the patient that surgery was the only option, when in fact the patient did not need surgery
     2.  DURRANI would tell the patient the medical situation was urgent and that surgery was needed right away. He would also falsely tell the patient that he/she was at risk of grave injuries without the surgery
     3.  For cervical spine patients, DURRANI would often tell a patient that there was a risk of paralysis or the head would fall off if the patient was in a car accident because there was almost nothing attaching the head to the patient’s body
     4.  DURRANI often did not read or ignored the radiology reports written by the radiologists for imaging studies that DURRANI ordered (e.g., xrays, CT scans, and MRIs)
     5.  DURRANI would provide his own exaggerated and dire reading of the patient’s imaging that was inconsistent with or plainly contradicted by the report from the radiologist; at times, DURRANI provided a false reading of the imaging
     6.  DURRANI would dictate that he had performed certain physical examinations and procedures on patients that he did not actually perform
     7.  DURRANI would order a pain injection for a level of the spine that was inconsistent with the pain stated by the patient or the imaging
     8.  DURRANI scheduled patients for surgeries without learning or waiting for the results of certain pain injections or related therapies
     9.  DURRANI often dictated his operative reports or other patient records months after the actual treatment
     10.  DURRANI’s operative reports and treatment records contained false statements about the diagnosis for the patient, the procedure performed, and the instrument used in the procedure
     11.  When a patient experienced complications resulting from the surgery, DURRANI at times failed to inform the patient of or misrepresented the nature of the complications
There’s also a rather strange, but interesting, twist in this story, namely that the five patients whose medical records were reviewed might all have Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, a connective tissue disorder in which the collagen that makes up certain connective tissue is too elastic and easily deformed. Most forms of Ehlers-Danlos syndrome are inherited in an autosomal dominant fashion. Dr. Durrani’s attorney is arguing that the standard of care is different for these rare patients and that they did need surgery. Even if that’s true, I don’t see how it would absolve Dr. Durrani of charges that he documented diagnoses patients didn’t have, procedures never done, and dictating procedures and charts months later. In any case, I will concede that, to me at least as a surgeon, Dr. Durrani’s case strikes me as less clear-cut than that of Dr. Fata, but quite troubling nonetheless.
The problem
In the wake of these cases, I have heard many observations, some reasonable, some not, regarding what the problem is. As an example of the unreasonable, take a look at Debbie Schlussel’s profoundly racist and offensive take on Dr. Fata’s case, where she accuses that “a significant percentage of doctors and other healthcare professionals who commit healthcare fraud are Muslims, Arabs, or both.” One notes that she provides zero evidence to support her assertion that a disproportionate amount of Medicare and health insurance fraud is committed by “Muslims, Arabs, or both.” Can anyone say, “confirmation bias”? Sure, I knew you could. I’ve also heard it also said that the problem is foreign medical graduates (FMGs). Never mind that Dr. Fata received all of his medical training and Dr. Durrani did his orthopedic surgery residency and multiple advanced fellowships at top-notch institutions right here in the good ol’ U.S. of A. While it’s true that we need good mechanisms to make sure that physicians who receive their medical training outside of the U.S. are trained up to the standards expected in the U.S., if there’s any evidence that FMGs are more prone to fraud than U.S.-trained physicians, I am unaware of it. Certainly Schlussel hasn’t provided any such evidence.
One reasonable observation that is unavoidable from all this is that an impressive pedigree and having trained at top-flight medical schools, residencies, and fellowships are no guarantee against what Dr. Fata and Dr. Durrani are accused of having done. Dr. Fata, for instance, routinely won local “top doc” honors from the local magazine that publishes the annual list (every major city has one). Dr. Durrani was on the clinical faculty at the University of Cincinnati and had a reputation as an expert in complex spine surgery.
The real question that cases like this bring up is about state medical boards. Fraud almost never gets to the level of what Dr. Fata, for example, is accused of without a long prior history. Indeed, Dr. Fata apparently had that history, as is coming out now in local news reports, for example, this report from WXYZ-TV, which describes allegations of patient mistreatment going back years. Also revealed is that there is currently an open complaint against Dr. Fata with the Michigan Board of Medicine:
Interestingly, a search of the Michigan website for Dr. Fata’s medical license reveals no open complaints against him. Similarly, neither the State Medical Board of Ohio nor the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure websites have any notice of action against Dr. Durrani. The question is: Why not? Why is it that it took the feds investigating Medicare and health insurance fraud to discover—virtually stumble upon, actually—evidence of Dr. Fata’s wrongdoing? Why is it, for example, that the North Carolina Medical Board has been unable to do much against Dr. Rashid Buttar and, even more egregiously, the Texas Medical Board hasn’t been able to stop Stanislaw Burzynski? It matters not to me whether the offense is practicing pseudoscientific “alternative medicine” (as Dr. Buttar does, in my opinion), using unapproved and unproven cancer drugs (as Dr. Burzynski undoubtedly does), administering unnecessary chemotherapy (as Dr. Fata is accused of doing), or doing unnecessary surgery (as Dr. Durrani is accused of doing). What matters is that these physicians either administer treatments far outside of the science-based standard of care or are accused of doing so.
As I’ve pointed out before, one of the most contentious and difficult aspects of trying to improve medical care is enforcing a minimal, science-based “standard of care.” Optimally, this standard of care should be rooted in science- and evidence-based medicine and act swiftly when a practitioner practices medicine that doesn’t meet even a minimal requirement for scientific studies and clinical trials to support it. At the same time, going too far in the other direction risks stifling innovation and the ability to individualize treatments to a patient’s unique situation–or even to use treatments that have only scientific plausibility going for them as a last-ditch effort to help a patient. Also, areas of medicine that are still unsettled and controversial could be especially difficult to adjudicate. The cases I’ve described above, with the possible exception of that of Dr. Durrani (and even then I’m not convinced yet) do not fall into these gray areas. So why can’t medical boards protect patients against such doctors? Why did it take allegations of insurance fraud to bring in the feds, who acted rapidly to shut them down? Indeed, in the case of Dr. Fata, U.S. District Attorney Barbara McQuade explicitly said, “Our first priority is patient care. The agents and attorneys acted with a great attention to detail to stop these allegedly dangerous practices as quickly as possible.”
Why couldn’t the Michigan Board of Medicine have done the same? Why couldn’t the other relevant state medical boards do the same about the other doctors? Unfortunately, our current system doesn’t do a very good job of protecting the public from physicians who practice obvious quackery or who commit fraud, for many reasons. Most medical boards are overburdened and underfunded. Consequently, until patient or fellow practitioner complaints are made and there is actual evidence of patient harm, there is all too often literally nothing they can do. Also, in my experience, state medical boards tend to prefer to go after physicians who misbehave in undeniably bad ways: alcoholic physicians or physicians suffering from other forms of substance abuse; physicians who sexually abuse patients; or physicians who are “prescription mills” for narcotics. As our very own Kimball Atwood put it:
When a physician is accused of DUI, “substance abuse,” being too loose with narcotic prescriptions, throwing scalpels in the OR, or diddling patients, the response of a state medical board tends to be swift and definitive. Shoot first, ask questions later. After all, the first responsibility of the board is to the public’s safety, not to preserving the physician’s livelihood.
As well the boards’ responses should be in these cases. Still, these sorts of cases are easier to adjudicate. They tend to be more clear-cut (you don’t have to be a doctor to understand why these sorts of behaviors endanger patients), but most importantly they don’t force boards to make value judgments on the competence and practice of physicians, such as determining whether Dr. Fata’s use of chemotherapy or Dr. Durrani’s surgical practice are outside the standard of care. Unless a patient is hurt and complains, state medical boards often can’t even investigate.
That doesn’t leave physicians off the hook. Having spoken to oncologists I know last week, I know that some of them who saw patients of Dr. Fata’s as second opinions had serious misgivings about some of the courses of treatment they encountered. I know that some physicians in the area of Dr. Fata’s home base (Crittenton Hospital Medical Center) did not think very highly of him. Although I’ve never had any personal interaction with him and don’t recall seeing any of his patients for surgery, from what I can tell there were many indications and red flags, but for some reason Dr. Fata practiced for eight years untroubled by the state medical board or the law except for the occasional malpractice suit. Did any of these doctors seeing Dr. Fata’s patients for second opinions think to report him to the medical board? What about those doctors who saw some of Dr. Durrani’s patients and told them they had had unnecessary surgery? While it’s true that sometimes doctors have differences of opinion, if what the feds say is true these go far beyond reasonable medical differences of opinion between health care professionals. Of course, it doesn’t help that in some states health care professionals can suffer serious consequences for filing reports, as two nurses in Winkler, TX discovered when they tried to report a bad doctor. Also making it difficult to discipline physicians is the problem that in many states physicians who are on these medical boards are unpaid and reluctant (as they see it) to strip a fellow doctor of the means of his or her livelihood. There’s also a cultural tendency among physicians to stick together. We understand the difficulty of making decisions that can have profound consequences in our patients’ lives, and we tend to want to bend over backwards to give fellow doctors the benefit of the doubt.
Advocates for science-based medicine cannot help but be appalled at how easily physicians can get away with practicing far outside the standard of care, even to the point that patients are harmed, with little or no interference by state medical boards. Boards are outgunned and underfunded to the point where they can barely deal with the sorts of cases Dr. Atwood described. Also, truth be told, part of the problem is that the attitude among doctors seems to be that a medical license is a right, not an incredible privilege, bestowed upon us by society that takes an equally incredible commitment and skill to be allowed to keep. That being said, I will take this opportunity to emphasize again that doctors who consistently do not practice science- and evidence-based medicine to the minimal standard of care, be it because they are incompetent, dishonest, impaired by substance abuse, or because they have come to believe in quackery, do not deserve to be physicians. If we as a profession do not find a way to do better, legislators will do it for us, but that shouldn’t be our primary motivation. Our primary motivation should be that quality patient care should rule supreme because our patients deserve no less.

Ethical Failures
Mark Crislip on July 10, 2015
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It is summer vacation for me in Eastern Oregon at Sunriver. Unbelievable geology, fantastic hikes, great biking, wonderful golf, delicious beer and good food. The thesaurus fails me for superlatives. It is hard to get too riled up about all things SCAM to produce a blog entry when I could be doing one or all of the above. I really don’t want to do this. Sadly, David keeps threatening me with the video he has of me touting the benefits of Integrative Medicine with its holistic approach to health care, and I just can’t have that published on the ‘net. So some brief speculation to fill the time between golf and a pint of IPA overlooking the Sisters.
Ethics, and the purpose of SBM
Steve started this blog in 2008 in part because he realized that evidence-based medicine was inadequate for the task of evaluating pseudo-medicines. He coined the term ‘science-based medicine’ with the realization that for fantastical therapies like acupuncture or homeopathy, all the potential biases and flaws in the evidence from clinical studies could result in pseudo-medicines appearing effective when at heart they are all Oakland California.
I do not suppose there could be science-based ethics. One person’s ethical certainty is another’s belly laugh. I remember a grand rounds on human cloning years ago and they had, among others, a priest discussing the ethics of human cloning, and I thought at the time there would be few speakers with less legitimacy. And really, I can see no harm in cloning an army of zombie super soldiers, especially if they were under my control.
Still, one of the issues I remain amazed at is how many clinical trials testing pseudo-medicines are approved by institutional review boards (IRB).
The changing practice of medicine
Let us ignore for the sake of this essay the issue that there is little point in testing pseudo-medical therapies from a medical practice perspective. In real medicine we do studies to guide therapies, eventually adding or abandoning interventions as the data accumulates as to their benefit or lack thereof. I have been in medicine for 30 years and the old saw that half of what you learn in medical school will be proven wrong is off by a log. So much of what I used to do has either been abandoned or superseded as new clinical trials and diagnostics have become available.
This is the opposite of pseudo-medicine. No therapy is ever abandoned as a result of the accumulation of negative clinical studies. Pseudo-medicines do change, but usually the unholy merging of two different pseudo-medicines to give a third, say, laser acupuncture or chiropractic nose balloons. But there is little reason from a practical point of view in doing pseudo-medical research as practice will never, ever, never change as a result of research. They are reality-proof endeavors. The end result of 30 years of negative or inconclusive pseudo-medical research is the growth of Integrative Medicine divisions in all the major universities.
The ethics of SCAM research
Let’s talk instead about the ethics of research. Clinical trials have to be approved by an IRB, and usually these IRBs are often at the institution where the research is being performed. Perhaps it is not for the best that your friends and colleagues are the ones to determine if a given SCAM clinical trial is actually appropriate. I would be willing to bet the average person sitting on an IRB has as much understanding and background about pseudo-medicines that I did 10 years ago: almost nothing.
The purpose of an IRB:
…is to assure, both in advance and by periodic review, that appropriate steps are taken to protect the rights and welfare of humans participating as subjects in the research. To accomplish this purpose, IRBs use a group process to review research protocols and related materials (e.g., informed consent documents and investigator brochures) to ensure protection of the rights and welfare of human subjects of research.
And it is important that they:
Safeguard the rights, safety, and well-being of all trial subjects. Special attention should be paid to trials that may include vulnerable subjects, such as pregnant women, children, prisoners, the elderly, or persons with diminished comprehension.
The IRB should, I suspect, follow the NIH ethical guidelines. Although guidelines are not commandments, they do form a conceptual framework to guide the evaluation of a clinical trial:
Social and clinical value
Every research study is designed to answer a specific question. Answering certain questions will have significant value for society or for present or future patients with a particular illness. An answer to the research question should be important or valuable enough to justify asking people to accept some risk or inconvenience for others. In other words, answers to the research question should contribute to scientific understanding of health or improve our ways of preventing, treating, or caring for people with a given disease. Only if society will gain useful knowledge — which requires sharing results, both negative and positive — can exposing human subjects to the risk and burden of research be justified.
Scientific validity
A study should be designed in a way that will get an understandable answer to the valuable research question. This includes considering whether the question researchers are asking is answerable, whether the research methods are valid and feasible, and whether the study is designed with a clear scientific objective and using accepted principles, methods, and reliable practices…Invalid research is unethical because it is a waste of resources and exposes people to risk for no purpose.
Favorable risk-benefit ratio
Uncertainty about the degree of risks and benefits associated with a drug, device, or procedure being tested is inherent in clinical research — otherwise there would be little point to doing the research. And by definition, there is more uncertainty about risks and benefits in early-phase research than in later research. Depending on the particulars of a study, research risks might be trivial or serious, might cause transient discomfort or long-term changes. Risks can be physical (death, disability, infection), psychological (depression, anxiety), economic (job loss), or social (for example, discrimination or stigma from participating in a certain trial). Has everything been done to minimize the risks and inconvenience to research subjects, to maximize the potential benefits, and to determine that the potential benefits to individuals and society are proportionate to, or outweigh, the risks? Research volunteers often receive some health services and benefits in the course of participating, yet the purpose of clinical research is not to provide health services.
Independent review
To minimize potential conflicts of interest and make sure a study is ethically acceptable before it even starts, an independent review panel with no vested interest in the particular study should review the proposal and ask important questions, including: Are those conducting the trial sufficiently free of bias? Is the study doing all it can to protect research volunteers? Has the trial been ethically designed and is the risk–benefit ratio favorable? In the United States, independent evaluation of research projects is done through granting agencies, local institutional review boards (IRBs), and data and safety monitoring boards. These groups also monitor a study while it is ongoing.
Informed consent
For research to be ethical, most agree that individuals should make their own decision about whether they want to participate or continue participating in research. This is done through a process of informed consent in which individuals (1) are accurately informed of the purpose, methods, risks, benefits, and alternatives to the research, (2) understand this information and how it relates to their own clinical situation or interests, and (3) make a voluntary decision about whether to participate.
There are exceptions to the need for informed consent from the individual — for example, in the case of a child, of an adult with severe Alzheimer’s, of an adult unconscious by head trauma, or of someone with limited mental capacity. Ensuring that the individual’s research participation is consistent with his or her values and interests usually entails empowering a proxy decision maker to decide about participation, usually based on what research decision the subject would have made, if doing so were possible.
To my mind almost all studies of pseudo-medicines like acupuncture, homeopathy, chiropractic, reiki etc. all fail first with scientific validity. Research with these modalities are the poster child for being “invalid research [that] is unethical because it is a waste of resources and exposes people to risk for no purpose.”
The ethics of dividing by zero
And clinical trials for pseudo-medicine fail to “gain useful knowledge” as well as a risk/benefit that has no meaning. Can’t divide by zero after all.
What amazes me is the perfect storm of pseudo-medicine testing in vulnerable populations, where the IRBs have failed in all ethical aspects of clinical trials.
Homeopathy is water. I cannot imagine how it could be ethical to test water for any process in children. I can’t understand how an IRB that understood homeopathy could approve a study in at risk populations.
But there are no end of homeopathy studies in children:
A total of 326 articles were identified, 91 of which were retrieved for detailed evaluation. Sixteen trials that assessed 9 different conditions were included in the study. With the exception of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and acute childhood diarrhea (each tested in 3 trials), no condition was assessed in more than 2 double-blind randomized clinical trials. The evidence for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and acute childhood diarrhea is mixed, showing both positive and negative results for their respective main outcome measures. For adenoid vegetation, asthma, and upper respiratory tract infection each, 2 trials are available that suggest no difference compared with placebo. For 4 conditions, only single trials are available.
And there shouldn’t be even one.
The University of Toronto (yes, that University of Toronto) wants to test homeopathy in ADHD children even though a prior pilot study was:
…unblinded, devoid of randomization, had no control group and relied on a subjective outcome, making any data derived from it essentially meaningless.
A good basis for experimenting on children. Ignoring the question of why such a study would be done in the first place, how does such a study even meet bare ethical requirements for performing a study? Maybe Canadians have a different set of ethical standards.
SCAM ethics around the world
Not that researchers around the world are any better. There are a half-dozen studies evaluating acupuncture for tonsillectomy pain in children, and studies in children for acute appendicitis. And there are trials of acupuncture in dementia patients and coma patients. And theraputic touch for the demented. And no end of chiropractic in children, from asthma to bedwetting, with all its downsides.
To my way of thinking, the most egregious abuse of at-risk populations were the trials of homeopathy for diarrhea in Nepal, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Truly vulnerable and impoverished populations who desperately need real medications have the magic that is homeopathy inflicted on them with the approval of IRBs. The gaster is flabbered.
The NCCIH evidently has an ethics counselor. As best I can determine, she has no publications on either PubMed or the NCCIH site. And I can find no discussion on the ethics of pseudo-medicinal research on the NCCIH website. Why am I not surprised?
Children, the demented and the comatose. So much for protecting at risk populations.
The paving stones to Hell, and IRBs
How do these studies get past IRBs in this century? I suspect I know the answer. I would bet that like so much SCAM treatment, the believers make a compelling argument while those on the IRB take them at their word, knowing little about the interventions and trusting to the good intentions of the researchers. And as I have recently discovered:
The opposite of good is not evil. The opposite of good is good intentions.
– Kurt Tucholsky
The PubMeds find discussions both ways: those who have no issues with the ethics of SCAM and those who find the use problematic at best. These references concern the use of pseudo-medicines, but if there are discussions concerning the ethics of CAM research, I can’t find them.
I do not see how to hold IRBs accountable for approving studies on magic. Maybe they should read their mission statement and apply it. It remains one of the conundrums of modern medicine. There are no astrologers publishing in astronomy journals or alchemists in the chemistry journals, but the study of magic continues apace in medicine with no signs of slowing down, ethical or not.
But time for a bike ride then a hike in the Sisters.

When urgency to cure beats research ethics, bad things happen
David Gorski on August 26, 2013
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Editor’s note: Just for your edification, here’s a “bonus” post. True, you might have seen this recently elsewhere, but it’s so appropriate for SBM that I couldn’t resist sharing it with those of you who might not read the other source where this was published recently. 🙂
I’ve written a lot about Stanislaw Burzynski and what I consider to be his unethical use and abuse of clinical trials. Before that, I used to regularly write about Mark Geier and his unethical use and abuse of IRBs and clinical trials. Both doctors use their own IRBs stacked with their own cronies to rubberstamp scientifically and ethically dubious studies. Mark Geier got away with it for years. Stanislaw Burzynski got away with it for decades and, apparently, is still getting away with it to some extent. (His IRB is chaired by an old Baylor crony of his from the 1970s, and he has been cited for numerous problems with his IRBs.) I’d like to contrast how their unethical research, in which Mark Geier and his son David subjected autistic children to chemical castration with Lupron to decrease testosterone levels and allegedly make mercury easier to chelate (to them mercury was bound by testosterone, something that doesn’t happen under physiological conditions but requires organic solvents) and Stanislaw Burzynski administered an unproven cancer chemotherapy (antineoplastons) to hundreds of patients over the years and charged them for it, compares to a recent case in the news.
The case has been mentioned by PZ Myers. It happened that it involves the same sort of tumors that Stanislaw Burzynski claims to be able to cure, namely brain tumors. It happened at the University of California Davis (UC Davis) and involved two very prominent neurosurgeons there, a former head of the department Dr. J. Paul Muizelaar and Dr. Rudolph J. Schrot, who were found to have violated university’s faculty code of conduct with their experimental work. When you read this part of the story, you’ll shiver. At least, I did:
The procedure in question involved three patients described in documents only as Patients 1, 2 and 3 – two middle-aged women and one man who had a common enemy: glioblastoma.
For anyone unlucky enough to be diagnosed with the highly malignant brain tumor, the prognosis is dismal. Median survival is less than 15 months.
Muizelaar and Schrot called their novel approach “probiotic intracranial therapy,” or the introduction of live bowel bacteria, Enterobacter aerogenes, directly into their patients’ brains or bone flaps. The doctors theorized that an infection might stimulate the patients’ immune systems and prolong their lives.
The first patient lived about 5 1/2 weeks. The second survived another year, an outcome that buoyed the doctors and seemed to bolster their theory, they said.
The institutional trouble began in March 2011, when a newly diagnosed third patient developed sepsis, became unresponsive and died two weeks after being deliberately infected. The university’s first internal investigation soon followed.
As a cancer scientist and surgeon myself, my first thought here was: Who on earth thought this was a good idea? Let me put it this way. What Muizelaar and Schrot were doing was intentionally causing bacterial meningitis. In cancer patients! You know, patients whose immune systems are often compromised to begin with! To be honest, on the surface, Burzynski’s antineoplastons have more biological plausibility than this. Thirty years ago, I could say that they were at least drugs and therefore might have had some activity against cancer.
The concept that inducing an inflammatory reaction might help “prime” the immune system to counter cancer is not a new idea. In general, however, it’s not a good idea to use bacteria that could cause potentially life-threatening infections. The CNS is generally viewed to be an immune “privileged” site, meaning that the immune system doesn’t function the same way there as it does in the rest of the body. Immune privilege was first observed when it was noted that tissue grafts that would be rapidly rejected if grafted to the skin or other sites would survive a long time when grafted into the CNS. The original thought was that this meant the CNS was somehow cut off from the immune system by the blood-brain barrier, its lack of draining lymphatics, and the apparent inability of cells known as microglia to function as immune cells. However, recently this concept has been reevaluated in light of new data that show that the CNS is neither isolated nor passive in its interactions with the immune system, but that doesn’t change the observation that the immune system functions somewhat differently in the CNS. In any case, gut bacteria are in general not expected to be in the CNS, and bacterial meningitis can be really nasty. It’s also not that difficult to induce meningitis. Remember the outbreak of fungal meningitis from contaminated steroid injections last year?
Apparently, Muizelaar based his idea on an apparent observation in among neurosurgeons that postoperative infection was associated with better survival in patients with glioblastoma. However, the data supporting this particular association is, to put it kindly, mighty thin, a retrospective study. What Muizelaar apparently did was to place an enteric (gut) bacteria, Enterobacter aerogenes, into the open wound and bone flap after surgery in order to produce a wound infection. E. aerogenes tends not to be pathogenic except in patients who have compromised immunity, such as the elderly, infants, and, yes, cancer patients.
It’s instructive to read some of the PDFs included with the article, such as the report of the UC Davis investigation of Dr. Muizelaar and of Dr. Schrot. It reveals a bit of the complexity of doing investigations like this and, more importantly, why Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot went too far and how they gamed the system. He started with a consultation to the Bioethics Consultation Committee, which, after a lengthy debate, concludes that the practice “may be seen as consistent with the customs and practices of medicine.” However, the committee thought that the procedure required more oversight than it could provide, and suggested that the protocol should be reviewed by the IRB. So Dr. Schrot submitted a full application to the IRB in which he admitted that further preclinical work was needed but argued that in this patient the benefit/risk ratio was favorable. On what evidence? Who knows? I don’t have the IRB application. Dr. Schrot also discussed the procedure with the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research at the FDA and was told that “animal studies will be necessary prior to entering into the clinic with your proposed therapy.” In addition, he was told that “these animal studies must show not only safety, but also establish a reasonable proof of concept in order for this investigational therapy to be introduced into patients.” In other words, the FDA told them to do the preliminary work first.
In the meantime, Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot submitted an NIH grant application for the animal studies. It was not well received by the study section, which characterized it as having “low translational impact with seriously flawed methodology and statistical analysis.” The summary statement concluded, “There is absolutely no feasibility evidence in support of this project” and comments that it has a “low translational impact since it is very unlikely that any IRB or the FDA will allow the introduction of Enterobacter aerogenes directly into patients.”
Here’s where things get interesting. The FDA had told Dr. Muizelaar that he and Dr. Schrot could proceed with their “innovative treatment” if the bacteria were available locally. No doubt this was because the FDA is a federal agency and doesn’t have jurisdiction if everything happens within one state. (It’s the same issue with Stanislaw Burzynski, actually.) If it was not available locally and had to go through the investigational new drug (IND) process, then more animal work was required, as the CBER stated. It turns out that a graduate student had some Enterobacter aerogenes from ATCC, and that’s what was used on these patients.
What follows then is wrangling between Dr. Muizelaar and the university. Dr. Muizelaar went to the Chief Medical Officer Al Siefkin and told him that the IRB had told Dr. Schot that the proposed procedure wouldn’t be considered research. In any case, both gave the impression that they were “shopping” for approval, and, although probably not lying, being a bit selective in what they told various parties involved in the approval process. As the news report notes:
Among the university’s findings, detailed in reports, email correspondence, interviews and regulatory documents:
    • A former top administrator said he believed the doctors went “shopping for approval” and were “doing all they could to get around” the formal approval process. A physician who served on the research oversight board said the surgeons seemed to be “gaming” the system to bypass any institutional rejection or skepticism of their plans.
    • Muizelaar and Schrot did not complete a study on rats before they began treating the three human patients, despite an FDA directive in 2008 that “animal studies will be necessary prior to entering into the clinic with your proposed therapy,” according to an email to Schrot from an FDA official. When asked by a compliance investigator why animal trials were not done first, Schrot allegedly responded that such testing would take “10 years … his entire career,” one internal review states. The investigator found Schrot’s “eagerness to proceed” to be concerning and his actions “reckless.”
    • One university investigator questioned whether the doctors ever would have been able to get federal approval of their concept. According to one report, Schrot’s grant application to the National Institutes of Health to study the bacterial treatment was rejected, with NIH commenting in 2009 that “(t)his is a very poorly developed scientific proposal that lacks feasibility.” The NIH thought it unlikely that university or federal regulators would allow the introduction of live bacteria directly into patients, the report states.
Ultimately, the procedures were done on three patients. Particularly disturbing is the consent forms that were drawn up, which basically said that there was no evidence that this would work but that the surgeons wanted to do it anyway. While technically that is accurate, one has to wonder how much coercion the patients might have felt and how free they felt they could say no. After all, they all had horrible diseases with a median survival of less than 15 months expected. As this editorial points out, patients also weren’t told everything:
Despite the absence of any FDA approval or IRB review, the neurosurgeons proposed their treatment, to Terri Bradley. The consent form she and her daughter signed appears straightforward. It made clear that the infection the surgeons were deliberately introducing into Bradley’s brain “may be totally ineffective.” It then laid out the many serious risks, including “further neurological deterioration … paralysis, coma or death.” The women were told the procedure did not have FDA approval.Faced with the alternatives presented and the near certainty of death, not surprisingly, the Bradleys signed.
Here’s what the Bradleys weren’t told. They were not told that the FDA hadn’t just failed to approve the procedure their physicians were pushing, federal officials had told the doctors specifically not to perform the procedure until they had conducted animal studies. The Bradleys were not told that the doctors had bypassed the university’s IRB process or that the IRB had previously told the doctors not to perform their “experimental” procedures on human patients.
In other words, the “informed consent” provided was every bit as much misinformed consent as what antivaccinationists and “health freedom” activists advocate for.
The end result was one patient living less than six weeks, another surviving two weeks, and the second patient, the “success story” living over a year. However, the family of that patient, Terri Bradley, didn’t view it as a “success.” Indeed, Mrs. Bradley required at least one operation to “clean out” her infected head wound and directly administer antibiotics. Indeed, her daughters reported that the infected wound had begun to smell bad. True, this patient did apparently have some tumor shrinkage. As I read about the tumor shrinkage, thoughts of Stanislaw Burzynski came to mind, as did the observation that three patients are too few to say anything and that one sees longer-than-expected survival in cancer patients with homeopathy (i.e., treatment with nothing but water). In any case, despite the doctors’ thinking that Ms. Bradley had benefited, she did not:
“Patient 2 did not experience significant functional benefit,” investigators concluded, “and upon her death … recurrences of the tumors and chronic infection of the brain were identified.”
Shockingly, even after this almost certainly treatment-related death, Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot convened an ad hoc ethics committee and presented them with a proposal to proceed with five additional patients. According to this report, the ad hoc committee concurred with the proposal and recommended continuing clinical activities with the understanding that they would develop an IRB-approved protocol as soon as possible.
In the end, this case demonstrates just how much oversight is needed on human subjects research and just how disturbing what “brave maverick doctors” like Stanislaw Burzynski, Mark Geier, and, yes, Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot do can be. The problem, of course, is that the line between research and trying something “innovative” (or truly innovative without the scare quotes) is not always clear, nor is the line between research and making a “last ditch” effort to save a patient’s life. It also speaks to the inherent conflict between the desire of a doctor to save lives and the need to do rigorous research in order to determine whether what the doctor does actually does save lives. As a physician, it’s very easy to develop a tunnel vision and believe that your latest idea is something that will work, that will save lives, if only those unimaginative clods would see what you see. Also, in the service of the goal of saving lives, it becomes progressively easier to justify cutting ethical corners, as Drs. Muizelaar and Schrot appear to have done. It’s very easy to start to view the system designed to protect human subjects as obstacles to be overcome rather than the patients’ advocate.
You know how they say that the road to hell is paved with good intentions? I can’t think of a better example in medicine than a case like this.

The post I think most about is FDA commish; there, my view is that any consulting for pharma/ device co should be disqualifying
In an interview last May, Dr. Marty Makary expressed reasonable concerns about people who left the FDA to work for industry. While noting that we live in a “free country”, Dr. Makary also worried about former FDA employees having “undue influence”. “When it comes to their influence on the operations of the FDA, that is something we cannot tolerate,” he said.
In another interview, Dr. Makary said that previous FDA commissioners, who doubted the still unproven claim the COVID vaccine killed 10 children, were “paid by big pharma” and therefore unreliable. Dr. Makary reported at a MAHA summit that in contrast to these unethical doctors, he has “taken a voluntary pledge never to work for Big Pharma for the rest of my life.” Good for him.
Dr. Makary’s right-hand man at the FDA, Dr. Vinay Prasad, has long expressed similar thoughts, writing:
    • “I am, like most Americans, sick of revolving doors & tweeps may know I have published on this topic You can’t take 400k from airbnb and 400k from carnival cruises and then shape policy that impacts their profits.”
    • “The post I think most about is FDA commish; there, my view is that any consulting for pharma/ device co should be disqualifying, but most don’t agree with me, I concede.”
    • “This is Bob Califf, current FDA commish. When not in office, he stuffs his pockets with pharma cash & takes roles in biotech that interface with FDA. When in office, he approves ineffective, costly drugs & lies about antivirals like Paxlovid. The current system is corrupt.”
Those are harsh words, but these concerns are not misplaced, and every reasonable person supports a wall between pharma and FDA regulators. There is ample evidence that pharma money influences doctors, even though most of them incorrectly feel that they are immune to such forces. A wise mentor advised me to avoid pharma long ago, and despite receiving many tempting offers, I have made $788 from pharma since 2018, all but $150 in the form of office lunches I am too weak to resist. I think it is great that this data is freely available to anyone.
Makary is a director on the board at Harrow, an ophthalmic pharmaceuticals company
However, as SBM readers know, our current medical establishment has one set of standards for themselves and an entirely different, higher set of standards for everyone else. Dr. Prasad’s concern about a doctor who stuffs his pockets with pharma cash & takes roles in biotech that interface with FDA vanished immediately upon assuming office. He no longer feels that any consulting for pharma/device co should be disqualifying for the FDA commissioner.
Similarly, Dr. Makary’s concern about the revolving door was entirely unidirectional. He expressed no concern about people leaving industry for the FDA, even though this path has greater potential for malfeasance. In fact, Dr. Makary has facilitated such journeys. He appointed Dr. George Tidmarsh to head CDER, for example, boasting in the announcement that “Dr. Tidmarsh has led the successful clinical development of seven FDA-approved drugs and served as founder and CEO of multiple biopharmaceutical companies”. Dr. Tidmarsh’s brief tenure ended in disaster precisely because of this history- he allegedly abused his powers at the FDA to enact revenge on a former business partner.
Dr. Makary also conveniently never mentions his own pharma ties. According to one news report from 2024:
Makary is a director on the board at Harrow, an ophthalmic pharmaceuticals company, and an adviser to Sidecar Health, an insurance provider that aims to lower customer costs by eliminating provider networks and drug formularies. He’s also chief medical adviser to Nava, a benefits brokerage, and chief medical officer at Sesame, a cash-pay health service market that offers compounded semaglutide.
Despite being a pancreatic surgeon with no expertise in ophthalmic products, Dr. Makary earned a pretty penny from Harrow Health, garnering $130,357 in the two years prior to becoming FDA commissioner. That’s triple the amount Dr. Robert Califf received, which prompted Dr. Prasad to say he “stuffs his pockets with pharma cash” and the “current system is corrupt.”
Aldeyra Dry Eye Disease Candidate Hit by FDA Delay
I discussed Dr. Makary’s conflicts of interest when he was nominated in my article Questions for Senators to Ask Drs. Marty Makary and Jay Bhattacharya. That first question in that article asked, “why should the American people believe you’ll represent their interests over these corporations?” That remains a fair question, especially for anyone working for an openly corrupt President in an administration where blatant conflicts of interests are the norm. Indeed, now that Dr. Makary is FDA commissioner, regulatory standards are falling, leaders like Dr. Prasad have private meetings with investors, and the headlines read On Eve of JPM, Everything’s Coming Up Big Pharma. That article said:
From the corporate jets of Teterboro Airport to the crowded halls of the J.P. Morgan Healthcare Conference, it’s a good time to be a pharmaceutical executive.
After months of fear, anxiety, and frantic negotiation, the men and women who run the world’s largest drugmakers are striding into 2026 newly unencumbered as they descend on San Francisco next week for JPM, as it’s known. President Trump, who began his second term with sharp words and escalating demands for the industry to lower its prices, has become a vocal supporter. And thanks to a series of White House photo-ops, presidential handshakes, and agreements with drugmakers, the risk of destabilizing tariffs and painful pricing policies appears to be off the table, giving Big Pharma its warmest investor reception since the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Meanwhile, Dr. Makary is doing promotional infomercials at industry events for untested AI wellness devices.
Give all this, I couldn’t help but notice that other ophthalmic pharmaceutical companies are having trouble with the FDA today. According to the article US FDA Declines to Approve Outlook’s Eye Disease Drug for Second Time in 2025:
Outlook Therapeutics said on Wednesday the U.S. health regulator has declined to approve its drug for a type of eye disease, dealing another blow in the company’s prolonged push to bring the treatment to market and sending its shares tumbling nearly 70% after the bell…
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration had initially declined to approve the drug, also called bevacizumab, in 2023, in part due to manufacturing issues observed during pre-approval inspections.
It again declined to approve the drug in August 2025, citing a lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness, and recommended the company submit additional data to support the application.
Outlook said on Wednesday the FDA concluded that additional data provided with the resubmission did not change its prior view, and it again recommended confirmatory evidence of efficacy to support approval.
The FDA has not indicated what type of confirmatory evidence would be acceptable for Lytenava, which is approved in the European Union and the UK, the company said.
According to the article Aldeyra Dry Eye Disease Candidate Hit by FDA Delay Amid Shifting Agency Guidance:
The FDA has delayed an approval decision for Aldeyra Therapeutics’ lead dry eye disease candidate, adding another detour to the candidate’s winding road to potentially enter the market.
At a Dec. 12 meeting, the agency requested Aldeyra submit a report for a failed trial that the regulator had previously told the company not to include in reproxalap’s new drug application, Aldeyra CEO Todd Brady, M.D., Ph.D., explained during a Dec. 16 conference call…
The Office of Specialty Medicine (OSM) oversees the Division of Ophthalmology, and Brady said that Aldeyra has had no interaction with OSM or any other part of the FDA aside from the ophthalmology office. The request to submit a report on the failed trial to the NDA, which triggered the PDUFA delay, was made by the OSM, he explained.
Extensive layoffs and leadership flux at the FDA this year has prompted fears of disrupted drug reviews and the loss of American biotech leadership. Brady said Aldeyra has seen no turnover in the ophthalmology staff that they interact with. The only major change, he noted, is that the former director of OSM retired over the summer, with a new director taking over.
It was not immediately clear who the current director of OSM is—an FDA webpage last updated in 2020 lists Charles Ganley, M.D., as acting director. At the time of publication, the FDA had not answered questions from Fierce about leadership at OSM.
It’s likely there are reasonable explanations for all this, or that it is indicative of the broader dysfunction and chaos at the FDA. But it’s also possible the FDA commissioner is exerting “undue influence” to help his former benefactor and target their competitors. It’s not my fault for wondering about this. It’s Dr. Makary’s fault for excoriating doctors who get paid by big pharma with one hand, while getting paid by big pharma with the other.


The Truth?
Mark Crislip on July 11, 2014
Link

Summertime and the living is easy. I am in Sunriver, Oregon for the week and I though, hilariously, that I would have plenty of time to write a post. Between the hiking, the biking, the golf, the food and the beer, there has been little time to sit in from of a keyboard. There may be no better place to spend a week if you like the outdoors, but they do not have internet on the hike around Paulia Lake. So while a caramel banana cake bakes for a dinner tonight, I have an hour or so churn out a post. Do not expect much.
One person’s ethics is another’s belly laugh, but in medicine ethics are formalized. The basic principles in the US are
    • Respect for autonomy – the patient has the right to refuse or choose their treatment (Voluntas aegroti suprema lex)
    • Beneficence – a practitioner should act in the best interest of the patient (salus aegroti suprema lex)
    • Non-maleficence – “first, do no harm” (primum non nocere)
    • Justice – concerns the distribution of scarce health resources, and the decision of who gets what treatment (fairness and equality).
These are guidelines, not mandated, but if you get an ethics consult in my institutions the above concepts are the framework within which the consult will be completed.
Patients can only be autonomous if they are given accurate, truthful information with which to make a decision about their treatments. You can’t lie to patients, but we all know how you phrase an idea can subtly alter the response. Do you say an 80% success rate or a 20% failure rate? I tend to say both. And not everyone can handle the unvarnished, blunt truth. Part of the art of medicine is trying to tell each patient the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in a manner palatable for the individual patient. It is not easy and I am certain I do not always do a good job.
What troubles me is how much what is written about SCAM’s is to my way of thinking, not truthful, or shaded in a way as to be, at best, disingenuous. I am not referring to the Natural News or Dr. Oz. I long-ago realized those are not sources for a reality-based understanding medicine. I am referring to major medical centers that offer what I would consider misinformation. As an example, take the Mayo Clinic. Please.
I did my residency in Minneapolis at the county hospital. Occasionally a patient would go to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester for a second opinion, get all their tests repeated and more, and come back with the same diagnosis and treatment plan. We would say if you want a Rochester Sandwich, hold the Mayo.
That started my skepticism about big name clinics and famous hospitals. There are good and bad doctors everywhere. Judging from the metastasis of pseudo-medicine into many of the prominent medical institutions in the US, I suspect that these institutions are more interested in income than science-based medicine.
Which brings us to “Complementary and alternative medicine” from the Mayo Clinic, with the subtitle:
You’ve heard the hype about complementary and alternative medicine. Now get the facts.
Given that they have an Integrative Medicine Department, I was wondering how they would spin ‘the facts.’ As always in a CAM article, they start with the disingenuous.
Nearly 40 percent of adults report using complementary and alternative medicine
It’s actually 38.3 %.When I was in grade school I would have been told to round to 38. I am surprised they did not round it up to “nearly 50%”. And you only get to that number by including interventions that are not alternative, like diet and exercise.
The use the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) classification:
    • Whole medical systems
    • Mind-body medicine
    • Biologically-based practices
    • Manipulative and body-based practices
    • Energy medicine
What all of these have in common, with the exception of “biologically based” which includes herbs, is a complete disconnect from reality as it is understood by the sciences. You would not know that from the Mayo.
Homeopathy is described as using
minute doses of a substance that causes symptoms to stimulate the body’s self-healing response.
Most homeopathic nostrums have zero active substance in them and the ideas behind homeopathy are totally nonsensical.
Energy medicine is an
Invisible energy force flows through your body, and when this energy flow is blocked or unbalanced you can become sick. Different traditions call this energy by different names, such as chi, prana and life force. The goal of these therapies is to unblock or re-balance your energy force.
No such energy has ever been measured and none of these interventions have been shown to have efficacy beyond bias. Credulity is the order of the day at the Mayo.
They continue:
Many conventional doctors practicing today didn’t receive training in CAM therapies, so they may not feel comfortable making recommendations or addressing questions in this area.
Could it be that conventional doctors, based in realty and science, know it would be unethical and fraudulent to recommend therapies that are fanciful delusions with no efficacy?
However, as the evidence for certain therapies increases, doctors are increasingly open to complementary and alternative medicine…While scientific evidence exists for some CAM therapies, for many there are key questions that are yet to be answered
What these ‘certain therapies’ are goes unmentioned, since the NCCAM has yet to support a study that demonstrates any benefit from the pseudo-medicines mentioned in the article. And there is the old saying, what do you call alternative medicine that has been proven to work? Medicine. BTW, I am not a conventional doctor, I am a doctor. I do not need the adjective.
They continue with the question
Why is there so little evidence about complementary and alternative medicine?
One reason for the lack of research in complementary and alternative treatments is that large, carefully controlled medical studies are costly. Trials for conventional therapies are often funded by big companies that develop and sell drugs. Fewer resources are available to support trials of complementary and alternative medicine. That’s why NCCAM was established — to foster research into complementary and alternative medicine and make the findings available to the public.
Perhaps there is a paucity of funding for these modalities because prior plausibility would suggest that since they are based on fantasy, not reality, it would be unethical and a waste of resources to study them? Not that the numerous well-done studies that show a lack of efficacy prevent the expansion of integrative medicine programs.
That’s in-depth consumer health at the Mayo. I can’t see that they have done much to improve since I was a resident. I would still hold the Mayo on my Rochester sandwich.
That is not unusual. How can you offer, as does the Osher Center for Integrative Medicine at Harvard Medical School and Brigham and Women’s Hospital, moxibustion, laser acupuncture, and craniosacral therapy without lying to the patient or by being so disingenuous about these therapies disconnect from realty that it amounts to the same thing?
Or, as at UCSF, can you ethically say
While Ayurveda places greatest emphasis on preventing disease before it occurs, scientific research suggests Ayurvedic treatments have positive effects on a range of conditions and disease. Ayurveda is believed to have positive results in the treatment of diabetes, asthma, attention deficit disorder, osteoarthritis, Parkinson’s disease, management of hyperlipidemia and schizophrenia, as well as prevention of certain types of cancer.
While I would not be surprised when any intervention has an effect of diabetes or hyperlipidemia (for many patients any change away from the standard US diet is probably beneficial), schizophrenia and cancer? Really? I can’t find any clinical trials on PubMed to support that contention.
Oh wait. Believe. Believed to have positive results. That is the kind of disingenuous statement that, to my mind, is the moral equivalent of a lie.
Pick an academic Integrative Medicine program, any academic Integrative Medicine program. Are they fully compliant with truth and reality? If so, I cannot find one.
My hospital system, and the hospital systems in Portland in general, are surprisingly SCAM-free. I had long thought that Portland was a mecca of pseudo-medicine, instead we are a bastion of reality-based medicine.
So I lack the opportunity, but it would be interesting for someone to ask for an ethics consult concerning the appropriateness of the information and services offered by their Integrative Medicine. Perhaps the year you plan on retiring.

   The Guatemala syphilis experiment and medical ethics in science-based medicine
David Gorski
Link
Several of the bloggers here at SBM have repeatedly criticized various clinical trials for so-called “complementary and alternative medicine” interventions for various conditions and diseases (or should I say dis-eases?) for being completely unethical. Examples include the misbegotten clinical trial for the Gonzalez protocol for pancreatic cancer, which — surprise, surprise! — ended up showing that patients undergoing Dr. Gonzalez’s combination of 150 supplements a day, dietary manipulations, and coffee enemas, actually did much worse than those undergoing standard of care, despite how depressingly poor the results of standard of care are; clinical trials of homeopathy in Honduras and other Third World countries, which both Wally Sampson and I lambasted; and ongoing clinical trial of chelation therapy for cardiovascular disease. I’ve also criticized the “autism biomed” movement, that amalgamation of parents who believe that vaccines cause autism and yet are willing to subject their children to all sorts of quackery to “cure” the “vaccine injury” of uncontrolled and unethical experimentation on autistic children. As valid as all these criticisms are, it is important to recognize that science-based medicine is not free of its own abuse of ethics.
A couple of weeks ago, I wrote about the concept of clinical equipoise. Clinical equipoise is a critical concept in any clinical trial. Basically, a state of clinical equipoise exists when there is genuine scientific uncertainty over which of the options being tested in/on living, breathing human beings is better, and any clinical trial in which a state of clinical equipoise does not exist is at the very least ethically dodgy and probably downright unethical. For example, when the occasional anti-vaccine activist argues for a randomized controlled clinical trial comparing vaccinated children and unvaccinated children, it’s easy to shoot that idea down as unethical because there is no clinical equipoise. The children receiving placebo vaccines would be put at a much higher risk of suffering harm compared to the vaccinated children because they would be left unprotected against life-threatening diseases. In the realm of conventional medicine, the reason that few cancer clinical trials involve a placebo control group anymore but instead test a new therapy either against the standard of care or with the standard of care is because in many, if not nearly all, cases placebo use in a cancer patient is unethical when there exists effective therapy, even if the therapy is not all that effective. What all this boils down to is that science is only part of the basis of science-based medicine. Medical ethics must take precedence. After all, arguably the most efficacious way to test a new antibiotic would be to infect people with the bacteria the antibiotic treats and then divide these people up into a placebo control group and a group receiving the antibiotics to see how each group does. After all, this is the sort of thing that the Nazis and Japanese did during World War II, and the same sort of dehumanization and abuse of research subjects that every ethical precept regarding human subjects research that has been developed since then, such as the Helsinki Declaration of 1964, has been designed to prevent.
Unfortunately, medical scientists in the U.S. have not always lived up to these precepts. The most famous example is arguably the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, in which poor black men with syphilis were studied and the control group denied effective therapy for syphilis even after it was known that penicillin was an effective treatment for syphilis. This study spanned 40 years, from 1932 to 1972, and is justifiably held up as one of the worst examples of research misconduct in American history, if not the history of the world. The shock the revelation of this study to the American public in 1972, when it learned of men dying of syphilis, women contracting syphilis, and babies being born with congenital syphilis, all unnecessarily, led to Belmont Report and the establishment of the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP).
It turns out that there was an even worse atrocity against medical science perpetrated by U.S. investigators in Guatemala over 60 years ago that only now has come to light in stories in the New York Times, MSNBC, and elsewhere. So bad was the offense that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius have issued a formal apology to the Guatemalan government for the experiments in which Guatemalan prisoners were intentionally infected with syphilis and then treated with antibiotics, an apology that President Obama reiterated in a personal telephone call to Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom on Friday.
Experimenting on Guatemalans
The Guatemala syphilis experiment might have remained lost in the depths of history, unknown, records of its having taken place buried in archives at the University of Pittsburgh, were it not for the efforts of Wellesley College Professor of Women’s Studies Susan Reverby and medical historian, who unearthed the notes of John C. Cutler, who, ironically enough, later spent some time as an important member of the team carrying out the Tuskegee experiment and continued to defend the study 20 years after it was closed. What she found was horrifying, and she has recently published a manuscript describing her findings. Because I always like to go to the primary source wherever possible, I will refer you to the manuscript, available on Dr. Reverby’s faculty web page and entitled “Normal Exposure” and Inoculation Syphilis: A PHS “Tuskegee” Doctor in Guatemala, 1946-48 (synopsis here). The HHS response can be found here, including the statement issued on Friday by Clinton and Sebelius in both English and Spanish.
The background behind Professor Reverby’s revelations is important. As she states in the advanced synopsis:
Perhaps the most infamous of American research studies is the “Tuskegee” Syphilis Study in which the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) watched, but did not treat, hundreds of African American men with late stage syphilis for forty years (1932-1972).1 Much of the folklore surrounding this study assumes that the doctors actually infected African American men in Macon County, Alabama with syphilis by inoculating them with the disease. Historians of the Study, the author included, have spent years now explaining why this was not true and why this myth persists. Part of the explanation is that the spirochete-shaped bacteria that cause syphilis cannot be cultured and grown in a laboratory, easily put into a syringe, or transferred from the blood of one infected person to another.
The inoculation story that is part of the Tuskegee myths did, however, go on elsewhere. In 1946-48, Dr. John C. Cutler, a PHS physician who would later be part of the Syphilis Study in Alabama in the 1960s and continue to defend it two decades after it ended in the 1990s, was running a syphilis inoculation project in Guatemala, co-sponsored by the PHS, the National Institutes of Health, the Pan American Health Sanitary Bureau (now the Pan American Health Organization), and the Guatemalan government.
It was the early days of penicillin and the PHS was deeply interested in whether penicillin could be used to prevent, not just cure, early syphilis infection, whether better blood tests for the disease could be established, what dosages of penicillin actually cured infection, and to understand the process of re-infection after cures. Many scientific questions remained to be answered.
Now you see why the Guatemala syphilis experiment is arguably worse than the Tuskegee experiment, although the Guatemalan experiment only lasted two years and every man infected with syphilis was given penicillin. On the other hand, as the full manuscript describes, although researchers did obtain permission for their studies from the prisons and other institutions with which they worked, they did not receive permission from the inmates or their families. Indeed, deception was part and parcel of the entire process. In return for cooperation, researchers offered supplies to the institution, such as anti-seizure medications like Dilantin, refrigerators to store medications, and a “motion picture projector that supplied the sole recreation for the inmates, metal cups, plates and forks to supplement the completely inadequate supply available.” Individual subjects were plied with cigarettes, “an entire packet for inoculation, blood draws or spinal taps and a single cigarette for ‘clinical observation.’”
Researchers also went to ludicrous extremes to infect the men with syphilis. First, they took advantage of legalized prostitution in Guatemala and the fact that Guatemala allowed prostitutes to pay regular visits to men in penal institutions by locating prostitutes with syphilis:
With the cooperation of officials at the Ministry of Justice and the warden of Guatemala City’s Central Penitentiary, which housed nearly 1500 inmates, prostitutes who tested positive for either syphilis or gonorrhea were allowed to offer their services to prison inmates, paid for by U.S. taxpayers through the funds of the PHS. In yet another set of experiments, uninfected prostitutes had inoculum of the diseases placed on their cervixes before the sexual visits began. Serological tests were done on the inmates before the prostitutes were invited to the prison and then afterwards to see if infection had occurred. The men were divided into groups and various chemical and biological prophylaxis techniques were tested after presumed infection. If positive, the men were then provided with enough penicillin to produce a cure.
Your tax dollars at work in 1946. This method soon ran into problems:
Not enough of the sexually well-serviced men (the researchers actually timed how long they spent with the prostitutes and thought they acted “like rabbits”), even when plied with alcohol, seemed to getting syphilis. The prostitutes were not easily controlled either, and one researcher lamented, “unfortunately our female donor is leaving her profession for marriage and is no longer available.”
Due to the unreliability of the serological tests used to diagnose syphilis in the 1940s, the researchers soon went beyond these methods. It turned out that there were too many positive blood tests even before the men were exposed to syphilis, which posed a huge problem given that the research protocol required men who had never had syphilis or who’d had it and been cured. This led to a trial examining the serum of children in an orphanage, where they found that indeed the false positive rate of the serological test for syphilis was quite high. This problem also meant that the researchers couldn’t yet answer whether penicillin could prevent syphilis.
So Cutler and his team went beyond using prostitutes and isolated syphilis to directly inoculate inmates with. Their sources were the gumma (syphilitic growths) on the testicles of infected rabbits or scraping the penile chancres of infected men, from which they had to isolate the spirochete that causes syphilis. This was difficult, because the spirochete could not survive more than 45 to 90 minutes outside the body, during which time it had to be isolated, centrifuged with fresh home-made beef heart broth, and then delivered to the subjects:
With the men, the inoculation was often much more direct after what soldiers for generations had called the “short arm” inspection. They chose men with “at least moderately long foreskins [to keep the mucus membranes moist]” and who could “sit or stand calmly in one spot for several hours.” In the experiments, a doctor held the subject’s penis, pulled back the foreskin, abraded the penis slightly just short of drawing blood by scraping the skin with a hypodermic needle, introduced a cotton pledget (or small dressing) and dripped drops of the syphilitic emulsion onto the pad and through it to the roughed skin on the man’s penis for at least an hour, sometimes two.
This was also compared with other methods of introducing the spirochete, including scraping of the forearm, ingestion of syphilitic tissue mixed with distilled water, introduction into the spinal fluid, and direct injection into the bloodstream.
It turns out that even back in 1946 many of the officials who knew of or participated in the experiment knew it was unethical. Even Cutler was reported to have said, “As you can imagine, we are holding our breath, and we are explaining to the patients and others concerned with but a few key exceptions, that the treatment is a new one utilizing serum followed by penicillin. This double talk keeps me hopping at times.” Even more disturbing is the general attitude among several researchers seemed to view law breaking as sometimes necessary for the advancement of medical science, as Thomas Rivers, who led the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research Hospital in New York, made clear in his memoir in 1967:
Well, all I can say is, it’s against the law to do many things, but the law winks when a reputable man wants to do a scientific experiment. For example, the criminal code of the City of New York holds that is a felony to inject a person with infectious material. Well, I tested out live yellow fever vaccine right on my ward in the Rockefeller Hospital. It was no secret, and I assure you that the people in the New York City Department of Health knew it was being done….Unless the law winks occasionally, you have no progress in medicine.
It is against this attitude that ethical standards and laws have evolved. It is also as a result of these abuses that many minorities and underprivileged groups of people are mistrustful of physicians and science. Supporters of SBM can’t deny that there have been serious ethical violations committed by overzealous scientists who came to value the study of their scientific question more than they did for the rights and dignity of their human subjects, because the evidence of such violations of human rights are incontrovertible. The questions remain: What to do about them and how to prevent them?
The Belmont Report, The Common Rule, and CAM
After the horrors of Nazi medical experimentation and the abuses during the Tuskegee syphilis study (remember, the Guatemala syphilis experiment was not widely known until now), it was clear that rules were needed to protect human research subjects from such abuses. First came the Nuremberg Code in 1947. This code, drafted in the wake of the infamous Doctors’ Trial at Nuremberg set forth ten principles to govern human subjects experimentation, many of which regular readers of SBM will be familiar with. Examples include the requirement for informed consent; that unnecessary pain and suffering be avoided; that the experiment should be designed based on the results of animal experimentation and knowledge of the natural history of the disease that justifies the performance of the experiment (prior plausibility, anyone?); the requirement that subjects can refuse to continue at any time; and that no experiment should be conducted where injury, disability, or death can reasonably be expected (clinical equipoise). The Declaration of Helsinki, introduced in 1964 by the World Medical Assembly, is based on the same principles as the Nuremberg Code but takes them even further, for example, stating that “the interest of science and society should never take precedence over considerations related to the well-being of the subject.” The Helsinki Declaration was last updated in 2008. It is ironic that at the time the Nuremberg Code was being written and approved that the U.S. government was engaging in the same sort of abuse of human research subjects that the Nuremberg Code was designed to combat.
In the U.S., the Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration notwithstanding, the Tuskegee debacle was the impetus that led to the Belmont Report on Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research finalized on April 18, 1979. This report identifies three essential and fundamental ethical principles for human subject research (respect for persons, beneficence, and justice) that form the basis of all Department of Health and Human Services human subject protection regulations to this day. It is essential reading for anyone doing human subject research in this country. In 1991, these regulations were — finally! — codified into what is now known as The Common Rule. All institutions doing federally funded research are required to adhere to The Common Rule.
A key aspect of The Common Rule is the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB is in essence a committee that oversees all human subject research for an institution and makes sure that the studies are ethical in design and that they conform to all federal regulations. Basically, IRBs are charged with weighing the risks and benefits of proposed human subject research and making sure that (1) the risks are minimized and that the risk:benefit ratio is very favorable; (2) to minimize any pain or suffering that might come about because of the experimental therapy; and (3) to make sure that researchers obtain truly informed consent. I’ve written extensively about The Common Rule before in the context of how certain CAM trials violate the Common Rule and how, for example, Mark and David Geier created a sham IRB packed with their cronies (as so ably documented by Kathleen Seidel) to rubber-stamp their unethical studies of using Lupron to treat the “vaccine injury” they believe to be the cause of autism. What is important (and embarrassing for proponents of SBM) to note is that The Common Rule only first went into effect in 1981 and reached its current form in the 1991 revision to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Title 45 CFR 46 (Public Welfare) Subparts A, B, C and D. Subpart A. What that means is that, in the United States at least, the current government regulations mandating a baseline standard of ethics have only been in effect less than 30 years and only in their current form for less than 20 years.
Ethics: The difference between CAM and SBM
Not surprisingly, CAM proponents have jumped all over these revelations. For example, even quackery promoter Mike Adams has a grain of a valid point when he writes hysterical headlines like Guatemalan STD medical experiments were just one crime in a long history of medical-government collusion to use humans as guinea pigs. Unfortunately for him, he can’t resist taking a valid criticism and running right off the rails with it. Most of the examples he mentions date back at least 50 years and are now commonly known. Few of them are more recent than the 1970s. Most of these are either problems that couldn’t reasonably been foreseen (for instance, the observation that 30% of the participants of a trial for a vaccine against hepatitis B were found to be HIV-positive in 1983) or that are questionable pseudoscience at best, such as ranting against the clinical trials of Gardasil or labeling vaccine mandates as being the equivalent to the Tuskegee or Guatemala syphilis experiments. This is a point that Anne Dachel, Media Editor for the anti-vaccine propaganda blog Age of Autism, predictably parroted yesterday in a post entitled Valid Concern for 60 Year Old Medical Travesty: What About Today’s?, in which she attacks bioethicist Art Caplan for alleged hypocrisy in his refutations of anti-vaccine misinformation in “contrast” to his justifiable outrage over the revelation of the Guatemala syphilis experiment, even going so far as to write:
Increasing exposure to mercury is having a dramatic impact on our lives. “Nonetheless, officials knew it was wrong” also means that there’s a great incentive to cover up the damage at all costs. There is a real lesson from the Guatemala and Tuskegee experiments. Let’s hope it doesn’t take 60 years before officials admit what mercury exposure in vaccine has done to our children.
Never mind that the concept that mercury in vaccines causes autism is a long-discredited hypothesis, a failed hypothesis even more discredited (if that were possible) than the hypothesis that vaccines cause autism. The difference is important; in the case of vaccines science is on the side of those defending the clinical trials studying vaccines and their efficacy, not on the side of anti-vaccine activists like Anne Dachel. Odd, too, that she failed to mention Mark and David Geier’s and Andrew Wakefield’s completely unethical experiments.
Not really, actually.
Yes, charges of hypocrisy go both ways, which is why one of the reasons I wanted to write about the Guatemala syphilis experiment is that it is a stark reminder to proponents of SBM (like myself) that SBM does have a history of not always being as ethically pure as we should be. Indeed, the U.S. Government was right, albeit late, to apologize to the Guatemalan government:
The sexually transmitted disease inoculation study conducted from 1946-1948 in Guatemala was clearly unethical. Although these events occurred more than 64 years ago, we are outraged that such reprehensible research could have occurred under the guise of public health. We deeply regret that it happened, and we apologize to all the individuals who were affected by such abhorrent research practices. The conduct exhibited during the study does not represent the values of the United States, or our commitment to human dignity and great respect for the people of Guatemala. The study is a sad reminder that adequate human subject safeguards did not exist a half-century ago.
Today, the regulations that govern U.S.-funded human medical research prohibit these kinds of appalling violations. The United States is unwavering in our commitment to ensure that all human medical studies conducted today meet exacting U.S. and international legal and ethical standards. In the spirit of this commitment to ethical research, we are launching a thorough investigation into the specifics of this case from 1946. In addition, through the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, we are also convening a body of international experts to review and report on the most effective methods to ensure that all human medical research conducted around the globe today meets rigorous ethical standards.
Reparations to survivors and families would be entirely appropriate in a case like this, as is the investigation ordered by the U.S. government into what happened. It is also entirely appropriate to point out, as Robert Herriman does, that at the time Dr. Cutler’s experiments were being carried out, the U.S. government was passing judgment on the Nazi doctors who carried out the same sorts of experiments, such as purposely infecting prisoners with tetanus and other agents to test the effectiveness of the antibiotic, sulfonamide? What was done in Guatemala in the name of public health was, at its core, different only in that the U.S. didn’t actually round up prisoners and throw them in concentration camps to do its experiments. In other words, little different.
The difference, however, is that proponents of SBM must be (and, for the most part, are) advocates for ethics in all medical experimentation, be it animal or human research. SBM depends upon science and rigorous clinical trials, but never at the expense of violating clinical equipoise, subjecting subjects to risks without true informed consent, or violating patient autonomy. All too many CAM advocates and anti-vaccine advocates use ethical misadventures and abuses as nothing more than a tu quoque argument; they delight in pointing out the gross ethical violations that are committed from time to time by science-based investigators while ignoring those committed by “their side,” such as Nicholas Gonzalez and the investigators performing the Gonzalez trial, Mark and David Geier, Andrew Wakefield, and the investigators performing the TACT trial. (Ironically, except for the Geiers’ trial, all of these trials were funded by our tax dollars — every bit as much as the Guatemalan or Tuskegee syphilis trials.)
I have long argued that there should be no such thing as “alternative” medicine. Rather, there should be one scientific standard for medicine regardless of where it comes from, and that includes all of what is commonly referred to as “CAM.” Similarly, there should be one ethical standard for all research involving human subjects. Unlike Adams and Dachel, when I condemn ethical atrocities in CAM trials that does not mean I will turn a blind eye when such lapses occur in trials of ostensibly science-based medicine and nor should anyone else. The Guatemalan syphilis experiment was indeed a gross failure on the part of SBM to live up to ethical precepts and police its own, but, as shocking as this incident is, it does not validate Mike Adam’s quackery and conspiracy theories or Anne Dachel’s anti-vaccine pseudoscience any more than it invalidates science-based medicine. What it should do is to strengthen the resolve of anyone involved in SBM never to let something like this happen again, regardless of the kind of medical study.

   Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Case Study Exploring the Battle Lines of Science Based Medicine
Joseph Albietz
Links
““Primum non nocere.” First, do no harm. It is a guiding principle of medicine, and one which is next to impossible to achieve in practice. It is difficult for the general public to hear, but any intervention a physician makes, and indeed the decision to make no intervention, carries a risk of harm with it. Given enough time, every physician will make a decision which results in unintended harm to a patient, even death, and it haunts us every day of our careers. Faced with this horrible certainty, what is one to do? The only responsible, ethical position to take is to ensure that each patient receives the care most likely to generate a positive outcome, in other words, to stack the deck as steeply in favor of the patient as is possible. Diligent application of the scientific method to every therapy, novel and new, old and venerated, is the only way we as physicians can be certain we are doing the greatest good and the least harm to those who seek our help; it is the only way to assuage our conscience if things end badly.
Our professional organizations and academic institutions have been vital in formulating, propagating, and enforcing the practice of evidence based medicine (EBM). They have stood, to borrow the phrase from Carl Sagan, as “a candle in the dark,” promoting the best practices and protecting patients from those that are ineffective, fraudulent, harmful, or even simply sub-standard. It is a heartening environment in which to work.
With increasing distress, I and others have watched, and I fear have been complicit in, the assisted suicide of EBM at the very moment it is reaching maturity. While our academic centers have supported EBM, they have simultaneously allowed its antithesis to take root within their very halls under the misnomer of Complimentary and Alternative Medicine (CAM). As CAM is almost by definition non-evidence based, EBM and CAM are guaranteed to come into conflict in practice.
This conflict is one I was certain I would confront in due time, but not on my very first day as a newly minted faculty member. Few things are as stressful to a family as an acute, severe illness. The disruption of normal life, reminder of mortality, financial burden imposed, and in particular the loss of control are trying to everyone who finds themselves in the intensive care unit. These factors are magnified when the victim is a child. When faced with the critical illness of their child, parents will seek help from any source they feel may hold the slightest glimmer of hope. Frequently this will lead them to some form of pseudoscience. It is not uncommon, then, for me to be faced with questions about homeopathic treatment for a child with a severe infection, herbal supplementations for a metabolic disorder, or chiropractic after a car accident.
In most situations, such questions are a request for more detailed discussion about their child, for reassurance, or for insight into what I and the other physicians are actually thinking about. Sometimes a rational explanation of why any given pseudoscience is unhelpful and may put their child at risk is enough to explain why my preferred needle is an IV and not acupuncture. Even in the situation where families are staunch believers in a pseudoscience, most recognize that the intensive care unit is not the place for its application. Such was not the case on my first day.
Among the children in my care was a 6 month old child with a new onset of seizures. He had appeared to be previously healthy, but now was on a breathing machine, heavily sedated, and would seize again whenever his medicine was lightened. Frustrating to his family and his caregivers was the lack of a clear diagnosis, a reason for his aggressive seizures. My team and I took a great deal of time every day to explain what we knew and what the plan, both short and long term was for their child, and even went so far as to involve the family in our daily rounds. In spite of these efforts, their dissatisfaction grew, and their relationship with me and the care team became increasingly antagonistic.
While I worked with many sub-specialists and pursued causes both likely and less so, his family pursued its own investigation. The child’s uncle was a chiropractor, and told them of another chiropractor who claimed to specialize in neurological problems. The family asked on several occasions to have the neuro-chiropractor brought in to the hospital and officially consulted by my team.
Here then, is the crux, the conflict. EBM or CAM? Shall I refuse to involve the chiropractor, as there is no reason to suspect he has anything of value to add, and significant risk to the child can be incurred with manipulations? In refusing the family’s explicit request, I would almost certainly undermine their trust, making it more difficult to provide the care this child will continue to require. In protecting this child from the chiropractor and preserving my academic integrity, I would sacrifice any hope for a healthy collaborative relationship with the family. On the other hand, I could grant the family’s desire to have the chiropractor become a functioning member of the medical team, which would bolster their confidence while exposing the child to risk without benefit, and sacrificing both my and my institution’s academic integrity.
As though this situation were not already difficult, there is precedent within my hospital to allow temporary privileges for chiropractors to see children while they are inpatient when families have requested it. Furthermore, the university we are affiliated with is one of dozens of major institutions which now teach elements of CAM in medical school and who have a section of CAM within the university. Put bluntly, this means that if I as the attending physician were to make a stand at this child’s bedside against the involvement of chiropractic within my ICU, I would not have been supported by my own administration.
In this child’s case, I opted for a compromise between the two polar alternatives I described. I allowed the chiropractor a one time visit to see the child, under the stipulation that his visit be supervised by me while he examined the child, and that no manipulations of any kind would be done before consultation with both myself and the involved neurologist. I would gladly speak to him and the parents together regarding our thoughts on the case, and take his recommendations under advisement, but would be under no obligation to act upon them.
The chiropractor’s recommendations were a bit surprising. He had no interest in spinal manipulations of any kind. The philosophy under which he labored was that he needed to encourage “normal neuronal pathways.” This amounted to gentle tactile stimulation, passive range of motion exercises, having the parents talk to the child, and playing music he claimed was specially designed to stimulate different parts of the brain. He also made dietary and nutritional recommendations, which included continuing to use breast milk (he was stunned and impressed I would “allow” such a thing to happen), and supplementing his mother’s diet with fish oil. Further herbal recommendations were made directly for the child; these I flatly refused to entertain without knowing the exact contents and pharmacologic interactions. In the end, the family was pleased by the visit, we enhanced our relationship with them, and prevented the child from coming to harm.
In this episode, I don’t feel that it was in the child’s best interest to fight the battle between EBM and CAM at his bedside (though I acknowledge that such a fight may be required under different circumstances). In hindsight, though, I feel it could have been handled slightly differently. We frequently have priests, imams, prayer sessions, rabbis, etc visit children within the PICU and make no special arrangements. We will speak to these people about their thoughts on the patient and the family’s condition, if they so desire. We do not, however, seek to give them privileges within the hospital. I think that I should have allowed the family to have the chiropractor visit as they would any other family friend, and if they wanted me to speak with him, I would agree to do so. This would have allowed the family to be heard and to have their needs sated without giving the mistaken impression of treating a chiropractor as an equal.
What are we to make, however, of the situation within our academic institutions? As long as CAM is supported, EBM will remain difficult to practice. The public will become more confused as to what constitutes safe and effective medicine, funds will be wasted on futile projects, and medical progress will be retarded. Most concerning, the next generation of physicians, immersed in the mutually exclusive principles of CAM and EBM will be poorly prepared to provide the best possible care to their patients.
The current political, commercial, and academic powers have been ineffective at preventing the corrosion of the principles of EBM. We have a professional and ethical obligation to strengthen and reform the intellectual infrastructure of medicine. If, however, it is no longer sufficient for physicians to align themselves with existing organizations in order to stand clearly in support of EBM, it may be time to develop a way for physicians and health care professionals who practice science based, evidence based medicine to publicly stand up and be counted.
Primum non nocere. An unattainable goal it may be, but a relentless commitment to EBM is the only way for us to honor our duty to our patients and our profession. To compromise for anything less is unacceptable.

   How SHOULD We Discuss Quackery with Innocents and the Not-so-Innocent?
Kimball Atwood 
Link
Recents posts by Drs. Albietz and Gorski have highlighted questions that are recurrent on SBM. We are convinced that medicine should be based on real knowledge, to the extent that it exists, and that physicians should be honest; these are matters of science and ethics. How do we reconcile that with heartfelt, if misguided beliefs of patients, their families, and others? When Dr. Albietz wrote that it might have been better for the chiropractor to visit in the same way that “priests, imams, prayer sessions, rabbis, etc visit children within the PICU,” it was reminiscent of Dr. Peter Moran’s hypothetical “witch doctor.” When he lamented academic medicine’s current dalliances with quackery, it brought to mind the NCCAM, David Katz, Andrew Weil, Bravewell , and their enablers.
Dr. Albietz argued that when talking to credulous patients or their families, taking a hard line against quackery is likely to be counter-productive. Most of us would agree with that. Dr. Gorski described a different scenario: after calling a quack “a quack” when talking to a friend of a friend who is a scientist, he concluded that he had been too “blunt.” Several commenters disagreed, but all would probably agree with Dr. Gorski that “you have to know when to pick one way over another; i.e., diplomacy over all out war or vice versa.”
Another Case of Foot-In-Mouth Disease
I recently had an experience strikingly similar to Dr. Gorski’s, during which I castigated myself for my rancor even as I was incapable of moderating it. Fellow blogger Dr. Val Jones was a witness!
A couple of weeks ago there was a meeting in Philadelphia of those involved with, or otherwise interested in the Health Care Renewal (HCR) blog and its related organization, the Foundation for Integrity and Responsibility in Medicine (FIRM). The blog had been started several years ago by Drs. Roy Poses of Brown, Wally Smith of Virginia Commonwealth University, and Russ Maulitz of Drexel. Those three docs lamented recent threats to the core values of medicine:
The Problem:
Health care around the world is beset by
    • rising costs
    • declining access
    • stagnant quality
    • increasingly dissatisfied health care professionals.
    • Physicians fear their core values are threatened.
These values include:
        ◦ putting the interests of individual patients ahead of other concerns;
        ◦ practicing with honesty and integrity;
        ◦ keeping patients’ information confidential;
        ◦ teaching the next generation of health professionals;
        ◦ practicing medicine based on science and scientific principles.
        ◦ Strong but generally unrecognized threats to these values arise from concentration and abuse of power in health care systems, because:
        ◦ health care is increasingly dominated by large organizations;
        ◦ these are often led by the ill-informed, the self-interested, and even the corrupt.
        ◦ Thus, the results are:
        ◦ patients and physicians are caught in cross-fires between conflicting interests;
        ◦ patients and physicians are subject to perverse incentives;
        ◦ free speech and academic freedom are threatened;
        ◦ pseudo-science and anti-science are gaining ground.
You can see, especially in the last bullet, why I was attracted to this group. After years of email discussions and blogging, the principals convened a one-day meeting to consider how the movement might grow. It attracted about 50 people from a variety of backgrounds: academic and practicing physicians, medical informatics experts, at least one medical student, the editor of the Annals of Internal Medicine, health policy researchers, a few reporters, my co-author and president of CIRCARE Liz Woeckner, Dr. Val (who had just finished sitting on a panel with Roy Poses at a different meeting), several lawyers (including frequent SBM commenter Marilyn Mann), and more.
There was a dinner at a local restaurant the night before the meeting. About 18 participants were there, spread among 3 tables. I sat between Dr. Val and a physician I’d not previously met, whom I shall call Dr. O. The ambient noise level was high, so most conversations involved only 2-3 people. I can’t remember how it started (did she ask me how I came to be involved with this group?), but at some point I heard myself explaining to Dr. O that I was skeptical of implausible medical claims. That soon led to my offering homeopathy as an example of a claim that doesn’t warrant the slightest credibility, and certainly doesn’t warrant clinical trials.
It might have been then that Dr. O said something like, “I’m a faculty member at the first science-based CAM program in the country.” The inherent contradiction aside, that was a show-stopper if there ever was one. It began to dawn on me that I knew who she was: a “CAM” researcher who has stuck to the relatively plausible end of the “CAM”-scale, namely botanicals, and who has published articles that seem reasonable—when viewed through the prior probability-impoverished lens of Evidence-Based Medicine—if banal. Dr. O has also written some more interesting and useful articles about how industry has influenced medical research and practice, including examples of ghostwriting of papers and effects on prescribing patterns. It is the latter activity that drew her to the HCR/FIRM group and vice-versa.
Dr. O continued by observing that the “homeopathy debate” is a vigorous one among her colleagues, with about equal numbers believing that homeopathy does or doesn’t work. She suggested, however, that all of them agree that it ought to be tested, and didn’t I as well? No, I didn’t; or, more precisely, there have already been billions and trillions of tests of homeopathy, in the form of purposeful or incidental tests of the 2nd law of thermodynamics, and no small, error-prone clinical trials could possibly overthrow those findings. I hoped to make a general point about prior probability that might get her to entertain a more scientific point of view; I wanted to summarize arguments made here and here in just a few sentences. Alas, ’twas not to be.
I’d barely taken my next breath when she said something like, “but how can you dismiss all of CAM research? There are some brilliant CAM researchers!” Yikes. I should know that feeling by now: she got my goat and I was about to say things that I might later regret:
“Who, for example?”
“So and So.”
“So and So? So and So is a fraud!”
“HOW can you say he’s a fraud? So and So is one of my dearest friends!”
“For one thing, his [degree] isn’t even real!”
“That’s not true! [His] medical school looked into that and found out that it was real!”
“Oh yeah? I’d love to see the evidence. I was one of the people who asked [his] medical school to look at the issue, and I doubt that they did it in a thorough way.” 
“YOU DID THAT? Do you realize the hell that he went through because of that?”
It was loud in the restaurant, and I missed a lot of what she said next, but I’m pretty sure she called me “a miserable human being.” Shortly thereafter she got up and left, although dinner was barely half over. I’d made an attempt to salvage the conversation (“why don’t we talk about this some other time when we’re more calm and can hear each other better?”), but she was having none of it.
As soon as she left I turned to Dr. Val, who had gleaned but a small amount of what had just happened, and said something like “I can’t believe what an idiot I was. WHY did I have to say that?” Even though, like Dr. Gorski, I believed everything I’d said. The point is, “you have to know when to pick one way over another,” and sitting in a loud restaurant next to someone you’ve just met, who probably assumes that you share fundamental views about medicine, isn’t a time to pick “all out war.”
It’s funny: I got the feeling that Dr. O was far more surprised by me than I was by her. I wondered why. Wasn’t she aware that two of the group’s perceived threats to medicine’s core values were “pseudo-science and anti-science”? Had she read a paper written by Roy Poses a few years ago, in which he elaborated on the bulleted points made in the quotation above? In a section entitled “Attacks on the scientific basis of medicine,” Dr. Poses wrote:
Postmodernists argued that clinical trials became pre-eminent not because they are less susceptible to selection bias than are observational studies, but because they somehow gained more political support than did other methods, e.g., ‘in a self-authenticating manner, the double-blind RCT became the instrument to prove its own self-created value system’.’’
And:
Postmodern arguments also underlie some of the current enthusiasm for alternative medicine. For example, …the editors of a prominent published series on alternative medicine…asserted the ‘old cultural war of a dominant culture versus heretical rebellion in politics and religion as well as medicine has begun to transform into a recognition of postmodern multiple narratives’.”
If Dr. O had read that paper, she would have known that the quoted PoMo drivel had been written by…So and So! Copies of the paper were handed out at the meeting; I wonder if she’s read it by now.
The Changing Etiquette of Criticism
The whole matter got me to thinking, for the umpteenth time, about how American society’s view of acceptable criticism seems to have changed in the recent past. Calling a thing by its name, even if unflattering, used to be honorable; now it’s considered shrill, or worse, mean. When Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., discussed the views of his contemporary, Samuel Hahnemann, he didn’t give what is now called a “balanced” presentation. Responding to Hahnemann’s claim in the Organon—”It was by these means” (i.e. Homeopathically) “that the Princess Eudosia with rose-water restored a person who had fainted!”—Holmes wondered:
Is it possible that a man who is guilty of such pedantic folly as this—a man who can see a confirmation of his doctrine in such a recovery as this—a recovery which is happening every day, from a breath of air, a drop or two of water, untying a bonnet-string, loosening a stay-lace, and which can hardly help happening, whatever is done—is it possible that a man, of whose pages, not here and there one, but hundreds upon hundreds are loaded with such trivialities, is the Newton, the Columbus, the Harvey of the nineteenth century!
Such stark criticism was still de rigueur only a few decades ago. At the HCR/FIRM meeting, Dr. Scot Silverstein told of his mentor, the cardiac surgeon Victor Satinsky, who had argued “that ‘use of public embarrassment’ was an effective tool in dealing with the corrupt.” It was during his Summer Science Training Program for gifted high school students, taught at the Hahnemann Hospital, of all places, that Satinsky made that statement.
I realize that this lamentation—the degradation of good criticism in our time—does not apply to such scenarios as Dr. Gorski’s with his friend’s friend or mine with Dr. O. In my case, it was a matter of matching the presentation to the occasion, and I’m afraid I did not do that very well. Nevertheless, we must insist, in the relevant venues, on being honest and unyielding in our criticisms of quackery.
Near the end of the meeting day, I saw Dr. O again. She appeared to be in a conciliatory mood; she even asked me if I would be walking to the train with a few others, including her. I would not be, but I got the impression that there might have been just a scant possibility of communicating without rancor. Maybe not: the charge that I had made is a serious one. Perhaps one day I’ll write about it here, using real names.
The greater issue involving science, medicine, ethics, honesty, and language is even more serious. Dr. Albietz correctly worried that “the next generation of physicians, immersed in the mutually exclusive principles of CAM and EBM, will be poorly prepared to provide the best possible care to their patients.” If the “open forum” that followed the article linked from the first mention of Dr. Poses’ name above is any measure, “poorly prepared” is an understatement.

When science- and evidence-based guidelines conflict with patient wishes: What’s a doc to do?
We use the term “science-based medicine” (SBM) because medicine isn’t a science. The best medicine, however, is based in science. Patient values are also important, but what is a science-based doctor to do when SBM conflicts with what a patient or family wants?
David Gorski on October 3, 2016
Link

There’s a misconception that I frequently hear about evidence-based medicine (EBM), which can equally apply to science-based medicine (SBM). Actually, there are several, but they are related. These misconceptions include the idea that EBM/SBM guidelines are a straightjacket, that they are “cookbook medicine,” and that EBM/SBM should be the be-all and end-all of how to practice clinical medicine. New readers might not be familiar with the difference between EBM and SBM, and here is not the place to explain the difference in detail because this post isn’t primarily about that difference. However, for interested readers, a fuller explanation can be found here, here, here, and here. The CliffsNote version is that EBM fetishizes the randomized clinical trial above all other forms of medical investigation, a system that makes sense if the treatments being tested in RCTs have a reasonably high prior probability of translating to human therapies based on basic science mechanisms, experimental evidence in cell culture, and animal experiments. Using Bayesian considerations, when the prior probability is very low (as is the case for, for example, homeopathy), there will be a lot of false positive trials. Such is how EBM was blindsided by the pseudoscience of “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) or, as it is called now, “integrative medicine.”
However, for purposes of this post, SBM and EBM can be considered more or less equivalent, because we are not going to be discussing CAM, but rather widely accepted treatment guidelines based on science, both basic and clinical trial science. I merely mention this difference for completeness and for new readers who might not be familiar with the topics routinely discussed here. For purposes of this post, I’m talking evidence-based guidelines from major medical societies. More specifically, I want to address the disconnect between what patients often want and what our current guidelines state. It’s not just patients either, but doctors; however, for purposes of this post I’m going to focus more on patients. It’s a topic I’ve addressed before, in particular when it comes to breast cancer, where I’ve discussed changes in the mammography screening guidelines and Choosing Wisely guidelines for breast cancer. There are many other examples that I haven’t discussed.
What got me thinking about this again was an article by Don S. Dizon, MD, FACP, Associate Professor of Gynecologic Oncology at Harvard Medical School, appearing in the ASCO Post entitled “Evidence Should Inform Guidelines, Not Be Used as a Mandate.” While I agree with a lot of what Dr. Dizon writes, I also have a couple of nits to pick as well, but first let’s see what he wrote.
Early detection of cancer recurrence: Evidence versus patient wishes
While cancer patients are understandably overjoyed when their treatment successfully puts them into remission, they are equally understandably frightened as well. What terrifies them, of course, is the fear that their cancer will recur to claim their lives. It’s not an unreasonable fear, either, because even for early stage invasive breast cancer, which is highly successfully treated, long term survival is well over 90%, which means that 5-10% will still recur in their lifetimes despite the best efforts and maximal therapy. For higher stages of breast cancer and other cancers, the risk is higher. As the years go by and patients pass the five year mark, that fear will tend to recede, but it never goes away, particularly for hormone receptor-positive breast cancer (for example), which is notorious for recurring late, sometimes as late as 20 years later. Here’s where patient wishes frequently clash with EBM/SBM. Patients naturally want to be monitored frequently and aggressively for recurrence. However, for many cancers oncologists know that, paradoxically, early detection of recurrence does not impact survival.
This is true, for example, for ovarian cancer, and Dr. Dizon, being a gynecologic oncologist, begins with one of his patients, whom he calls “Jody.” Jody was treated two years ago for a rare form of ovarian cancer. At surgery, fortunately it was confined to the pelvis and had not spread to the abdomen. She then underwent chemotherapy, and her CA-125 levels fell with each cycle until her CA-125 was within the normal range. CA-125 is a tumor marker frequently elevated in ovarian cancer and useful for following response to therapy. If therapy doesn’t drop CA-125 to normal, chances are that there’s residual disease. Also, frequently, a rising CA-125 level is the first indication of recurrence, which made it very attractive for oncologists to follow CA-125 levels after successful treatment of ovarian cancer.
With that background in place, Dr. Dizon continues:
At her first post-chemotherapy visit, I relayed the results of her CA-125 and CT. “Based on both, you are now in remission.”
“Wow,” she said. “I am so relieved this is over. What comes next, though?”
At that point I discussed her follow-up. “Your risk of recurring will be greatest in the next 3 years,” I said. “As such, I’d like you to be seen here every 3 months for a physical exam that will include a pelvic. I really wouldn’t recommend anything more.”
“Wait—no blood tests? What about imaging?” she asked.
These are, of course, perfectly reasonable questions, questions that virtually every cancer patient asks when confronted with a post-therapy screening regimen that strikes them as insufficiently aggressive. After all, intuitively, it seems “obvious” to most people that early detection of a recurrence should lead to better outcomes, just as it is intuitively “obvious” to most people that early detection of cancer in a healthy population should lead to better survival and better outcomes. Yet, as any longtime reader of SBM knows, that is often not the case. Thanks to overdiagnosis (the diagnosis of subclinical disease that would never progress to harm the patient), lead time bias (how screening can give the false appearance of prolonging life even in the absence of effective treatment), and length bias (the bias in screening towards picking up indolent, slowly progressing disease), the relationship between early detection and prognosis is not nearly as clear as “intuition” leads us to believe. In other words, more is not necessarily better, the assumption of even doctors that failure to screen kills their patients. The reality is that screening for cancer (or any disease) in asymptomatic people can help, but it can also harm. Most patients (and, unfortunately, a lot of doctors) don’t understand that.
Many of these considerations come into play in screening a cancer patient for recurrence after she has been successfully treated to bring her cancer into remission, although the difference is that the incidence of recurrence will be much higher in such patients than the incidence of the disease is in asymptomic patients never before diagnosed with cancer. It’s also why, for most cancers, evidence-based guidelines no longer recommend intensive screening for recurrence after successful treatment, as is the case for ovarian cancer, which Dr. Dizon tried to explain to his patient:
“Well,” I answered, “the data suggest that nothing else will be very helpful. I know we measured your CA-125 during treatment, but it was to help me guide the impact of chemotherapy. After treatment, a large randomized trial done in the United Kingdom showed that routinely measuring CA-125 isn’t helpful. In that trial, women entering remission agreed to have their CA-125 levels checked but the results were masked. If their CA-125 rose above twice the upper limit of normal, patients were randomly assigned to one group who were told their CA-125 and asked to start chemotherapy as soon as possible (called the “early” chemotherapy group) or to another group who were not told their CA-125 and only started chemotherapy when clinical or symptomatic relapse was diagnosed (called the “delayed” chemotherapy group). The upshot is that overall survival was no different between either group. The only impact was that women in the early chemotherapy group experienced worsening of their perceived health sooner than those treated in the delayed group.”
“Therefore,” I concluded, “on the basis of pretty good data, it would be very reasonable not to follow your CA-125 if you are feeling well. However, if you develop any symptoms at all, or if you are worried at some point, we could certainly check it. As for imaging, I wouldn’t subject you to CT scans at regular intervals if you feel well. If we do a scan, it should be because there’s a question or a concern.”
This is the study to which Dr. Dizon was referring. There were 1,442 patients in the study, and its conclusions were about as unequivocal as one can get in a study:
Our findings showed no evidence of a survival benefit with early treatment of relapse on the basis of a raised CA125 concentration alone, and therefore the value of routine measurement of CA125 in the follow-up of patients with ovarian cancer who attain a complete response after first-line treatment is not proven.
To repeat: The only effect of screening CA-125 and treating early based on a biochemical increase in the level of the tumor marker was more treatment with chemotherapy and a longer period of time with a recurrence before death.
Ovarian cancer is not alone
It’s not just ovarian cancer for which intensive screening is not recommended after curative treatment has successfully resulted in cancer remission. In fact, after a period of time a couple of decades ago when we were routinely screening patients for recurrence, we’ve learned again that more is not necessarily better and that less can be more. Consider Choosing Wisely, a program initiated by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) Foundation that challenged medical professional societies to identify and publicize medical practices that are not evidence-based but nonetheless common. (Given my tendencies, I can’t help but contrast Choosing Wisely to how practitioners of CAM pretty much never urge their members to abandon practices that aren’t evidence-based, but I digress, if only slightly.) Among these first five guidelines was this:
Don’t perform surveillance testing (biomarkers) or imaging (PET, CT, and radionuclide bone scans) for asymptomatic individuals who have been treated for breast cancer with curative intent.
    • Surveillance testing with serum tumor markers or imaging has been shown to have clinical value for certain cancers (e.g., colorectal). However for breast cancer that has been treated with curative intent, several studies have shown there is no benefit from routine imaging or serial measurement of serum tumor markers in asymptomatic patients.
    • False-positive tests can lead to harm through unnecessary invasive procedures, over-treatment, unnecessary radiation exposure, and misdiagnosis.
That was 2012. What about now? Well, ASCO has doubled down, recently extending the recommendation to basically all cancers, at least as far as advanced imaging, such as CT and PET scans go:
Avoid using PET or PET-CT scanning as part of routine follow-up care to monitor for a cancer recurrence in asymptomatic patients who have finished initial treatment to eliminate the cancer unless there is high-level evidence that such imaging will change the outcome.
    • PET and PET-CT are used to diagnose, stage and monitor how well treatment is working. Available evidence from clinical studies suggests that using these tests to monitor for recurrence does not improve outcomes and therefore generally is not recommended for this purpose.
    • False positive tests can lead to unnecessary and invasive procedures, overtreatment, unnecessary radiation exposure and incorrect diagnoses.
    • Until high level evidence demonstrates that routine surveillance with PET or PET-CT scans helps prolong life or promote well-being after treatment for a specific type of cancer, this practice should not be done.
There are exceptions, one of which, at least, leads to some disagreement with the ASCO Choosing Wisely guideline above. For example, for colorectal cancer, for high risk patients with colorectal cancer (stage II or III) treated with curative intent, there is high level evidence that intensive surveillance can be beneficial for high risk patients (stages II and III) treated for cure with normal CEA levels and no evidence of disease on scans—although that even has its caveats. For example, the authors of the guidelines for surveillance after treatment of colorectal cancer caution:
Seven meta-analyses have addressed the relationship between intensive surveillance and survival following re- section of colorectal cancer2,23–28 (table 2) including an updated Cochrane analyses.28 All meta-analyses report increased curative resections and improved survival in patients undergoing more intensive surveillance. One meta-analysis,2 which included the largest number of cases (n = 2923), reported that more intense follow-up was associated with increased curative resection rate (24.3% vs 9.9%) and improved survival (78.2% vs 74.3%). In the most recent Cochrane analysis, improved chance of curative surgery for recurrence was associated with higher intensity of surveillance (OR, 2.41; 95% Ci, 1.64–3.54).28 however, there are difficulties with evaluating these studies because testing modalities and the definitions of “intense follow-up” vary. When evaluating the RCT and meta-analyses data in total, it appears that curative resection for recurrence uniformly increases with increased surveillance, whereas the survival advantage is more variable, and likely modest at best.
Another exception: Surveillance colonoscopy is recommended every year for five years for patients with colorectal cancer treated with curative resection.
I could go on with multiple other examples, but the point remains. For the vast majority of cancers, intensive screening after curative treatment does not result in prolong survival, and, even when there is evidence that it does, such as in colorectal cancer, the survival benefit reported is variable and at best very modest. That means that the overall message to oncologists for most cancers is: Don’t be ordering CT scans every six months or following tumor markers every three months. It’s a viewpoint that oncologists have resisted but are finally coming around to. It’s also a viewpoint that is not popular with patients, as you will see.
Dr. Dizon’s patient reacts
Consistent with what I’ve been saying, Dr. Dizon’s patient was not—shall we say?—enthusiastic about his recommendation:
She had looked at me then, not quite sure what to make of this. “Okay, but if I want my CA-125 checked every 3 months you’d do it?”
“Yes, I would,” I said. “I just wanted to make sure you had all the information you needed to make that decision.”
“Fine,” she continued. “I would really prefer we checked my CA-125 when I came in for my exams. It just doesn’t make sense to me that it wouldn’t be helpful.”
See what I mean by these new data being counterintuitive? Most patients react that way, and it often requires a fair amount of explaining and cajoling to reassure the patient that doing a bunch of expensive tests (or even a relatively inexpensive blood test many times) will not benefit the patient, at least not in terms of overall survival, and is likely to negatively impact her quality of life. On the other hand, anxiety is a powerful motivator, and, if it is intense enough, can rub off on even the most experienced clinician armed with piles of evidence from well-designed clinical trials to support his recommendations.
Here’s what happened next at a later visit by the patient for followup after her having persuaded Dr. Dizon to do regular CA-125 levels:
Unfortunately, her CA-125 result came back markedly elevated. I called her and gave her the results, recommending that we get a CT scan. She agreed.
Jody returned to my office the following week. Her CT showed new growth in her abdomen, consistent with peritoneal disease. I started to review options for treatment, but she stopped me. “I just need you to know that I am angry,” she said. “Thank God I asked to have my CA-125 followed—it’s how we picked up this disease. I can’t even imagine where I’d be had I taken your advice and didn’t do bloodwork and just waited for symptoms. Who on earth would follow such advice? It’s like you had asked me to put my head in the sand and ignore what was going on around me. I’m sorry, but I could never do that—and it turns out, I was right.”
I wasn’t prepared for her anger, especially about a conversation we had had years earlier, but I also knew that rehashing the data would serve no purpose. So, instead of going through the data once more, I did what I thought was best. I apologized:
“Jody, I am sorry that you had felt like I was imposing a recommendation on you. It was not my intent. I had hoped to let you know of your options, so that, together, we could choose a surveillance strategy that made sense to you. To do it, I wanted to make sure you knew that there was data available. If it came across any other way, then I take responsibility.”
Whether this was the right course of action or not, I’m not sure. One could certainly argue that that visit wasn’t the right time for Dr. Dizon to point out that he had done nothing wrong and in fact did everything right. As physicians, it is our job to present the best evidence-based treatment recommendations that we can, personalizing them to the patient. Indeed, my main quibble with him is that, at least as he told the story, Dr. Dizon gave in too easily to agreeing to do something that he himself knew not to be purely evidence-based. Personally, although I agree in general with Dr. Dizon’s conclusion, I wasn’t sure, as I read his article, whether Jody was the best example to use to illustrate the principle:
But Jody reminded me once more that evidence has its place­, but it’s not gospel. In the end, the data need to be interpreted by our patients, in the context of their own preferences and values, and each person will reach a different conclusion. In the end, evidence should inform our guidance, but it should not be used to enforce mandates.
On the other hand, if the survival outcome is the same regardless of whether one checks CA-125 levels every three months after curative treatment of ovarian cancer or not, one can argue that there wouldn’t be a lot of harm in acceding to the wishes of patients like Jody. Going against that conclusion is evidence that diagnostic tests with a low pretest probability of disease to rule out conditions and reassure the patient actually do little to reassure patients or decrease their anxiety. Indeed, there is actually evidence that more testing increases patient anxiety and certainly leads to higher costs.
Be that as it may, I myself have not infrequently said that a patient’s values matter, using this example. Some patients want to do everything; others value quality of life over quantity. Our job is to give the best evidence-based recommendation that will fit in with the patient’s values. However, in this age where we cannot just ignore cost, a very uncomfortable question always rears its ugly head: How much more are we willing to pay to deviate from evidence-based guidelines to accommodate a patient’s values? If physicians and patients together don’t answer that question, we can be sure that third party payers will.

Should the Incidental Discovery of Nonparentage be Disclosed?
Clay Jones on August 1, 2014
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The July issue of Pediatrics, the official journal of the American Academy of Pediatrics, contains an extremely thought provoking article discussing the risks and benefits of disclosing an incidental finding of nonparentage during pediatric genetic testing. Nonparentage occurs when one, or very rarely both, of the social parents did not serve as source code for a child’s genetic programming, so to speak. Naturally, we aren’t talking about known adoptions but rather when the nonbiological parent is unaware of the fact that they did not contribute an egg or sperm.
Authors Marissa Palmor and Autumn Fiester, both bioethicists at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perelman School of Medicine, take the position of universal nondisclosure when nonparentage is discovered. They acknowledge the pro-disclosure arguments and, in my opinion, successfully rebut them. They go on to make a compelling recommendation for the incorporation of a universal nondisclosure clause into consent forms which states clearly that parental status will not be discussed.
They start the article off with a case that nicely demonstrates how a healthcare professional might face the difficult decision of whether or not to disclose a finding of nonparentage. Rather than the exceedingly more common paternal nonparentage, the case involves a couple that required the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) and the discovery that “Mrs. Johnson” is not the biological mother. This is not at all an unheard of complication of the IVF process, although it is rare, as all it takes is a clerical error to retrieve the wrong egg or sperm for fertilization, or even the wrong embryo for implantation.
Again, the possibility that an IVF clinic would make a mistake that would result in maternal or paternal nonparentage is very low. But the overall incidence of nonpaternity in general is probably higher than most dads would like to admit. This 2005 review of nonpaternity studies found rates ranging from 0.8% to 30% depending on the study population and risk factors, with a mean of 3.7% of children being fathered by someone other than the man who identifies himself as the biological father.
Specific paternity testing for legal reasons will likely always reveal the majority of cases of nonpaternity. But as our medical diagnostic capabilities continue to improve and more genetic testing takes place, the incidental discovery of nonparentage will assuredly increase. The ethical considerations of such a finding, and the repercussions of either disclosing or not, are considerable. So it shouldn’t be surprising that there are proponents of either course, with both sides able to cite a long list of arguments. The authors of the paper even admit that while they believe that the nondisclosure side has the stronger argument, they don’t claim to have solved the issue and state that this is an area of much controversy. There is not a consensus approach yet. Palmor and Fiester, after a careful weighing of the risks and benefits, present what is in their opinion a practical approach for the interim.
Arguments in favor of disclosure
So how do proponents of disclosure justify such a revelation? Before I go further, I feel that it’s important to point out that there is a dearth of evidence available for either side of the argument to turn to for support. Everything is a potential risk or benefit. The social variables are far too numerous, and the human reactions to such news too complex, for there ever to be a predictive algorithm, which of course plays a role in the reasoning behind the author’s recommendation of nondisclosure.
Here we go.
Argument 1 – Parents have a right to know.Argument 2 – The child has a right to know.Argument 3 – Not disclosing is paternalistic.Argument 4 – Physicians are obligated to tell the truthArgument 5 – There are potential medical benefits for the childArgument 6 – It’s better to disclose now because finding out later might be worse
The rebuttal and arguments in favor of nondisclosure
Argument 1 rebuttal – This approach often assumes that deception was involved, or at least negligence, leading to a gut feeling that a wrong must be righted in some way. A father is unknowingly devoting time and resources to someone else’s child for example, or the family is in the case of an error during the IVF process. I can certainly empathize with the desire to see that justice is served.
But, the authors’ offer up in response, “it is not possible to exercise this right in a way that guarantees the social parents an autonomous, informed decision to receive or waive the information.” Patient autonomy, or legal authority in the case of a minor, is a core principle of ethical medical practice which requires that decisions be based on appropriate education without undue pressure from the healthcare professional. We make recommendations and obtain informed consent, but we generally try to avoid making a decision for a patient.
Imagine the following conversation starter:
Geneticist- “I have information which I can either disclose or not. It was an incidental finding, unrelated to your child’s health, that might benefit certain members of your family but it also might lead to social upheaval in the form of divorce, relocation, loss of resources for childcare, negative psychological affects, etc. Will you consent for disclosure of this information.”
It is hard to imagine that a family would decline such an invitation. In the case of an incidental discovery of nonparentage, by either disclosing without consent or attempting to obtain consent, the parent(s) will almost certainly have had their right to autonomy sacrificed. Remember, the family did not come in actively seeking to investigate parentage. This isn’t like disclosing the result of a biopsy, where the patient has agreed to the procedure and the report of findings, and has had the opportunity to consider the repercussions.
Argument 2 rebuttal – Does the child have a right to know that his father isn’t who he thinks it is. The authors use the example of genetic testing for a disease with no known treatment, the prime example being that of Huntington’s disease. This is a genetic condition which typically presents later in life and results in death roughly 20 years after symptoms begin, usually from pneumonia, heart disease or suicide. Testing the child of a patient with Huntington’s isn’t ethical because a young child cannot give informed consent and, according to Palmor and Fiester, this parallels disclosing nonparentage because both result in only “negative information.”
Argument 3 rebuttal – Is not disclosing nonparentage paternalistic? Palmor and Fiester argue that it isn’t because the information withheld by the physician wasn’t sought out. A good example would be the intentional withholding of biopsy results showing metastatic cancer because a physician thought that the patient wouldn’t be able to handle it emotionally. If the patient consented to have the biopsy performed, and understood what the findings might or might not be, then it would be paternalistic to not disclose the findings. Again in the case of an incidental finding of nonparentage, no informed consent has been obtained regarding the information and the preferences of the family isn’t known.
The authors make the valid comparison to a third party disclosing infidelity of a spouse. Some might appreciate knowing that their husband or wife has been unfaithful while others may be resentful of the intrusion into their personal affairs. A physician with the burden of whether or not to disclose incidental nonparentage, unless some kind of a sociopath, will struggle with the decision and has no idea what impact their disclosure will have.
Physicians must, with every possible intervention, consider both the risks and the benefits. We often must strive to balance the seemingly contradictory duties of beneficence and non-maleficence. A treatment may cure a patient of a disease, but it may have serious side effects. Proper informed consent allows the opportunity for a patient or caregiver to decide for themselves, based on appropriate information from the physician, the personal importance of the risks and benefits. Going forward with disclosure of nonparentage, to me, is more deserving of the label of paternalism.
Argument 4 rebuttal – Are physicians obligated to tell the truth? Does dishonesty damage the relationship forged between a medical professional and a patient? The answer is of course a resounding yes. Palmor and Fiester argue, however, that nondisclosure does not constitute dishonesty in the way that intentionally giving inaccurate information does.
Is not telling a patient about to start a treatment course that there is a remote chance of developing an itchy rash an example of dishonesty? Or if a physician chose to not reveal an unrelated, transient and clinically meaningless mild lab abnormality while discussing a new diagnosis of inflammatory bowel disease? To say that the incidental finding of nonparentage warrants disclosure, while other information does not, requires knowledge of the involved parties that could only be obtained with appropriate informed consent. And if the family has already made it clear that they are interested in parentage testing, they can easily be directed to widely available resources for obtaining it elsewhere.
Argument 5 rebuttal – Can a child benefit medically from the disclosure of nonparentage? This seems obvious on a common sense level, considering how much emphasis is commonly put on family history when assessing health and the risk for future medical problems. Palmor and Fiester counter this argument with the claim that a child is very unlikely to benefit medically with the exception of very rare genetic conditions. The reason for this is that disclosure doesn’t reveal the genetic risks of the biological father or mother, and they may be the same as the nonbiological social parent for all they know.
Argument 6 rebuttal – To me, this argument seems the easiest to refute. It is based on the assumption that the child will eventually find out anyway, so you might as well tell them. But, as the authors state, that is pure speculation. Most of the potentially disastrous outcomes related to disclosure would only be possible when the child is young. The effect of parental divorce, for instance, has considerably more potential for harming the psychosocial development of a toddler than it does an adult.
Why universal nondisclosure?
Absent a compelling argument that not revealing nonparentage to a family risks significant harm, and in light of the very real potential for harm from disclosure, Palmor and Fiester believe that there should be a proactive move to put policies regarding universal nondisclosure into place. They argue that “To disclose or not to disclose?” is simply a question that health care professionals have no legitimate right to decide. They base this declaration on the realization that physicians, ethics committees and hospital administrators, among many other healthcare entities, have no real emotional or material stake in the information.
My personal experiences with nonparentage
As a newborn hospitalist, I spend a lot of time with happy parents and their newly arrived bundle(s) of joy. Unless informed otherwise, such as when the infant has been conceived with the assistance of IVF technology involving donor egg or sperm, there is a general assumption that the baby is the product of the genetic contributions of both parents. Obviously, this isn’t always the case.
In my line of work, the issue of potential nonparentage can come up every now and then. I never bring it up intentionally, but I’ve been asked by some fathers if paternity testing is available. I typically invite them to have that kind of testing performed elsewhere and then I worry about my patient’s future. It’s not a sign that things are going well at home.
Sometimes the issue is forced upon me in a much more uncomfortable way. While we don’t routinely need to determine the blood type of a newborn, it is sometimes necessary when there is a potential incompatibility with the mother. When a mother’s blood type is O, and the baby’s is either A or B, there is a potential for an immune response to have occurred prenatally which could lead to anemia and severe jaundice after the child has been born. Knowing the baby’s blood type helps us determine risk and manage accordingly.
At some point in every pediatrician’s career, particularly if they see newborns all day long as I often do, a father will put two and two together when the baby’s blood type reveals that it isn’t his child. If a mother has O (2 O alleles) blood, and a father has A (AO or AA) blood, for instance, a baby with B (BO or BB) blood would be suspicious for paternal nonparentage. That B had to come from somewhere.
It’s happened to me twice. My response, and it’s true, is that many people base what they think that their blood type is on what they remember from years ago. People are often mistaken. I recommended that they not pursue testing and stated that such testing was not available here but that there were resources available in the community. I then slowly backed out of the room, faked a seizure to get out of work and found the nearest pub.
Conclusion
I agree with the authors’ assessment of the arguments in favor of disclosure. I’m not a bioethicist, but my skeptical sixth sense didn’t go off. I don’t believe that there are any straw men being set up just to be burned down. I think that pro-disclosure arguments do have some merit, I just think that the arguments against disclosure win the day.

Beyond Informed Consent: Shared Decision-Making
Harriet Hall on January 1, 2013
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Happy New Year to all our readers! Today marks the completion of 5 years of SBM and the beginning of year 6. My contributions, at one a week, have now reached a total of 260. My first post on this blog, 5 years ago, was a review of an important book about science and alternative medicine, Snake Oil Science. This year I’d like to start with an important book about communicating medical science to patients, Critical Decisions, by Peter A. Ubel, M.D.
I was wrong about informed consent. I thought informed consent was a matter of explaining the risks and benefits of treatments to patients so they could decide what they wanted to do. That was naïve, simplistic, and misguided. Ubel’s book has radically changed my thinking about how doctors should interact with patients.
Paternalism in medicine is dead. Patient autonomy rules. We respect the right of patients to determine their own treatments, even if their choices seem unwise to us. Patients should do what they want. But there’s a problem: patients may not know what they really want. Emotions and unconscious and irrational forces influence their medical decisions. Preferences can change from one moment to the next, and they can shift with subtle changes in how treatments are described and how the issues are framed. Doctors need to develop a better understanding of what is going on in their patients’ minds, of how the way they present treatment options can inadvertently influence patients, and of how they can participate with patients in a process of shared decision-making. It’s possible to provide direction without paternalism.
The biopsy shows prostate cancer. The doctor explains that the risk of death in this particular case is small and the options include watchful waiting instead of surgery. The patient may hear that as “I have cancer and you’re not going to do anything about it?!” Or be so alarmed (“Omigod, I’m going to die”) that he is unable to process any further information. He is told the risks of surgery, but he can’t imagine what it would really be like to live with impotence or incontinence. He may over- or under- estimate his risk of side effects and how they would affect his life. The doctor typically uses medical words that the patient doesn’t understand, and overwhelms him with abstruse details about Gleason scores and atypical cells and non-aggressive appearance on biopsy. The urologist often doesn’t recognize the emotional impact of the diagnosis and doesn’t respond to the patient’s feelings. He asks if the patient has any questions, and when the patient doesn’t ask any, he is reassured that the patient has understood. But the patient may simply be confused, scared to death, and unable to express his concerns.
What Would It Be Like?
Young people dread the limitations of old age but research shows that happiness actually tends to increase with age. People often think they would rather die than be paralyzed, go blind, etc. because they can’t imagine what it would really be like. They think they would be terribly unhappy. But in reality, people who face those challenges soon adapt to them and are just as happy as they were before. People mis-predict their own long-term emotional reactions to everything from losing a leg to winning the lottery. Winning millions makes them ecstatically happy at first, but as time passes, they end up no happier than people who didn’t play the lottery. The initial emotional impact of an injury or illness is strong, but it wanes over time. People underestimate their emotional resilience. Talking to others who have faced the same challenges may help them to judge more accurately what it would be like for them. In one anecdote in the book, a patient categorically rejects surgery involving a colostomy but doesn’t think it through to realize that he would rather live with a colostomy than die. Making a quick judgment based on an initial emotional reaction is unwise
Don’t Make Families Regret Their Decisions
Families may be reluctant to authorize “Do Not Resuscitate” orders when the doctor tells them the patient is dying and resuscitation would be futile. The current practice is to explain the situation to the family and let them (make them) decide. But Ubel says:
Resuscitating a dying patient is not the worst thing we doctors can do. Making a family regret their decision is far worse… in the vast majority of these conversations, my recommendation [for a DNR order] was met not with resistance but relief. They didn’t want their loved one to suffer, and they knew that CPR would only prolong their pain. But they didn’t want to be the ones who made that choice. My recommendation helped them by sharing the decision-making burden.
Experiments in Decision Psychology
Research has illuminated how irrational people are at making decisions. If they are trying to get a red jelly bean, they prefer to pick from a bowl of 100 jelly beans with 10 red ones than from a bowl of 10 with one red one. The odds are exactly the same, but somehow the larger bowl seems like it ought to offer more chances, even though they understand on a rational level that it doesn’t. In a hypothetical scenario where a virulent flu will kill 10% of the population and a vaccine will prevent infection but carries a 5% risk of death, people prefer inaction with a higher risk of death to taking an action that results in half the risk. On the other hand, if patients are asked to choose between watchful waiting for a cancer than has a 10% chance of eventually killing them and taking chemotherapy that will eliminate the cancer but kill 5% of patients from side effects, almost no one chooses to forgo the treatment that reduces the risk by half. Apparently there is some kind of unconscious bias against vaccines as compared to chemotherapy (?!). In a scenario where watchful waiting led to a 5% chance of death and surgery carried a 10% risk of death, most people preferred the surgery, preferring to take action even when that action was more likely to harm them. They just wanted that cancer out of their body.
When given a statistical prognosis like a 10% chance of survival, patients tend to think it doesn’t really apply to them, to think there is something about their case that ratchets their chance up to 20% or even more. Doctors, too, tend to over-estimate the chances of the patient’s survival in their unconscious desire for optimism.
The way information is framed is influential. Patients prefer an operation when it is presented as having a 90% survival rate to the same operation when presented as having a 10% mortality rate. And the power of a doctor’s recommendation is very strong. In another experiment, patients were told that the risks of a hypothetical vaccine outweighed the benefits. Then they were told that their doctor recommended it, but that their doctor didn’t know any more about the vaccine than they did. They chose the vaccine because the doctor recommended it, unconsciously feeling that the doctor knew more than they did even when they had been assured he didn’t.
Then there is the power of stories. For a surgery with a 75% success rate, telling one anecdote about a success and one about a failure seemed to cancel each other out, but 3 success anecdotes and one failure anecdote reinforced the 75% statistics and made people more willing to get the surgery, even though the anecdotes were about specific individuals and did not change the information about the actual percentage of people who would benefit.
Telling patients there is a 17% risk of side effects or showing them pie charts or graphs tends to confuse them. Pictographs with 100 squares and 17 filled in with a different color to represent side effects are far better at reminding them of the 83% who don’t get side effects.
Decision Aids
These decision psychology experiments provide clues, but it is still necessary to test every approach. A number of decision aids have been developed, such as videos showing what it is like to live with a colostomy; some patients are reassured to see how real people have adapted and how little it has affected their lives, others are repulsed by seeing a colostomy stoma. We need to test whether each component of the decision aid does more harm or good. We want to inform, not influence.
Decision aids give patients the information they need, but they don’t always change behavior. Informed patients must also be prepared to interact successfully with their doctors. Ubel provides helpful tips and guidelines for patient empowerment and better joint decision-making.
What Does Patient Autonomy Really Mean?
Every doctor has been asked “What would you do if you were me?” “What would you do if it were your mother/wife/daughter?” “What do you recommend?” Sometimes patients really want the doctor to decide for them, either because they just don’t feel confident about their knowledge and judgment or because they don’t want to feel responsible if something goes wrong. Doctors are told not to make those decisions, but to give patients the relevant information and leave the decision to them. But here’s a thought: what if the patient autonomously decides he wants the physician to choose for him? Does that count? Can he delegate and still be autonomous? What are the legal implications? Would he have to sign over a power of attorney for health care to the physician? Would that even be legally acceptable? We need to grapple with this and other thorny issues.
Conclusion
Oliver Wendell Holmes said:
Man’s mind, once stretched by a new idea, never regains its original dimensions.
This book stretched my mind, and it feels good to know that I have learned something and have improved my way of thinking. Admitting that one has been wrong should not be a source of shame, but a source of pride because one is now more right. It is one of the great joys of being a critical thinker.
Patient autonomy is good, but shared decision-making is better. The goal of truly informed consent with no hint of bias or coercion is a worthy one, but it’s not enough. The doctor and patient should cooperate in a joint decision-making process that incorporates the doctor’s medical knowledge and the patient’s values and preferences. It’s difficult for a doctor to understand those values and preferences when the patient himself may not consciously understand them or be able to articulate them. If the doctor can develop a deep understanding of the patient’s values and preferences, then he can tell him what he thinks he should do without being paternalistic or coercive. It’s complicated, and our efforts to improve the situation must be tested with the scientific method to see if they are as effective as we would like to think. If doctors and patients could all read this thought-provoking book, we would be off to a good start. Highly recommended.

Patient Participation in Decision-Making
Steven Novella on May 29, 2013
Link
“Patient-Centered” decision-making is a new buzz-word in medicine. It is a metaphor for a general approach to care that puts the patient’s experience and needs at the center, as opposed to the needs of the physician or the system.
While this is an effective marketing term, and a useful principle as far as it goes, as a guide to medical practice it is a bit simplistic. It needs to be viewed in the context of the overall medical infrastructure and the net effect specific practices have on the cost and effectiveness of medical care.
A 2012 NEJM editorial by Charles Bardes nicely summarizes the issues. He notes that patient-centered care represents the next step in a general trend (a good trend) in the medical profession over the last half-century:
The British psychoanalyst Enid Balint appears to have coined the term in 1969. She described a form of mini-psychotherapy that general practitioners could provide for persons who had illnesses that were partially or wholly psychosomatic. Her concept contrasted with “illness-oriented care” and meshed well with other critiques of modern medicine’s emphasis on pathophysiology to the exclusion of other means of knowing and treating the patient. Landmarks in this paradigm shift have included Engel’s proposal for a biopsychosocial model that would “take into account the patient, the social context in which he lives, and the complementary system devised by society to deal with the disruptive effects of illness”; Cassell’s transcriptions of clinical encounters, which provided an empirical basis for understanding the doctor–patient relationship; and Kleinman’s definitions of “disease” and “illness” as contrasting the doctor’s understanding of disordered biomechanics with the patient’s subjective experience of feeling sick.
He concludes, and I agree, that the patient and the physician are both the central actors in the doctor-patient interaction, but that there are interested third parties, like insurance companies, that also affect decision-making.
The optimal balance between the doctor, the patient, and third parties has been a longstanding debate within medicine. Thoughtful engagement on this issue, it seems, has resulted in real progress. The old paternalistic model, in which the patient simply did as they were told without meaningful consultation, has largely been replaced with a more cooperative model and one that properly grants to the patient informed consent.
Unfortunately, complexity intrudes on this comfortable relationship. We have to recognize that we are somewhat at cross-purposes. Optimal medical practice would maximize several outcomes simultaneously — the patient experience, doctor and patient autonomy, medical outcomes, and cost effectiveness, to name the most important. The problem is, you can’t always get all of these things to an optimal degree at the same time.
Medical outcomes, for example, are optimized when quality control measures are put into place, but these measures often reduce patient and doctor autonomy. Cost constraints also may come at the expense of patient experience and doctor-patient autonomy (we hope not medical outcome, but realistically, this also).
Whenever we push or pull on this entangled system, we have to consider the net effects on all the other aspects.A recent study, for example, looked at the effects of patient participation in decision-making. This was a survey of 22,000 patients admitted to a hospital system, asking them about their desire to be informed about decision-making, and also to participate in medical decision-making. Nearly all of those surveyed responded that they wanted to be informed, but more than 70% also wanted to leave the medical decision-making to their doctors. The rest wanted to participate in the medical decision-making. The researchers then linked the survey results to length of stay and cost of care outcomes and found that:
“Preference to participate in medical decision making increased with educational level and with private health insurance,” the authors note. “…patients who preferred to participate in decision making concerning their care had a 0.26-day longer length of stay and $865 higher total hospitalization costs.”
A recent review of research into health outcomes with patient participation was inconclusive — the existing studies are scant and of poor quality. So this question remains an unknown.
There appears to be a lot of support for shared decision-making as an idea, and most of the published studies focus on how to improve shared decision-making. We need more research, however, on what the actual effects of this shift in practice will have.
I find it interesting that over the same course of time, the last few decades, there has been a shift away from physician experience as the ultimate arbiter of decision-making, to evidence-based medicine, practice standards, and quality control. The evidence is pretty clear that evidence-based guidelines produce better outcomes than physicians relying on their own experience and judgment.
The rising costs of health care make all of these issues much more acute. Can we afford a philosophical shift to greater patient involvement in decision-making when it is associated with higher costs and we don’t really know the net effect on medical outcomes but there is good reason to suspect that it may be negative (when compared to evidence-based standards)? It seems to me we should more thoroughly explore these outcomes before we institute major infrastructural changes.
Meanwhile, what is the best synthesis of the evidence that we do have? The good news is that what most patients want, and how most physicians practice today, are also non-controversial in terms of cost and medical outcome. Patients want to be well-informed, and informed consent is the current standard of care. There does not appear to be any downside to informed consent.
Where it gets tricky is the proper balance of actual decision-making between the doctor, the patient, the insurance company, and other mechanisms of quality control (such as official practice guidelines). The evidence supports heavy reliance on rigorous evidence-based guidelines as much as possible. The health care system and patients would benefit from exploring ways to enhance compliance with such guidelines.
Insurance companies, in my opinion, are a double-edged sword. They can actually reduce health care costs by avoiding unnecessary tests and treatments (when they follow evidence-based guidelines) but can also hamper the practice of medicine with short-sighted rules and requirements and onerous procedural hurdles.
Patient participation in decision-making remains a complex question. Clearly there is no one model for all patients — patients have different desires in this regard, and varying healthcare literacy. Keep in mind, an adult competent patient is 100% in control of their own health care decision-making. The ultimate decision is always theirs. What we are talking about is how the patient and physician should interact.
For example, should a physician present a recommendation to their patient, or a list of options, or both — this is what I recommend, but here are some other options and their strengths and weaknesses. This hybrid approach is what I do and what I find most of my colleagues do, individualized to the patient. There is an art to this that cannot be captured in any algorithm.
One huge advantage to patient participation in the decision-making process is that they are more likely to be compliant with the treatment plan. The best recommendation is wasted if the patient does not follow it. Patients are often reluctant to contradict their physician if a strong recommendation is made without consultation, but then they will not follow the recommendation and will seek a second opinion (at extra cost to the system).
To the extent that patients ask for or the physician offers options, it is necessary to give accurate information about risks and benefits. Patients often need counseling if fear, anxiety, or hidden misconceptions are causing them to make decisions that depart significantly from what the evidence suggests is the best course. This, of course, all depends on what the patient’s goals are, and this is always a good place to begin (rather than assuming what their goals are).
All of this complexity is probably why existing evidence is inconclusive — it is very difficult to capture all of this nuance in a clinical trial. But still, we must try. The stakes are simply too high to make major changes to the practice of medicine based upon feel-good philosophy without the backing of rigorous evidence.

   Paternalism Revisited
Harriet Hall
Links
Paternalism is out of fashion. Doctors used to have a parent-child relationship with their patients: they concealed the truth if they thought it was in the patient’s best interest, they dictated the treatment and did not have to justify it to the patient. “You have to take this pill because I’m the expert and I know what’s best; don’t ask questions.” Sort of like “You have to go to bed now – because I said so and because I’m the mommy.”
Some time in the 20th century we evolved to a different doctor-patient relationship, an adult-adult one in which the doctor shared expert knowledge and information with the patient and they cooperated to decide on the best treatment plan. The principle of patient autonomy became paramount and the patient gave informed consent to the chosen treatment.
It is generally accepted that this is all for the good. But is it really? In his book Intern: A Doctor’s Initiation, Sandeep Jauhar says, “Over time, my views on informed consent have evolved. I no longer view paternalism as suspiciously as I once did. I now believe that it can be a core component of good medical care.”
He gives some vivid case examples from his training in the cardiac care unit to illustrate his thinking. Patients are frequently asked to make critical decisions when they’re at their worst – sick and frightened, and maybe not thinking as clearly as usual. The stakes are high and they are pressed to make immediate decisions.
How far should autonomy go? What do you do if a patient is DNR but you believe the current problem is transient? Is it justified to override the DNR order if you think the patient will recover and thank you?
Is there really any such thing as fair informed consent? The way the doctor presents the options can influence perceptions. “With treatment X, 50% of patients will survive” doesn’t sound the same as “Without treatment X, 50% will die a horrible death.” The patient may not fully understand the implications. He may be frightened of chemotherapy because a family member went through an unusually bad experience. He may reject intubation because of false beliefs. A surgeon may not be entirely objective when recommending surgery over medical treatment.
What if the patient refuses life-saving treatment? Jauhar asks, “When do the demands of beneficence outweigh those of patient autonomy? First, do no harm, I had been taught, but what about the harm a patient can inflict upon himself?”
Sometimes patients want autonomy, sometimes they want to be guided or even told what to do. We’ve all had them ask us “What’s best?” “What would you do if you were in my shoes?” Sometimes they even say, “You’re the doctor; you decide.”
Informed consent often used to ratify decisions that have already been made or bully patients into making decisions they’re not equipped to make. If they make a decision that we don’t agree with, we think they’re not in their right mind; but “as long as they agree with us, they’re not crazy.” This isn’t fair: most doctors would gladly accept a scar to save a life, but Jauhar points out that a scar may have a very different meaning for a fashion model than for a doctor. A model might be willing to accept a greater risk of death to avoid a scar. We have to respect differences of judgment and patient autonomy, but do we go too far?
Informed consent was intended to protect patients, but in practice it is often used to protect doctors from hard decisions or to abdicate responsibility. A signed consent form provides some protection from malpractice suits. If the outcome is poor, doctors can blame the patient for a poor decision.
Don’t doctors have a responsibility to use their knowledge, experience, and hard-earned judgment to help the patient make the best decision? Isn’t that what most patients really want? Maybe a little judicious beneficent paternalism is not such a bad thing after all. It’s something to think about.

   Animal rights terrorists endanger science-based medicine
David Gorski 
Link
I’m a bit ticked off right now, enough that I thought I’d break with tradition and do an extra post today. Don’t worry; it’ll be brief. It will also be angry, more so than you are perhaps used to hearing on this blog. However, I think my anger is justified, and I hope that Steve Novella–and you–will understand. I view the problem that I am about to discuss to be at least as serious a threat to science-based medicine as any infiltration of woo into medical schools or residency programs.
Remember back in February, when I discussed how animal rights terrorists had been harassing a researcher at the University of California Santa Cruz (UCSC)? At the time, protesters attempted a home invasion of a researcher, leading to a police response where a home was searched by the police. This time around, however, these animal rights thugs have turned violent–again:
SANTA CRUZ — The FBI today is expected to take over the investigation of the Saturday morning firebombings of a car and of a Westside home belonging to two UC Santa Cruz biomedical researchers who conduct experiments on animals.
Santa Cruz police officials said Sunday the case will be handed to the FBI to investigate as domestic terrorism while local authorities explore additional security measures for the 13 UCSC researchers listed in a threatening animal-rights pamphlet found in a downtown coffee shop last week.
“The FBI has additional resources and intelligence into groups and individuals that might have the proclivity to carry out this kind of activity,” police Capt. Steve Clark said. “The FBI has a whole other toolbox of tools for this kind of investigation.”
The front porch of a faculty member’s home on Village Circle off High Street was hit with a firebomb about 5:40 a.m. Saturday, police said. The bomb ignited the front door of the home and filled the house with smoke, police said. About the same time, a Volvo station wagon parked in a faculty member’s on-campus driveway on Dickens Way was destroyed by a firebomb, police said.
Clark described the bombs as devices, which he said investigators have seen used by animals rights activists in the past, as “Molotov cocktail on steroids.”
That no one was seriously injured or died, especially the researcher’s children, is incredibly fortunate. As in previous cases, these two firebombing attacks were the culmination of a campaign of intimidation:
This appears to be the latest in a string of incidents targeting UCSC researchers and others in Santa Cruz.
Fliers identifying 13 UCSC scientists, some of whom use mice, fruit flies and other nonprimate creatures in their research, were discovered at a downtown coffee shop Tuesday. The fliers say, “Animal abusers everywhere beware; we know where you live; we know where you work; we will never back down until you end your abuse.” The names, home addresses, home phone numbers and photos of researchers were published on the fliers.
Fruit flies? Drosophila? How messed up do you have to be to threaten violence over Drosophila experiments? Why aren’t they threatening violence over the trillions upon trillions of E. coli or yeast that die in the name of science in molecular biology labs every day?
Right on cue, that disgrace to surgeons everywhere, that disingenuous spokesperson for the Animal Liberation Front whom I call “Sgt. Schulz” for his amazing ability to be always somehow around or associated with acts of animal rights violence but at the same time to always find a way to claim that “I know nothing” about who was responsible for said acts of violence, Dr. Jerry Vlasak, popped up to spew his usual venom:
While a spokesman said he didn’t know who committed the act, the Woodland Hills-based Animal Liberation Front called the attacks a “necessary” act, just like those who fought against civil rights injustices. Spokesman Dr. Jerry Vlasak showed no remorse for the family or children who were targeted.
“If their father is willing to continue risking his livelihood in order to continue chopping up animals in a laboratory than his children are old enough to recognize the consequences,” said Vlasak, a former animal researcher who is now a trauma surgeon. “This guy knows what he is doing. He knows that every day that he goes into the laboratory and hurts animals that it is unreasonable not to expect consequences.”
To Dr. Vlasak, if a researcher’s children happen to die in one of his fellow travelers’ attacks, well, to him it’s regrettable but all just collateral damage in the service of his cause. Indeed, here’s an old quote from him:
I think there is a use for violence in our movement. And I think it can be an effective strategy. Not only is it morally acceptable, I think that there are places where it could be used quite effectively from a pragmatic standpoint.
For instance, if vivisectors were routinely being killed, I think it would give other vivisectors pause in what they were doing in their work – and if these vivisectors were being targeted for assassination, and call it political assassination or what have you, I think if — and I wouldn’t pick some guy way down the totem pole, but if there were prominent vivisectors being assassinated, I think that there would be a trickle-down effect and many, many people who are lower on that totem pole would say, “I’m not going to get into this business because it’s a very dangerous business and there’s other things I can do with my life that don’t involve getting into a dangerous business.” And I think that the — strictly from a fear and intimidation factor, that would be an effective tactic.
And I don’t think you’d have to kill — assassinate — too many vivisectors before you would see a marked decrease in the amount of vivisection going on. And I think for 5 lives, 10 lives, 15 human lives, we could save a million, 2 million, 10 million non-human animals.
And I — you know – people get all excited about, “Oh what’s going to happen when – the ALF accidentally kills somebody in an arson?” Well, you know I mean — I think we need to get used to this idea. It’s going to happen, okay? It’s going to happen.
Early Saturday morning at UCSC, it almost did.
Finally, comparing animal rights terrorists with civil rights advocates in the 1950s and 1960s is an insult to the memory of those nonviolent protesters who, not infrequently at great personal risk, spoke out against injustice. Vlasak’s cowardly little band of animal rights terrorists are far more akin to the criminals who bombed the 16th Street Baptist Church in 1963 and the other thugs who tried to stop the civil rights movement through violence than they are to the civil rights marchers.
Here’s hoping that whoever is responsible for these attacks is found, arrested, and locked up for a long, long time. Make no mistake, the goal of these terrorists is not to improve the lot of animals used in research. The goal of these terrorists is to stop all animal research. If you want to grind progress in science-based medicine to a halt, I can’t think of a better way to do it than to make scientists too afraid to carry out research into potentially life-saving measures.
Thus endeth the rant.
I apologize if it was not as sedate and scholarly as the usual fare here at SBM. However, this is an issue that is of great concern to anyone who does translational cancer research–or translational research of any kind, for that matter. it is also of great importance to any patient who relies on the fruits of medical research; in other words, virtually all of us. There is one little way, however, that you and I can fight back against these thugs. Please donate generously to Americans for Medical Progress or other pro-research groups to help them combat the misinformation promulgated by groups like the Animal Liberation Front.

   Bad scientific arguments in the service of animal rights activism
David Gorski
Link
One of the greatest threats to the preclinical research necessary for science-based medicine today is animal rights activism. The magnitude of the problem came to the forefront again last week with the news that animal rights terrorists tried to enter the home of a researcher at the University of California Santa Cruz (UCSC) whose research uses mice to study breast cancer and neurologic disease while she and her husband were having a birthday party for one of their children and assaulted her husband, who had gone to the front of the house to confront them. Fortunately, the license plate number of the car fleeing the scene was reported to police, leading to a raid on a house by police and the confiscation of computers and other materials. This attack appeared to be the latest crescendo in an increasing campaign of harrassment and intimidation by animal rights “activists” that has also been observed in nearby Berkeley.
This sort of threat to researchers is not a problem just in Santa Cruz and the Bay area, but in particular has been a problem in southern California as well. Just earlier this week, the University of California Los Angeles announced that it was suing several animal rights groups and individuals suspected of attacks on researchers who use animals, including UCLA Primate Freedom Project, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), and the Animal Liberation Brigade (ALB), as well as several individuals believed to affiliate with these groups. The inciting event for this action was the second attack on the home of Edythe London, Professor of Psychiatry and Bio-behavioral Sciences and of Molecular and Medical Pharmacology at the David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, in early February. Her research involves the use of primate models to study nicotine addiction. In this most recent attack, an attempt was made to set her house on fire. This came on the heels of a previous attack in October, in which animal rights activists flooded her house. Prior to that, animal rights terrorists had indeed succeeded in their aim of intimidating a scientist sufficiently that he gave up animal research after a fellow researcher was targeted with a Molotov cocktail meant for her home that was mistakenly placed on the porch of an elderly neighbor. Also, we in the U.S. often forget how much more radical animal rights extremists are in the U.K., where the campaign of intimidation takes the form of death threats, intimidation of personnel of companies that supply researchers, and even in one case digging up the grave of Gladys Hammond, whose family ran a farm that raised Guinea pigs for use in medical research, and stealing her remains.
Readers may make the argument that my introduction to this discussion is unfairly inflammatory, but I have my reasons for starting this way, and I think they are good ones. First, make no mistake, the aim of the most radical of these activists is nothing short of the cessation of the use of all animals in biomedical research. Second, sooner or later, someone will be hurt or killed. As a researcher who on occasion uses mouse models of cancer myself, I state up front that I could be on the firing line just as much as the UCSC researcher or others and am justifiably disturbed when I hear spokesperson for the ALF Dr. Jerry Vlasak, for example, repeatedly advocate violence against researchers who use animals. In this article, I am not going to discuss the moral issues involved in animal research. What I am going to discuss is the seemingly scientific arguments that some opponents of animal research and animal rights activists like to invoke, arguments increasingly used in addition to the moral arguments that extremists use to justify their actions. If the arguments of opponents of animal rights research were indeed good science, then their appropriation by extremists would not allow me to do much other than bemoan the misuse of valid science as a justification for extremism. Unfortunately, such is not the case, and the bad scientific arguments used by opponents of animal research are often piled onto the extreme moral arguments that fuel actions such as those earlier this week at UCSC. Consequently, given the events of the last month or so, I thought I would take this opportunity to look at some of the common scientific indictments of animal research by its opponents.
If you examine various websites or literature from animal rights extremists looking at the issue of animal use in medical research, the forms of the scientific arguments tend, when you boil them down to the very core of their essence, to take three main forms, which are related:
     1.  Animal research doesn’t teach us anything of value or even misleads us (i.e., it is bad science).
     2.  Animal research does not predict human physiology or response to disease, or animals are “just too different from humans to give reliable results” (i.e., it is bad science).
     3.  There are better ways of getting the information that do not use animals (i.e., there is better science available than using animals.)
I tend to look at these arguments as three faces of what is in essence the same argument, specifically what I like to call an “argument from imperfection.” In other words, because animal models have many difficulties and flaws and all too often don’t predict human physiology or drug response as well as the critics think that they should, then by implication all animal research is bad science. It is an example of demanding 100% perfection or certainty, a bar that no science can ever meet and of concrete thinking typical of extremists. (Creationists and “alternative” medicine mavens are particularly fond of this sort of argument against their hated “Darwinism” or “allopathic” or “conventional” medicine–usually said with a sneer–respectively.) In its most ridiculous form, this argument takes the form of claiming that cell culture and computer models, among other modalities, can give us the same information without animals. The first reason that this argument is ridiculous is that cell culture models tend to be even less predictive of many responses than animal models for many questions and because much physiology depends upon the interaction of different cell types in their native three dimensional matrix. The second reason is that, for a computer model to be adequately predictive, it needs (1) sufficient information to input and (2) sufficient understanding of the intricacies of the physiology and biochemistry. We don’t have either. Finally, physiology requires understanding at the macroscopic level of how organs interact. Of course, these arguments are often made in less extreme forms, and I will discuss a some of these shortly. Keep in mind as I do, though, that the problem inherent in this sort of argument is that one has to look at what the alternatives to animal research are and compare their usefulness, accuracy, and reliability. If one can’t show that one’s alternative is better than animal research, then all the complaints about the imperfections of animal research don’t amount to much. It’s still the best that we have, and, as such, it’s bad science (and unethical, to boot) not to use it before trying therapies in humans. I have yet to see a compelling argument that any alternative modality predicts human response to disease and treatment well enough that we should rely on it instead of animal models.
The first of the three arguments, namely that animal research doesn’t teach us anything of value or even misleads us, is the easiest to deal with. Keep in mind that I am a cancer researcher and surgeon; consequently, my knowledge of applying animal research to cancer is stronger than for the use of animals in other fields. For example, when I see animal rights activists claim that human stem cells can be used instead of various animal models of cancer, it’s hard for me not to want to grab them by the lapels, shake them, and point out that cancer stem cells were first discovered by a researcher who observed that only a small fraction of leukemic cells in a mouse–yes, mouse!–model of leukemia could transmit the cancer from one experimental model to another. Since it is not currently possible to transmit leukemia from one person to another and would be incredibly unethical to try, the conclusion I draw from this is that whoever wrote that FAQ is ignorant of recent medical history. Indeed, Americans for Medical Progress is quite correct in pointing out how the judicious use of animal models has led to improvements in understanding and treatment of a number of diseases, such as cancer, asthma, HIV/AIDs, antibiotics, organ transplantation, and far more.
My favorite example to cite when I hear the argument that other methods besides animal research can do better than animal research in helping us understand disease (or, in its more sophisticated form, that animals may have been needed a few decades ago to discover, say, insulin, but our understanding has advanced to the point where they are no longer needed) comes from my field and my area of research interest. It also happens to come from my scientific hero, Dr. Judah Folkman, who passed away suddenly in January. It shows an area of cancer biology whose importance would have been incredibly difficult to model, appreciate, or target for therapy without mouse models of cancer. That area, of course, is tumor angiogenesis, and Dr. Folkman did his pioneering work that has now resulted in drugs like Avastin and other antiangiogenic drugs that are making it to market now and making a real impact on cancer. Dr. Folkman did it through an ingenious strategy that began from the clinical observation that sometimes tumor metastases appear shortly after the operation to remove the primary tumor.
Folkman found a mouse tumor model that mimicked this behavior and in the early 1990s did a series of pioneering experiments. In a strain Lewis lung carcinoma cells of low metastatic potential (LLC-LM), when cells are injected into C57BL/6 mice and allowed to grow subcutaneously, if the tumor is left alone, mice develop only microscopic lung metastases. These metastases do not grow and kill the mouse. If, however, the primary cancer is removed, then many large lung metastases grow rapidly. The results of the experiment above strongly implied that the primary tumor is secreting something that suppresses the growth of microscopic metastases. After this, the Folkman group did what we like to call “brute force” science, collecting mouse urine and analyzing it for tumor suppressive activity until they were able to purify a single 38 kDa peptide, which they designated angiostatin. This involved analyzing literally gallons of mouse urine. (Who said science isn’t glamorous?) Once Folkman’s group had a bunch of angiostatin on hand, it peformed the following experiment. Two groups of mice were injected with LLC-LM and the tumors allowed to grow to a certain size, after which they were surgically removed. One group was treated with angiostatin, and the control group with saline. The result was that the control group developed massive lung metastases and died, while the group treated with angiostatin had microsocopic lung metastases that never grew beyond a ball of cells. Dr. Folkman then demonstrated that it was the inhibition of angiogenesis by the angiostatin that kept these tumors in check. Ultimately, he used a similar method to discover endostatin, and later he demonstrated that endostatin could induced tumor dormancy in mice. I trust that the reader can see how these seminal preclinical observations about angiogenesis would have been virtually impossible without animal models, given that angiogenesis requires the interaction between tumor cells, cells in blood vessels, and the surrounding tissue stroma to occur.
There are numerous other examples of how animal research allows us to do things that we can’t do in humans and discover things that can’t be discovered using just cell culture or human experimentation. Angiogenesis couldn’t have been discovered through tissue culture, and computer models need the concept and measurements of a pheneomenon’s behavior to be useful. Before Folkman, although angiogenesis was suspected to be important in tumor growth, it wasn’t known to be so. My favorite other example is transgenic mice. The technology of making transgenic mice allows scientists to selectively delete a single gene (or multiple genes) and observe the effects that occur in the animal when this happens. P.Z. Myers at Pharyngula has written extensively of one class of genes whose functions in guiding vertebrate development and pattern formation were dissected largely through the use of both Drosophila models and transgenic mouse models, the homeobox genes, and indeed one of my two major areas of research interest involves the study of a diverged homeobox gene. Through these models, we have been able to study not only the structure and function of HOX genes in a manner not possible without animal models, but we’ve been able to trace the evolution of the genes all the way from worms, to fruit flies, to mice, to humans, even to the point of studying how plants and animals are related at a genetic level. These sorts of studies allow us to examine the effect of genes at the whole organism level in a manner that is not possible any other way, and, indeed, sometimes produce strikingly surprising results that lead to new avenues of research.
Another common argument of animal rights activists is that “animal testing” is a very poor means of predicting human response to drugs or other therapies. This argument is closer to the true situation than the first one, and no scientist involved in animal research would deny that there are all too often serious problems in using animal models this way. The problem is, there are even more serious problems using other methods to predict toxicity, drug response, and other parameters in human beings. The most recent example of this type of argument I’ve seen comes from, of all places, a recent issue of Skeptic, in which animal research opponents Niall Shank (a professor of philosophy who, oddly enough, authored a book critiquing intelligent design), Dr. Ray Greek (an anaesthesiologist and President of Americans for Medical Advancement, Europeans for Medical Advancement, and Japanese for Medical Advancement, all facets of a single group that appears to be totally opposed to animal research in medicine), Nathan Nobis (another philosopher), and Jean Swingle-Greek (a veterinarian) authored an article entitled Animals and Medicine: Do Animal Experiments Predict Human Responses? Unfortunately, the text is not available online, but, given that it is a fairly long article, I will summarize and excerpt judiciously to give you a flavor of their thesis and trust my cobloggers and anyone else who has read the article to keep me honest. I will also, when I deem appropriate, include statements from Dr. Greek’s organization in my discussion, given that the Skeptic article clearly flows from the same sorts of rationales found there. In essence, the article consists of arguments #2 and #3 above writ large, with a the additional tactic of setting impossible standards for animal research to meet before they would concede that it is necessary.
First, it should be pointed out that the authors concede that “fundamental biological discoveries in the past three centuries were made by studying animals” and that “animal studies continue to be of important scientific value in the context of basic biological and biomedical research.” Of course, given that they make this concession, it’s odd that the authors can then argue that animal research is so useless in understanding human physiology and designing drug therapies, and they can’t resist disingenuously adding later something that makes me wonder if they truly understand clinical research:
Animal models claimed to be predictive of human responses are widely used in drug testing, environmental toxicology and disease research. Animals, in the case of predictive models, are clearly used as substitutes for human subjects. Unless researchers believed that such models were causally analogous to humans in relevant respects, there would be no rational basis for their use as predictive models.
Yes, and no. Yes, we consider animal models to be somewhat predictive of human responses, but, no, we do not use animals as a substitute for human subjects. If that were the case and animals were viewed as substitutes for humans in testing drugs, then there would be no need for such extensive clinical trials after animal studies were completed. Rather, animal studies should be best viewed as the first test of a new drug or treatment on a whole-organism level in order to look for unexpected, toxic, or other effects that might not be apparent in cell culture. In other words, animal tests are a screening process, not a substitute for human studies. They are also a convenient tool that allows us to test hypotheses that we cannot test in humans, either for reasons of practicality or ethics. We can certainly argue about how good a tool or screening test animal studies can be, but it is disingenuous and incorrect to argue so strongly that animals are meant to be “substitutes” for human subjects. In fact, the argument above is consistent with, albeit a weaker statement of, part of the manifesto of Dr. Greek’s organization, as stated on its website:
Americans For Medical Advancement (AFMA)/ Europeans For Medical Advancement (EFMA)/ Japanese For Medical Advancement (JFMA) is a mainstream science-based research and educational institute dedicated to improving policy and decision-making regarding the use of the animal model in biomedical research.
AFMA/EFMA/JFMA opposes animal-modeled research as a modality for seeking cures and treatments for human disease based on overwhelming scientific evidence that findings from animal models cannot be reliably extrapolated to humans. We seek to demonstrate, through rigorous research and analysis, that the reliance on animal-modeled research, as well as other pseudoscientific endeavors, harms rather than helps humans, and prolongs human suffering by inhibiting medical progress.
If this isn’t dogmatic, I don’t know what is, particularly the implied claim that all animal-modeled research is “pseudoscientific.” Continuing in the Skeptic article, the authors then go on to list a number of references that supposedly show how horrible a tool animal studies are in terms of predicting human response. They tend to pick the worst examples and put even examples that are not so bad in the worst possible light, arguing that animal studies are so inaccurate that they cause more harm than good. That is a tenuous argument based on claims that false negatives and false positives generated by some animal research cause more harm than good by “misleading” researchers and that they “directly” harm patients by allowing harmful treatments to be tried on humans because they supposedly were found safe in animals, so much so that the whole enterprise should be scrapped as hopelessly irredeemable. The latter claim is such a mischaracterization of clinical drug development that it makes me wonder if the authors honestly believe that drugs are approved for general use after only animal trials. Apparently, they have never heard of a phase I clinical trial, where the goal is to give human volunteers increasing amounts of a new drug until toxicities are observed. Animal studies serve, until more predictive studies are found, as a rough guide for (1) dosage and (2) possible toxicities. Moreover, a logical consequence of another part of their complaint, namely that compounds that were found to be harmful in animals and therefore were not taken to clinical trials, is that we should test in humans therapies whose development stopped because of animal testing. After all, if animals and humans are so different that the animal results must be viewed as meaningless, then how else would we identify potentially life saving drugs that were missed? Again, if we as medical scientists actually operated under the straw man assumption that the authors attack (that animal models are such accurate predictors of human response), then we wouldn’t bother to do phase I clinical trials at all! We could just test a new drug in animal models and then go straight to phase II trials of efficacy in humans. Indeed, Niall et al are not only attacking a straw man argument here but dubiously conflating toxicity testing and the recommendations made from it. Health policymakers, many of them unfortunately physicians, often err on the side of extreme caution when an animal experiment using even doses much higher than any human could ever encounter, shows that compound A causes cancer in mice, even as scientists point out the disconnect.
Another oddity is that the authors couch much of their arguments in evolutionary terms. Indeed, they more or less claim that evolutionary considerations are why one absolutely can’t extrapolate responses in one animal to those of humans. Consistent with this article, the website of Dr. Greek’s group, there is a bold claim rejecting the contention that we should, as most scientists would advocate, apply the “three Rs” (“Reduce, Refine, and Replace”) to animal models:
    • Applying knowledge gained from animals to humans harms humans most of the time (see A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation for many examples)
    • Intractable differences between species mean that animals cannot ‘predict’ how the human body will respond to a disease or a drug. Their use violates the most fundamental principle of biology: evolution. Therefore the ‘animal model’ paradigm should be rejected as unscientific.
And:
Science already has a wealth of superior (not ‘alternative’!) human-based methods at its disposal. They are responsible for the medical care we enjoy today and are the only way to prevent, cure and treat human illness – yet many are starved of funds while animal experimentation is highly funded. The animal experiment lobby maintains that animal experimentation is an expensive business – it is. But it is not just costing society enormous sums of money, it is costing us far more in terms of human health.
The authors use these same arguments in a weaker form in their article for Skeptic, but not once do they show a concrete example illustrating how and why one of these methods is so “superior” to animal experiments–and by how much. One would think, if these methods were so obviously superior and already available, that it would be child’s play for the authors to spell out one or two specific examples in detail, with references from the peer-reviewed literature and concrete numbers, given how much verbiage they devoted to the deficiencies of animal testing. (More on that later,) As for evolutionary considerations, contrary to the fallacious arguments made by Niall et al, appeals to evolution do not tell us that animal models are useless, only whether one model is more likely to be useful than another. There’s a reason why there are no good mouse models of HIV in rodents, while there are useful, albeit imperfect, primate models (some imperfections of which our always-intrepid critics of animal research point out gleefully in the article). Some physiological mechanisms are more highly conserved across species than others, and some animal tumor models, such as lung carcinogenesis due to carcinogens from cigarette smoke, actually recapitulate the genetic changes observed in human tumors pretty well, suggesting common, evolutionarily conserved mechanisms of carcinogenesis, as do some rodent models of human colon cancer, where chemoprevention trials in special strains of mice and rats actually line up fairly well with human trials. Although Niall et al correctly point out that modern medicine is moving towards personalized treatments based on gene expression profiles, we are not there yet.
In some cases the authors also appear to exaggerate just how bad the situation is, even when it comes to references that they themselves cite. One example is a recent BMJ systematic review that–big surprise–found that animal models were good predictors for some conditions and poor predictors for others and was in fact more of a criticism of the quality of published animal studies than the utility of animal studies. It concluded:
Systematic reviews can provide insights into the limitations of animal models. For example, the animal models for stroke, where there was agreement with the results from clinical trials, seemed more representative of the condition in humans than the animal models for head injury, where there were differences in the results. In stroke, the time from the occlusive event to the start of treatment was similar in animal and human studies. In head injury, treatment was given within five minutes of injury in the animal models but up to eight hours after injury in the clinical trials. None of the animal experiments used models that mimic the complex situations that usually follow traumatic head injury. Comorbidities are clearly relevant in stroke, which occurs in older people with hypertension and diabetes but also in people with head injuries, often accompanied by other injuries and by hypotension and hypothermia. Comorbidities were examined in the stroke models but not in the head injury models.
That there is a gap between clinical research and clinical practice is well established. Our work highlights another gap—specifically the lack of communication between those involved in animal research and clinical trialists. Systematic reviews of animal experiments could promote closer collaboration between the research communities and encourage an iterative approach to improving the relevance of animal models to clinical trial design. When models do not represent the clinical context they could be adapted accordingly. Furthermore, as is the case for human research, systematic reviews could help identify and improve deficiencies in the conduct and reporting of animal research.
In other words, according to this article animal models of stroke, for example, are actually pretty good at predicting human response to ischemic brain injury. At the risk of injecting anecdotal evidence, I’ll also point out that research using mouse tumor models that I did 10 years ago and that colleagues with whom I worked until 1999 did shortly after I left their laboratory showing that combining antiangiogenic therapy with either radiation or chemotherapy produces a synergistic antitumor effect has been validated in humans. Indeed, that is now how antiangiogenic therapies are generally used, as combination therapy. I could also point out a number of other reviews that find that animal models can be useful and predictive for cancer chemoprevention treatments, antibiotics, and neuroscience. In rabbits, for instance, evidence for a preclinical effect of drugs against fungal infections can be translated into humans if toxicity and pharmacology can be optimized in humans. In cancer, the use of mouse tumor models is more problematic in that single tumor models tend to have a fairly poor predictive value of human response. However, results are much better when a panel of in vitro and in vivo tumor models are used.
The most pervasive problematic aspect of the Skeptic article (and, indeed, all arguments of this type advanced by opponents of animal research) is the utopian “impossible dream” fallacy coupled with differential standards, in which they demand standards of accuracy of animal research that are impractical or even unobtainable for nearly any disease model, while failing to make the case that the substitutes proposed will yield results at least as accurate and useful or preferably more so. This is very much like the tactics of advocates of “alternative medicine,” who are prone to demanding a utopian standard of perfection for what they perceive to be “conventional” therapies while asserting without good evidence that their therapies are better or expecting us to accept their speculations that they are. The authors of this Skeptic article do in essence the same thing, detailing the problems with animal models while making overblown claims for potential replacements. For example, here is part of their section What Will We Use If We Don’t Experiment On Animals?:
There are two answers to this question.
1. If a test or research method does not accomplish the purpose for which it is used, it should be abandoned. If testing drugs for liver toxicity in animals does not predict liver toxicity in humans, then the test is a waste of resources and, moreover, can be dangerous since the results cannot be counted on to reflect the human condition. So, even if no other testing and research modalities existed, the animal model should still be abandoned. By analogy, there is no cure for AIDS but (hopefully) we would not treat AIDS patients with trephination—drilling holes in the skull—even if trephination happened to be the only available procedure.
This argument sounds seductive on its surface but greatly exaggerates the lack of utility of animal testing. Trephination is indeed utterly useless. Even the worst description of animal testing as made by these authors does not render it the equivalent of trephination, and their comparing it to trephination is clearly a huge exaggeration. The authors then propose a second answer:
2. In the case of human medicine, there are myriad research and testing modalities that are scientifically productive. Anything that is humanbased is, ipso facto, going to be more reliable than anything animal-based. Examples include human embryonic stem cell research; epidemiological studies of patterns of human disease and their associations with environmental causes; in vitro research using human cells and tissues; the use of gene chips or microarrays to study patterns of gene expression in humans; clinical research; autopsies; mathematical and computer modeling; post-marketing drug surveillance; basic scientific research in the fields of biology, physics and chemistry; and technology-based research methods such as those using positron emission tomography, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and others; these are viable means for discovering truths about human disease and drugs.
Here’s where the authors’ double standard towards animal research starts to become obvious. I note that in the several pages of prose leading up to this statement, the authors list and reference many, many problems with animal research. They provide citations for these problems and, when possible, provide numbers for the poor predictive value of some animal models of some diseases. Yet, when they describe their preferred models and tests, suddenly there is not a single reference to tell us how predictive these other methods are, not a single concrete number to show that these tests, or combinations thereof, can predict human response better than the animal models that the authors would like to see replaced by them. Instead, we are told the authors’ preferred methods are “scientifically productive.” No kidding! I wouldn’t argue with the contention that they can be scientifically productive; what I’d argue with is whether the authors’ preferred methods can presently predict human responses better than our current tools that include animal research. If they can’t, then what the authors are proposing is that we throw out a useful (albeit flawed) tool (animal studies) in favor of either unproven techniques with a lot of promise that has not yet been realized (genomics and proteomics, functional MRI), known methods that study human response after the fact, given that they are done after a drug is in release (post-release surveillance, epidemiology), or methods that are clearly no better and probably worse at prediction than animal models (cell culture and computer models), all of which are also being used in addition to animals anyway. I would be more than happy to replace my animal tumor models with a combination of the above–when it can be shown that the above tests do an equivalent or better job of modeling human physiology, biochemistry, and pharmacology. The authors fail to show that they can, preferring argument by assertion rather than by evidence. Indeed, I’m not sure that they can ever show that some aspects of whole-organ physiology can ever be modeled that way, but I’ll never know because they didn’t try. Yet such complexities do not disturb the authors of this article:
We agree that life processes are interdependent; for example, the liver influences the heart, which in turn influences the brain, which in turn influences the kidneys and so on. Thus, the response of an isolated heart cell to a medication does not confirm that the intact human heart will respond as predicted by the isolated heart cell. The liver may metabolize a drug to a new chemical that is toxic to the heart whereas the original chemical was not toxic.
We also concede that cell cultures, computer modeling, in vitro research etc., cannot replace the living intact system of a human being. But while animal models may be intact systems, are they intact systems in ways that are causally relevant to human intact systems? Shifting the focus from genes, cells and tissues to intact animal systems does not evade the long reach of our concerns about causal disanalogy.
This, and their comment about how anything “human-based is, ipso facto, going to be more reliable than anything animal-based” also betrays their agenda. (It also makes me wonder if they think that a study of cultured human cells would be superior in figuring out the effects of hemorrhagic shock on cardiac pumping capacity than the use of a well-designed animal model. Hint: It would be highly unlikely to.) They seem to think that scientists use animal models because we don’t realize that it would be better to do research whenever possible on human cells and human tissue. The reason we do not is that most of the time it is neither practical nor ethical to do such research on humans, particularly research involving what we most want to know about these days, macroscopic responses to genetic and biochemical signals and changes.
Finally, let me show you an example of what I referred to earlier as the “impossible dream” fallacy, namely the impossible standard to which the authors demand that animal research be held:
We realize that our claims are controversial, but our arguments are straightforward. If our arguments are unsound, they should be easy to refute. Here is how:
1. Explain why animals, when used as predictive models for the study of human disease and to test drugs, are not used as CAMs ["causal analogical models."] (Remember, we fully accept that animal studies can yield fruitful insights in the context of basic biological research. If you want to know about rat biology, you must study rats. The issue here is whether you can study humans in ways that are predictively efficacious by studying rats).
2. Show that animal models, when used as CAMs, are successful far more often than not. This can be accomplished by comparing the results of drug toxicity studies in animals with studies in humans or by comparing the results of induced diseases in animals with the same disease in humans.
The first one is more a game of semantics than any substantive criticism in that animals don’t have to be “causal analogical models” to be useful to biological research or predictive enough of human responses to remain useful. It is in essence defining the use of animals in such a way that one could never demonstrate sufficient accuracy to satisfy the authors, namely as a true predictive surrogate for human beings. The second one, however, is the “Bingo!” of double standards. The authors demand that animal models must be successful predictors “far more often than not,” a standard to which they do not even try to hold their preferred methodologies or even claim that they can achieve. Remember, epidemiology is prone to all sorts of confounding factors that make incorrect conclusions very easy, as we discuss quite frequently on this blog. Do they honestly claim that epidemiological studies are accurate “far more likely than not”? Post-marketing surveillance is not predictive; it is after the fact. Genomic approaches, although promising, are very expensive (although they are decreasing in cost). They are also computationally intense, require many human tissue samples to produce statistically valid patterns that must then be validated as predictors, and require very sophisticated statistics and rigorous methodology, without which they are extremely prone to false positive results, something that occurred time and time again early on in such studies. Finally, computer models, as sophisticated as they are becoming, are still too unreliable to trust as a primary modality for preclinical drug testing.
The authors give another indication of where they’re coming from near the very end of the article. First they crow about how none of their critics have been able to meet their intentionally impossible standards, while neglecting to recognize that they can’t meet their own standards, and then they bring out a dread accusation:
Thus far, we have not been able to find such data contradicting our arguments; more importantly, none of our critics have been able to present this data either. One hypothesis that explains this is that there are no such data. Either no one has compiled it, or it simply doesn’t exist. We suspect that these are hypotheses worthy of further research. Until such data can be found, analyzed, and interpreted we must tentatively conclude that the use of allegedly predictive animal models remains in vogue not for scientific reasons but for non-scientific reasons. Those who have an interest in social policy being guided by science should demand that good science prevail and, thus, that society turn its attention to more fruitful methods of biomedical research.
Actually, we are trying to use methods that use fewer or no animals. There isn’t a biomedical researcher alive that I’m aware of who doesn’t wish that there were another way to get the answers we seek. Animal research is expensive, messy, labor- and time-intensive, and falling under increasingly onerous federal regulations. As for the claim that animal models remain in vogue for non-scientific reasons, that’s about as good a case of the pot calling the kettle black as I’ve seen in a long time. Here’s why. Most responsible animal researchers actually do subscribe to the “3 Rs” mentioned earlier. It’s a reasonable strategy for minimizing the use of animals now while still using them to study diseases where they have relevance, all with the the long term goal of eventually rendering animal models unnecessary, particularly if we regulatory bodies approve only high quality studies. Unfortunately, that reasonable strategy is not enough for the authors of this article, however, at least not for Dr. Greek as evidenced on his group’s website. He considers animal research to be so rotten and useless that it should be stopped now, even though he can’t show that there are other methods, whether they are “alternatives” or mainstream, that can do the job even as well as (according to the article) the poor standard animal research presently shows. He comes to that conclusion through straw man arguments about how animals are actually used and defining the bar for success so high that few imaginable modalities could reach it while excusing his “alternatives” from the same bar. His vision, if it came to pass, would be a disaster for biomedical research. His arguments, as embodied in the Skeptic article, are the real pseudoscience.
When it comes down to it, opposition to animal research is almost always far more ideological than scientific in nature. I purposely did not go into the moral issues involved with animal research because such issues depend very much upon the background and moral framework from which each of us proceeds. Animal rights extremists, such as those described at the beginning of this post, tend to emphasize their moral objection to such research above all, or how they view animals as being equal to humans and deserving of the same rights. That is how they justify their campaigns of harrassment and even violence against medical researchers. Indeed, some of them argue that even in the hypothetical case in which animal research would definitely result in a cure for AIDS or cancer, they would still oppose it. Other opponents of animal research, such as authors of the Skeptic article, differ from the extremists in that they are not violent, will acknowledge when pushed that animal research has produced useful scientific discoveries, and do not make arguments that animals are morally equal to humans or that we should therefore not eat them, experiment on them, or keep them as pets. However, in their seeming reasonableness, their opposition to animal research is not, their claims otherwise notwithstanding, based any more on science than that of the animal rights extremists. That they would apply such a double standard to animal research compared to their favored non-animal research modalities, coupled with their absolutist language and cherry picking of studies, show this quite conclusively. Just remember, whenever you hear seemingly “scientific” arguments against animal research that emphasize how bad and inaccurate it is, ask for concrete examples from the peer-reviewed literature that show that non-animal modalities are consistently equal to or better than animal experiments to answer the question being asked. You’ll be hard-pressed to find them.

   A Foolish Consistency
Mark Crislip
Link
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.
— Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882)
It is odd isn’t it? Large numbers of quality studies published in the best peer review journals consistently showing the same or similar effect and no contradictory studies. Despite the emphasis on evidence-based medicine, the entire literature is dismissed as not relevant because personal experience suggests that the studies are wrong.
Curiouser and Curiouser. Coherent arguments as to the validity and scope of the literature are met with denial but never a critique of the primary literature. The facts of the research are never argued. The only argument is personal experience or blanket denial. Despite the published literature, practice continues the same, untouched by the facts.
How can practitioners routinely deny a preponderance of evidenced-based medicine? What is a doc who believes in the primacy of evidenced-based practice to do but roll their eyes and think, as Bugs Bunny so memorably said, “What a maroon”.
I’m talking about acupuncture? Homeopathy? Therapeutic touch?
Nope.
I’m talking about the interactions of physicians and the pharmaceutical industry.
This is a large literature on the topic. It is collated at www.nofreelunch.org where you find 70, seventy, references to support the following rant.
Good studies. Published in quality journals such as JAMA and The New England Journal of Medicine and the Annals of Internal Medicine. Offering a large, robust, consistent and routinely ignored set of conclusions.
I will summarize key points. Don’t want to trust me? The literature is there.
    • Pharmaceutical companies give misleading and biased information.
    • Physicians prescribing habits are influenced by drug company interactions.
    • Pharmaceutical reps and pharma sponsored lectures are often the number one source of continuing medical education.
    • Small gifts of food, pens, and other paraphernalia create an obligation that alters prescribing behavior.
    • The conclusions in published studies in peer review journals are in part determined by who provided the funding, and the more pharmaceutical funding, the more like the results will be in favor of the pharmaceutical company’s products.
    • Physicians often do not know when they are being manipulated.
    • Physicians deny that these interactions actually alter their practice. To quote one abstract “Although each physician is likely to consider himself or herself immune from being influenced by gift giving, he or she is suspicious that the “next person” is influenced.”
That is, I think, a fair summary of the literature. There are, to my knowledge, no published studies that contradict the above conclusions. It’s not like acupuncture where there are poorly done studies that suggest an effect. The literature on pharma-MD interactions is more akin to the literature on the use of penicillin and syphilis: overwhelming and consistent.
But unlike the penicillin literature, which everyone applies to their practice, there is this ongoing curiosity of a breakdown of critical thinking. Most physicians consistently deny that this literature applies to them.
It is like the issue of a physicist evaluating a psychic: the hubris of the advanced degree prevents the physicist from admitting they can be fooled. A physician can’t be fooled by mere advertising.
It more than branding and name recognition that guides advertising. It is manipulation.
An analysis of 174 advertisements for pharmaceuticals appearing in six Australian medical publications. Fewer than 8% of the advertisements contained quantitative data about the outcomes of therapy, and most of these framed the information in relative rather than absolute terms. Only 28% of the therapeutic claims in the advertisements conveyed clinical outcomes in any specific, substantive and unambiguous way. (5)
It is not what you say, but how you say it that often matters most. Spin, I believe they call it.
Physicians are susceptible to corporate influence because they are overworked, overwhelmed with information and paperwork, and feel underappreciated. Cheerful and charming, bearing food and gifts, drug reps provide respite and sympathy; they appreciate how hard doctor’s lives are, and seem only to want to ease their burdens. But … every word, every courtesy, every gift, and every piece of information provided is carefully crafted, not to assist doctors or patients, but to increase market share for targeted drugs. (6)
The proof of the pudding is probably in the tasting, as the pharmaceutical companies continue to spend billions (paid for, by the way, by our patients in higher drug costs, so don’t complain next time your patient has to pay $1500 dollars for a 10 day course on linazolid). Companies do not spend that kind of money and provide lunch and pen lights because it has no effect. It is estimated that for every dollar spent on drug rep detailing, there is a $10.29 return (2). AARP reports (unreferenced) that one minute with a drug rep increases physician prescribing by 16%; three minutes increases prescribing by 52% (3).
Does this marketing lead to worse outcomes? Or just more expensive treatment. I don’t have data. I will note that one of the driving forces of antibiotic resistance in bacteria is the overuse of broad spectrum antibiotics and choice of antibiotics is more often driven by marketing rather than science. Association or causality? The Xigris marketing lead to the use of the product for patients that, in subsequent clinical trials, had a higher mortality rate (4). How many died or were harmed due aggressive marketing beyond the limitations of the published clinical trials? No one knows. But if that number is greater or equal to one, than it is one too many.
My observation, with all the frailties and biases of the three most dangerous words in medicine (“In my experience”), is that antibiotics are given not because they are the appropriate choice for a given infection, but that somehow the choice is viewed as ‘strong’, ‘powerful’, ‘big gun’, or ‘broad spectrum.” Descriptors that have almost 100% sensitivity and specificity in identifying a physician that knows nothing about the treatment of infectious diseases and everything about their gullibility for marketing ploys.
I have been quoting this literature for years at my hospitals and I am always met with the same argument: I am immune to the wiles of big pharma, I can’t be bought, sold, fooled or manipulated. I’ll eat the food, but I don’t ever remember who is providing it. The literature doesn’t apply to ME. No one has ever argued that the literature is flawed, that the numerous and consistent studies are wrong. They do not point to studies that demonstrate a different outcome.
Nope. Never. Despite the data, there remains an intellectual blind spot in nearly all physicians I know. A complete inability, even after being given the data, to apply it. There is an increasing trend of institutions prohibiting reps at educational events. My institution (Legacy Health System) did it a decade ago, mostly because Housestaff questioned the propriety of mixing medicine and mammon.
I am curious. I assume readers of this blog are interested in applying evidence to the practice of medicine. Read the literature. Get back to me. Why is it wrong? Why am I misreading it? Or if you do find the literature compelling, why do you not apply it?
As an aside, I have not talked to a rep or taken anything from a drug company in at least 23 years. I attempt to apply all evidence to my practice. It is not without its downside. They provide pizza to our local Infectious Disease conference (where the reps can outnumber the medical students) and it is painful to sit there an smell the pizza and not partake. Mmmmmmmm. Pizza.
After one of my intermittent outbursts against the involvement of big pharma in our conferences (I am the lone voice in this argument), the head of my hospital received an anonymous letter complaining about my behavior. The letter was ostensibly from a member of the hospital staff. Accompanying the letter were copies of emails I had sent to the ID docs in the city complaining about the influence of drug reps at our conferences. It turns out when you print a page from Windows sometimes it will also print the path on the hard drive to the file. At the bottom of the page you will see, as an example, C:/folder/folder/bchristi/file. Curiously, and I am sure it was a weird coincidence, the name of the folder was the same as the email address of a local drug rep, bchristi@company.com. Weird, huh, how the folder and the email had the same name? What are the odds of such a serendipitous event? Also of interest was a copy of a private email I had sent to one of our local ID docs. How that personal email ended up in the folder of the writer I still have yet to determine.
If you think this kind of behavior is atypical, it is not. I suggest you read Surviving Sepsis — Practice Guidelines, Marketing Campaigns, and Eli Lilly in the NEJM of Oct 19, 2006. If I were prone to conspiracy theories, this would make for good supporting information.
In the interests of patients, physicians must reject the false friendship provided by reps. Physicians must rely on information on drugs from unconflicted sources, and seek friends among those who are not paid to be friends” (6).
References
Halperin EC, Hutchison P, Barrier RC Jr. A population-based study of the prevalence and influence of gifts to radiation oncologists. Int J Radiat Oncol Biol Phys. 2004 Aug 1;59(5):1477-83.
The Drug Pushers. Atlantic Monthly. April 2006. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200604/drug-reps.
AARP Bulletin. Jan-Feb 2006. Page 26. http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/yourhealth/drugreptiesthatbind.html
Surviving Sepsis — Practice Guidelines, Marketing Campaigns, and Eli Lilly in the NEJM of Oct 19, 2006.
David A Newby and David A Henry. Drug advertising: truths, half-truths and few statistics. MJA 2002 177 (6): 285-286
Fugh-Berman A, Ahari S (2007) Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors. PLoS Med 4(4): e150. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040150

   Antiscience-Based Medicine in South Africa
Steven Novella 
Link
South Africa’s Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, is fighting to protect the traditional healers of her country from having their methods tested scientifically. She warns that, “We cannot use Western models of protocols for research and development,” and that she does not want the incorporation of traditional healing to get “bogged down in clinical trials.” Her arguments are anti-scientific and represent a health tragedy for South Africa. However, such attitudes are not uncommon within the community of sectarian medicine and represent some of the common rhetoric used to disguise anti-scientific positions.
This is also not the first controversial statement made by South Africa’s health minister. In 2006 she advocated using garlic and beetroot to treat HIV infection, prompting outrage from South Africa’s academic community. In response to criticism about delays and funding cuts in providing anti-retroviral drugs to HIV sufferers in South Africa, the Health Minister said, “Garlic is absolutely critical, we need to do research on it. We cannot just ridicule it.” South Africa’s president, Thabo Mbeki, resisted calls for Ms. Tshabalala-Msimang’s resignation.
President Mbeki has a spotty history on this front as well, gaining international infamy when in 2000 he declared that he was unconvinced as to the cause of AIDS and convened a panel to discuss its true causes. Just last year Mbeki came under further criticism when he fired the deputy health minister, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, who was an outspoken critic of Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang and is credited with reversing many of South Africa’s disastrous HIV and health policies.
This fight over the role of science in public health would likely have escaped world attention were HIV/AIDS not at the center of the controversy in a country that is itself at the epicenter of the African AIDS epidemic. (It is estimated that about 10% of the population may be infected with HIV.) But let us take a look at Tshabalala-Msimang’s statements in the broader context of science-based medicine.
“We cannot use Western models of protocols for research and development.”
The implication behind this statement is that science is somehow a “Western” cultural endeavor, or that there is “Western science” vs “Eastern science” or perhaps in this case “African science.” Such attitudes are simply a way to take a position that is anti-science while providing rhetorical cover.
There is no such thing as “Western science” or any other qualified science. Science is a set of methods for systematically and carefully gathering reliable evidence, for testing ideas by seeing if their predictions can be verified, using valid logic to draw conclusions, and fairly considering all available evidence. What, exactly, about “Western” protocols does Tshabalala-Msimang find objectionable or incompatible with the public health goals of her country? Does she object to using valid logic or to considering all available evidence? Perhaps she objects to the transparency of “Western” research.
“bogged down in clinical trials.”
Her other statement does clarify what she does not like about “Western” protocols – its reliance upon clinical trials. So perhaps she prefers anecdotes to placebo-controlled trials (in other words preferring inferior forms of evidence whose conclusions one likes to superior forms of evidence whose conclusions one does not like). Apparently she feels that taking the time to see if a treatment is safe and effective is a waste of time and only slows the widespread incorporation of the treatment.
We hear this type of thing from promoters of dubious and sectarian methods frequently – they are too busy healing people to take the time to do the research. Of course this is based upon the assumption that their methods work. History has clearly shown that such assumptions are not warranted. The research is necessary to determine if they are helping people and not hurting them.
Medicines used for thousands of years
Tshabalala-Msimang believes that because traditional healing methods have been used for thousands of years they do not need to be subjected to proper scientific study. I call this the argument from antiquity, which is a special case of the argument from authority. It falsely assumes that a treatment modality that has stood the test of time must be safe and effective. History shows this is not always the case. For example, blood letting based upon the humoral philosophy of illness survived for a couple thousand years in Europe and was only abandoned when it was replaced by scientific medicine. Also, the argument from antiquity is just another way of appealing to anecdotal evidence. Large amounts of anecdotal evidence, even spread out over many centuries, is still anecdotal and therefore subject to all the uncertainty and limitations that implies.
This is not to say that collective experience with a treatment is of no value. Uncontrolled observation is capable of detecting very obvious and immediate effects. But it is not reliable enough to detect long term risk or toxicity from treatment, nor to judge if it truly changes the course of an illness.
I will further note that Tshabalala-Msimang is relying upon traditional healing practices to claim that garlic and beetroot are effective in treating HIV/AIDS. It is, of course, not possible that there is thousands of years of experience with such a treatment, since HIV has been recognized for only two and a half decades. She therefore must be extrapolating from more non-specific claims made for these treatments. There simply is no evidence for the efficacy of nutrition in general or garlic and beetroot in particular as first-line therapy for HIV. The Academy of Science of South Africa, after studying the role of nutrition in HIV and TB, made the following statement:
The Study Panel is frankly appalled by the dearth of reliable and truly informative studies of the nutritional influences/interventions on the course and outcomes of the pandemic chronic diseases addressed in this report.
The argument from antiquity, when stripped down, is just another way to argue that poor quality evidence should replace or even trump high quality scientific evidence, or for putting health claims and practice ahead of proper evidence.
Conclusion
Unfortunately it seems that by firing the deputy health minister, while keeping Tshabalala-Msimang on as health minister despite widespread calls for her resignation, President Mbeki is making his intentions clear. Science-based medicine is being denigrated in South Africa as “Western,” tedious, and unnecessary, while implausible health methods are being offered without evidence or adequate justification. This does not bode well for outh Africa’s health crisis.

Doctors Shouldn’t Legitimize Pro-Tobacco, Child-Labor Advocates
As the adage says: “A man is judged by the company he keeps.”
Jonathan Howard on December 29, 2023
Link
Here are some headlines normal people find disturbing:
    • Hyundai Under Scrutiny for Child Labor Violations in Alabama
    • Georgia Chipotle Pays Over $300K to Settle Child Labor Allegations in DC
    • 2 Florida Bills Could Roll Back Child Labor Laws. What Do They Do?
    • Third Teen Worker Killed In Industrial Accident As States Try To Loosen Child Labor Laws
    • Children Risk Their Lives Building America’s Roofs
    • Where Migrant Children Are Living, and Often Working, in the U.S.
    • Slaughterhouse Children: Child Labor Exposed In America’s Food Industry
    • ‘It Should Never Have Happened’: Death Of Boy, 16, At Sawmill Highlights Rise Of Child Labour In US
    • California Poultry Supplier Illegally Employed Kids, Stole Wages: Labor Department
    • Feds Probe Child Labor Issues In New Bedford Seafood Plants
    • They’re Paid Billions to Root Out Child Labor in the U.S. Why Do They Fail? 
One person who may not be perturbed by these headlines is Mr. Jeffrey Tucker, the former Editorial Director for the American Institute for Economic Research, the founder of the anti-vaccine misinformation group the Brownstone Institute, and the chief organizer of the Great Barrington Declaration (GBD), which promised that herd immunity would arrive in under 6-months, if only 250 million unvaccinated Americans contracted COVID simultaneously in October 2020. Mr. Tucker did more than assemble the epidemiologists (Drs. Martin Kulldorff, Jay Bhattacharya, Sunetra Gupta, and Stefan Baral), journalists, and camera crew at the signing of the GBD. He said he was “there while it was being drafted” and “I made a couple of suggestions here and there.”
According to his Wikipedia entry, Mr. Jeffrey Tucker:
Is an American libertarian writer, publisher, entrepreneur and advocate of anarcho-capitalism and Bitcoin. For many years he worked for Ron Paul, the Mises Institute, and Lew Rockwell. With the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER) he organized efforts against COVID-19 restrictions starting in 2020, and he founded the Brownstone Institute think tank in 2021 to continue such efforts.
Mr. Tucker also has some views that most doctors, especially those concerned about the well-being of children, would find disturbing. Prior to the pandemic, he wrote an article that encouraged children to smoke. He said:
The time to smoke is when you are a teen. It’s when your lungs are strong, and your body is prepared to fight back the ill effects. It’s also when you can gain the maximum advantage of the fact that smoking is very cool and enjoyable. I see no reason why parents shouldn’t encourage it, while warning that they will probably have to stop after graduating college. And of course this is opposite of what the government says! The anti-smoking campaigns for young people are based on its supposed addictive quality. The fear is that once you start as a teen, you will never stop. But I’ve never understood what is meant by addictive. It’s not like cigarettes take away your free will.
In addition to extolling the benefits of cigarettes for teens, Mr. Tucker also encouraged them to drop out of school and start working. In an article from 2016 titled Let the Kids Work he wrote:
The Washington Post ran a beautiful photo montage of children at work from 100 years ago. I get it. It’s not supposed to be beautiful. It’s supposed to be horrifying. I’m looking at these kids. They are scruffy, dirty, and tired. No question.
But I also think about their inner lives. They are working in the adult world, surrounded by cool bustling things and new technology. They are on the streets, in the factories, in the mines, with adults and with peers, learning and doing. They are being valued for what they do, which is to say being valued as people. They are earning money.
Whatever else you want to say about this, it’s an exciting life. You can talk about the dangers of coal mining or selling newspapers on the street. But let’s not pretend that danger is something that every young teen wants to avoid. If you doubt it, head over the stadium for the middle school football game in your local community, or have a look at the wrestling or gymnastic team’s antics at the gym.
Mr. Tucker further explained how he felt public schools damaged children and that working in fast food would be an improvement for them. He said:
And I compare it to any scene you can observe today at the local public school, with 30 kids sitting in desks bored out of their minds, creativity and imagination beaten out of their brains, forbidden from earning money and providing value to others, learning no skills, and knowing full well that they are supposed to do this until they are 22 years old if they have the slightest chance of being a success in life: desk after desk, class after class, lecture after lecture, test after test, a confined world without end…
If kids were allowed to work and compulsory school attendance was abolished, the jobs of choice would be at Chick-Fil-A and WalMart. And they would be fantastic jobs too, instilling in young people a work ethic, which is the inner drive to succeed, and an awareness of attitudes that make enterprise work for all. It would give them skills and discipline that build character, and help them become part of a professional network.
Presumably, parents who can afford to send their children to private schools should not encourage them to quit school and work flipping burgers. Chick-Fil-A and WalMart needs CEOs after all.
Mr. Tucker concluded his article by saying:
Then we look at pictures of newspaper boys from 1905 and say, “Oh how sad that these kids had jobs. We are so much more humane now!” It’s time we stop congratulating ourselves for taking away opportunity from kids. It’s time to let the kids work again.
Mr. Tucker remains proud of this article. After I shared a screenshot of it on social media, he said his article was “very compelling” and chastised me for not linking to the article itself. Journalist Walker Bragman further revealed Mr. Tucker’s enthusiasm for getting kids out of the classroom and into the workforce, in his article Leaked Brownstone Institute Emails Reveal Support for Child Labor, Underage Smoking. In one email, Mr. Tucker says:
I would fully repeal the 1936 “child labor” law . It’s cruel and robs kids of a good life.
In another email, Mr. Tucker shared an old picture of smoking adolescents and declared “these kids seem happier than kids today.” Reflecting this philosophy, the Brownstone Institute has published articles defending the vaping industry, such as The Attack on Juul Is a Scandal.
It’s sobering to realize that someone with this worldview had a profound influence on our pandemic response, especially with regards to children. What’s more disturbing is that Mr. Tucker’s failed quest for herd immunity through the mass infection of unvaccinated youth was aided and abetted by many prominent doctors, who themselves had access to powerful politicians, especially in Florida, where headlines now read Rollback Of Florida Child Labor Laws Gets Its First Committee Seal of Approval.
So why were these doctors, who purported to be very concerned! about the potential- often imagined– harms of remote learning, so eager to team up with a man who encouraged my son to drop out of school so he can smoke with his friends during his break from his shift at Chick-Fil-A?
You’ll have to ask them, of course.
I, however, am of the opinion that doctors shouldn’t lend the credibility of the medical profession to pro-tobacco, child-labor advocates. How sad that this is controversial.

The Ethics of Artificial Brains
Steven Novella on April 10, 2024
Link

We are living in a time of technology advancing so rapidly it is challenging to keep up. This has multiple ramifications, and in the area of biomedical research, there is an important ethical and regulatory dimension. Confronting the ethical considerations of our own technology is nothing new, and fresh debate seems to erupt with every new development – including in-vitro fertilization, transplanting animal tissue into humans, cloning humans, and genetic engineering.
We have recently entered a new technology controversy surrounding brain organoids (BOs), more colloquially and inaccurately referred to as artificial brains. They are not fully developed brains, but three-dimensional neural tissue. These are extremely useful models for studying neurological development and disease. Neurological pathology in particular derives not only from the health of individual brain cells, but from the organization and interaction of those cells. A three-dimensional functional model gives researchers the ability to study these interactions in a way that just plating neurons does not.
We also can use animal brains as models for human brain disease, but animal brains are always different and so this approach has limitations as well. BOs offer the possibility of creating organoids from human cell tissue, bypassing the limitation of animal models.
BOs were first created from pluripotent stem cells (PSC-derived BOs). These organoids proved very useful, however they only develop to a certain point and then stop. They do not create a sustainable cell line. More recently researchers have been able to grow BOs from human fetal brain tissue. These cells spontaneously self-organize into three dimensional structures, which is one of the things researchers want to study. They also can create sustainable cell lines and can develop to more advanced stages than PSC-derived BOs.
This new technology, however, challenges current regulations. There are regulations in the US dealing with the use of human embryos. They can only be developed for research purposes to day 14 after fertilization. BOs from fetal tissue (FeBOs) are derived from fetal brain tissue harvested from voluntarily aborted fetuses at gestational weeks 12-15. The question is – how much do we allow FeBOs to develop? One proposed limit is the equivalent of a 20 week gestational age fetus.
As with all embryonic research, there are ethical considerations surrounding informed consent, the source of harvested tissue, and the ultimate fate of such tissue. With FeBOs other considerations are introduced specific to neural tissue.
One such issue is consciousness. Keep in mind, brain organoids are not brains. It is difficulty enough to answer the question – at what point does a developing human fetus become conscious? With brain organoids researchers refer to the equivalent developmental stage, but equivalent how? This generally refers to number of cells and complexity of organization. However, organoids are not functional brains, but they may have some functionality that derives from the structure of their self-organization.
There seems to be broad agreement (for now) that we should not develop a conscious brain organoid in vitro. There is no way to really know the experience of such a conscious entity, but that means we cannot guarantee it isn’t suffering in some way, and also we would then face the ethics of destroying a conscious being when the time came. It is therefore prudent to keep brain organoid research at the subconscious level, but it may be tricky to determine exactly where that line is. And researchers are going to want to step up to that line, because there are things to be learned there.
We may face other ethical considerations as well, such as interfacing brain organoids with computer hardware. What if the addition of AI capable neural networks to brain organoids causes the result to cross over the line into consciousness. This may seem like science fiction, but in reality we may not be far from such technology.
Another issue that is likely to cause controversy is transplanting human BOs into animals. This creates a similar ethical situation to genetically engineering a research animal, such as a rat, to develop humanized brain cells, so that they are a more accurate animal model of neurological disease in humans. Human brain cells are not human brains and are therefore not human beings. But such research would blur the lines and requires careful consideration.
Right now there are no international standards or regulations dealing with FeBO research or organoids in general. Now is the time to develop such standards, before the technology is upon us. It will likely happen faster than we think.

When healing turns into killing: religious and philosophical exemptions from parental accountability
Jann Bellamy on March 13, 2014
Link
Parents have a fundamental right to guide the upbringing of their children protected under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This includes the choice of medical care for the child. They also have a First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religious beliefs, including the right to care for their children in accordance with the tenets of their religion. In a better world, these rights would be exercised in a manner that is consistent with a reasoned selection of medical care among choices supported by the best available scientific evidence. If, for example, deeply religious parents choose to forego a treatment that had only a minimal chance of extending their child’s life and terrible side effects in favor of palliative care because they believe that their child would be better off in heaven we could all agree that their choice is constitutionally protected.
Unfortunately, that is not the case. Religious believers and those whose “philosophy” favors pseudoscience in child medical care (surveys bloviating about the popularity of CAM to the contrary) are in fact a tiny minority of the American population who influence public policy in a manner that far exceeds their actual numbers. This influence allows these special interest groups to cause needless suffering and death among children and their families. As well, their actions siphon off medical and legal resources that could more properly be directed toward the common good when states and medical institutions are put in the position of having to go to court to protect children from their parents. And, by giving parents false choices between a belief in magic and standard medical care, unnecessary complications are introduced into what are already difficult and heart-wrenching decisions by parents who truly want to act in the best interests of their children. 
U.S. Constitutional protection of parental choices
As with all constitutionally-protected rights, religious freedoms are not absolute. Nor is the parents’ fundamental right (considered a liberty interest under the Due Process clause) to guide his child’s upbringing. But there is no constitutionally protected right to harm a child via the denial of medical treatment. As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Prince v. Massachusetts, decided in 1944 (emphasis added):
The family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parents’ control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child’s course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.
Why, then, do we fairly regularly see media reports about the “rights” of parents to choose faith healing or quack remedies for their children being litigated in the courts? Well, one reason is that these cases make for compelling news stories. There are plenty of run-of-the-mill child abuse and neglect cases circulating through the courts on a daily basis but these generally don’t have the David v. Goliath news value of the loving, God-fearing parents v. reductionist, Pharma-shill medical establishment/nosy, liberty-denying state authorities story. Nobody wants to defend the stereotypical drug-addled welfare mom who won’t take her sick child to the doctor. However, make that Christian Science parents whose child is wasting away from lack of effective medical treatment. Or, the parents who want to use “natural” remedies instead of chemotherapy for their child. Front page news! And plenty of people who’ll stand up for the “right” of these parents to harm their child.
In a better world, all three of these cases would be treated the same legally. The state could press charges of child abuse and neglect, seek to remove the child from the home and/or put him under a medical guardianship. The state attorney could criminally prosecute. And mitigating circumstances could be taken into account, as they are in all cases where issues such as intent to harm and possibility of future harmful conduct are an issue. The mom might agree to go into drug rehab and take parenting classes. The other parents might agree to rational medical treatment in the future and thereby avoid separation from the child and any criminal proceedings.
But that is not the case if a state attempts to intervene on behalf of a child whose parents refuse medical treatment on religious grounds. If the parents object to care on the basis that their First Amendment rights are being violated, their chance of succeeding depends on the extent of possible harm to the child with and without medical treatment as well as the likelihood of success with treatment and the treatment’s side effects. In other words, a religious barrier is erected between rational medical judgment and the child, although the deference to parental wishes is not insurmountable. One court ruled that state could not order treatment where the treatment was “risky, extremely invasive, toxic with many side effects, and/or offers a low chance of success.”
However, the court recognized that it is nevertheless
well-settled that the state may order medical treatment for a non-life threatening condition, notwithstanding the objection of the parents on religious grounds, if the treatment will, in all likelihood, temporarily or permanently solve a substantial medical problem.
Courts have refused to defer to the parents’ religious beliefs where the treatment is likely to succeed against an otherwise- fatal disease, even though the treatment can have terrible side effects. This was true of the highly publicized Daniel Hauser case, in which Daniel and his mother temporarily fled the court’s jurisdiction to avoid further chemotherapy. Daniel’s parents wanted to treat him with “natural healing” modalities instead as, they claimed, their religious beliefs dictated. (Although Minnesota, where Daniel lives, has certain statutory protections from state intervention, as discussed below, it is not clear to me they were applicable in this case. The parents did invoke, however, their constitutionally protected parental rights.)
Fortunately, where the parents claim only a liberty interest protected by the Due Process clause, the parents’ choices are typically given less deference, as was true in the Sarah Hershberger case, although a lot of good that did her. And quackery occasionally scores a total win. In the Matter of Joseph Hofbauer pitted the parents’ fundamental right to select their child’s medical care against science-based medicine. Joseph, age 7, was diagnosed in 1974 with Hodgkin’s disease, which is almost always fatal if left untreated. Joseph’s physician recommended sending him to an oncologist or hematologist for further treatment, which would include radiation and possibly chemotherapy. His parents’ preferred treatment by a physician who instituted a course of nutritional therapy and injections of laetrile.
This “duly licensed” physician treating Joseph, Dr. Michael Schachter, testified at the subsequent neglect proceedings instituted by the county. Naturally, Joseph’s condition had worsened, as testified to by two physicians conducting independent examinations. Dr. Schachter, on the other hand, thought that Joseph was progressing nicely under his treatment regimen, one that he considered effective and beneficial in cancer cases such as Joseph’s, although he did not rule out conventional therapy “if the boy’s condition appeared to be deteriorating beyond control.” A biologist also testified that a study showed “significant regression” in cancerous tumors in mice treated with laetrile, vitamin A, and proteolytic enzymes. The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts that it could not be said that the parents failed to give Joseph legally adequate medical care, although regular consultations with another physician were part of that decision.
Joseph died two years later (of Hodgkin’s disease). I don’t know if it’s the same person, but a Dr. Michael Schachter, who has been practicing since 1974, practices pseudoscientific “integrative” medicine in New York, not far from where Joseph was treated.
This is not an ideal situation, of course, but reliance solely on the First Amendment or Due Process Clause means that the child’s best interest must be weighed against the parents’ constitutional rights, and though it may require an extended court battle, ill-informed treatment choices that endanger a child rarely win out. Importantly, the Constitution provides no immunity from prosecution for neglect, abuse or the child’s death no matter how fervent the parents’ religious or philosophical belief.
Statutory medical and philosophical exemptions: immunity from criminal responsibility and more
However, if the parents live in one of the many states where the legislature has enacted the numerous medical exemption laws shielding parents’ harmful medical choices for their children, the results can be dramatically different. (Harriet Hall recently discussed how these laws negatively impact children’s health and efforts to repeal them.) These exemption laws have no basis in the constitution and go far beyond what would be allowed if denial of medical testing, preventive measures and treatment for children were simply based on constitutionally-protected parental rights.
CHILD (Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty) is a terrific non-profit organization that opposes medical mistreatment of children on religious grounds as well as parents’ use of quackery on their children. CHILD tracks the numerous cases where children are injured or killed by these practices as well as promotes the end of religious exemptions and other laws that might deny children access to proper medical care. (They do a lot more too and you should familiarize yourself with their work. It is a testament to what one small, dedicated organization can do to prevent health care based on prescientific thinking.)
Their website lists the many ways states protect parents who harm their children. While many people are aware of the vaccine exemption laws and their connection to the contraction of vaccine-preventable disease, the problem actually extends far beyond vaccination. A brief summary of religious and philosophical exemptions from medical testing and preventive care for children include:
    • Prophylactic eye drops (to prevent blindness), Vitamin K, metabolic testing, and hearing tests for newborns
    • Testing children for lead
    • Testing and treatment for TB (includes testing teachers)
    • Vaccination, school physicals, and wearing bicycle helmets
    • Medical examination, testing, treatment, and vaccination during public health emergencies (applies to everyone)
    • Learning about disease in public school
In addition, many states provide an exemption from civil and criminal liability for failure to provide medical care. Again, from CHILD:
    • From non-criminal action, such as child neglect sufficient to allow protective custody, in 38 states
    • From felony prosecution in 17 states, including, in some instances, manslaughter and murder
    • From misdemeanor prosecution in 15 states
As pointed out by both law professor Shirley Darby Howell and CHILD, the enactment of religious exemption laws in a lot of instances was due to a 1974 federal law providing states with funding to establish programs aimed at reducing the incidence of child abuse and neglect. (A pdf of Prof. Howell’s article can be located by searching for her name in Google Scholar.) Unfortunately, the law ensured that child abuse for religious reasons was exempted by stating that parents could not be considered negligent if they did not provide medical treatment due to religious beliefs. That did not, however, preclude the state from stepping in and ordering medical services. Based on the belief that these funds would not be available unless they enacted religion-based medical exemptions, the states complied. In 1983 the law was amended to allow states to abolish their religious exemptions without penalty to their funding. Unfortunately, few states have done so.
Pediatrician Seth Asser, M.D., and Rita Swan, who founded CHILD, assessed the impact of religiously-motivated child medical mistreatment and reported their findings in a 1998 article published in Pediatrics. Of 172 deaths of children when medical care was withheld on religious grounds, they concluded that 140 of the children would have had at least a 90% likelihood of survival with medical care. Eighteen more had expected survival rates of >50% and all but 3 of the remainder would likely have had some benefit from clinical help. In short, religious exemptions from medical care are deadly.
One of the ironies of religious exemptions is that the substitution of religiously-dictated practices for medical care is so rare in American religious belief. (In all world religions, actually.) Some religions and their various denominations consider faith an important part of healing but they don’t consider it a substitute for medical care. As best I can tell, Jews and Muslims do not hold the belief that medical care for children should be foregone in favor of faith healing. And among Christians the denominations supporting rejection of medical care are small and widely considered outside the fold by both mainstream and evangelical Christians, such as Christian Scientists and Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Further efforts to further medical neglect of children
Yet Christians Scientists have had an outsized effect on public policy through their vigorous lobbying, which continues to this day. Again, this is ironic because their votes – unlike, for example, the religious right in certain jurisdictions – are not essential to electing a candidate because there are so few of them. There are presently before the U.S. Congress two bills, HR 1814 and S 862, heavily lobbied by the Christian Science church, the deceptively named Equitable Access to Care and Health (EACH), which exempt everyone with “sincerely held religious beliefs” from the Affordable Health Care Act’s mandate to buy health insurance. Of course, this fits nicely with the intense hatred of Obamacare by Congressional Republicans, who will do anything, no matter who sponsors it, to undermine the law. This bill would obviously interfere with one of the central purposes of Obamacare – ensuring that children get a defined set of preventative services without cost and adequate medical care. Hypocritically, Christian Scientists have successfully lobbied for, and gotten, insurance coverage for their faith healing practitioners.
The Christian Science church sponsored a “call-in” day on Tuesday, asking members to contact their Representatives and Senators to support the bills. They were successful in the House, although that may have had more to do with procedural shenanigans than the call in. S 862 is still before the Senate.
There is also a movement afoot among conservative groups ostensibly directed at preventing the adoption by the United States of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which they view as undermining, among other things, parental rights. The group behind this, ParentalRights.org, vehemently opposes restriction or elimination of religious and philosophical exemptions to vaccination and the “right” of parents to choose quackery as a substitute for responsible medical care for their children, and they want those rights enshrined in the constitution with an amendment. (Orac blogged about this over on Respectful Insolence). An amendment, in their view, would make it much harder for the state to intervene in cases where parents are guided by their own religion and philosophical whims instead of rational, evidence-based information, no matter how much these beliefs trespass on the child’s health and welfare.
Coincidentally, Justina Pelletier has emerged as the perfect poster child for their cause. Justina’s case is a rare instance where the parents’ choice between two seemingly-conventional medical diagnoses and recommended treatment regimens has landed them in the courts. As is often the case, the facts are more complicated than parentsrights.org’s loving parents v. the evil state presentation. (The story is covered by the Boston Globe here and here.) Nevertheless, Justina’s story deflects attention from the fact that the choices in the more typical parents’ rights cases are between totally ineffective methods and conventional medical care.
The organization firmly denies that it is anti-vaccination, using the sort of weasely language often found in the anti-vaccination crowd.
We at ParentalRights.org neither endorse nor condemn vaccines. We simply hold that informed parents are in the best position to make medical decisions for their child.
Of course, misinformed parents, such as those who believe in propaganda from the National Vaccine (Mis)information Center, are not in the “best position” to make that decision. (The NVIC is listed as an “Allied Organization” and is a source specifically cited by ParentalRights.org in a plea for support sent to another organization.) But if you want to ditch science as the standard for medical care, I suppose all information a parent considers, no matter how misguided or flat-out wrong, is a sufficient excuse to deny children protection against illness and death caused by vaccine-preventable diseases.
The pro-quackery position is not in evidence at all (that I could find) on their website, yet the organization has issued a call for support (reprinted on another organization’s website) of Colorado Senate Bill 14-032 which would eliminate the restrictions on naturopaths and “alternative medicine” providers (basically anyone who declares, sua sponte, that he or she is an alternative medicine provider, including felons convicted of sex crimes).
Conclusion
All children deserve rational, science-based medical care. The U.S. Constitution does protect, to a limited extent, the parents’ choices in the child’s medical care. Preferably those choices would never be dictated solely by religion (to the extent it is not in the child’s best interest) or pseudoscience. Fortunately, the well-being of the child is paramount when the two conflict. Most of the harm to children from denial of medical care is done because state laws allow parents to make religious and philosophical decisions endangering the child’s well being. Yet these laws are contrary to the moral sensibilities of the vast majority of Americans, who do provide preventive care for their children, including vaccinations, and adequate medical care when they are sick. Children are being held hostage by a small minority of politically active zealots. All religious and philosophical exemption laws should be repealed. It would be especially useful to this cause if religious leaders who reject religion as a pretext for denial of medical care spoke out against this tyranny of the minority, as the American Academy of Pediatrics has done.

   Anti-vaccine warriors vs. research ethics
Published by David Gorski
Link
Three weeks ago, the anti-vaccine movement took a swing for the fences and, as usual, made a mighty whiff that produced a breeze easily felt in the bleachers. In brief, a crew of anti-vaccine lawyers headed by Mary Holland, co-author of Vaccine Epidemic: How Corporate Greed, Biased Science, and Coercive Government Threaten Our Human Rights, Our Health, and Our Children, published a highly touted (by Generation Rescue and other anti-vaccine groups, that is) “study” claiming to “prove” that the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) had actually compensated children for autism. As is typical with such “studies” generated by the anti-vaccine movement, it was bad science, bad law, and just plain bad all around. The authors intentionally conflated “autism-like” symptoms with autism, trying to claim that children with neurological injury with “autism-like” symptoms actually have autism. Never mind that there are specific diagnostic criteria for autism and that, if the children actually had autism, many of them would have been given a diagnosis of autism. Never mind that what they were doing was akin to claiming that all patients with “Parkinson’s-like symptoms” have Parkinson’s disease. (Hint: They don’t.) Never mind that all they did was to demonstrate a prevalence of autism spectrum disorders among the VICP-compensated children that was clearly within the range of what would be anticipated if there were no relationship between vaccines and autism. Never mind all that. This was Holland’s big chance, but it went over like the proverbial lead balloon. No one bit, other than FOX News.
The study rapidly faded into the obscurity it so richly deserves, in spite of mighty efforts by Generation Rescue, SafeMinds, and the likes of Ginger Taylor to keep it alive and use it as a rallying point to persuade legislators to pass anti-vaccine-friendly legislation. You could feel the frustration in its backers as Holland’s study, into which groups like Generation Rescue had apparently poured their hopes of being vindicated, crashed and burned.
However, there’s one aspect of this study that I didn’t discuss. In fact, I thought of it as I read it, but I wasn’t sure. What I (and others) have noticed is that there was no statement in the article that approval had been obtained from the relevant institutional review boards (IRBs) to do human subjects research. For those not familiar with what an IRB is, an IRB is a committee that oversees all human subject research for an institution. It is the IRB’s responsibility to make sure that all studies are ethical in design and that they conform to all federal regulations. Basically, IRBs are charged with weighing the risks and benefits of proposed human subject research and making sure that
risks are minimized and that the risk:benefit ratio, at least as well as it can be estimated, is very favorable;
to minimize any pain, suffering or distress that might come about because of the experimental therapy; and
to make sure that researchers obtain truly informed consent.
During the course of a study, regular reports must be made to the IRB, which can shut down any study in its institution if it has concerns about patient welfare.
Of course, I know this all because I happen to be involved in human subjects research. It’s part of what I do while doing research in breast cancer. Clinical trials are obviously human subjects research. After all, their very purpose is to test a new drug or treatment on human subjects in order to determine if it works. However, human subjects research encompasses a lot more than just clinical trials; in fact, it encompasses almost any research study that involves either human subjects or human subjects’ protected health information (i.e., medical charts). Basically, any human subject experimentation requires approval by a properly constituted IRB. There is no documentation in Holland et al that IRB approval had been obtained, either from the for NYU (given that Mary Holland is a research scholar at the NYU School of Law) and/or Pace University, given that Pace Law School is cited as having “provided significant research support for this study” in the footnotes of the paper:
Mary Holland, Research Scholar and Director of the Graduate Legal Skills Program, NYU School of Law; Louis Conte, independent investigator; and Robert Krakow and Lisa Colin, attorneys in private practice. Pace Law School provided significant research support for this study.
Autism News Beat and Sullivan are already all over this issue, but I thought I’d throw in a bit from my perspective, given that I actually have to work with IRBs and, before my career is over, will probably be roped into serving on an IRB. In any case, as is true of any researcher who is involved in human subjects research, I had to undergo specific training regarding the “rules of the road,” so to speak, as a requirement of being an investigator on any study involving human subjects research.
How is human subjects research defined? According to 32 CFR 219.102(d), research means “a systematic investigation, including research development, testing, and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge,” and according to 32 CFR 219.102(f) a human subject is defined as ” living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or identifiable private information.”
Under these criteria, I believe that the Pace study clearly qualifies as human subjects research. First of all, as poorly designed as the study was, it was clearly intended as a systematic investigation designed to contribute to generalizable knowledge and testing a hypothesis, namely that autism is associated with vaccine-induced brain injury. The authors claim to have found data in the VICP-compensated cases indicating that there is a higher incidence of autism in these children. Never mind that they found nothing of the sort, they set out to test that hypothesis and their methods were designed to support it. Moreover, as Autism News Beat pointed out, members of the Elizabeth Birt Center for Autism and Legal Advocacy (EBCALA) administered the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) to the parents or caregivers of 22 children. This clearly makes the parents who answered the questionnaire (and their children) human subjects, as identifiable protected health information about the children is being solicited and used to test their hypothesis.
To be fair, I have to point out that there are types of studies that are exempt from full IRB approval. In fact, there are six categories of so-called “exempt” studies. I frequently use category four, which involves the use of already existing clinical information that has been de-identified. I also note that this particular exemption involves research that does not involve interacting with living humans about their health information; rather, these sorts of studies tend to involve chart reviews or the examination of human tissue specimens that have already been collected. Be that as it may, there is one potential exemption that EBCALA might claim. First, number two:
Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless:
information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and
any disclosure of the human subjects responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects financial standing, employability, or reputation.
Unfortunately for Holland et al, the first “unless” probably kills this exemption. The information they obtained was obtained in a manner such that the human subjects can be identified. The second “unless” might or might not kill the exemption; I note that both criteria are used to decide whether an exemption is not permissible. However, even if this research could potentially be considered exempt – and I highly doubt that a reputable IRB operating within the law and the Common Rule would find it exempt, particularly since IRBs are charged with taking special care to protect human subjects considered to be vulnerable, such as children, and that the survey is in fact a screening/diagnostic tool, making the results protected health information – it should also be noted it is not the investigators who get to decide whether a protocol is exempt or not and therefore whether a protocol requires IRB evaluation and approval. Period. Investigators do not have the power to determine whether their research falls under one of these exempt categories; only the IRB can make that determination, usually in an expedited review that determines whether a potentially exempt protocol meets the standards of one of the categories that are exempt from full IRB approval. It’s right there in the rules:
Only the IRB may determine which activities qualify for an exempt review. Investigators do not have the authority to make an independent determination that research involving human subjects is exempt and must contact the IRB concerning the status of proposed research or changes in ongoing research.
Also note that the research cannot begin until after IRB approval is obtained.
Personally, unlike the case with the Geiers, my guess is that as lawyers Holland et al were simply ignorant that what they were doing constituted human subjects research and that’s why they didn’t bother with a little thing (to them) like obtaining IRB approval before doing their study. Indeed, when Autism News Beat inquired at Pace Law School about whether the EBCALA study had IRB approval, this is what he was told:
When asked if the Pace study had IRB approval, Pace Law spokesperson Lauren Rubenstein referred the question to the study’s co-author, Louis Conte. In an email, Rubenstein wrote “Louis Conte has told me that there was no human subjects research in this study.”
Which reveals Conte’s utter cluelessness about human subjects research. Investigators interacted with the parents of these children, administering a questionnaire to them for purposes of looking for data to support their hypothesis. It’s human subjects research until judged otherwise–by an IRB, not by Conte, Holland, or any of the other of the merry band of anti-vaccine lawyers who put this travesty of a study together. Not surprisingly, attempts to get Conte to respond to e-mails regarding IRB approval of the study were not returned.
Of course, ignorance of the law is no excuse; as lawyers the authors of Holland et al should know. I also find it rather hard to believe, whether or not they were ignorant of federal law and regulations regarding human subjects research, that at some point either Holland and her coauthors weren’t made aware somehow by someone that what they were doing constituted human subjects research under federal law. Surely someone must have realized this, given that questionnaires about protected health information were being administered to living human beings. If they did not, then, quite frankly, I find the level of incompetence and lack of concern about basic ethical standards that every investigator in the U.S. who engages in human subjects research knows as basic information because they are required to know them and abide by them as part of ethics and the law.
This lack of concern about such niceties of the ethical treatment of human subjects is nothing new in anti-vaccine studies. Andrew Wakefield demonstrated it with his callous treatment of children at a party, whom he basically bribed for blood samples and whose fear he made light of. The Geiers père et fils demonstrated it when they created an IRB to oversee their own research, sat on that IRB themselves with Dr. Geier himself chairing the committee (a massive conflict of interest), and packed it with their anti-vaccine cronies.
There’s one more “out” that Holland et al might try for, and that’s to say that their research was not federally funded and is therefore not covered by the Common Rule. However, most universities that accept federal funding for research agree to be bound by the Common Rule for all research carried out by their faculty, students, and trainees. Even if Holland et al tried to justify their failure to obtain IRB approval this way and argue that they are not legally bound to follow the Common Rule, their failure to obtain IRB approval for their study and submit to IRB oversight is a massive ethical failing. I characterized Holland et al as evidence that that when the anti-vaccine movement can’t win on science, it will appeal to the law. It also appears that when it can’t win on ethics, it will appeal to the law as well.
While Holland et al tout “unanswered” questions about autism and the VICP, the only question I have is: Will Pace University and NYU will investigate how such a study could be performed without its investigators obtaining the requisite IRB approval? Or will they sweep this massive ethical (and possibly legal) breach under the rug and hope it goes awa

Every accusation is a confession (or a statement of intent): MAHA’s new Tuskegee experiment
HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.s CDC just funneled a $1.6 million dollar grant to researchers to carry out an unethical and scientifically unjustified randomized clinical trial of the birth dose of the hepatitis B vaccine in Guinea-Bissau. With MAHA, it’s Tuskegee all over again.
David Gorski on December 22, 2025
Link

When I read Steve Novella’s end-of-year post this Wednesday, one thing he wrote hit me a bit hard, although you might think that it’s for an odd reason. Specifically, when he stated that he “honestly had to make a concerted effort to avoid writing about RFK Jr., Dr. Makary, Vinay Prasad, and Jay Bhattacharya (my colleagues here have it covered pretty well), in order to have some balance here and continue to tackle some of the more classic topics at SBM” and that “every week there is some outrage that deserves discussion on SBM,” it was like a slap in the face reminding me how tired and worn down I have become, thanks to writing every week one of Steve’s aforementioned outrages of the week from this administration attacking science-based medicine. Most of these attacks on science-based medicine, public health, and biomedical research have been, of course, orchestrated by longtime antivax activist turned Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Specifically, Steve reminded me that it’s been such a long time since I myself have had a chance to write about one of the more “classic topics at SBM,” so consumed have I been with the “Make America Healthy Again” (MAHA) outrage of the week (or day). Indeed, it’s so bad that, as the weekend approached, I looked for topics not related to this administration, vaccines, or biomedical health policy, but I couldn’t. Then, as I started seriously thinking about today’s post for SBM, I couldn’t make up my mind which outrage to write about this week. (There were at least three serious contenders.) ThenI learned about an incident that led me to throw out any hope of writing about a “classic SBM topic,” at least this week. Specifically, RFK Jr. appears to have quietly funneled $1.6 million of CDC funds to support an unethical randomized controlled trial in Africa that reminded me of a modern equivalent of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment.
The Tuskegee syphilis study, as many might recall, was an infamous experiment carried out on conducted between 1932 and 1972 by the US Public Health Service and the CDC on a group of nearly 400 African-American men with syphilis, comparing them to a control group without syphilis, the goal being to study the effects of untreated syphilis. Although effective treatments for syphilis had been developed in the 1920s, and an even more effective drug, penicillin, had become widely available to treat the disease by 1947, the experiment continued. The Black men in the group with syphilis were not informed of existing treatments, which were withheld from them. Moreover, the original experiment had been designed to last only six months, which would have been ethically very suspect but somewhat less horrifically unethical, but instead it continued for 40 years, ending only when a leak to the press led to its termination. By 1972, 28 patients had died due to syphilis itself, while 100 had died from complications related to the disease. In addition, 40 of the patients’ wives were infected with syphilis, and 19 children were born with congenital syphilis.
So obviously and horrifically racist and unethical was this study that exposure of the Tuskegee syphilis study in the press ultimately led to the Belmont Report in 1979, which became, after the Nuremberg Code in 1947, a foundational document regulating medical ethics of HHS-funded human subjects research. Since then, ethical standards have tightened even more with the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki, which is updated every few years. The Tuskegee study is one reason among many—but a big reason—why there are now extensive HHS regulations governing human subjects research codified under the Common Rule (45 CFR 46) and requiring, among other things, informed consent, voluntariness, approval and oversight by an ethics committee known as the institutional review board, and protection of vulnerable populations from exploitation, such as children and prisoners. With that background, in this post I will attempt to show you why this study is unethical, not justified based on the science, and reeks of cronyism.
I’m not the only one to compare this $1.6 million award to the Tuskegee syphilis study; Derek Beres of Conspirituality beat me to it. However, given how dubious and unethical this funded study is, I don’t consider the comparison to be too overblown. Let’s start by looking at the announcement of this award in the CDC register and gleaning what we can about the study itself. I’ll then briefly discuss the history of the antivax movement’s invocation of the Tuskegee study, to turn this around and demonstrate why this award reeks of a modern day resurrection of Tuskegee, complete with additional corruption and cronyism.
A mysterious announcement appears
Last Thursday, an announcement from the CDC appeared in the Federal Register entitled Notice of Award of a Single Source Unsolicited Grant To Fund University of Southern Denmark (SDU). Fortunately, a number of researchers took notice, as did some reporters, all of whom saw a number of red flags, to the point where various news outlets started investigating. First, let’s look at what is so concerning.
From Science:
Public health scientists are raising concerns following news of a $1.6 million award from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for a trial of hepatitis B vaccines in newborn babies in the West African nation of Guinea-Bissau. The funding is for an unsolicited proposal from a group in Denmark whose work has emphasized the potential dangers of vaccination and has frequently been criticized. Some researchers say the study raises ethical issues and is unlikely to offer scientific insights into a vaccine already known to be efficacious and safe.
The agency’s award comes on the heels of its controversial decision on Monday to revoke a longtime recommendation that all U.S. newborns get their first dose of the vaccine at birth. A CDC notice published today states that the 5-year study will investigate “the optimal timing and delivery” of hepatitis B vaccines, and collect data on “early-life mortality, morbidity, and long-term developmental outcomes.”
I discussed the ACIP decision to drop the routine universal recommendation for a birth dose of hepatitis B vaccine and why it’s so unjustified. However, antivaxxers were going to do what antivaxxers do. Also, the hepatitis B vaccine has long been a bête noire of the antivax movement, and this study suggests that MAHA is far from done with attacking the vaccine. Let’s shift now to what the CDC notice says about the study:
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), located within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), announces the award of approximately $1,600,000 over a five-year period, in response to an unsolicited proposal that has been submitted by University of Southern Denmark (SDU). The award will support a comparable study of the optimal timing and delivery of monovalent Hepatitis B vaccinations on newborns in Guinea-Bissau. Activities will include conducting a randomized controlled trial to assess the effects of neonatal Hepatitis B vaccination on early-life mortality, morbidity, and long-term developmental outcomes. The award is in response to an unsolicited proposal.
I realize that the details are sketchy, and not much more information is provided in the rest of the notice. Let’s just say that I would really, really like to see the detailed research proposal and, most importantly, the protocol for the randomized clinical trial itself. I’d also like to see the budget, because, as you will see below, $1.6 million strikes me as grossly insufficient to run a study of the type proposed over five years. In any event, the information provided is more than enough to raise serious alarm bells regarding the science and ethics of the proposed study that Science reported:
The proposed work being funded will support a single-blind, multi-center, phase IV randomized controlled trial enrolling over 14,000 neonates in Guinea-Bissau to evaluate the impact of neonatal monovalent Hepatitis B vaccination (HBV0) on all-cause mortality, severe morbidity, and long-term developmental outcomes. The study will also assess potential sex-differential effects of the vaccine. While the World Health Organization (WHO) recommends three vaccines at birth in low-income settings—Bacille Calmette Guérin (BCG), oral polio vaccine (OPV0), and HBV0—there is limited evidence on the broader health effects of HBV0. This study aims to fill that gap by rigorously evaluating the overall health impact of HBV0 in early life.
At this point, readers who are not familiar with the issues of “nonspecific effects” of vaccines might be scratching their heads, wondering what the heck this study is proposing and perhaps even what is wrong with this study from an ethical and scientific standpoint. I know that when I first read this description, one thing stood out, from a strictly scientific standpoint: Nowhere do I see among the primary outcomes to be tracked one that any vaccinologist would consider to be the most important, namely the incidence of hepatitis B in infants receiving the birth dose versus those receiving the current dose at six weeks of age, you know, the disease that the vaccine is designed to prevent. Nor do I find among any of the outcomes another critical outcome, namely the incidence of chronic hepatitis B, which is the form of the infection that produces an enormously elevated risk of liver failure and liver cancer during an individual’s lifetime. Of course, by design, a five year study is far too short to quantify beneficial effects of the birth dose of hepatitis B vaccination on long-term outcomes, which suggests to me that this study is clearly intended to generate data showing adverse health outcomes associated with the birth dose. (This ain’t my first rodeo.)
But back to nonspecific effects of vaccines. It didn’t take long after the CDC announcement hit the federal register for scientists, physicians, health communicators, and reporters to figure out upon whom this CDC largesse will be showered. Indeed, as soon as I learned of this news, I—and, to be fair, many who follow vaccine-related issues—immediately guessed immediately who the investigators most likely were. We were correct (ot that it was any great insight to be correct), and soon news reports confirmed that the investigators receiving this grant are Christine Stabell Benn and her husband, Peter Aaby, who together lead the Bandim Health Project, a research site located in Guinea-Bissau in West Africa.
Unsurprisingly as well, as has been reported in articles on various news and commentary websites, there are ties between one of the investigators and FDA officials that produce an acrid stench of cronyism. Specifically, Stabell Benn is buds with Dr. Tracy Beth Høeg, who before the pandemic was a sports medicine physician with no experience in vaccinology but during the pandemic became a prominent influencer by promoting COVID-19 contrarianism and anti-COVID vaccine misinformation. She is now a top advisor to FDA Commissioner Dr. Marty Makary and acting director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the FDA center in charge of approving all non-biologics drugs. Never mind that she is utterly unqualified for this position, having never herself designed or run a randomized controlled clinical trial of the sort required by the FDA to approve a drug and being utterly lacking in relevant experience in drug regulation to be the chief scientist in charge of drug approval and regulation.
STAT News describes this relationship between Stabell Ben and Høeg:
The two have co-hosted a podcast together called “Vaccine Curious” where they compare vaccine policies in the U.S. and Denmark. Høeg is also the FDA’s representative on the CDC’s ACIP panel, where she recently pushed for the U.S. to reduce the number of vaccines it gives newborns.
Stabell Benn told STAT in April that she would like regulators to raise the bar on vaccines. She suggested asking companies to prove not only that their products introduce antibodies or reduce the risk of the target illness, but that they improve overall health.
“There is a misunderstood fear that if we start digging down and scrutinizing vaccine effects on overall health, then we might reveal something that could shatter confidence,” Stabell Benn said. “But it’s really not the way to deal with uncertainty. To say that if we are so afraid of what we are finding, we will just not study it. I can’t see any excuse.”
I find myself drifting back to the early 1980s to respond, “Gag me with a spoon!” Seriously, this is the same schtick that every antivax-leaning investigator invokes whenever they are criticized for promoting scientifically unsupported speculations about harms from vaccines. That’s when they like to quote Colonel Nathan Jessup (played by Jack Nicholson) in A Few Good Men: “You can’t handle the truth!”
Seriously. We can handle the truth. It is, after all, scientists who study vaccines who discover real potential adverse reactions due to them. What irritates us are misinformation, disinformation, pseudoscience, and lies being sold as “The Truth.”
This relationship also helps explain why it’s been reported that the topic of an HHS press conference planned and canceled by RFK Jr. last Friday was to be to announce that the US would be moving to a vaccine schedule much more like that of Denmark, which vaccinates against far fewer diseases. This is not entirely a surprise to me given that two weeks ago I discussed how much current antivax leadership at CDC and FDA fetishizes the Danish schedule as “best practices,” while ignoring all the other things that Denmark does with respect to health, most importantly its government-funded program of universal health insurance. It’s a tendency that Angela Rasmussen pithily referred to as the the “vaccine disinformation to descheduling pipeline,” adding, “Make America Denmark never.”
It is, however, a surprise that RFK Jr. moved that fast to implement such a program. Indeed, there are a number of very good scientific and public health reasons why the US vaccination schedule should not mirror Denmark’s, particularly for hepatitis B vaccination. For example, Denmark has different burdens of various vaccine-preventable diseases, and, importantly, Denmark has universal health insurance and the US does not. As I’ve written before, there is no “one size fits all” childhood vaccination schedule, and the vaccination schedules of most countries, despite being different, are indeed science- and evidence-based, because what is needed in each country is context-, population-, and region-specific. Unfortunately, RFK Jr. and MAHA labor under the delusion that there is just one best science- and evidence-based vaccine schedule, and—surprise!—they always pick industrialized countries with the fewest vaccines on their schedule (such as Denmark) as the “ideal” schedule. Fortunately, the press conference has been postponed until January. Unfortunately, I’m sure that I’ll be writing about it in 2026.
But back to the study, such as it is, even given how little we know about it.
To give you an idea of Aaby and Stabell Benn’s dedication to scientific rigor, let me just quote a bit more from the STAT News article, but first let me provide context. Aaby’s desire to study nonspecific effects of vaccines seems to have come out of a reasonable experience, as reported in Mother Jones. Specifically, while studying malnutrition in Guinea-Bissau in 1979 during a measles outbreak with horrific mortality, Aaby noticed that vaccinated children didn’t die from measles, which was unsurprising, but also had a lower all-cause mortality from any disease, which was surprising, especially the magnitude, a three-fold decrease. This was actually one observation where Aaby’s work might actually have been a legitimate contribution, as decades later it was discovered that the measles virus can cause immune amnesia for up to three years after infection, leading to an increased risk of infection and death from other pathogens. Prevent measles, and you prevent that immune amnesia. Truly, the measles vaccine does appear to protect against more than the measles.
Unfortunately, the discovery of immune amnesia from measles might have just been Aaby getting lucky, as methodology of his later studies with his wife, some of which found negative nonspecific effects from vaccines, has been questionable. For example, in 2017, Aaby and Stabell Ben published an observational study using data from Guinea-Bissau during the 1980s that has been widely cited by antivaxxers ever since, including RFK Jr. In brief, it was a “natural experiment” in which they followed children after the DTP vaccine was introduced to an urban area, reporting that receiving the DTP vaccine was “associated with a mortality hazard ratio (HR) of 5.00 (95% CI 1.53-16.3) compared with not-yet-DTP-vaccinated children.” I won’t deconstruct this study in detail, because friend of the blog Skeptical Raptor took care of that at the time, as did I. Let’s just say that it’s not a good study.
Now, look at what STAT News reports:
Kennedy has repeatedly cited their research in interviews, particularly an observational study showing an increase in mortality among children who received the DTP vaccine, which prevents diphtheria, tetanus, and whooping cough.
The couple has come under fire in the Danish press for failing to publish the results of a separate randomized controlled trial they ran on the DTP vaccine in 2011, while touting the results of the observational study. Fellow Danish researchers have expressed skepticism of the Bandim Health Project’s methods and conclusions, according to articles from Weekendavidsen.
Where’s the RCT? Why doesn’t RFK Jr. want to see the results of the RCT? Could it be because the RCT doesn’t show what the observational study using 40+ year old data showed? I mean, just look at their excuse:
The couple told Weekendavidsen that they never published the results of the randomized trial due to a Ph.D. student’s pregnancy and the death of her field supervisor. The student “didn’t have time for long-term follow-up, and we didn’t have new resources to continue,” they said.
When life happens, as in a key personnel becoming pregnant, generally the principal investigator takes over until a replacement can be found—or just takes over indefinitely. Let’s just say that the couple’s excuse sounds a lot like, “The dog ate my paper.”
Worse, as Liz Szabo reported in CIDRAP:
In June, Kennedy used a single study by the Bandim group to justify canceling more than $1 billion in funding for childhood vaccinations in developing countries. The observational study found an increased risk of death in children who received a combined vaccine for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DPT) that hasn’t been used in the United States in three decades.
And, of course:
Yet Children’s Health Defense, the anti-vaccine organization Kennedy founded, cites the Danish group’s research on multiple pages of its website. One article praises the Bandim Health’s founder, Danish anthropologist Peter Aaby, casting him as a martyr who lost his funding when he suggested vaccines cause more harm than good.
Because of course he did.
I note that the person writing the article cited was none other than J.B. Handley, founder of Generation Rescue, the antivax group that later persuaded Jenny McCarthy to be its figurehead president back in the day. (I also note that I deconstructed the misinformation in this very article back in the day.) Did I also forget to mention that Peter Aaby isn’t even a vaccinologist, infectious disease specialist, epidemiologist, or any specialty with training in running clinical research? I have nothing against anthropologists; I find anthropology fascinating and very difficult, given the limitations of applying scientific methodology to the topics studied. It’s just that anthropologists are not one of my go-to professions for carrying out studies on vaccine efficacy and adverse events. Stabell Benn is, of course, a physician, but she seems to have drunk the Kool-Aid with respect to claims that a number of vaccines having nonspecific effects that are more harmful than their beneficial effects. Let’s just put it this way. There’s a reason why antivaxxers love her and her husband. (Granted, they don’t like their work showing that MMR has beneficial nonspecific effects, but they somehow ignore that part of the couple’s oeuvre.)
Indeed, Aaby and Stabell Benn’s studies have been widely criticized for their poor methodology. A recent commentary and reanalysis of clinical trials published earlier this month in Vaccine by Henrik Støvring et al in response to an article by Stabell Benn arguing that the evidence for adverse nonspecific effects of vaccines is now so compelling that we should significantly change how vaccines are approved and their safety monitored:
We have reached a point in time when we must rewrite our understanding of vaccines. It is no longer tenable to maintain a narrow perspective on vaccines as biological preparations that induce specific protection against a specific disease. NSEs make life more complicated for both policy makers and regulators. However, the reward is the auspicious prospect of wiser vaccination programs designed to protect against specific diseases and provide general immune training with even bigger benefits than in current programs.
Let’s just say that Støvring et al were…less than impressed:
However, just as the commentary appeared in Vaccine, a series of Danish news articles scrutinized the research practices of Drs Benn and Aaby. As external experts in statistics and research methodology, we were asked to contribute independent assessments of their conclusions from their own randomized controlled trials. We were surprised to find several instances of questionable research practices, such as unpublished primary outcomes, outcome switching, reinterpretation of trials based on statistically fragile subgroup analyses, and frequent promotion of cherry-picked secondary findings as causal, even when primary outcomes yielded null results. Sample size calculations appeared to be driven by unwarranted optimism regarding effect-sizes and event rates leading to underpowered studies.
The commentary focused on results from randomized trials (RCTs) to motivate policy changes. Yet, RCTs are only as good as the extent to which their analysis and reporting practices can be trusted. As the risk of false positives increases with the number of examined hypotheses, any findings from secondary, presumably exploratory, analyses should be viewed with caution, when primary outcomes fail to achieve statistical significance. Adjustment for multiple comparisons then becomes essential to make meaningful inferences beyond the primary endpoint.
In other words, Støvring et al found evidence that Aaby and Stabell Benn had cherry picked secondary and subgroup outcomes in papers for which the results in the primary outcome were negative, which is a no-no. Such results can be hypothesis-generating, but, unless prespecified in the protocol and statistical analysis, should not be inferred as causation. In many of their papers, they also apparently failed to do a basically statistical correction, namely to correct for multiple comparisons. As Støvring et al note:
Strong scientific claims based on flexible reporting of secondary hypotheses can be highly misleading [32]. When researchers explore data post hoc—after seeing the results—they may be tempted to highlight apparently interesting patterns or associations based on statistically significant findings. However, without proper correction for the number of tests performed, these are at high risk of being randomly occurring false positives. While explorative findings are essential for generating new hypotheses, they become problematic when presented as if confirmatory.
It should be emphasized here that Guinea-Bissau is a poor nation in Africa with a very high childhood mortality rate, as well as a high level of hepatitis B infection. As reported in multiple outlets, it is a country in which the prevalence of hepatitis B infection approaches 20%. Moreover, given the poverty of the country, maternal testing for hepatitis B infection is sporadic, at best. In other words, Guinea-Bissau is exactly the sort of country where the birth dose of hepatitis B vaccine would be expected to do the most good. Now here’s the wrinkle. As reported in STAT News and elsewhere, Guinea-Bissau plans to implement the birth dose of hepatitis B vaccine in 2027, which is the recommendation of the World Health Organization, changing its recommendation from its current guidelines recommending vaccination at 6 weeks. In other words, time’s running out for antivaxxers to do such a study in an underserved impoverished population. They had to strike while they still could, while the recommendation in the country still allows it.
I know what some out there might be thinking: What’s the big deal? The current recommendation for childhood vaccination with hepatitis B in Guinea-Bissau is to administer a dose at age 6 weeks. Could six weeks make that big a difference? Why is this study so unethical? There are a number of reasons. First, there is no strong scientific justification for the study, no preliminary data to lead one to suspect that there are nonspecific effects, positive or negative, associated with the birth dose of hepatitis B vaccination, as described by Szabo:
Multiple researchers who spoke to CIDRAP News questioned the need for another study of hepatitis B vaccines, which have been proven safe and effective in more than 400 studies over 40 years.
“The data that supports the safety advocacy of the current hepatitis B vaccines is very robust,” said Amesh A. Adalja, MD, a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
“Given the stance of the CDC under RFK Jr’s control, one can assume that the results of this study will be preordained to be against the hepatitis B vaccines,” Adalja said. “Continuing to do studies on a question that is already been answered sufficiently is a waste of resources that could better be used answering new questions.”
Precisely. As much as RFK Jr. claims to be supporting “gold standard science,” it’s not gold standard science to keep restudying an issue that has such a huge evidence base supporting one conclusion. It’s trying to generate an outlier study to justify what you want to do anyway. Worse, this award was granted through a completely opaque process in which Stabell Benn, a crony of Tracy Beth Høeg and someone who likes RFK Jr, sent the CDC an unsolicited research proposal, which was granted without any evidence that it underwent anything resembling a rigorous NIH study section-style peer review. Worse, the study intentionally takes advantage of an underserved, vulnerable population, namely children in a poor country with a very high infant and childhood mortality rate, to test a hypothesis that can’t ethically be tested in the United States or Europe. Indeed, no institutional review board in the US would grant ethical approval to a study like this, nor should any IRB do so. Ditto Europe. Moreover, in the US and European countries, it is unethical to carry out a study on a population in another country that would be considered unethical to do in the US or Europe, and this study stinks to high heaven.
As Angela Rasmussen put it:
Rasmussen notes that it would not be ethical to provide a birth dose of the hepatitis B vaccine to some babies but not others, given that doctors know the immunization saves lives, both in the early newborn period and decades later.
Exposing thousands of babies to “a significant risk” of hepatitis B “in a low-income country with limited health care resources” would be “wildly unethical and a disgraceful use of American taxpayer money,” Rasmussen said.
Correct. And, as Dr. Jake Scott, a clinical associate professor of infectious disease and geographic medicine at Stanford University School of Medicine, put it:
Scott said the study’s announcement suggests that the CDC isn’t truly looking for answers.
“In evidence-based policy, you gather data and then make a decision,” Scott said. “This is the reverse. CDC made the policy decision and then funded research to back it up. When you commission research after making a decision, you’re not looking for answers—you’re looking for validation.”
And that’s exactly what RFK Jr. is doing here. It is, as our very own Dr. Jonathan Howard put it, “policy-based evidence making.”
So where do comparisons to the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiment come in?
The Tuskegee syphilis experiment: For MAHA, every accusation is a confession (of intent)
As Derek Beres noted and as I have written about for ages and ages, the antivax movement in general and RFK Jr. in particular have loved to invoke the Tuskegee syphilis experiment with respect to vaccines in an attempt to portray vaccine research as being as horrifically unethical as that infamous experiment. Just for yucks, I searched this blog and my not-so-super-secret other blog for “Tuskegee” and “vaccines.” (You can do the same search yourself, if so inclined.) Let’s just say that, whenever antivaxxers, including RFK Jr., are trying to demonize vaccines in front of an audience consisting primarily of Blacks and other minority groups in the US, they just love to trot out the Tuskegee syphilis study. Here are just a few examples:
    • When antivaxxers descended on the Somali immigrant community in Minnesota, who had been in the news for the high prevalence of autism in their community, in order fuel the flames of suspicion of vaccines as the cause, Andrew Wakefield invoked—of course!—the Tuskegee syphilis study.
    • In 2018 at a chiropractic conference, RFK Jr. analogized the CDC whistleblower manufactroversy to the Tuskegee syphilis experiment on black men, an analogy he dredged up again in describing a California bill (which ultimately became law) tightening vaccine exemption requirements, all the while cozying up to the racist and anti-Semitic Nation of Islam.
    • At an event targeting Black people in Compton, Andrew Wakefield and Del Bigtree nodded approvingly as a Black antivaxxer named Sheila Ealey invoked the Tuskegee syphilis study, as well as the horrendous history of white physicians conducting painful and unethical experiments on enslaved people before the Civil War.
    • Over one of the taped conversations with William Thompson (a.k.a. the “CDC whistleblower” of The CDC whistleblower conspiracy theory at the heart of Andrew Wakefield and Del Bigtree’s antivax propaganda film disguised as a documentary, VAXXED), Andrew Wakefield invoked the Tuskegee syphilis study because a dodgy subgroup analysis from the study in question was being misrepresented as having shown that the risk of autism induced by vaccines was most pronounced in Black boys, a four-fold increase. Note that just last week STAT News reported that Thompson been promoted to a high ranking job at the CDC to oversee research into adverse events due to childhood vaccines. Yes, that was another possible topic of this post in and of itself. (As an aside, Thompson recently sent me cease-and-desist emails about old posts about him written by me. I can post them if you like.)
    • In a 2016 letter accusing the CDC of scientific fraud based on the “CDC whistleblower” conspiracy theory, Brian Hooker and Andrew Wakefield accused the CDC of conducting another Tuskegee experiment.
    • In 2021, RFK Jr. produced a film entitled Medical Racism: The New Apartheid for the antivax group that he had founded, Children’s Health Defense. The film leaned heavily into promoting false claims that COVID-19 vaccination efforts were part of a larger, sinister experiment on Black communities. The film mixed legitimate concerns about medical racism with conspiracy theories about COVID-19 vaccines as targeted medical experimentation on the Black community akin to the Tuskegee syphilis study. In essence the film portrayed COVID-19 vaccination as part of the sad heritage of how white physicians have treated Blacks in the US, including the unethical Tuskegee study.
I could go on and on and on, but you get the idea.
This brings me back to the title of this post. With MAHA in general—and RFK Jr. and antivaxxers in particular—every accusation is a confession or, at least, a confession of intent. The current study checks a lot of the boxes that the Tuskegee syphilis experiment did. It’s arguably racist in that white investigators from wealthy European countries and the US are targeting Africans, as the Tuskegee study targeted African-Americans and was run by white investigators. It targets a vulnerable population (children), as the Tuskegee study targeted poor Black men with little education or access to high quality medical care. It has not good scientific basis, just as the Tuskegee syphilis experiment did not have a sound scientific rationale, and by its very design it is likely to intentionally expose one group to harm, just as the Tuskegee syphilis experiment did. Indeed, after recent criticisms of Stabell Benn and Aaby’s work, even the research base suggesting harmful nonspecific effects due to vaccines has now been largely cast into extreme doubt, leaving even less of a scientific rationale for this study.
In fairness, one does have to point out some differences. The Tuskegee study was not randomized, as the proposed Stabell Benn and Aaby study is. However, it remains a foundational principle of biomedical research ethics that human subjects should not be knowingly randomized to a group that is more likely to suffer harm, which is what this study is likely to do. One must also remember that these are not neutral or benign actors. They have a history. Context matters. After all, what RFK Jr. has kept demanding, RCTs of existing vaccines versus saline placebo, is every bit as profoundly unethical as this study by Stabell Benn being funded by the CDC. Now maybe—maybe—the study protocol will be published, and I will have to eat crow, finding that there are no major ethical issues. No doubt Stabell Benn and Aaby won’t believe me, but let me just say that I even hope that that will be the case. However, I find it very difficult to believe that outcome likely given what we know now about the study, the history of its investigators, the hush-hush way it was funded and announced in the federal register in a way clearly intended to make it less likely that anyone would notice, and the obvious cronyism in how the award was granted. (Fortunately, there were reporters on the case who noticed the announcement of this study and now we all know.)
In the end, the reality of the situation is that neither MAHA nor antivaxxers like RFK Jr. ever really had any major ethical qualms about randomized controlled trials that randomize a group to likely harm, contrary to RFK Jr.’s rants about “no saline placebo-controlled trials” of vaccines and his penchant for comparing vaccine science to the Tuskegee syphilis study. Rather, led by RFK Jr., MAHA just wanted to be the one to do their own versions of the Tuskegee study—or to make sure that investigators who will do a 21st century Tuskegee equivalent will receive the research funding to do so—in order to generate data that casts the safety of vaccines into doubt as part of his effort to eliminate vaccines. Also, being part of the Trump administration, RFK Jr. can’t resist emulating his boss and treating research funding like patronage, funneling money to ideologically aligned researchers (like Stabell Benn and Aaby, regardless of science. Grift and unethical human experimentation are but two tools in the MAHA playbook to chip away at vaccine science.
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Does society try to shame and shun vaccine refusers and the vaccine-averse?
Antivaxers often complain that they are judged harshly, even shunned. A recent study suggests that, to some extent, they might well be. But are judging, shaming, and shunning parents who refuse to vaccinate their children wrong? More importantly, what about the children, who didn’t choose not to be vaccinated, and how likely is such stigmatization to change behavior?
David Gorski on June 12, 2017
Link

I’ve discussed several times over the several years that I’ve been writing for this blog my impression that the media have become in general less tolerant of antivaccine views. At least, the media seem less willing to indulge in “tell both sides” false equivalence. I remember how, back when I started blogging (a history that predates this blog by over three years), I routinely used to bemoan how news stories about vaccines or autism would almost inevitably include obligatory quotes from antivaccine activists like J.B. Handley, Jenny McCarthy, and sometimes even the Dark Lord Antivaxer Andrew Wakefield himself. I don’t know if it’s confirmation bias or reality, but over the last five years or so such tropes seem a lot less common to me. I don’t have any solid evidence to back up my impression, but I’m not alone in it. I’d like to think this decline in airing antivaccine views in the mainstream media is because evidence won out, but generally I’ve attributed much of this change to the downfall of the aforementioned Dark Lord Antivaxer Andrew Wakefield. When Wakefield lost his medical license and then was revealed to be a fraud, it provided a handy shorthand script for the mainstream media to dismiss antivaccine views without having to try very hard to explain the evidence. It’s not my preferred way to have won people over, but for most human beings stories tend to be much, much more effective than evidence for changing minds. Like it or not (and I don’t like it), discrediting a key figure of the antivaccine movement was far more effective in changing the narrative in the press than dozens of studies failing to support a link between vaccines and autism.
It’s against that backdrop that I came across a story about a study examining how the mothers of unvaccinated children are viewed by other people. Here’s the story in the Vancouver Sun:
Mothers of unvaccinated children are judged harshly by other people and their children are more likely to be shunned by other families, according to a study from the University of B.C.
And it really matters why the child is unvaccinated.
Those moms who outright refuse to vaccinate their kids are viewed most negatively, said co-author Nicholas Fitz, now a research associate at Duke University in Durham, N.C.
“On measures of social distance — like would you let your child befriend an unvaccinated child or work on a school project together — across the board unvaccinated children suffered from stigma,” he said. “People felt the most anger and the least sympathy for the refusal group and viewed the mothers as a danger to the community.”
But, because of the perceived health hazard, the child is most likely to be shunned.
“They don’t want the family to move into the neighbourhood … and they don’t want their children to play with (unvaccinated) children,” he said.
The authors Carpiano et al discuss how parents in the US are frequently judgmental of each other in the introduction to their study and then point out that vaccination status has become another area where judgmental attitudes can come into play:
In addition to these cultural expectations, media coverage of undervaccination has heavily focused on “anti-vaxxer” parents (mostly mothers), who refuse vaccinations for their children. This small, but vocal proportion of parents of the total undervaccinated population—more likely to be white and higher SES and thus with greater capacity to undertake healthy practices—are (a) known for rejecting certain evidence-based medical recommendations, (b) engaging in emotionally-, time-, and (often) financially-absorbing “intensive mothering” practices centered extensively on managing a child’s development; as well as (c) often identifying with essentialist notions of mothers as the best caregivers for their children (Reich, 2016 ; Hays, 1998). Popular media has even characterized anti-vaxxers as dangerous (e.g., Sriram, 2015). This attention paid to anti-vaxxers has contributed to misconceptions and even stereotypes about other vaccine-hesitant parents who refuse or delay vaccinations for their children (e.g., Haelle, 2015).
Of course, all antivaxers are dangerous to some extent, but there’s one message I always try to impart: It’s important to distinguish between vaccine-hesitant parents who have fallen under the sway of antivaccine views and become anxious or alarmed about vaccines and hard core antivaxers themselves, who tend to be evangelical in spreading their message. The former can be reached; the latter are virtually unreachable (with very rare exceptions).
In the study by Carpiano et al itself, the authors consider three issues:
    • Is undervaccination stigmatizing for the parent and the child?
    • Do stigmatizing attitudes depend on the reason for undervaccination?
    • What are the policy consequences of undervaccination attitudes?
Guided by these issues, the authors sought to investigate three questions:
     1.  To what extent does the causal reason for a child’s undervaccination status predict people’s: a. Evaluations of child undervaccination (in terms of attribution theory-based emotional reactions and/or mother judgment-based differentness, credibility, and dangerousness) and b. Stigmatizing behavioral orientations (i.e. social distance and discrimination) towards undervaccinated children and their parents?
     2.  Do people’s evaluations of child undervaccination explain differences in stigmatizing orientations observed across different undervaccination reasons?
     3.  Do these undervaccination evaluations and stigmatizing orientations predict support for specific child vaccination policies?
Carpiano et al examined these questions by designing a survey-embedded vignette experiment that was administered in 2015 using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that allows individuals and businesses (referred to as Requesters) to coordinate the use of human intelligence. It’s a tool that’s been increasingly used to recruit subjects for social science experiments like this one. Carpiano et al designed a survey-embedded vignette experiment with checks for whether or not the participants paid attention to the instructions and had understood the survey items. Overall, the sample surveyed included 1,469 participants representing at least 46 US states and Washington, DC.
The four vignettes were about a mother who either has:
     1.  Concerns about vaccinations and has decided to refuse vaccinations for her child (“refusal”).
     2.  Concerns about vaccinations and has decided to delay some of her child’s vaccinations (“delay”)
     3.  No concerns about vaccinations but whose job and family demands have made it difficult to schedule medical appointment so her child has only received some vaccinations (“time constraint”)
     4.  No concerns about vaccinations and has decided that her child always receives recommended vaccinations (“up-to-date;” the control condition).
Because this is the age of Donald Trump, the mother in each vignette was randomized to be:
    • either white (and named “Molly”) or Hispanic (and named “Maria”)
    • either high or low socioeconomic status (in terms of education and job).
The authors note:
We selected Hispanic (versus White) because, in addition to Hispanic being a minority demographic group in the US, at the time we developed the study (i.e. following the Disneyland measles outbreak), politicians and pundits had publicly raised concern about illegal immigrants (often portrayed as being Hispanic) being unvaccinated and thus posing a risk for spreading disease (e.g., see Kessler, 2015). Hence, randomizing the mother’s demographics enabled us to determine if they influenced respondents’ reactions to the undervaccination condition at hand. As further context, US White and Hispanic children ages 19–35 months had similar 2014 national coverage rates for most vaccines and dosages (Hill et al., 2015).
The authors then asked questions about how the parents in the vignettes were viewed, stigmatizing behavioral orientations, and policy support. Results of evaluation measures for the vignette parents are shown in this figure:
Basically, undervaccination reflected negatively on the mother. Anger and blame at the mother were highest for mothers refusing vaccines, less so for mothers who were time-constrained. These time-constrained parents also evoked much more sympathy than the other groups, which makes intuitive sense.
Here are the results on stigmatization:
What these results suggest is that both unvaccinated children and their parents are socially stigmatized, but that the child is stigmatized more than the parents, as the differences in the scores between fully vaccinated children and the undervaccinated were much greater than the differences in stigmatization between the parents. The authors themselves note in the discussion:
Third, participants reported even stronger social distancing attitudes towards the undervaccinated child than the mother. This suggests that children bear the bigger burden in undervaccination—in addition to not being protected from one or more vaccine-preventable diseases, they may be the recipients of courtesy stigma via the stigma of their parent’s decision/inaction (Phelan et al., 1998). We further discuss this idea below in relation to advancing stigma research.
It also turns out that those who read different vignettes also ended up with different attitudes towards what should be done to encourage vaccination. Those who read the refusal vignettes tended to be more supportive of punitive measures, such as banning unvaccinated children from school, but the differences were not large. For instance, those who read the vaccine refusal vignette were only 24% more likely to support banning undervaccinated children from school. In addition, those who read the delay condition were only 15% more likely to support more education and services and 16% more likely to support reporting school vaccinated rates, while those reading the time constraint condition were 30% less likely to support a fine or a tax on parents of undervaccinated children.
So basically, the results of this study show that negative portrayals of antivaxers might actually be having an effect. However the message is being received, via the media, the Internet, or other sources, the parents of undervaccinated children are viewed negatively, and the reason matters. Outright refusers are viewed the most negatively (as they should be), and time-constrained parents the least negatively. The latter group even provokes a fair measure of sympathy. These results do not bother me. The result that does bother me is the finding that undervaccinated children are stigmatized more than the parents. This finding bothers me because it is not the children’s fault that they were born to parents who won’t protect them from infectious disease, whatever the reason for their refusal or delay of vaccines. Basically, it’s not the fault of the child of antivaxers (i.e., the “refusal” group) if his parents are pseudoscience-believing, conspiracy mongering dolts.
The authors, to their credit, tackle the issue head on. They note that social stigmatization can work in changing behavior, noting the most obvious example, smoking. They then point the similarities and differences between smoking and vaccine policies:
Our investigation also informs stigma research more generally. First, it highlights the interplay of evaluations and consequences for the parent and child. Stigma research has considered how family members of stigmatized persons can also be stigmatized as recipients of courtesy stigma (Phelan et al., 1998). Child undervaccination extends the courtesy stigma concept, as the focus of the stigma is both the parent and the child—for mutual and distinct reasons. A child’s (under)vaccination status is a consequence of the parent’s actions, regardless of whether those actions are by choice or constraint. This status is beyond a child’s control, yet the child bears the burden of any negative consequences from parental (in)action. Thus, the child risks being doubly stigmatized as both the identified child of a vaccine-hesitant parent and a perceived health risk.
Second, our focus on stigma of undervaccinated children and their parents provides important angles to scholarship on the ethics of using stigma (or more broadly, denormalization) as a policy tool for modifying behaviors (see debates between Bayer, 2008a ; Bayer, 2008b and Burris, 2008; and Bell et al., 2010 ; Bayer, 2010). Given that vaccinations are necessary for ensuring the health of a community (including people who cannot be vaccinated), they juxtapose individual and public rights (as well as the role of government). This situation is similar to anti-smoking policies and second-hand smoke, but is more complex in that it entails the parent (as the decision maker) and child (as a beneficiary and health risk). This additional dimension is essential in ongoing debates about stigma and policies that aim to address adult and child health conditions and behaviors (e.g., eating unhealthy foods, obesity).
Of course, hard core antivaccine parents feed on any perception of stigmatization. How often have you read posts by such parents ranting about how they feel judged when interacting with health care providers, the press, and others? They revel in painting themselves as the persecuted minority, sometimes going to ridiculous extremes, such as donning a yellow badge with a syringe on it patterned after the Yellow Star of David that the Nazis required Jews to wear, thus likening their “plight” to that of the Jews during the Holocaust. Indeed, antivaxers are quite enamored of Holocaust analogies, either with vaccines causing a Holocaust or laws requiring children to be vaccinated before they can attend school being likened to Nazi-ism. Even mildly vaccine-hesitant parents can be turned off by excessive judgment.
Basically, stigmatization is highly problematic because it is the children who suffer from it far more than the parents, even as they are left unnecessarily vulnerable to infectious diseases. Also, we basically know that stigmatization only makes the beliefs of committed antivaxers stronger and increases their will to resist. However, this group of antivaxers is, as I pointed out at the beginning, different from the mere vaccine-averse, who are far more numerous. The numbers of hard core antivaxers are smaller, even though they are much louder and more responsible for spreading antivaccine beliefs.
The real question is whether stigmatization has an effect on vaccine-hesitant parents and whether it makes them more or less likely to vaccinate—and at what cost, given that it is the children who suffer far more than the parents. While it’s encouraging that parents of undervaccinated children are not viewed favorably because it suggests that in our society pro-vaccination views predominate and that the reason for not vaccinating matters, we have to ask: How can we as a society maximize the social pressure to vaccinate without harming the very children that suffer from not being vaccinated? The answers to those questions await further research.

Treating the Unvaccinated
Should vaccination status be used to triage care for critically ill patients during a crisis?
Steven Novella on December 8, 2021
Link

There is a debate going on regarding how to allocate limited resources during a pandemic surge. During the COVID pandemic hospitals have been overwhelmed in terms of their availability of ventilators and intensive care unit (ICU) beds. When this happened early on in the pandemic there was no ethical dilemma – resources were allocated based on need. Now, however, the situation is different. In the US every adult who wants to be vaccinated can be vaccinated (unless they have a medial reason they cannot). We therefore have a population of citizens who are voluntarily unvaccinated, and in recent surges they make up the vast majority of those requiring hospitalization and ICU care. How should this affect decisions regarding triaging of care?
This is not a new issue for the medical profession. Organ transplants, for example, are a limited resource. People will die on the waiting list for an available organ, and so how do we decide who to prioritize? The core ethical principles involved are utility, justice, and respect for persons as individuals.
Utility is the easiest to understand – who is most likely to benefit medically from the limited resource, and who is most likely to suffer from the absence of that resource? For example, with organ transplantation, the person most close to death whose life is most likely to be saved by a transplant gets the highest priority. A less obvious factor is location. Being located closer to the donor organ and the hospital system able to do the transplant gives a higher probability of success.
The principle of justice means that the overall system operates fairly, so that there is no systematic bias in allocation that would put some individual at an unfair disadvantage in receiving care. This principle may at times conflict with the principle of utility, so basically they have to be balanced. At present the recommendation is to give each principle equal weight in making decisions about priority.
Respect for persons as individuals means that the life and welfare of each person is an end unto itself, not just a means to an end. Further, this requires respect for individual autonomy, including transparency, informed consent, and the right to refuse care.
Under the umbrella of justice, however, there are two other ethical principles that may come into play when triaging patients based upon their vaccination status – reciprocity and proportionality. In a recent editorial, William Parker, MD focuses on these principles, arguing that there should be a very limited role for considering vaccination status in treatment decisions. The principle of reciprocity as a general ethical rule simply means that in any social contract we get back what we give. We all play by the same rules, giving each other what we expect to receive from others.
Applied in a medical context, this could mean that medical care itself is part of a social contract, with society providing resources and privileges to the medical profession in exchange for their services, professionalism, and ethical behavior. What does or should reciprocity mean at the individual healthcare level, however? That depends on context.
In the normal healthcare context, everyone is treated as equally deserving, without any consideration for any personal details. We do not withhold care because someone is a prisoner or because they are responsible for their own medical problems. If you get into an accident because you were speeding while drunk, you still get full health care to treat your injuries. There is no judgement, no politics, and no blame. That is part of the professionalism of medicine; we do not judge our patients, we treat them.
But as I said, this is in the context of normal medical care. There is also the context of crisis medical care, in which resources are limited. Now the decision is not whether to treat patient A, but rather whether to treat patient A or B if you can only treat one. This is a very real dilemma during this pandemic, and during local surges hospital systems are being overwhelmed. This means, for example deferring elective surgeries in favor of life-saving care for acutely ill COVID patients. By “elective surgeries” I am not just referring to cosmetic surgery or quality of life surgery. Patients needing mastectomy for breast cancer, or bypass surgery for coronary artery disease are also considered elective in that they can be temporarily delayed while a patient with COVID pneumonia may die without immediate life-saving care.
If we apply only the principle of utility, then it is clear that the people requiring immediate lifesaving care should have priority. The risk of death from cancer or heart attack will increase for those who delay surgery, but by a much smaller degree than the risk of death if those with severe COVID are not treated. If mastectomy is delayed by 4 weeks, for example, the relative increase in mortality is 8% (or an absolute increase of about one in 100 patients). That is real and significant, but still much lower than if we do not treat the acutely ill.
This triage can happen subtly, by large hospital centers turning away transfers of COVID patients because they do not have any available beds, but some of those beds are occupied by patients who have had surgery that could have been deferred.
Since most of those COVID patients now are the voluntarily unvaccinated, the question is – does the principle of reciprocity mean we can prioritize vaccinated patients with breast cancer over unvaccinated patients with COVID, essentially using reciprocity to trump utility? Some experts are flirting with this question. Dr. Parker answers this question by referring to the principle of proportionality – allowing someone to die because they chose not to be vaccinated is out of proportion (the punishment does not fit the crime). There are several reasons for this.
First, from a utility point of view, if you look at the numbers the decision to not get vaccinated likely does not place a burden on the overall society and healthcare system worth one full life. Parker estimates it is worth 0.001 of a life. He writes:
Proportional reciprocity (“payback”) for vaccination would be about 0.001 lives worth of medical care, orders of magnitude lower than what would be required to justify denying life-saving treatment to the unvaccinated so the vaccinated can get elective procedures.
Second, the decision whether or not to get vaccinated is not the sum total of a person’s worth nor their contract with society. An otherwise-upstanding citizen might have decided for various reasons to not get vaccinated, while a career criminal, spouse abuser, and drug user did get vaccinated. Should that latter really be the sole determinant of triaging care?
Further, the decision not to get vaccinated may be complicated. A member of a racial minority may not trust the vaccine because of historical medical injustice. Would we not be compounding that injustice to deny care based on their reaction to prior injustice? People may also have been influenced by their religious group, their family, or their social circle.
At SBM we are careful to distinguish the pseudoscience from the person. We are highly critical of false medical claims, poor regulations, and willing con-artists. But ordinary people who believe, use, and even spread false medical beliefs are victims. They do not deserve our condemnation, but our sympathy. I believe most people who decide to not get vaccinated are victims of misinformation, a society that does not sufficiently prioritize scientific literacy and critical thinking skills, and dysfunctional media and political systems. As frustrating as their choice to refuse a safe and effective vaccine at the expense of their own health and the health of others is, we still need to remember that this does not make them bad people. It makes them victims of pseudoscience (even if it results in them propagating that victimhood to others).
        ◦ It’s also important for the medical profession to stay above the political fray. It’s easy to get sucked into blaming the unvaccinated for the pandemic’s continuing harm. The solution, however, is not to use triage of medical care as a solution or a punishment. That is not the role of the medical profession, which is primarily to care for all patients without judgement. Rather, the pandemic is all the more reason that we need to find other solutions to the problem of vaccine hesitancy. Education is the preferred method, but if that is not enough then applying a variety of carrots and sticks may be justified. But we can’t withhold medical care.

Is Firing Vaccine-Hesitant Families Unfair? Definitely…I think.
Is the dismissal of vaccine-hesitant families from a pediatric practice unethical? Could it be unfair to other pediatric healthcare providers and increase risk to the community? Three medical ethicists who wrote a recent JAMA Pediatrics opinion piece believe so.
Clay Jones on June 1, 2018
Link

Historically, the official American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) position on dismissing vaccine-refusing families from a practice was, well, don’t do it. AAP policies aren’t binding, of course, and plenty of pediatric practices did show these families the door. But the Academy does carry a lot of weight, and the decision to proscribe dismissal policies was at least consistent with the sad fact that the AAP also allows anti-vaccine pediatricians to remain members in good standing. But that’s a different post.
An updated AAP position on dismissing vaccine-hesitant families
In September of 2016, the AAP issued a clinical report, “Countering Vaccine Hesitancy“, that discussed the varied reasons some parents have for refusing vaccinations and how to address them. It’s a nice summary of the issue, including some historical background, and I particularly appreciate the focus on the spectrum of parental hesitancy. It points out that only 3% of caregivers refuse all vaccines, while most hesitant caregivers are open to some or even all of them. Most can be reached with accurate information presented with thoughtful, respectful, non-confrontational, but personalized approach. Lumping everyone into either pro- or anti-vaccine piles isn’t helpful.
The last section of the report specifically discussed the dismissal of families who refuse some or all vaccinations. It acknowledges some of the ethical considerations involved in the decision to either dismiss these families or to keep them in a practice. It also points out that there is no published data on the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of dismissing families in regards to their eventual vaccine acceptance, however there are anecdotal reports that it can work after other efforts have failed.
It is important to note, and this is discussed in the AAP clinical report, that regardless of why a patient is being dismissed from a practice there are state laws in place to prevent abandonment. In general, families must be given some assistance in establishing care elsewhere and a reasonable amount of time to do so. They point out, correctly, that there are situations when dismissal is inappropriate even if it is a legally viable option, such as when a pediatrician practices in an area with no other qualified practitioners.
The report concludes its section on dismissal with a big change from previous iterations:
The decision to dismiss a family who continues to refuse immunization is not one that should be made lightly, nor should it be made without considering and respecting the reasons for the parents’ point of view. Nevertheless, the individual pediatrician may consider dismissal of families who refuse vaccination as an acceptable option. In all practice settings, consistency, transparency, and openness regarding the practice’s policy on vaccines is important.
But is dismissing these families fair to other practitioners and the community?
In an opinion piece in the latest JAMA Pediatrics, three medical ethicists discuss the fairness of dismissing vaccine-hesitant families. They worry about the erosion of “professional solidarity” because pediatricians are actually quite divided on the issue. I certainly know this to be true.
(For some personal perspective, I am strongly opposed to dismissing patients for the sole reason of vaccine-hesitancy or even blatant refusal. I think it’s wrong, and while evidence is lacking I am fairly confident that the practice will not improve vaccination rates. I think that it is a harmful and ethically questionable practice. This post isn’t really about my opinions, however, but if interested you can listen to a debate between myself and a fellow pediatrician on an episode of the podcast that I do with Grant Ritchey.)
The authors specifically focus on one common justification given by pediatricians who dismiss vaccine-hesitant families: children who are not appropriately immunized increase the risk to patients in a practice of acquiring a vaccine-preventable illness. This would seem to fulfill a pediatrician’s obligation to provide a safe environment for their patients. But, they point out, this merely shifts the risk to the patients in another practice. It also likely increases risk to the community.
If there are increasingly fewer pediatricians or family practice doctors in a community who do not dismiss vaccine-hesitant families, or if hesitant families are forced to turn to less science-based care, then these partially or non-immunized children may begin to form clusters. This would increase the risk of outbreaks should measles or some other vaccine-preventable disease make an appearance. This could increase the burden of risk for the patients of well-meaning providers who are comfortable continuing to promote vaccination and to the community. And because these discussions can be “emotionally and cognitively draining”, and frequently result in the uncompensated expenditure of added time and resources, dismissal policies might also unfairly shift a mental health and financial burden as well.
Pediatricians must take into consideration the health of not only their personal patients but also the community in general, particularly children. Promoting timely immunization practices is only one of many ways that we focus on public health. Usually our approach to managing pediatric healthcare achieves both ends, but these dismissal policies may actually result in a breach of our commitment to the community. The authors of the JAMA Pediatrics opinion piece argue that dismissing vaccine-hesitant families isn’t ethically sound for this reason as well, and they worry that the updated AAP position is not in keeping with their commitment to public health and professional solidarity.
Conclusion: No easy answers regarding vaccine-hesitant parents
There are, in my opinion, better reasons to question the wisdom of dismissing a vaccine-hesitant family from a pediatric practice. But I agree with the authors of the JAMA Pediatrics Viewpoint article that it is probably a bit unfair to other pediatricians and their patients, and that it may increase risk to the community. Thankfully vaccination rates in the United States remain high, and the risk of serious outbreaks of dangerous diseases is low for the patients in any practice. But the risk is real and can’t be ignored. This is a complex issue and I’m confident that there are no easy answers.

Would you pay $1 million to enroll in a phase 1 clinical trial of an “anti-aging” gene therapy?
Libella Gene Therapeutics, LLC made the news last week for announcing a “pay-to-play” trial of its telomerase-based anti-aging gene therapy. What was shocking about the announcement was not that it was a “pay-to-play” trial, given that such trials have become all too common, but rather the price of enrollment: $1 million. Worse, the trial is being conducted in Colombia; the therapy doesn’t have the greatest preclinical justification; and it’s a phase 1 trial, which means it is only trial of safety, not efficacy. How can unethical and scientifically dubious trials like this be stopped?
David Gorski on December 2, 2019
Link

In the paradigm of science-based medicine, ideally basic science discoveries are translated into human treatments in a multistep process involves discovering a mechanism, testing that mechanism in cell culture and animals, and then introducing a treatment based on that biological mechanism into human patients by testing it in a series of increasingly rigorous clinical trials that culminate in large phase III randomized controlled efficacy/safety trials. Of course, science can be messy, and it’s often more complicated than that, with the various steps being carried out in orders different than what I describe, or simultaneously, or sometimes missing a step. Then, of course, after testing in humans, additional observations are made, taken back to the laboratory, and the whole process can start again in order to try to refine and improve the treatment discovered. For treatments whose prior plausibility has been demonstrated in preclinical experiments, though, the randomized, double-blind controlled clinical trial remains the final arbiter if a treatment “works”. The ethics of these trials usually demands, with rare exceptions, that the patients agreeing to be human subjects in the trial be free of incentive or coercion, which usually means that they should not pay to be a part of the trial; the sponsor, the company or investigator testing the new treatment, pays. In the past, I’ve been very critical of people and companies undertaking “pay-to-play” clinical trials, such as Stanislaw Burzynski and various dubious stem cell clinics that have at times managed to turn the US database of clinical trials, ClinicalTrials.gov, into a marketing tool for their scientifically worthless pay-to-play uncontrolled observational trials. Never, however, have I seen anything like what Libella Gene Therapeutics, LLC is doing, which I learned about right before the holiday break here in the US:
"Libella's clinical trial has been posted at the United States National Library of Medicine (NLM)'s https://t.co/7VDbgFpTJL database." $1 million a person for this "pay-to-play" study and of course it makes it into ClinicalTrials dot gov. https://t.co/ZmgYVYzLoq
— Leigh Turner (@LeighGTurner) November 25, 2019
And:
"This is the world's first IRB-approved clinical trial aimed at reversing aging by at least 20 years; it is also the world's most expensive pay-to-play trial with a one million price tag to enroll." The fee is $1 million per person. 💰💰💰 https://t.co/ZmgYVYzLoq
— Leigh Turner (@LeighGTurner) November 25, 2019
And:
Telomerase gene therapy in mice delays aging and increases longevity. https://t.co/Nh54LHVdcH <- World's most expensive pay-to-play trial.
Libella's clinical trial involves a new gene-therapy using a proprietary AAV Reverse Transcriptase enzyme & aims to lengthen telomeres.
— Comprehensive Cell Solutions @CCS_NYBC (@CcsNybc) November 26, 2019
I had thought that Burzynski and the various quack stem cell clinics I’ve come across over the years requiring participants in their “clinical trials” to pay to be in them were bad, but Libella Therapeutics takes the abuse of the clinical trial process to a whole new level, and it’s not just because of the eye-popping price tag, which is more than three times higher than any previous pay-to-pay price tag that I’ve ever seen before. Let’s first take a look at the press release, and then I’ll describe what I discovered doing a bit more digging.
The hype: A “breakthrough” anti-aging treatment
When I first saw the Tweets about Libella Gene Therapeutics’ press release last Monday (the date of the press release was November 21), I was debating whether to write about it right away (before the Thanksgiving holiday) on my not-so-secret other (and pseudonymous) blog, but I decided that this was more appropriate as SBM material and could wait. So I waited a week. In the interim, I was disappointed to see very little published about it, other than promotional articles and some criticism on Twitter by Leigh Turner and some others.
So let’s go to the press release. Let’s see what Libella has to say about it:
Libella Gene Therapeutics, LLC (“Libella”) announces an institutional review board (IRB)-approved pay-to-play clinical trial in Colombia (South America) using gene therapy that aims to treat and ultimately cure aging. This could lead to Libella offering the world’s only treatment to cure and reverse aging by 20 years.
Under Libella’s pay-to-play model, trial participants will be enrolled in their country of origin after paying $1 million. Participants will travel to Colombia to sign their informed consent and to receive the Libella gene therapy under a strictly controlled hospital environment.
Traditionally, aging has been viewed as a natural process. This view has shifted, and now scientists believe that aging should be seen as a disease. The research in this field has led to the belief that the kingpin of aging in humans is the shortening of our telomeres.
No red flags there, right? I mean, seriously. This trial has more warning signs of being a scam than any I’ve seen in a really long time. Sign the patients up in their own country? Require them to pay $1 million up front before enrollment and travel to Columbia for treatment? Make them pay up before signing informed consent? (If the patient changes his mind between signing up in his home country and signing informed consent in Colombia, can he get his money back?) Why on earth did the company choose this method, instead of going for FDA approval, and doing it the right way? Obviously, Libella Gene Therapeutics must be sensitive to the criticism of profiteering, because the press release includes this rather unconvincing explanation:
On why they decided to conduct its project outside the United States, Libella’s President, Dr. Jeff Mathis, said, “Traditional clinical trials in the U.S. can take years and millions, or even billions, of dollars. The research and techniques that have been proven to work are ready now. We believe we have the scientist, the technology, the physicians, and the lab partners that are necessary to get this trial done faster and at a lower cost in Colombia.”
I would counter that, more than anything else, it sounds more like their wanting to transfer development costs to the patient in order to profit. That’s my opinion, and I’m not alone, obviously. Moreover, as you will see, the principal investigator in Colombia and the facility where the trial will be carried out does not inspire confidence.
What, specifically, is the treatment that Libella is testing? According to the press release:
Telomeres are the body’s biological clock. Every time a cell divides, telomeres shorten, and our cells become less efficient at dividing again. This is why we age. A significant number of scientific peer-reviewed studies have confirmed this. Some of these studies have shown actual age reversal in every way imaginable simply by lengthening telomeres.
Bill Andrews, Ph.D., Libella’s Chief Scientific Officer, has developed a gene therapy that aims to lengthen telomeres. Dr. Andrew’s gene therapy delivery system has been demonstrated as safe with minimal adverse reactions in about 200 clinical trials. Dr. Andrews led the research at Geron Corporation over 20 years ago that initially discovered human telomerase and was part of the team that led the initial experiments related to telomerase induction and cancer.
Telomerase gene therapy in mice delays aging and increases longevity. Libella’s clinical trial involves a new gene-therapy using a proprietary AAV Reverse (hTERT) Transcriptase enzyme and aims to lengthen telomeres. Libella believes that lengthening telomeres is the key to treating and possibly curing aging.
Before we proceed, I’ll indulge in a little basic science. A telomere is a stretch of repetitive nucleotide sequences at each end of a chromosome. For the basics about telomeres for people not trained in molecular biology, the Wikipedia entry is a quite acceptable entry point. The basic concept is that, due to how DNA is replicated, the enzymes that duplicate DNA can’t duplicate it all the way to the very end of the strand. Each cell division, each duplication, of a chromosome, therefore results in loss of nucleotides at the end of the chromosome and thus some shortening of the chromosome. In some cells, to counter that, there’s an enzyme, telomerase reverse transcriptase (often just called telomerase or abbreviated as TERT or hTERT), that replenishes telomeres, adding the aforementioned repetitive sequences to the ends of the chromosomes.
So why do we age? One mechanism behind aging is the telomere. Telomerase is not made in all (or even in most) cells. Thus, in differentiated cells each telomere becomes shorter, and this is indeed thought to play a role in aging, with deficiencies in telomerase activity are associated with aging and genetic syndromes, such as cri du chat. There are exceptions, of course. For instance, telomerase is made in stem cells and certain reproductive cells and responsible for their ability to continue to replicate nearly indefinitely. Not surprisingly, given its function in preventing senescence (the loss of the ability of a cell to replicate that can occur when telomeres become too short), making too much telomerase is associated with cancer, although telomerase alone doesn’t appear to cause cancer (more on that below).
To boil that passage all down, what Libella is proposing to do is to use AAV (adeno-associated virus) as its vector to deliver the gene for hTERT to cells. AAV is a common vector used to introduce coding sequences for genes into cells and has many attractive features for use in gene therapy, including lack of pathogenicity, ability to infect both dividing and non-dividing cells, and ability to stably integrate into the host cell’s genome at a specific site on human chromosome 19. There have been a number of clinical trials of gene therapy using AAV as the delivery vector for the therapeutic gene. Indeed, the first gene therapy product to be approved by the FDA is an AAV-based therapy, LUXTURNA™ (voretigene neparvovec-rzyl; Spark Therapeutics, Inc., Philadelphia, PA), which delivers a normal copy of the RPE65 gene to retinal cells for the treatment of RPE65 mutation–associated retinal dystrophy, a disease that results in blindness. The main downsides of AAV for delivering gene therapy are that it doesn’t have the packaging capacity to deliver large genes and, because it’s a virus, it can provoke an immune response, leading to resistance as the body eliminates the virus.
Right off the bat, one can see that, depending upon the preclinical data developed by Libella, the idea that telomerase treatment could impact human aging is not entirely implausible. The marketing materials do, however, go beyond simplified into the realm of simplistic. Aging is not as simple as the company’s promotional materials make it sound. Let’s take a look at a booklet included with the press release, Bill Andrews on Telomere Basics: Curing Aging.
Does bad graphics mean bad science?
The first image in the booklet is an atrocity against graphics that looks as though someone made it on an animation application from 15-20 years ago:
One might accuse me of being petty, but one would think that someone like Bill Andrews could afford to hire a more competent graphic designer. Obviously, bad graphics don’t necessarily mean bad science, although the opening passage does not give me confidence, in particular his emphasis of the claim made in the press release that aging is a disease:
But, in some multicellular organisms, such as humans, certain cells strayed from the germ line and began to exhibit signs of aging. These cells aged because they became afflicted with a disease: their ability to reproduce themselves indefinitely became broken. The cause of this disease is still speculative, but many scientists are searching for cures.
The fact that a disease has existed in the genetic code of an animal for a very long time does not mean that it is not a disease. Thousands of diseases, from hemophilia to cystic fibrosis, have lurked in our genes for far longer than recorded history. These diseases should be cured, and aging is no exception.
Yes, but neither hemophilia nor cystic fibrosis nor all those other genetic diseases affect each and every living sexually reproducing multicellular organism with, proportionally speaking, few exceptions, nor have they affected each and every such organism since multicellular organisms first started to evolve billions of years ago. To simplify (but hopefully not to oversimplify), there’s a tradeoff between becoming multicellular and having cells that can reproduce indefinitely, the former requiring the controls on cell duplication and cells that eventually undergo senescence and the former being a risk for uncontrolled replication, one form of which is cancer. In any event, a detailed discussion of the evolutionary biology of how complex multicellular organisms began to age is way beyond the scope of this post and beyond the scope of my knowledge of evolutionary biology, but one thing’s for sure. Aging is intrinsic to the vast majority of multicellular organisms, and telomerase is only made where and when it’s needed, such as in stem cells.
That’s not to say that there isn’t evidence that telomerase can’t prolong life expectancy. Andrews even cites some of it:
Would the concept apply to living organisms? In November 2008, scientists published a paper describing how they had created cloned mice from mouse cells containing the inserted telomerase gene, which continually produced the telomerase enzyme. These mice were shown to live 50% longer than cloned mice created from cells that didn’t contain the inserted telomerase gene.
It’s becoming increasingly clear that prevention of telomere shortening might be the best way to extend human lifespan beyond the theoretical 125-year maximum lifespan. How long this can extend the human lifespan is anyone’s guess, but living a healthy, youthful life to 250, 500, or even 1,000 years is not outside the realm of possibility. More research needs to be done to answer that question.
Maybe, but let’s just say I’m skeptical that telomerase alone can increase human lifespan that much if it could only increase a mouse’s lifespan by 50%. There’s so much more that goes into cellular aging than just telomerase, including increasing genomic instability through gradual accumulation of DNA damage, oxidative stress, and several other major mechanisms. That reminds me. One thing Andrews conveniently neglects to mention about the mouse model mentioned above is that telomerase was introduced into a mouse “engineered to be cancer resistant by means of enhanced expression of the tumor suppressors p53, p16, and p19ARF” in an “effort to dissociate the effects of telomerase on cancer and aging,” noting in the introduction:
Telomere shortening is an important barrier for the uncontrolled proliferation of tumor cells (Feldser and Greider, 2007, Blasco, 2005). In this context, it is not surprising that constitutive telomerase expression in several independent Tert-transgenic mouse models resulted in increased incidence of spontaneous tumors (González-Suárez et al., 2001, González-Suárez et al., 2002, Artandi et al., 2002, Canela et al., 2004). Therefore, in normal laboratory mice, the advantageous impact of telomerase on cancer cells obscures the potentially beneficial effects of telomerase in the context of normal cells and tissues; for this reason, we have resorted to cancer-resistant mice previously generated by us (Garcia-Cao et al., 2002, Matheu et al., 2004, Matheu et al., 2007). In particular, by transgenesis using large, nonmanipulated, genomic segments, we have generated mice carrying a single transgenic copy of p53 or a single transgenic copy of the locus encoding Arf and p16 (Garcia-Cao et al., 2002, Matheu et al., 2004). These three tumor suppressors are involved in protection against a large variety of cancers (Collado et al., 2007). The above-mentioned transgenic mice, which we call super-p53 (Sp53) or super-p16/Arf (Sp16/SArf), possess three gene doses of each of the indicated tumor suppressors instead of the normal diploid gene dose; this increase in tumor suppression activity is sufficient to significantly increase cancer resistance (Garcia-Cao et al., 2002, Matheu et al., 2004). Of relevance, single transgenic Sp53 or Sp16/SArf mice have a normal aging and life span (Garcia-Cao et al., 2002, Matheu et al., 2004), but the combination of both transgenes in doubly transgenic Sp53/Sp16/SArf mice results in delayed aging, probably because of the ability of these tumor suppressors to eliminate cellular damage and damaged cells (Matheu et al., 2007).
I also note that Anderson cites an earlier paper, one from 1999, to claim that driving excess telomerase production doesn’t in and of itself result in cancer, a nice sleight of hand, particularly his emphasizing that telomerase is not an oncogene (which appears to be true, given that it appears to be unable induce carcinogenesis by itself). However, that doesn’t mean that its expression doesn’t predispose to cancer, and a recent review notes that it is “still not established whether telomerase expression has any oncogenic characteristics or is simply required for the maintenance of sustained tumor growth (that is, whether it is permissive).” Again, even if telomerase is not oncogenic by itself, if activation of telomerase alone is not enough to cause cancer, that doesn’t mean it doesn’t contribute to cancer. If a cell with telomerase activity ramped up takes a “hit” that can result in cancer, telomerase activity plus that “hit” could result in cancer where the “hit” alone might not have. Even a 2012 mouse experiment (which, oddly enough, I don’t recall seeing in his booklet) that reported increasing mouse longevity without an increased incidence of cancer might well not be applicable to humans, given humans’ much longer lifespan, which provides much longer for cancer to develop. That’s why I find Dr. Anderson’s arguments at best disingenuous.
The last part of the booklet is puzzling, a real head-scratcher. Anderson goes on and on answering “objections”, such as: If we cure aging, then:
    • Won’t the earth become overpopulated?
    • Won’t Social Security be bankrupted?
    • Isn’t curing aging unnatural or sacrilegious?
    • Won’t future generations face challenges, such as long-lived dictators, that could have been avoided?
Oddly enough, he says little about the preclinical evidence for his treatment. He also even admits that some “scientists feel that curing cellular senescence is only a single piece of the aging puzzle, and that aging must be addressed on other fronts” and that telomerase “activation may or may not be the ‘magic bullet’ needed to achieve that end, but it’s a technology that’s well within reach, and any extension of lifespan could allow us to live long enough to see the next technology developed.” OK, then.
Interestingly, Anderson’s Cure Aging or Die Trying website appears no longer to exist, but the almighty Wayback Machine at Archive.org showed that it redirected to Sierra Sciences, which advertises something called TAM-818, billed as the “most potent telomerase inducer on the planet,” plus books with titles like Curing Aging and a YouTube video:
But what about the clinical trials? For that, we have to go to the Libella website and ClinicalTrials.gov.
Would you pay $1 million to sign up for a phase I trial?
When you visit the website for Libella Gene Therapeutics, LLC, you’re immediately greeted with this splashpage:
This splash page touts not just one, but three, clinical trials. They are:
    • Evaluation of Safety and Tolerability of Libella Gene Therapy for Alzheimer’s Disease: AAV- hTERT (ClinicalTrials.gov identifier NCT04133454; first posted October 21, 2019)
    • Evaluation of Safety and Tolerability of Libella Gene Therapy for the Treatment of Aging: AAV- hTERT (ClinicalTrials.gov identifier NCT04133649; first posted October 21, 2019)
    • Evaluation of Safety and Tolerability of Libella Gene Therapy for Critical Limb Ischemia: AAV- hTERT (ClinicalTrials.gov identifier NCT04110964; first posted October 1, 2019)
The first thing that I noted was that these are all phase I trials, with an accrual goal of five patients each. That just means that they’re designed to assess safety, not efficacy, and even then, given the tiny numbers, only to detect really common adverse events. Remember, phase I trials are “first in human” trials whose main purpose is to assess safety, and indeed, the primary endpoints of each of the three trials are:
    • For Alzheimer’s disease: Investigate the safety and tolerability of AAV-hTERT by IV and IT administration. (IT = intrathecal, into the cerebrospinal fluid)
    • Antiaging study: Investigate the safety and tolerability of AAV-hTERT by intravenous (IV) administration.
    • Ischemia study: Investigate the safety and tolerability of AAV-hTERT by intravenous (IV) administration.
Would you pay $1 million to be on a study that does nothing but evaluate the safety of the treatment and measure some telomerase-related biomarkers? A trial whose primary outcomes are basically tolerability and the incidence of serious adverse events? I sure wouldn’t, even if I were a billionaire!
And the secondary endpoints? Basically they’re pretty similar same for all three trials. Here are the endpoints for the antiaging trial:
     1.  To determine changes from baseline in hTERT expression, telomerase activity, and telomere length in cells after treatment with AAV-hTERT.
     2.  To determine changes from baseline in health and aging-related biomarkers after treatment with AAV-hTERT.
     3.  To determine changes from baseline in the immune system after treatment with AAV-hTERT.
     4.  To determine changes from baseline in physical function measures after treatment with AAV-hTERT
Which cells? Which immune system cells? Which biomarkers other than telomerase and telomere lengths? I really want to see the detailed protocol! I also would love to see the preclinical evidence. Libella features a list of research papers “related to our therapies.” I can’t help but note that most of them aren’t by Libella scientists and many of the papers co-authored by Andrews have little or nothing to do with telomerase. It’s the “pile of papers” method of justifying questionable research. I’ve seen it many times before. Dump out a list of papers, which might or might not report results that support and justify the work you want to do or, more commonly, are mixed in support and lack of support. Then don’t explain them or put them into context, and expect the reader just to be impressed by so much research, whether it supports your claims or not.
A highly unethical and dubious clinical trial
Reading Libella’s marketing hype, I couldn’t help but be strongly reminded of the marketing of stem cells of quack stem cell clinics, which make the same sorts of exaggerated or unjustified claims for clinical trials that are, like the Libella antiaging trial, no more than a phase I clinical trial that will almost certainly not benefit a single patient enrolled on it, while exposing them to risk. (Remember, the purpose of a phase I trial is to test for safety, not efficacy. I can’t repeat that enough.) Libella’s marketing materials keep referring to a 20 year old study in which human skin cells were grafted onto mice and telomerase expression made them much younger in phenotype, as if that were definitive preclinical evidence that their approach will work. It was infuriating to read. It is outrageous grift, in my not-so-humble opinion, to charge patients $1 million to sign up for a phase I trial of anything, much less an “antiaging” therapy with so thin a preclinical evidence base to justify bringing it to the clinic. I couldn’t determine for sure whether Libella is going to charge patients on the other two trials the same amount, or charge them at all, but the same criticisms apply to these trials, particularly the overhyped marketing. For example, the press release for the Alzheimer’s disease trial is titled “New Clinical Study May Be the World’s First Cure for Alzheimer’s Disease“. Yeah, right. Do we even know that telomerase has anything to do with Alzheimer’s disease other than that Alzheimer’s disease tends to be a neurodegenerative disease of aging? Sure, there is an association between shorter telomere length and accelerated telomere shortening in patients with Alzheimer’s disease, but is that just because of faster aging or does it actually have anything to do with Alzheimer’s?
Then there’s the clinic in Colombia. For all three trials, the principal investigator in Colombia is a man named Jorge Ulloa, MD at IPS Arcaslud SAS. A bit of Googling led me to conclude that this is probably the Dr. Jorge Ulloa Domingez who is running the trial for Libella. He’s a vascular surgeon who is the scientific director Fundación Vascular, a vascular clinic in Bogotà that specializes in venous diseases, and, as far as I could tell, appears not to possess any relevant training or experience to run a phase I clinical trial of gene therapy. His clinic, which appears to be his private practice clinic and has been in existence since 1980, is named after himself, El Instituto Vascular Jorge Ulloa Domínguez, or the Jorge Ulloa Domíngez Vascular Institute. The clinical trials themselves are listed as being performed at Clínica Arcasalud (IPS Arcasalud SAS) in Zipaquirá, Cundinamarca, near Bogotá. Its cover picture on its Facebook page sure doesn’t look like much:
Not being facile with Spanish, I couldn’t find out a heck of a lot more. Let’s just say, though, that what I’ve discovered doesn’t exactly fill me with confidence regarding the quality of science and medicine involved with what would even under ideal circumstances be a difficult trial.
So why did Libella decide to do the trial in Colombia? An anti-aging website Fight Aging! made this argument:
Neither Bioviva nor Libella took the standard regulatory path forward, opting for some combination of regulatory arbitrage and medical tourism to bring their therapies to patients. This sort of effort, carried out responsibly, is, I think, necessary and must spread if the present excesses of the FDA are to be reined in. The FDA sees its role as reducing risk to zero, at any and all cost, including the cost of slowing medical development to a crawl. Analyses have long shown that the cost in lives of this regulatory burden of slowed development far outweighs the benefits – but absent therapies are invisible and arouse no media outrage. Bureaucracies inevitably optimize to minimize visible problems. The only way to combat this issue effectively, given that working to change the system from within, and political advocacy to change the system from the outside, have been ongoing energetically for the past few decades, a time over which the financial burden imposed by the FDA has more than doubled, is to prove out a viable, responsible, cost-effective path to market outside the FDA system of regulation.
Libella Gene Therapeutics recently announced a patient paid trial to be held outside the US. Patient paid trials are unfairly excoriated by the research and regulatory establishment. As I have remarked upon in the past, they are an entirely legitimate approach to obtaining data. The chief objection is the lack of a control group in most such trials – but if we are only interested in large, reliable effect sizes, then the control group is the rest of the patient population, and that works just fine. In general, good therapies for aging, those that target relevant mechanisms in ways that will truly move the needle on life span, will indeed have large and reliable effects.
Yawn. No, the FDA does not cost lives through its caution. That’s a trope beloved by quacks, unscrupulous medical entrepreneurs, and FDA- and regulation-hating libertarians. If anything, the FDA is actually pretty fast at approvals when compared with other industrialized nations. Indeed, arguably, the FDA doesn’t require enough evidence for drug approval, and there’s been a problem with accelerated approval of drugs that later turn out not to be efficacious.
This interview with Libella’s President Dr. Jeff Mathis is also very telling:
Dr. Mathis’ justifications for sidestepping the US to do the trial of his gene therapy for Alzheimer’s disease in Colombia instead was unconvincing at best, and what about his claim that his gene therapy could be proven to work for Alzheimer’s disease within months? Well, here it is two years later, and that hasn’t happened.
In addition, as you can see above, Libella isn’t even the first company to go this route with a telomerase-based gene therapy. BioViva touts “advanced cell treatments” and “personalized therapy” based on your “unique genetics.”
Its website links almost exclusively to something called Integrated Health Systems, where its treatments are offered. The whole idea and platform are the same, delivery of telomerase to nerve tissues using AAV. Interestingly, I note that you can apply for treatment OR to be on the study. In the latter case, you’re greeted with:
You may qualify for a FREE $62,000 human study treatment.
Today 5.3 million people in the United States have Alzheimer’s Disease. Each one of them is sentenced to certain death if they have to wait for years of endless animal studies. That is why Max Life wants to go straight to the clinic for those who would otherwise have no hope.
Until now the FDA has approved no cure for Alzheimer’s disease. Our intention is to support research that demonstrates a successful treatment, and hopefully, a permanent cure within 12-18 months. Once proven, we hope to get FDA approval fast-tracked.
This is not only the humanitarian thing to do, but it will also save hundreds of billions of dollars annually — dollars that are currently being directed to patient care instead of a cure. Will you help make this clinical trial a reality? Will you help make this study a reality?
It all sounds very fishy and very scammy to me, even more so than the Libella study, as searches of ClinicalTrials.org for Bioviva or Integrated Health systems plus variants turned up no registered trials. Bioviva’s CEO, however, claims that her company’s product elongated her telomeres, after having “hopped on a plane to Colombia” in 2015 to receive “multiple injections of two experimental gene therapies her company had developed.” I can’t help but note that this report is from well over three years ago but that the company has not yet published its results or subjected them to peer review, as far as I can tell, although there is an update from 2018 claiming that her telomeres are longer still, at least in her white blood cells, which are all that were measured. There’s also the usual hype:
But aging is also preventable. We live in a golden age of technology, yet little is accessible and affordable to the general population, due to lack of knowledge, safety data and a general perception that aging cannot be helped. We have been taught that this is how life should end.
I refuse to subscribe to this complacency. I refuse to allow humanity not to benefit from the breakthrough scientific discoveries in the anti-aging field. I am not talking about cosmetics, but about whole body rejuvenation at cellular level. Humans are capable of living long healthy disease-free lives; we have anecdotal cases that prove this fact. I fight so that that these become the norm instead. I want my company to be a portal into a future of long healthy lifespans for all across the globe.
Then publish your case report and do science to obtain preclinical evidence to justify a clinical trial! I did a PubMed search for BioViva, and all I found were four papers, none of which had anything to do with telomerase! Also, demonstrate that managing to increase telomere length in white blood cells has any effect on immune function or aging whatsoever.
The bottom line is that I view Libella’s clinical trial to be profoundly unethical. I’d love to know which IRB they used to get regulatory approval in the US (required if they’re going to sign up patients in the US), because that’s an IRB that should not be evaluating clinical trials, given that it apparently approved at least one phase I clinical trial that charges patients $1 million to be treated in a trial that is not intended to benefit them and exposes them to risk of harm that is also being carried out in a country whose regulatory environment is—shall we say?—less than rigorous. (Again, it’s still unclear to me if the same charge is being required of patients enrolling in the other two trials.)
Let’s just put it this way. Libella’s marketing of its pay-to-pay antiaging clinical trial is so egregiously overblown that even enthusiastic advocates of “life extension” and “radical antiaging” treatments have problems with Libella’s marketing of it, with a man named Steve Hill even going so far as to call it “ridiculous” before writing:
This study will certainly cause controversy, especially given the huge price tag, which is likely what most media will focus on, but that isn’t the largest problem here. This has the potential to backfire very badly, and the resulting fallout could be harmful to credible researchers working in the field who are very careful about overpromising in the absence of results. While there is a need for marketing, good marketing can be done without resorting to unrestrained hype and nonsense. Ultimately, the success of this endeavor can only be determined with peer-reviewed data.
Hill also noted the lack of a control group. He didn’t, however, note that a phase I trial doesn’t have a control group and isn’t even designed to show efficacy. Maybe he didn’t know.
Meanwhile, back over at Fight Aging!, some of the commenters in the comment section after the article about the Libella trial were even more blunt, with frequent uses of the word “scam” and statements that it “sounds like a scam.” One even called it a “dangerous joke”, while another called it “snake oil.”
Meanwhile, someone named Dylan Mah wrote:
“These people” aren’t top thought leaders. They’re in the same basket as cryonicists; an albatross weighing down on the neck of legitimate researchers, siphon funding and damaging the reputation of actual, rigorously performed research that occupies the same sort of space in the public consciousness.
I can’t argue with Mr. Mah or any of the other commenters, who, I noted, are predisposed to support anti-aging research, other than that I find cryonics even more implausible than I find Libella’s gene therapy. In any event, Libella’s gene therapy trials sure sound to me like quackery no better than “clinical trials” run by the stem cell quacks I’ve discussed at length so many times before. Obviously, only the rich or those with access to a large line of credit will be able to afford a $1 million entry fee for Libella’s clinical trial, and one might be tempted to shrug one’s shoulders and ask: Who cares if a few super rich people waste a million bucks each on a trial that can’t help them? The problem is the precedent. The more companies get away with this sort of practice, the further they will push the envelope, and that will harm clinical trial efforts for treatments that aren’t as obviously dubious as the Libella trial.

Update on neglect cases
An update on two Canadian cases where reliance on alternative medicine resulted in the death of two children.
Scott Gavura on December 14, 2017
Link


Two recent legal cases have concluded in Alberta, Canada, where parents had been criminally charged after the deaths of children that could have been treated with medicine. In both cases, the parents refused to seek medical advice, even when it was clearly obvious that their children were dying. These cases paint a frightening picture of parental ideology and beliefs in alternative medicine being prioritized over obvious signs that their children were in distress. 
The most vulnerable suffer the most
Ryan Lovett never saw a medical doctor in the short seven years of his life. He was born at home and was never even issued an Alberta health card. His mother, Tamara Lovett, took her infant son to a chiropractor because she believed they have the same level of training as a medical doctor. She later took him to a naturopathic clinic for his health needs. Ryan died in 2013 of meningitis, pneumonia, and a streptococcal infection, after a ten-day infection. At the trial, Alberta’s acting chief medical examiner described that he was infected with group A streptococcus, which caused most of his major organs to deteriorate and fail. A computer expert testified that during this time, Tamara Lovett scoured the internet looking up symptoms, including ear infections, swollen groin lymph nodes and constant bleeding noses. Ultimately, she chose to give Ryan dandelion tea and oil of oregano instead of taking him to hospital. As per the Calgary Herald:
The day before Ryan died, a friend offered to take them both to a doctor and the defendant refused to do so. “She did not believe in conventional medicine or doctors and insisted that home remedies would take care of Ryan’s ailments,” he said. “She was of course proven wrong hours later when Ryan died in their apartment.”
Lovett later described that she believed Ryan had a cold or the flu, and thought his symptoms could be managed with home remedies. When paramedics were finally summoned, after 10 days of illness, Ryan was unconscious and in cardiac arrest. As per the CBC:
Dr. Taj Jadavji, who authored a report for trial, using medical and autopsy reports, as well as witness statements from police and paramedics, said the child’s death was preventable. He said the bacteria in Group A strep is easily treated with “a very simple penicillin.”
“You could have prevented the death of this child,” said Jadavji.
“Dandelion tea or oil of oregano have never been shown to treat streptococcus.”
‘If your child is not getting better, you are legally and morally bound to take that child to an actual doctor for actual medical care.’– prosecutor Jonathan Hak
Tamara Lovett was convicted in January 2017 of criminal negligence causing death. She was sentenced in November 2017 to three years in prison.
Supplements before real medicine can kill
In 2016, David and Collet Stephan were found guilty of failing to provide the necessaries (not a typo) of life for their 19-month-old, Ezekiel, who died of bacterial meningitis. The Stephans ignored obvious signs that the son was seriously ill, and instead used vitamins, supplements, hot pepper, horseradish, and remedies from the family’s own home business, Truehope Nutritional Support. Ezekiel had never seen a physician in his life. He had received no vaccinations, including vaccination against Haemophilus influenza type b (Hib), a vaccine which protects against bacterial meningitis. And as he lay dying, the parents chose to use an Echinacea tincture recommended by a naturopath, Tracey Tannis, who never even examined Ezekiel. As per the Toronto Star:
The trial heard the little boy’s body was so stiff he couldn’t sit in his car seat, so the toddler had to lie on a mattress when his mother drove him from their rural home to a naturopathic clinic in Lethbridge, where she bought an echinacea mixture.
The Star also noted:
Justice Bruce McDonald said Collet Stephan’s testimony showed she did tests for meningitis and ignored the positive results. “If they were only to take the child to a doctor, this evidence supports the conclusion that they actively failed to do what a reasonably prudent and ordinary parent would do,” McDonald wrote.
Shortly after his conviction, David Stephan was back promoting supplements. He apparently claims that this prosecution was all part of the “vaccine agenda”. And he and his wife are now darlings of the alternative-to-medicine and anti-vaccine crowds. David Stephan was sentenced to four months in jail. His wife was ordered to spend three months under house arrest. Both were released early, pending the outcome of an appeal. In a ruling released in late November 2017, the Court of Appeal refused to grant a new trial to the parents. However, as it was a split (2-1) decision, the Stephans can appeal their conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada.
David Stephan has not been shy in expressing his own opinions about his conviction. As per the Calgary Sun, Stephan has written on Facebook:
“I have come to . . . realize that within the current system there is no room for justice and truth, there is no humanity and there definitely is no love,” David Stephan wrote from his home in Nelson, B.C., hours after the Alberta Court of Appeal decision on Wednesday.
The facts are very clear in this case. Ezekiel was seriously ill with bacterial meningitis, a vaccine-preventable disease. Had he been seen by medical professionals promptly, he might be alive today. His parents endangered his life by ignoring clear signs that he was seriously ill. A nurse friend visited the family and suggested he might have meningitis, and recommended a physician assessment. The parents ignored this advice.
No science, no choice
Not providing your child with proper medical care is neglect, as these tragic cases show. Children are at tremendous risk of harms from alternative medicine when parent make treatment decisions on their behalf. Moreover, there is no shortage of alternative-to-medicine providers, like naturopaths and homeopaths, who actively promote themselves as pediatric specialists, despite the lack of any credible scientific qualifications. Has this growing acceptance and normalization of these providers created an environment where this is more likely to happen in the future? If society has a duty to protect children, are we doing enough when we simultaneously enable providers who promote “medicine” that’s not based on objective science? We can do better. If we don’t advocate for the weakest, who will?

The Ethics of Involuntary Pediatric Drug Testing
Although it may seem like a good idea, testing for recreational drug use on an adolescent patient without consent is ethically questionable, challenging to interpret, and unlikely to benefit patient or family.
Clay Jones on June 16, 2017
Link

Rather than simply peppering medical learners with questions about the pathophysiology or management of a particular condition, although that does have a place in certain situations, I will often make use of “teaching cases” as a means of simply starting a dialogue. In my opinion, the aspects of patient care that surround the diagnosis and treatment are often equally valuable. Also I really like to see how students and residents think through the complexities of individual patient biopsychosocial particulars, and how they handle unexpected findings that don’t fit an expected narrative.
How our gears turn when approaching patient care is extremely important. There is often more than one way to discover the cause of a patient’s complaints, but some ways are simply more effective than others in that they reduce health care expenditure and, more importantly, patient exposure to diagnostic and treatment misadventures that may result in harm. A solid foundation in critical thinking and scientific skepticism optimizes this process.
Good communication is paramount at every step. Medical professionals must become skilled in retrieving information from patients and caregivers, not to mention from the recesses of our own minds and/or UpToDate®, but also to be able to help them process complex information about their health and understand the risks and benefits of various treatment approaches. Sounds simple, right?
Often we need to guide patients and caregivers as they make difficult medical decisions, and without inappropriately compromising their respective autonomy or authority. The days of paternalism in medicine are over, not that we are completely beyond reproach in this regard. But we have improved significantly in recent years. In fact, discussion of the ethics surrounding medical decision making occurs frequently on my rounds.
Most recently, the case I presented to the team involved drug testing on an adolescent patient.
“I want to know if Timmy is on drugs!”
I described the following encounter to the team:
An anxious appearing woman has brought her 15-year-old son into the emergency department (or urgent care or PCP office) seeking a drug test. The patient, Timmy, has become less interactive with the family over the past few months, quit his soccer team, and sometimes his clothes smell funny. He spends more time alone in his room than in the past and his mother feels like he has become less interested in school, noting that he used to be an honor student but now he is barely passing his classes.
Timmy’s mother also expresses concern regarding a new group of friends, which she does not approve of because they are older and she has heard rumors of possible drug and alcohol use. Timmy, who appears uninterested in the conversation, denies drug use. During a thorough history and physical exam, performed while his mother waits in the hallway, Timmy again denies drug use. He states that he does not want to be tested.
So we have a reasonably concerned parent requesting drug testing of a minor for whom they have the legal authority to make medical decisions, and a neurologically intact patient who does not want testing to be performed. Now what? Should testing be done against the patient’s wishes? If not, how do we explain our refusal to perform drug testing to the mother in a way that will help her understand the decision?
SBM presents You Make the Call!
In this case, although not necessarily easy to execute considering the understandable anxiety on the part of Timmy’s mother, the right answer is to refuse to perform drug testing against the will of a competent adolescent patient who has decisional capacity. Of course, decisional capacity in a minor depends on the patient and the situation, but most experts would agree that in this setting the risk of forced testing outweighs potential benefit. In 2014, the American Academy of Pediatrics released their updated recommendations on drug testing in children and adolescents, which warned that involuntary testing is extremely problematic for numerous reasons, and they didn’t beat around the bush:
Drug testing of a competent adolescent without his or her consent is, at best, impractical and without his or her knowledge is unethical and illegal.
In other words, you would have to either restrain the patient in order to obtain a catheter specimen or deceive them in such a way that they would provide a urine sample believing that it was for a different reason.
It is important to recognize that caregivers often do pick up on changes in mental and physical health, and become aware of high risk behaviors, long before they are brought to the attention of medical or law enforcement professionals. These concerns should be well-documented and taken seriously. In some cases, a recommendation for drug testing may be an appropriate component of an evaluation, particularly when a patient of any age has an altered mental status and might be acutely intoxicated. In that case, a young patient would not have decision-making capacity and test results would inform emergent medical management.
Sometimes the results from a drug test, positive or negative, can be helpful. If caregiver-requested drug testing is deemed reasonable in a non-emergent situation, it is imperative that all parties receive proper informed consent and that the patient be treated with the same consideration of confidentiality as an adult. The AAP recommends specifically that caregivers be informed of “the limited scope of information available from testing as well as the need to reach a consensus on an action plan for both positive and negative results.”
Confidentiality is incredibly important when caring for the adolescent patient. This is a population prone to numerous high risk behaviors and worrying that information shared with their pediatrician or family doctor might be handed over to an outside party without permission might lead to avoidance of the medical system and a critical delay in care. If they don’t want to share the results of drug testing, we don’t do it. In fact, in many states adolescents are legally allowed to consent for their own drug treatment without parental notification.
It is equally important to understand that proper medical care of an adolescent who may be abusing drugs or at risk of it does not end with their refusal to provide a specimen for testing or to share results with caregivers. A mental health referral may still be very helpful, particularly considering the overlap of symptoms of depression and psychosis with drug use. It is also not uncommon for adolescents to self-medicate with psychoactive substances when dealing with the symptoms of mental health problems.
No test is perfect
Drug testing, and I am referring to urine testing because that is by far the most commonly used modality, is limited by the possibility of both false positive and false negative results. Cross-reactivity with other substances, such as with some common antibiotics, can occur. And no drug test can distinguish proper use of certain medications from abuse. ADHD medications, for example, can trigger an amphetamine screen. And even a true positive result says nothing about the extent of the patient’s drug use.
False negative results also occur for a variety of reasons, such as when a patient provides urine from a clean friend or adulterates the specimen with tap water or some other masking agent. And even a negative test on a legitimate specimen doesn’t necessarily rule out drug use because timing of the last use is a key factor in the sensitivity of the test. Also, not all drugs are included in standard screening tests, such as numerous newer designer drugs. And not even all drugs in a particular class are metabolized in such a way as to be detected by the screen. This is why clinical concern is the ultimate indication for referral.
The AAP points out the many challenges in specimen collection in their clinical report. Protocols for obtaining urine properly, particularly in the event that results may be used by law enforcement, are onerous, and most offices don’t follow any of them. These include direct supervision, leaving coats/bags outside the bathroom, removing access to running water or other possible adulterants, tinted toilet water, and measurement of the specimen temperature within four minutes of collection. Many offices just put someone outside the bathroom door to listen for the sink.
Conclusion: Appropriate care doesn’t always require testing and testing doesn’t always result in appropriate care
If there is a good reason to suspect drug use or abuse, a negative test doesn’t rule it out. Again, it is always okay to refer a patient for counseling when clinically indicated. Paternalistic forced testing that violates a patient’s autonomy and confidentiality, even if resulting in a positive result for the suspected drug, may not even be of benefit considering the low likelihood of treatment success when a patient is unwilling to participate. And a great way to ensure an unwilling teenager is to treat them like a child.
Explaining why drug testing won’t be carried out is the true challenge in this scenario. Caregivers should be told of the ethical standard and why it is important to uphold it. It is important to explain the risk of harming the relationship between the patient and the medical community, but also how coerced or deceptive drug testing may severely impair family relationships. If drug use is actually occurring, this can make it more difficult to achieve a successful outcome down the road. This is also an opportunity to counsel the patient on the potential benefit of having an open dialogue with his or her family.
Final thoughts
Ethical dilemmas such as this are common in medicine, and healthcare professionals are required to continually refresh our knowledge through CME courses. There are even medical ethicists who focus on these issues and can be consulted for assistance with the most challenging cases. I have to wonder, if given the opportunity how would the “chiropractic primary care provider” respond to Timmy’s mother? I was unable to find anything regarding this topic online other than websites discussing how to boost profits by offering drug testing:
In short, while you can have a positive impact on your practice’s revenue through drug specimen collection itself, the true benefit in providing this service is the opportunity it provides you to educate the employer about chiropractic and “sell” the other services your clinic provides.
Classy.
On the other end of the spectrum, here is some great info from the AAP on adolescent drug testing.

   Stem Cell Therapy and the Need for Transparency
Steven Novella
Link
Dr. Geeta Shroff is an Indian physician who is running a New Delhi clinic offering embryonic stem cell therapies for a large number of various medical conditions. The only thing these medical conditions have in common is that they are incurable. Indian law allows for the use of unproven treatments for terminal or incurable diseases. I cannot know Dr. Shroff’s intentions, but she has rejected the ethics and standards of science-based medicine and in so doing has transformed herself into a dangerous charlatan.
Embryonic Stem Cell Therapy
Embryonic Stem Cells (ESC) are controversial because of the ethical and moral consideration regarding harvesting ESC and the rights of an embryo. But that is not what makes Dr. Shroff’s treatments controversial, and not what I am going to write about here. The question, rather, is the state of the science of ESC therapy.
ESC’s are scientifically interesting because they have the potential to turn into any type of cell in the body. The hope for ESC therapy is that they can be used to replace dead or abnormal tissue in the body, something which is not now possible for many conditions. (Organ and bone marrow transplants are among the current treatments to replace failing tissue.) For example, an injured spinal cord might be repaired by using ESC’s to replace the damaged motor neurons and reestablish a connection between the brain and muscles. Atrophied muscles themselves can be repaired by having ESC’s turn into working muscle cells.
The potential for ESC therapy is amazing, and it is therefore no wonder that it is capturing the imagination, and therefore the hopes, of many who suffer from a disease or injury that ESC therapy might cure. However, for now the hope is only that. ESC therapy requires the development of a tricky new technology, and we haven’t done it yet.
In order for ESC therapy to work we have to figure out how to properly harvest and prepare the cells, how and where to inject or transplant them, and then how to control them once they are inside the host. Controlling ESC’s may be the most difficult challenge. We need the cells to turn into the right kind of cells, and in some cases to also make the right kinds of connections to other cells and tissues. Also, we have to make sure the host doesn’t reject the transplanted cells – just like any transplant. And then there is the potentially biggest problem with ESC therapy – how to keep the transplanted cells from growing out of control and becoming a tumor.
Until all of these issues are worked out, simply injecting ESC’s into a patient may be worthless, or it may even be harmful. Tumors and rejection are harmful things.
The Ethics of Experimental Treatments
Dr. Shroff acknowledges that her treatments are experimental, but she insists that they work. This, of course, prompts the question – how do we know that the treatments are effective, or safe, for that matter?
There is general agreement that it is ethically reasonable to give low probability experimental treatments to patients who are terminally ill and/or incurable (so-called compassionate use). But this does not mean that anything goes. There are strict ethical guidelines for experimental therapies that have evolved over decades and are very thoughtful, compassionate, and practical.
Ethical use of experimental treatments includes the notion of informed consent – which means that the patients need to know that what they are getting is unproven, in some cases they may be getting a placebo, and they need to know everything currently known about the potential risks and benefits, and how they are going to be monitored.
Further, there needs to be the potential that the experimental subjects will be helped by the treatment, and there should be a reasonable expectation that the subjects are more likely to benefit than to be harmed.
It is unethical to lure patients with the hype of a false promise in order to induce them to spend thousands of dollars on an experimental treatment. Dr. Shroff says, “I do not give any guarantees,” but this is not sufficient. Patients are not looking for guarantees – they are looking for hope. In a separate interview Dr. Shroff indicates that she understands this, saying, “My patients often have no other choice. I am their last chance.” Giving them false hope with a lame disclaimer is not ethical.
The Need for Transparency
Science cannot function without transparency. Since effective regulation of health care requires reliable scientific information -regulation cannot function without transparency. The most severe problem with Dr. Shroff’s claims is the complete lack of the usual clinical and scientific documentation – the lack of transparency. We have no idea what she is injecting into her patients, under what protocol, and how they are responding.
Dr. Shroff does not have any legitimate excuse for why she is not following proper scientific protocols. I can only think of one reason – to hide her own fraud. She only says, “Everything I have done has been notified to the Indian Council of Medical Research and there has been no comeback.” But this response is a dodge – she is saying that she is in compliance, but the rules in India are particularly lax in this situation, and the money she is bringing in is a conflict of interest. She does not have an answer for the deeper scientific and ethical questions.
Dr. Shroff claims that she has treated over 300 patients, almost all of them have improved without any side effects. If this sounds too good to be true, it’s because it probably is. But she is asking the world to rely upon anecdotal evidence, which is completely unacceptable for such a claim. Unless side effects are systematically checked and recorded, we really cannot make any statements about the safety of her treatment.
Several cases have been presented through the media as apparent success stories, but they are all completely unconvincing. Their alleged improvements are all mild – quadraplegics who now have some tingling sensation in their legs, or patients who can walk a little better. One patient could breath but not adequately to be independent from a ventilator, and now claims he can breath without the ventilator. All of the cases sound superficially impressive, but they all represent minor changes in actual neurological function.
Legitimate researchers who study neurological disorders are keenly aware of what is called the “cheerleader effect.” This is related to the difference between neurological recovery and functional recovery. In order to say that a treatment is working we need evidence to conclude that there is some neurological recovery – more neurons are connecting more effectively to more muscle tissue, etc. But if all one is observing is net function – the ability to breath and walk – pure functional recovery must also be taken into consideration. What this means is that, even without greater neurological function, patients may have a functional improvement because of the non-specific effects of trying harder (the cheerleader effect) and physical rehabilitation. Even someone who has been paralyzed for many years, if you get them out of their chair onto the parallel bars, or you have them go through a series of exercises and try really hard to walk better – they will. This will happen to a certain degree even if the treatment has zero effect.
The cheerleader effect causing purely functional improvements is a factor that must be considered in all clinical research into neurological diseases and injuries that impair function, from strokes to spinal cord injuries. In order to control for such effects treatments have to be assessed in a blinded fashion, and multiple quantitative measures of function should be used, including measurements of pure physiology where applicable, to show neurological improvement beyond the nonspecific effects of exercises and effort.
What this means is that anecdotal observations of such treatments are highly misleading and are almost guaranteed to produce false positive results – the false appearance of an effect. The stories coming out of Dr. Shroff’s clinic appear to be such cases.
There are also serious concerns about the safety of her treatments. If she is indeed injecting stem cells into her patients there is no indication that she is taking the steps necessary to prevent rejection, or to prevent the transplanted stem cells from becoming tumors. Her anecdotal reassurances are not sufficient.
What if her treatment actually works? While this is doubtful, if this were the case then her failure to provide proper documentation and perform standard scientific testing is depriving the world of an effective treatment. If she has somehow discovered the secret to get stem cell therapy to work today for the diseases she claims she can treat, then she should share it with the world.
Sharing her methods would not only make them available to more people but it would allow medical scientists throughout the world to evaluate her treatments and perhaps figure out a way to make them even better.
There really is no legitimate excuse for the lack of transparency with such an experimental treatment. There is nothing Dr. Shroff can say in her defense – her behavior is unacceptable.
Unfortunately Dr. Shroff is not the only doctor who has set up a dubious clinic charging thousands of dollars to desperate patients for the premature hope of stem cell therapy. Dr. Huang in China has a similar clinic with equally dubious ethics and results. An independent evaluation of some of his cases revealed that his patients do not benefit from his treatments at all (despite their belief that they did benefit) and that many of them were harmed by the treatment due to complications such as infection.
Patients should be very cautious before traveling half-way around the world and spending thousands of dollars on any controversial stem cell therapy. Clinicians need to be aware of these clinics so that they can properly inform their patients about them. The media (which has been very mixed) needs to be careful before reporting about controversial medical claims. All media reporting, even when negative, tends to drive the desperate to such clinics. Wishy washy reporting built around glowing anecdotes from patients is the charlatan’s best friend. It is not enough to include “token skepticism.”
In the end it is likely that the only effective way to protect patients from such clinics is through proper regulation. But this is extremely difficult as such clinics are likely to find safe haven in some part of the world, and patients who are willing to spend thousands of dollars for the hope to walk again are likely willing to travel as well.
All we can do is fight on all fronts and try to minimize the damage by the Dr. Shroff’s of the world.

Tightening Gene Editing Rules for Humans
Gene-editing regulations are again in the news. We need to take a thoughtful approach.
Steven Novella on March 8, 2023
Link

Dr. He Jiankui has ensured that his name will forever be linked to the history of gene editing in humans. In 2018 He announced that he had edited the genes of twin girls using CRISPR during IVF. Importantly, he edited them at the single cell stage, which means their germline was affected, which further means that the changes would be passed down to their offspring. He removed a single gene, the CCR5 gene, to reduce their chance of contracting HIV from their father.
He was widely criticized for doing human germ-line gene editing without proper regulatory oversight or approval. He has since been convicted and spent three years in prison, but now seems unrepentant and plans on doing further gene-editing research in humans. Specifically he wants to research how to cure the genetic neuromuscular disease, Duchenne muscular dystrophy.
At the same time China announced it is tightening its regulations regarding human gene editing. Part of the He controversy was that he was allowed to conduct such research in the first place. Regulations only limited human gene editing in hospitals. China has now expanded the ban to all human gene editing research, regardless of setting. Similarly, in the US germline human gene editing is banned, although non-germline genetic engineering is not (although there are further regulations about federal funding of such research). The EU position is that gene editing in humans: “may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants.”
Cells in the body are either germline, which means they affect the germ cells (sperm and ova) and therefore can be passed down to offspring. Somatic cells, part of the body, are essentially everything else. If the cells in your liver, for example, were gene-edited those changes would only affect you, and could not be passed down. The big controversy with He’s research is that he altered all cells, including the germline, which can be passed down.
The obvious concern with germline gene editing is that it can potentially introduce genetic changes into the general human population. If such changes were not regulated, once this technology is widely available there would be a steady stream of such changes, having unpredictable effects on the human population. There is also concern that such changes could create different genetic populations of humans, even potentially genetically mutually exclusive populations. That would require significant genetic alterations, but is technically possible.
Often the term “designer babies” is brought up in such discussions. These are genetic alterations that are not intended to treat a disease, but to make either cosmetic changes (such as eye color) or to enhance function. This is the “Gattaca” scenario, as in the 1997 film of a dystopian biopunk future with extreme genetic profiling and discrimination (although in the film gene selection, but not editing, was apparently used).
Ethically there is a clear difference between somatic and germline gene editing. One can argue that competent adults have a right to make whatever changes they want to themselves. Germline changes potentially affect others, and this effect crosses national boundaries. So there is a motivation and justification for international rules regarding human germline gene editing.
However, I think that a simple ban is not the way to go long term. Dr. He is one demonstration of why this is – the goal of using gene editing to prevent Duchenne muscular dystrophy is a reasonable one. Pressure for such technology will become extreme, once the public gets the idea that this technology is possible and it works. A total ban is almost a guarantee of creating a black market, and medical tourism in less well-regulated parts of the world.
Also – using germline gene editing to prevent horrible genetic diseases is, I think, the right thing to do. Obviously the research needs to be highly regulated and supervised, but not completely banned. That is an overreaction. There are over 10,000 single gene disorders known, collectively affecting about 1% of the population. This is a huge disease burden. This is the low-hanging fruit for gene editing as these are generally single mutation disorders (although some are more complex such as repeat expansions). The knowledge of what changes we should make and their effects is pretty well known for most of these disorders.
The limiting factor now is simply the effectiveness, precision, and safety of the technology to use some version of CRISPR during in-vitro fertilization in order to make the desired genetic change. This process can be combined with something already in use – preimplantation genetic testing. Fertilized eggs without an undesired mutation can be selected for implantation. However, this won’t work for a dominant homozygous parent. l
But in practice PGT (selection) can obviate the need for actual gene editing in most cases, if the only goal is to prevent genetic disorders. But gene-editing can potentially do things that selection alone cannot. We can go beyond genetic disorders to genetic predispositions. What if a parent has two copies of the genetic allele that confers an increased risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease, for example? Similarly, there are some gene variants (alleles) that may be protective, reducing the risk of heart disease or stroke.
If we expand the list of acceptable targets from not only genetic disorders but genes that have a significant effect on disease risk then we can rapidly go beyond what selection can do. If, for example, there are 20 or 30 targets for gene selection in each parent, the probability of having a fertilized egg with all the desired alleles is negligible. Even with selection at the sperm level, with millions of sperm, getting all the desired traits will be difficult – and not possible with eggs from the mother, which are much more limited in number.
Even if we do not get to more extreme uses of this technology, such as physical enhancements, and just stick with disease modification, it’s easy to see the tremendous potential and risk of this technology. The utopian version is that single-gene genetic diseases can be virtually eliminated. There is always a spontaneous mutation rate, so new mutations are always appearing, even after fertilization. But if known mutations for dominant and recessive diseases were altered at the fertilization stage, the burden of such diseases would be dramatically reduced. At the same time we can reduce the burden of major diseases, such as neurogenerative disease, vascular disease, and diabetes.
The dystopian version is essentially the Gattaca scenario, where the technology is available to the relatively wealthy who not only disproportionately benefit from the technology but also use it to screen for potential partners. Even if this selection were not explicit, there is already a problem of selective sorting along economic lines when it comes to couples. It is not hard to imagine at all a dating app limited to people who can verify they have been “genetically cleansed”.
As if often the case with technology, the difference between incredibly beneficial and dystopian abuse is regulation and how we implement the technology. Usually, something in the middle emerges. Using gene editing will likely disproportionately benefit the wealthy, but the technology may become low cost enough that it is actually cost-effective for societies to subsidize the procedure. Remember – the whole concern with germline editing is that these edited genes get into the general population. But this cuts both ways – this also is a great potential benefit. Everyone potentially benefits from fewer disease causing alleles circulating in the population. A poor child may benefit from an upper-middle class grandparent who had gene editing.
The health-care cost savings to society could massively outweigh the upfront cost of selection and gene editing, especially for those with known genetic risks. Perhaps prospective parents may routinely get an exome screen, and then may qualify for state-sponsored gene editing (or at least insurance will cover part of it, or there is a tax-break or some assistance).
This world is very likely coming, sooner or later, even if it makes you feel squeamish. Rather than pushing this technology underground, regulations should focus on developing the technology in a responsible way, in order to protect individual patients and have the maximal benefit for society. A simple ban will not accomplish this.

CRISPR and the Ethics of Gene Editing
Steven Novella on December 2, 2015
Link
If you have not heard of CRISPR yet, you should have. This is a truly transformative technology that allows for cheap and easy gene editing. It makes a powerful technology easily accessible.
Powerful biological technology, like stem cells to give another example, always seem to provoke profound hope and fear. The ability to manipulate human biology comes with it the hope of treating horrible and currently untreatable diseases. At the same time such technology provokes fear that it will be abused, or that it will violate the sanctity of what it means to be human.
As the public debate over stem cells seems to be fading into the background a bit (like IVF before it), debates over CRISPR and gene editing are likely to come to the forefront.
What is CRISPR?
CRISPR stands for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Pallindromic Repeats, which refers to a sequence of base pairs found on the DNA of bacteria that have this feature. Some bacteria and archaea use CRISPR for adaptive immunity, in order to incorporate bits of DNA from invading viruses into segments of their own DNA in order to target their immune system at those sequences.
Cas refers to CRISPR-associated genes. Cas9 is a specific endonuclease that can cleave DNA. It can be combined with specific RNA in a system that can either insert or delete genetic sequences into the target DNA.
What all of this means is that the CRISPR system can be used for highly specific and convenient gene editing, either deleting or inserting sequences into target genes, or turning those genes off. There is an overwhelming consensus that this technology will usher in an age of cheap and easy genetic manipulation.
Research and non-human applications of CRISPR
CRISPR technology, if nothing else, is already proving to be a powerful research tool, and has been adopted by thousands of labs around the world. A small lab with modest funding can use CRISPR to, for example, turn off a gene in a target species (from bacteria to mice) and then study the effects in order to understand what the gene does. This promises to accelerate our understanding of genes which will likely have tremendous downstream effects.
CRISPR can also be used to create genetically modified organisms. It was recently reported, for example, that researchers used CRISPR technology to create genetically modified mosquitoes that are resistant to malaria. This sparked its own ethical discussion about releasing genetically engineered organisms into the wild before we can fully understand all the intended and unintended consequences.
Medical applications for CRISPR
CRISPR technology has not yet been adequately tested in humans, but there is no reason to suspect that it will not work just as well in people as in other animals.
A Chinese team of researchers recently announced that they attempted to edit the genes in human embryos with the genetic disease beta-thalassemia. The results were mixed, and were not reliable enough to be a safe and effective treatment. The results suggest that the application of CRISPR to human disease needs to be further developed before we will begin seeing treatments based on this technology.
There are research teams currently working on just that. The low-hanging fruit for application in humans are diseases in which the cells are easily accessible. One company, Editas, is working on two possible applications. The first is a treatment for a rare retinal disease, Leber congenital amaurosis. This would involve treating the retina, which is easily accessible.
The second application is the treatment of blood cancers by removing immune cells from the patient, then using CRISPR to target those immune cells against the cancer, and inject them back into the patient.
There is no theoretical reason why any cell population in the body cannot be targeted, but there may be significant practical limitations.
The ethical considerations of editing the human genome
Where ethicists become most concerned is when germ cells are the target of CRISPR. Any changes in the germ cells can be potentially passed down to future generations, essentially introducing those changes into the human population.
The reason to do this is to treat genetic disorders. It might be possible, for example to treat sperm or eggs with a genetic mutation with CRISPR to remove or replace a gene that causes disease. Alternatively, a fertilized egg could be treated prior to implantation.
With gene-altering technology, treating horrible genetic diseases is always the obvious application. Critics, however, worry that if the technology is developed to treat diseases it is a slippery slope to treating unwanted characteristics that are not actually diseases. Parents wanting stronger, smarter, taller children, for example, might be tempted by such technology. This all leads to the ubiquitous example of gene editing for superficial characteristics – choosing eye color.
What really stokes fears, however, is contemplating genetic alterations that are outside of the current range of human variability. This can be simple, like creating eye colors that do not currently exist, but science-fiction is full of examples of creating super soldiers or elite rulers.
Today is the second day of a three day conference being held in Washington DC to discuss the ethics of using CRISPR technology on humans. The conference was organized by Jennifer Doudna, the inventor of the CRISPR-Cas9. She says about the conference:
“The real purpose of this is not only to communicate fundamental aspects about the science to the public and nonscientists, but also to really think deeply together, as a community, about how we move ahead in a responsible fashion,” she said. “At the very least, I hope we will get on the table what people’s concerns are and what their points of view are.”
She is calling for a halt to the use of CRISPR on germ-line cells until the technology can be further studied. She will lay out her views in an article published tomorrow in Nature.
Conclusion: The feared becomes the familiar
I think it is a good idea for the scientists involved to discuss the ethics of CRISPR openly, involving concerned segments of the public. It is reasonable to think carefully about any new technology, especially one that is as powerful, and spreading as rapidly, as CRISPR.
I also think, however, that fears about the use of CRISPR on humans, and on germ-line cells, will be overcome. That is the typical pattern – recombinant DNA technology, implanting animal parts in humans (like pig valves), in-vitro fertilization, gene therapy, and stem cells have all met similar concerns and resistance, and predictably over time came to be accepted.
Eventually the benefits of biological technologies come to be recognized, while the worst fears never manifest. This does not mean we do not need to think carefully about new technologies, and to regulate them properly.
One source of fear is that biological technologies somehow violate what it means to be human. People have an emotional sense of what is “natural” and “pure,” and a disgust reaction can be provoked by anything that challenges that sense. This is essentially the source of opposition to GMOs as “frankenfoods.”
Over time, however, familiarity blunts that response.

Faith Healing: Religious Freedom vs. Child Protection
Harriet Hall on November 19, 2013
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We have written a lot about people who reject science-based medicine and turn to complementary/alternative medicine (CAM), but what about people who reject the very idea of medical treatment?
Faith healing is widely practiced by Christian Scientists, Pentecostalists, the Church of the First Born, the Followers of Christ, and myriad smaller sects. Many of these believers reject all medical treatment in favor of prayer, anointing with oils, and sometimes exorcisms. Some even deny the reality of illness. When they reject medical treatment for their children, they may be guilty of negligence and homicide. Until recently, religious shield laws have protected them from prosecution; but the laws are changing, as are public attitudes. Freedom of religion has come into conflict with the duty of society to protect children. The right to believe does not extend to the right to endanger the lives of children. A new book by Cameron Stauth, In the Name of God: The True Story of the Fight to Save Children from Faith-Healing Homicide, provides the chilling details of the struggle. He is a master storyteller; the book grabs the reader’s attention like a fictional thriller and is hard to put down. He is sympathetic to both the perpetrators and the prosecutors of religion-motivated child abuse, and he makes their personalities and their struggles come alive.
Rita Swan: From Christian Scientist to Crusader
Rita and Doug Swan were Christian Scientists who firmly believed that disease was an illusion, and that “the most dangerous thing they could do was to show lack of faith in God by relying on medical treatment.” (One wonders just how strong their belief was, since when an ovarian cyst caused intractable pain, Rita had surgery to remove it.) When their baby Matthew developed a fever, they paid a Christian Science practitioner to come to their home and pray over him. She told them fever was just fear; and indeed, Matthew recovered.
At age 16 months, Matthew developed a fever again and this time he didn’t improve with the practitioner’s prayers. Rita and Doug were worried but unwilling to reject the lifelong beliefs that made sense of their lives. Rather than taking Matthew to a doctor, they compromised by calling in a second Christian Science practitioner. The practitioner accused Rita of sabotaging her work with fear, and both parents believed that defects in their own thoughts were responsible for Matthew’s illness. Eventually they called in a Christian Science “nurse” (trained in metaphysics, not medicine). She did nothing except talk to Rita. Shortly after she left, Matthew began having convulsions. The desperate parents found an escape strategy: they would take Matthew to a doctor with the complaint of a broken bone (something the Church allowed to be treated by a doctor), and would not mention the fever. He was quickly diagnosed with bacterial meningitis and a brain abscess. They had waited too long. Despite intravenous antibiotics and surgery to relieve pressure on the brain, Matthew died.
That happened in 1977. The Swans promptly resigned from the church. They filed a wrongful death lawsuit, but the case was dismissed. Ever since then, Rita Swan has devoted her life to preventing the deaths of other children from faith healing. She founded the Matthew Project, which developed into a foundation called CHILD (Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty). She exposed case after case of child abuse that would otherwise have gone unnoticed and reported outbreaks of polio and measles in Christian Science schools and camps. She documented preventable deaths of Christian Science children from meningitis, diabetes, diphtheria, measles, kidney infection, septicemia, cancer, and appendicitis. The Church fought her at every step, but the surrounding publicity only contributed to the ongoing decline in Church membership (they don’t announce membership numbers, but the number of US churches has fallen from 1,800 to 900, and by one estimate they have fewer than 50,000 members in the entire world).
As time passed, she turned her attention to similar abuses in other religious sects. A one-woman tornado, she cut a swath across America. She headed a child advocacy organization, published a quarterly newsletter, wrote articles, became a media presence, spoke at conferences on child abuse, lobbied and testified in states where proposed bills would help or hinder her cause, and even moved to Oregon for a time during the campaign to pass effective legislation there. She was eventually instrumental in getting religious shield laws changed in several states.
An Indiana case
One of the first non-Christian-Science-related deaths Rita discovered was in Indiana. As Stauth tells the story,
4-year-old Natali Joy Mudd was found dead by detectives in her own home, with a tumor in her eye that was almost as big as the rest of her head. At the horrific scene, a police sergeant found horizontal trails of blood along the walls of the house. The trails matched the height of the girl’s head. Natali had apparently been leaning against the wall as she dragged herself from room to room, blinded, trying to find a way to freedom, before the tumor killed her.
Natali’s parents belonged to the Faith Assembly Church, a Pentecostal offshoot. They didn’t believe in medical care, and they were not prosecuted because Indiana had strict religious shield laws. Two years later, Natali’s five-year-old sister died from an untreated tumor in her stomach the size of a basketball.
The Faith Assembly Church was responsible for as many as 100 childhood deaths and for a maternal childbirth mortality rate that was 870 times the usual rate. The most common cause of death was infant mortality in home births; something that is now rare in Christian Science because it now supports prenatal care and hospital births attended by doctors.
The Faith Tabernacle Church
The Faith Tabernacle Church is a sect that has been responsible for deaths from exorcisms in several countries. One believer strangled her five-year-old son to death and kept his body for several days hoping for his resurrection. One couple in Pennsylvania lost six children to untreated illness, all under the age of two. A measles epidemic involving 491 people resulted in the deaths of six children. One couple was prosecuted for letting their sixteen-year-old daughter die of untreated diabetes, but their sentence was only two years’ probation and community service at a hospital (and the hospital didn’t want them).
The Pediatrics article
In 1998, pediatrician Seth Asser and Rita Swan published an article in the medical journal Pediatrics entitled “Child Fatalities from Religion-motivated Medical Neglect“. They documented 172 faith-healing deaths over a 20-year period, involving 23 different sects in 34 states. The true numbers were undoubtedly much higher, since these cases were collected informally rather than systematically and some deaths are never reported. In most of these cases the prognosis would have been excellent with medical care. Asser later characterized some of the cases as babies literally being tortured to death. In one case, a mother died in childbirth after the infant’s head had been at the vaginal opening for more than 16 hours. The infant’s corpse was so foul-smelling that it was inconceivable that anyone attending the delivery could not have noticed.
In 1988, the American Academy of Pediatrics had called for elimination of religious exemption laws, and in 1983 the federal government had removed religious exemptions from federal mandate; but at the time of the study there were only five states that had no religious exemptions either to civil abuse and neglect charges or criminal charges.
The Followers of Christ in Oregon
In 1997, 20 years after Matthew’s death, a six-year-old boy in Oregon died from a necrotic bowel due to a hernia that could easily have been treated. The pathologist’s first reaction was “Not again!” He and his associate had compiled evidence of 18 children who had died over the last 10 years from curable diseases in a Followers of Christ congregation of 1,200 people. That worked out to 26 times the usual infant mortality rate. And it wasn’t just children: followers’ wives were dying in childbirth at 900 times the usual rate. One died of a type of infection that hadn’t killed anyone in America since 1910.
Nothing could be done about it, because Oregon had one of the strongest religious shield laws in the country. It protected parents from allegations of religious intolerance and gave them the right to withhold medical care for their children. In fact, the shield had just been beefed up: a new law to increase the punishment for murder by spousal or child abuse specifically prohibited prosecution for manslaughter if the person responsible was acting on religious beliefs.
A TV reporter named Mark Hass was told that there had been a cluster of preventable deaths among the Followers of Christ in Oregon City. He looked into it, but there were no criminal complaints, no police investigations, and the county DA was uninterested. When his investigation seemed to have reached a dead end, someone suggested he visit the local cemetery. He counted the graves of 78 children. He launched America’s first major series of TV reports on faith-healing abuse on KATU in Portland.
The psychology of believers
Even Rita and Doug Swan found it hard to break away from the seductive premise that the power of belief itself could heal, a create-your-own-reality idea that is echoed by Rhonda Byrne in The Secret and by a host of other New Age gurus.
The faith healing sects truly believe they are doing the right thing when they let their children die; they accept it as God’s will. Some believers even refuse to wear seat belts. Their inconsistent behavior shows that they tend not to have thought things through very carefully. They hypocritically accept care from eye doctors and dentists. Adults often clandestinely seek medical care for both major and minor medical problems while children don’t have that option. In some cases parents saw a doctor for hangnails or mole removal for themselves yet refused to take their child to a doctor for a fatal illness.
Their beliefs come from groupthink and social consensus rather than from reasoned theology or the Bible. Many of them have not read the Bible; when a whistle blower did, he was surprised to learn how much it differed from what he had been taught. They have a supportive, close-knit community and face overwhelming peer pressure. If they resort to medical care, they are shunned by everyone they know and may never see anyone in their family again.
There has never actually been a single extraordinary healing among the Followers, only ordinary recoveries from common illnesses; but that’s enough to convince them prayer works, if only their belief is strong enough. Confirmation bias is a powerful thing, and when a child dies the death is considered unavoidable and is attributed to God’s will. An insider said he thought that if a few Followers were punished, the rest would rationalize that going to doctors was OK after all and would come up with a new doctrine. He thought most of them would be happy to change if everybody else did. When courts have ordered blood transfusions for the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses, they have sometimes seemed more concerned about what their co-religionists would think than about the religious implications of the transfusion itself.
Progress in legislation
The first state to repeal a religious shield law was South Dakota. Then CHILD won a federal lawsuit in Minnesota, arguing that taxpayers should not be required to subsidize Medicare and Medicaid payments for Christian Science nursing. Unfortunately, Senator Orrin Hatch negated their win by getting a new law passed that provided for Medicare payment for “religious non-medical health care.” CHILD sued again but this time they lost. In 1999, a compromise bill was passed in Oregon eliminating religious shields for murder by abuse, murder by neglect, first and second degree manslaughter, and criminal mistreatment. After this, no Followers died of medical neglect for the next five years, and there were major modifications in the shield laws in several other states.
Examples of prosecutions
Josef Smith, eight years old, was beaten to death during an exorcism in Tennessee. His parents, members of the Remnant Fellowship, were found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years.
A mother who beat and smothered her child was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder. She gladly accepted her punishment as part of God’s plan.
The people who starved a 16-month-old to death for failing to say “Amen” and then absconded with his corpse in a suitcase were sentenced to 50 years each for second-degree murder.
A test case was needed in Oregon, but DAs were reluctant to prosecute, and even church members who no longer approved of their own churches were too frightened to provide inside information. Finally Patrick Robbins turned whistle blower after the death of his newborn baby led him to doubt the teachings of the Church. His assistance led to several prosecutions.
In 2008, 15-month-old Ava Worthington died with a softball-sized lump on her neck that obstructed her breathing and caused pneumonia. Investigation of the case was difficult, because witnesses denied having observed any signs that the child was in distress. Her parents were the first to be tried under the revised 1999 law. The jury was sympathetic to the parents. The father was convicted of misdemeanor criminal mistreatment, but not of manslaughter; he spent two months in jail. The mother was found not guilty.
The Beagleys were convicted of criminally negligent homicide in the death of their 16-year-old son Neal for complications of a congenital urinary tract anomaly that could have easily been repaired. They each served 16 months (consecutively, so one of them was always home to care for their other children).
18-month-old Alayna Wyland nearly went blind from an untreated enlarging hemangioma that obstructed her left eye. She was rescued just in time for pediatric ophthalmologists to save her eyesight, and her parents were tried for first-degree criminal mistreatment of their child. They got 90 days in jail and three years’ probation.
These are tragic cases. No one likes to see children taken away from their parents, and these parents loved their children and truly believed they were doing the right thing. They were victims too.
Oregon’s 2011 law
The Oregon 1999 compromise bill was not enough: it had repealed five of the nine religious shield exemptions but left four others in place. After five years without a death, three more Followers’ children died in 2008 and 2009. In 2011, after extensive lobbying by Rita Swan and others, Oregon passed a new law to eliminate religious beliefs entirely as a legal defense and allow prosecutors to seek murder charges against parents who deny their children medical care for religious reasons. There are only five other states with no religious exemptions for sick and injured children: Hawaii, Nebraska, Massachusetts, Maryland, and North Carolina.
But Oregon law still allows religious exemptions for caregivers of dependent adults, and it still allows religious exemptions for immunizations, metabolic screening (for conditions like PKU), newborn hearing screening, vitamin K and prophylactic eye drops for newborns, and bicycle helmets. Ashland, Oregon has the highest school vaccine exemption rate of any US city; and in one school in Eugene, 76% of students had rejected one or more vaccines for religious reasons. The religious exemption for bicycle helmets is particularly puzzling: where in the Bible does it say “Thou shalt not wear bicycle helmets” or even “Thou shalt take no precautions against injury”? I guess the reasoning is that if God wants a child to die from a head injury, we shouldn’t get in His way.
The Oregon law is being enforced. Later that year, Dale and Shannon Hickman were found guilty of second degree manslaughter in the death of their infant son, prematurely born at home with only unqualified midwives in attendance. They were sentenced to six years and three months in jail, followed by three years supervised probation.
The tide turns
A few months later, when Oregon members of the Church of the First Born were accused of negligent homicide for the death of their son from a treatable condition, they didn’t even try to fight, but pled guilty. They agreed to provide medical care for their other children and were sentenced to probation with close monitoring.
Some members of the Followers sect were starting to accept medical treatment and even wondering what all the fuss had been about.
In Philadelphia, Herbert and Catherine Schaible, were put on 10 years’ probation after their two-year-old died of untreated bacterial pneumonia. The terms of their probation required them to purchase medical insurance and put their other children under the care of a pediatrician. They callously disregarded the terms of probation and their eight-month-old son died of untreated bacterial pneumonia when they failed to seek medical care for him. They were charged with third-degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy, and endangerment. They were jailed and denied bail because the judge feared their co-religionists might hide them in other parts of the country. They pled “no contest.” Their pastor said the father “…knows he has to obey God rather than man.” He said the children died because of the parents’ “spiritual lack.”
Following the Followers to Idaho
Investigative reporter Dan Tilkin of KATU News covered the Oregon court cases, and he has recently reported on 10 more dead children of the Followers of Christ in Idaho, where religious shield laws are still in place. Of the marked graves in the Peaceful Valley Cemetery, more than 25% are children. Sadly, his report ends by saying “No significant move to change the laws is underway.”
Conclusion
The medical ethics principle of autonomy justifies letting competent adults reject lifesaving medical care for themselves because of their religious beliefs, but it does not extend to rejecting medical care for children. Society has a duty to over-ride parents’ wishes when necessary to protect children from harm. It is not uncommon for the courts to order life-saving blood transfusions for the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses, or cancer treatment against parents’ wishes. But 30 states still have religious shield laws, and every state but Mississippi and West Virginia allows religious and/or philosophical exemptions for school vaccination requirements. Those laws should be repealed. The Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) requires insurance companies to cover “nonmedical” health care such as prayers by Christian Science practitioners. That provision should be removed.
Note: It has been argued that most of the increase in human lifespan was due to advances in hygiene rather than to advances in medicine. The estimates of a 26-fold increase in infant mortality and a 900-fold increase in maternal mortality among the untreated Followers of Christ demonstrate just how valuable modern medical care really is.
Another Note: For those who want to know more but prefer not to buy the book, another source with much of the same information is available free online: the newsletter archives of CHILD (Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty). It describes many more tragic cases of children who have been harmed or have died from religion-motivated child abuse and neglect.

A Request for Founders of Sensible Medicine: Teach Us Why it Was Ethical to Profit from Pro-Kennedy Propaganda. We All Have So Much to Learn From Your Glorious Nuance.
When Lysenkoism threatened the US, some of us tried to stop it. Other doctors saw an opportunity to attract paid subscribers.
Jonathan Howard on August 29, 2025
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Motivating biases need not be considered nefarious, only considered.
In 2019, Drs. John Mandrola, Adam Cifu, Vinay Prasad, and Andrew Foy wrote an article titled The Case for Being a Medical Conservative. In it, they stressed the importance of considering “dualities of interest” and “motivating biases”. They wrote:
The medical conservative sees benefits from the confluence of interests between profit motives of industry and progress in research; we do not oppose industry–physician collaboration. But these dualities of interest must be considered in determining the quality of evidence for or against new interventions. For instance, an incomplete evidence base due to selective publishing of “positive” studies can inhibit true knowledge of an intervention’s net benefit.
The medical conservative, therefore, is pragmatic about human nature and the prevailing business model of medical science. To wit, content experts, professional societies, or journal editors who too harshly criticize an industry product jeopardize future funding. Motivating biases need not be considered nefarious, only considered.
Fair enough. I also wrote extensively about the risks of these motivating biases in my book on cognitive errors in medicine. I made many similar points.
In their must-read article, Subscription Science: How Crowdfunding Has Become a Conflict of Interest, Drs. Benjamin L Mazer and Michael R Rose similarly warned about these “dualities of interest” and “motivating biases.” They said:
For example, Substack, an online newsletter platform, is increasingly used by physicians to write medical commentary, with some newsletters reaching 10s of thousands of subscribers. Substack estimates that 5-10% of readers will upgrade to a paid tier, and paid subscriptions on the service cost a minimum of $5 per month. Although $5 sounds negligible, consider a newsletter with 10 000 total subscribers, 1000 of whom pay a $5 monthly fee. After subtracting Substack’s 10% cut, a doctor could expect $54 000 in annual payments. If physicians accrue 5000 backers, they can expect $270 000 in revenue. This is greater than the $265 000 average salary of primary care physicians in the US.
Not bad.
Why Doctors Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love MAHA.
In spirit of considering “motivating biases”, we can turn to Sensible Medicine, a monetized Substack founded by these same “medical conservatives”. Sensible Medicine has over 100,000 subscribers and multiple subscription plans.
In return for their money, Sensible Medicine readers were treated to absurd and dangerous articles, such as Why Doctors Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love MAHA, which was written by Dr. Joseph Marine in November 2024. Though you should read the entire article, it said:
I argue that we should embrace the Make America Healthy Again (MAHA) agenda and try to convince our medical leaders to work for major changes in our dysfunctional health agencies and deteriorating health care system.
RFK Jr has tapped into a strong sense among the public that government health agencies, and the health system at large, have been corrupted by corporate interests that have become increasingly misaligned with the public interest, a fact that was exposed by the disastrous authoritarian covid response.
The raw, histrionic appeals to anger and emotion- disastrous authoritarian covid response– are standard fare on Sensible Medicine, as are attempts to numb people to risks that are both grave and obvious. Dr. Marine’s article did not mention RFK Jr.’s anti-vaccine disinformation, and on social media he said:
MAHA is more than RFK and has little to do with vaccines.
This is the wisdom and insights that Sensible Medicine offers to its paid subscribers, and this was not an isolated article. Dr. Frederik Schaltz-Buchholzer published an article there titled The Nomination of Robert F. Kennedy Jr. as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services: A New Beginning? He wrote:
My prediction? RFK Jr. will be a net positive for public health in the US. The mainstream media – who were the most important enablers of the destructive COVID-19 policies – are falling over themselves and screaming wolf, oblivious to the fact that current US public health is a complete failure.
According to Dr. Schaltz-Buchholzer, RFK Jr.’s critics- enablers of the destructive COVID-19 policies– were just “screaming wolf.”
In the introduction to that article, Dr. Prasad said Sensible Medicine offered a “refined view of evidence based medicine” and begged more people to subscribe to it. Dr. Prasad wrote:
Today’s guest column is by Dr. Frederik Schaltz-Buchholzer. He is Danish expert in vaccine science, who is supportive of US reforms. How can he possibly be enthusiastic about RFK Jr? And enthusiastic despite writing, “[Mr Kennedy] focuses on topics that are potentially important/relevant, and then unfortunately often exaggerates or distorts the facts.” So what are the facts, and what are the distortions? Why is this expert in vaccine science largely in agreement with RFK Jr’s skepticism? In my opinion, this is why Sensible Medicine exists. To take you, the reader, out of your comfort zone, and towards a more refined view of evidence based medicine. If you believe in what we are doing, subscribe.
Sensible Medicine published at least one honest article, RFK Jr is NOT the Contrarian We Need, but the paid subscribers hated it. “More recycled arguments from a Big Pharma shill,” said one typical commentator. “The use of the term ‘anti-vaxx’ is polarising and unhelpful…. The proper term should be ‘pro-health’, not ‘anti-vaxx’,” said another. This is the audience Sensible Medicine cultivated. This is who paid for their content.
I Was Inside CDC During the Shooting. I Can Still Hear the Bullets.
Well, fast forward to today and RFK Jr. is doing exactly what he said he was going to do. No one here at SBM is surprised by any of it. His tenure, which is just 6-months old, has been marked by purges, censorship, resignations, anti-vaccine disinformation, and defunded research. Scientists are wondering if they have a future in the US, and over 5,000 government workers wrote a letter calling RFK Jr. “dangerous and deceitful.” Other CDC staffers and walking out and quitting in protest. In a scathing resignation letter, Dr. Demetre C. Daskalakis noted that the fans of “natural infection”, We Want Them Infected– have won and warned of eugenics at the CDC. He wrote:
The intentional eroding of trust in low-risk vaccines favoring natural infection and unproven remedies will bring us to a pre-vaccine era where only the strong will survive and many if not all will suffer. I believe in nutrition and exercise. I believe in making our food supply healthier, and I also believe in using vaccines to prevent death and disability. Eugenics plays prominently in the rhetoric being generated and is derivative of a legacy that good medicine and science should continue to shun.
CDC staffers are rightly blaming RFK Jr. for the terrorist attack there. An article titled I Was Inside CDC During the Shooting. I Can Still Hear the Bullets said:
According to news reports, the gunman was fueled by vaccine disinformation. Convinced that the COVID-19 vaccine caused his physical ailments, he sought revenge…
This disinformation is now being amplified from the highest levels of the government. HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has spent years fueling anti-vaccine sentiment. As chairman of Children’s Health Defense, he led one of the most prominent anti-vaccine organizations in the world. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, Children’s Health Defense was identified as a leading source of misinformation on social media, and since the pandemic, Kennedy has been identified as one of the “Disinformation Dozen” a group of anti-vaxxers responsible for almost two-thirds of digital misinformation about vaccines.
In his short time since taking office, Kennedy has dismantled key pillars of public health. He unilaterally withdrew COVID-19 vaccine recommendations for pregnant women and children; fired all members of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, replacing them with several people known to hold anti-vaccine views; and refused to strongly endorse measles vaccination. Just days before the gunman attacked CDC, Kennedy canceled $500 million in mRNA vaccine research, citing debunked safety concerns and expressing skepticism about efficacy
Other articles about this tragedy point the finger directly at RFK Jr.’s chosen leaders, including a founder of Sensible Medicine. An article titled The CDC Shooting Was Public Health’s Jan. 6 said:
Kennedy’s appointees have gone even further. In 2022, the National Institutes of Health’s now-Director Jay Bhattacharya appeared on a panel that inaccurately claimed Covid-19 vaccines had killed 20 times as many people as they had saved. The day after the shooting, Bhattacharya went on Steve Bannon’s podcast to criticize mRNA vaccines. A few days later, he doubled down in a Washington Post op-ed.
Just last year, Vinay Prasad, now a Food and Drug Administration official, said of the public health professionals who guided the Covid-19 response, “I don’t believe in forgiveness, because in my opinion, these pieces of shit are still lying.”
Dr. Prasad also called for mass purges at the CDC, the kind that are happening now. This is the type of rhetoric that Sensible Medicine doctors specifically defended and endorsed. I never spoke this way or called for anyone to lose their job.
Meanwhile, RFK Jr. himself is claiming he has magic powers to diagnose “mitochondrial challenges” in children by looking at their faces as he walks past them in the airport.
This is everything SBM warned about and everything Sensible Medicine enabled. We have 3.5 more years to go.
Tone is important. It is hard to engage when you feel like you’re being yelled at.
At the same time Sensible Medicine was telling doctors to “love” MAHA, myself and many others were desperately trying to warn about it. Some of us, especially Dr. David Gorksi, have been doing so for decades. We failed to stop RFK Jr., but at least there’s a record of us trying. One review of We Want Them Infected said:
One striking example of this is how strongly Robert F. Kennedy Jr. features in the book. Dr. Howard was writing before Kennedy announced his campaign for president, but he regularly uses Kennedy’s anti-vaccine and anti-science positions as a benchmark while refuting contrarian doctors.
Kennedy’s anti-science lies and anti-Semitic remarks had long kept him out of “polite society,” but he is now promoted as a serious politician by such diverse commentators as neo-Nazi Nick Fuentes and Socialist Alternative’s Briahna Joy Grey. Kennedy’s anti-vaccine non-profit Children’s Health Defense saw its funding skyrocket from just over $2 million a year in 2019 to $15.7 million in 2021.
There’s also a record of Sensible Medicine doctors openly refusing to even read our warnings and instead rolling out the red carpet to RFK Jr. It’s OK to consider their “motivating biases” and ask them how much money they made doing this. It’s also reasonable to ask them to explain why it was ethical and appropriate to publish and profit from love letters to RFK Jr.? I’d love to read all about it.
Until then, I think the doctors behind Sensible Medicine should only be known for helping to unleash RFK Jr. and his minions on us, even if they didn’t all personally support him. While we were trying to sound the alarm, they faked a concern about our “tone”, published RFK Jr. fluff pieces, and cashed checks from their paid subscribers. Nothing else about them matters to me, and they own everything that happens under RFK Jr.’s watch.
But hey, maybe I am wrong about all this. Maybe it was appropriate and ethical to publish articles like this. Maybe I am missing something. In contrast to the founders of Sensible Medicine, I do not publicly claim to be a master of critical appraisal. So, my mind is open to their glorious nuance, and I hope they share it in the comments here. They have so much to teach us all, and it won’t cost them a penny. Unlike Sensible Medicine, anyone can comment for free.

